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PREFACE 
In 1981, during my study Human Geography of Developing Countries, I had to 
chose a subject for my MA field research in Mexico. It was my intention to inves-
tigate the development prospects of the huge oil industry of this country and the 
involvement of various enterprises in this sector. My supervisor at that time, dr. 
Otto Verkoren -realistically estimating the research a student going to a Third World 
country for the first time can do -advised me to concentrate on a somewhat smaller 
type of enterprise first. It would not only be easier but also far cheaper, since their 
would be less need in the small Mexican companies to offer expensive business 
lunches in order to obtain the information. Under his supervision I gained a great 
deal of experience with industry oriented research in the Third World. Meanwhile, I 
didn't let go of my wish to investigate larger firms in the oil industry or sectors 
related to it, and their impact on industrial development. Thus, I was very glad to 
have the opportunity to become a temporary research assistant at the Third World 
Center of the University of Nijmegen. From 1987 till 1991 I carried out the research 
presented here which deals with the functioning of the tripartite developmental 
model -consisting of joint ventures between large foreign companies, state firms and 
national private firms- in the petrochemical industry in Brazil. 
At the time I started the research about four years ago, the increasing inter-
nationalization of world production had intensified the discussion on the role of 
multinational enterprises. Besides this, democratization was taken place in a number 
of countries in Latin America, amongst which Brazil was one of the earliest. In 
short, all ingredients were present to make this a challenging research project. 
The first thing I was confronted with in Brazil was its warmth and hospitality. 
Business executives, employees of government institutes and other researchers were 
so kind as to spend hours sitting with me, answering my almost endless row of 
questions, without expecting me to buy a lunch. I, therefore would like to thank the 
representatives of national chemical enterprises, of foreign chemical companies and 
of state institutions -the Petroquisa directors in particular- for providing me some 
insight into Brazil's petrochemical industry. The days I spend at the IBASE office in 
Rio de Janeiro proved to be very useful as well. 
In addition, I would like to thank Joäo Bosco Feres, Rute Rios, Roberto and José 
Renato, who provided me with some key informants and, in particular, showed me 
a Brazil that I will never forget. Furthermore I greatly appreciated the hospitality of 
Nel Vijzelman in Rio de Janeiro and Jan and Maria van der Berg in Sao Paulo who 
helped me to feel comfortable in huge world cities in which one can easily get lost. 
It is impossible to thank all persons who were of great help during my two field 
researches in Brazil, but the last persons who meant a great deal to me and showed 
me the other side of Brazil, the side unknown by most of the managers, executives 
and government employees I interviewed, are the street children represented on the 
'Secundo Congresso Nacional de Meninos e Meninas da Rua' in Brasilia. They 
ν 
taught me about the difficulties of staying alive in a Third World country charac-
terized by extreme differences in wealth such as Brazil. I do hope that the benefits 
of industrial development will one day reach and enrich the lives of Damilo, 
Theresa, Fransico, and all the other children presently living on the streets of Rio, 
Sao Paulo, Salvador and other Brazilian cities. 
After returning from my final field research trip -the Brazilian 'forro' still in my 
ears- I was confronted with the task of writing a PhD thesis. Thanks to the support 
of my colleague's at the Third World Center, and not the least some friends at the 
Department of Anthropology and the Peace Research Center, to commute from 
Utrecht to Nijmegen never became a burden. I would like to thank them, in 
particular for the tea breaks in which a needed distance from the research could be 
taken. I would further like to thank Kees Koonings, from the State University of 
Utrecht, who, despite his full agenda, always found time to discuss the processes of 
industrialization in Brazil with me. I wish to thank Karin Fierke, for correcting my 
English, Wilbert Kruijsen for the lay-out and Yvonne and Roel for designing the 
maps and figures. The pleasures of living in a house together with Ciska, Marga 
and Margreet, who followed the progress of my research with never lasting interest, 
as well as the support given to me by my family, certainly contributed to the result. 
But this thesis would never have been completed within the four years as 
'Assistant in Opleiding', without the help of Omer van Renterghem, who not only 
assisted me during the field researches in Brazil, but also made critical comments on 
the entire text. Despite the fact that his comments on the chapters were sent to me 
all the way from Sudan, he followed the process from nearby. 
Wilma Roos 
Utrecht, 1st April 1991 
vi 
CONTENTS 
Preface ν 
List of tables xiv 
List of figures xv 
List of photographs xvi 
List of abbreviations xvii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Theoretical assumptions: the role of multinational 
enterprises in the triple alliance in Brazil 6 
2.1. Introduction 6 
2.2. From dependency to dependent development 8 
2.3. The triple alliance as fundamental factor in 
dependent development 10 
2.3.1. Multinational capital 10 
2.3.2. Local capital 11 
2.3.3. State capital 11 
2.3.4. External conditions 12 
2.4. The strategy of the triple alliance in Brazil: 
contribution and constraints 13 
2.4.1. Contribution of the triple alliance 13 
2.4.2. Constraints of the strategy of the triple alliance 14 
2.4.3. The foreign partner: a neglected participant? 15 
2.5. Theories of international business 17 
2.6. Kojima's hypothesis 18 
2.6.1. Development impact of Japanese investments 18 
2.6.2. The role of technology transfer 20 
2.6.3. Some critical comments on Kojima 22 
2.7. The importance of joint ventures for development 24 
2.7.1. Motivations for starting joint ventures 24 
2.7.2. Impact of origin on joint venture participation 24 
2.8. Stability of joint ventures 27 
2.8.1. Different attitudes toward state participation 27 
2.8.2. Control over the joint venture 28 
2.8.3. Adaptation to local circumstances 30 
2.8.4. Corporate culture 31 
2.9. Purpose of this research 32 
2.9.1. Research objective and research questions 32 
2.9.2. Research methods 33 
2.10.Summary and conclusions 34 
vii 
Chapter 3: The development of the chemical industry in Brazil 41 
3.1. Introduction 41 
3.2. Characteristics of the chemical and petrochemical 
industry 41 
3.2.1. The petroleum branch 42 
3.2.2. The petrochemical branch 43 
3.2.3. The final chemical branch 46 
3.3. The development of the petrochemical industry on 
a world scale 47 
3.4. The economic development of the Brazilian 
petrochemical branch 49 
3.4.1. Fluctuating demand for petrochemical 
products 49 
3.4.2. Production growth and stagnation 50 
3.4.3. Impressive change in balance of trade 53 
3.5. The construction of the petrochemical complexes 55 
3.5.1. The Sâo Paulo complex, the first petrochemical 
producers 55 
3.5.2. The Camaçari complex: an integrated complex 55 
3.5.3. The Rio Grande do Sul complex: Polosul 58 
3.6. The National Petrochemical Programme (PNP) 1987-1995 59 
3.7. Shift from petrochemicals to fine chemicals 64 
3.8. Summary and conclusions 66 
Chapter 4: The importance of the tripartite model in the 
petrochemical industry in Brazil 70 
4.1. Introduction 71 
4.2. The creation of the tripartite model 71 
4.2.1. The first tripartite firms in Säo Paulo 72 
4.2.2. Conflicting interests converted into 
a model: Camaçari 73 
4.2.3. Government aims in the implementation of the 
tripartite model 74 
4.3. The changing contribution of the state to the petrochemical 
industry 77 
4.3.1. The creation of state institutions. 77 
4.3.2. Specific nature of the state technocracy 79 
4.3.3. Relations between petrochemical technocracy and 
Bahian state bureaucracy: increasing influence of 80 
the state 81 
4.3.4. The changing role of Petroquisa 81 
4.3.5. The importance of Norquisa 82 
vni 
4.4. The increasing importance of national petrochemical 
entrepreneurs 84 
4.4.1. Some sector-related firms: Ipiranga, Ultra, 
Unipar and Cevekol 85 
4.4.2. Some non-sector related firms: Mariani, 
Odebrecht, Banco Economico 87 
4.4.3. Relative power between national entrepreneurs: 
ABIQUIM 89 
45. The third partner in the tripartite model: the 
transnational corporation 92 
4.5.1. Foreign enterprises outside the tripartite model: 
Dow Chemical 92 
4.5.2. Hesitant participants: Shell do Brasil 94 
4.5.3. Early participants: Rhodia 97 
4.5.4. Eager participants: Mitsubishi 98 
4.5.5. Foreign participation in the petrochemical industry: 
a polemic question 99 
4.6. Summary and conclusion 100 
Chapter 5: The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 105 
5.1. Introduction 105 
5.2. The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 106 
5.3. Economic characteristics of the petrochemical firms 
on the complex of Camaçari 108 
5.3.1. Number and industrial branches 109 
5.3.2. Output figures 112 
5.3.3. Expansion plans 116 
5.4. The ownership structure and financial investments 118 
5.4.1. Total financial investments 118 
5.4.2. Investment structure and ownership structure 119 
5.4.3. The National Development Bank, BNDES 121 
5.4.4. Developmental Corporation SUDENE 123 
5.5. Regional impact of the petrochemical complex 124 
5.5.1. Origin of resources 125 
5.5.2. Market destination of the production 126 
5.5.3. Employment figures 129 
5.5.4. Decision making centers 130 
5.5.5. Technology linkages 131 
5.5.6. The contribution of value added taxes (ICM taxes) 133 
5.6. Summary and conclusions 135 
IX 
Chapter 6: Limitations of the tripartite model in the petrochemical 
complex of Camaçari: origin and causes 14Ί 
6.1 Introduction 141 
6.2. The unstable ownership structure of tripartite and 
bipartite joint ventures 142 
6.2.1. The fading popularity of tripartite joint ventures 142 
6.2.2. The shaky alliances of joint venture firms 145 
6.2.3. Changes in the participation of foreign firms 146 
6.3. Reasons for instability: opinion of the managers involved 149 
6.3.1. Foreign, national or state responsibility 150 
6.3.2. Differences between American, Japanese and 
European companies 152 
6.4. Limitations concerning the transfer of technology 153 
6.4.1. Attention paid by the government to the role of 
technology 154 
6.4.2. Different views to technology transfer 156 
6.4.3. Limited technology transfer: results from 
present research 158 
6.5. Reasons for limited technology transfer in Camaçari 161 
6.5.1. Policy of the government: a too fragmented 
petrochemical sector 161 
6.5.2. Attitude of national petrochemical firms 
towards R&D 162 
6.5.3. The role of transnational corporations 163 
6.6. Technology transfer compared for Japanese, American 
and European firms 165 
6.6.1. The three phases of technology transfer compared 166 
6.6.2. Reasons for the more outward orientation of 
Japanese partners in regard to technology 
acquisition 171 
6.7. Summary and conclusions 173 
Chapter 7: The different origin of foreign firms as 
an explanatory factor 179 
7.1. Introduction 179 
7.2. Foreign investments in Brazil 180 
7.2.1. Development of foreign investments in Brazil 180 
7.2.2. The various industrial sectors attracting 
foreign investments 182 
7.3. Investment patterns of firms of various origin 184 
7.3.1. Pioneering investments: European countries 185 
7.3.2. Brazil: backgarden for the United States? 186 
7.3.3. The Japanese: fast rising newcomers 187 
χ 
7.4. Attitude of foreign firms towards joint ventures 188 
7.4.1. Motives of American and European firms 
for entering into a joint venture 188 
7.4.2. Motives of Japanese firms for entering 
into a joint venture 190 
75. Organizational aspects of the Camaçari-based 
companies 190 
7.5.1. Decisionmaking structures: Board of 
Directors and Executive Management 191 
7.5.2. External relations with governmental and 
private institutions 193 
7.6. Corporate culture of the various foreign participants 
in Camaçari 195 
7.6.1. A variety of negotiating practices 196 
7.6.2. Firm management and adaptation to Brazilian 
culture 197 
7.6.3. Opinion of foreign managers 198 
7.7. Limitations of the tripartite model explained 199 
7.7.1. Instable ownership structures in relation 
to country of origin 200 
7.7.2. Limited R&D related to country of origin 201 
7.8. Summary and conclusions 202 
Chapter 8: Final conclusion: the impact of firm origin on 
the functioning of the tripartite model 207 
8.1. Review of Brazil's petrochemical industry 207 
8.1.1. Introduction 207 
8.1.2. Development of the petrochemical industry 207 
8.2. Differences between foreign investors: internationalization 
theories tested 209 
8.2.1. Firm organizational aspects 209 
8.2.2. Macro-economic aspects: Kojima 211 
8.3. Impact of firm origin on the functioning of 
the tripartite model 212 
8.3.1. Stability of the joint venture structure 212 
8.3.2. Technology transfer 213 
8.4. Ten years Camaçari: results and analysis 214 
8.5. The concepts of triple alliance and dependent 
development reviewed 218 
8.5.1. Contraints of the triple alliance: 
the findings of Evans 219 
X I 
8.5.2. Contribution of the internationalization 
theories 220 
8.5.3. Supplementing the theory of 
dependent development 221 
8.6. Future prospects for Brazil;s petrochemical 
industry 223 
References 227 
Annex 1 241 
Nederlandse samenvatting 244 
Curriculum Vitae 254 
xii 
List of tables 
Table 3.1. The most important installations of ethylene in the world in 1985 
Table 3.2. Production figures for basic petrochemicals and thermoplastics in the 
Brazilian petrochemical industry, 1984-1988 
Table 3.3. CDI approvals for investments in fine chemicals in the period between 
1965 and 1981 in number of projects and investments in million US $ in 
Brazil 
Table 4.1. Reorganization of the composition of shareholders of Copene 
Table 4.2. Composition of ABIQUIM board of directors and successive president 
directors according to origin of representatives in the period 1977-1989 in 
absolute numbers and percentages 
Table 4.3. Most important multinational chemical enterprises in Brazil present in 
the three petrochemical complexes in 1987 
Table 5.1. The number of firms located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
between 1979 and 1989 
Table 5.2. The number of firms located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
according to industrial branch 
Table 5.3. Production volume, turnover, profits and profitability of 38 companies 
located on the Camaçari complex in 1988 
Table 5.4. Profitability of 38 companies located on the Camaçari complex in 1983, 
1984, 1987, 1988 and 1989 
Table 5.5. The origin of resources of the firms functioning on the petrochemical 
complex of Camaçari in 1989 in number of firms and in percentages 
Table 5.6. Exports from the petrochemical complex of Camaçari between 1979 and 
1987, in US dollars and as percentage of total exports from the state 
Bahia 
Table 6.1. Number of firms located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
according to ownership structure, from 1979 to 1989 
Table 6.2. Number of firms projected and cancelled on the petrochemical complex 
of Camaçari, according to ownership structure, between 1979 and 1988 
Table 7.1. Foreign investments in Brazil according to country of origin between 
1950 and 1987 
Table 7.2. Foreign Direct investments for some sectors and countries in 1979 in 
percentages 
xiii 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1. Derivatives from one barrel crude oil in 1985 in percentages 
Figure 3.2. The different petrochemical generations and their interrelations with the 
petroleum and the final chemical branch 
Figure 3.3. Regional share of ethylene capacity in percentages 
Figure 3.4. Brazilian internal demand of thermoplastics between 1970 and 1985 
Figure 3.5 Brazilian petrochemical production of thermoplastics between 1970 and 
1985 
Figure 3.6. The commercial balance of the Brazilian petrochemical industry between 
1970 and 1985 
Figure 3.7. Location of petrochemical complexes in Brazil 
Figure 3.8. Petrochemical projects approved by the CDI in 1987 
Figure 4.1. Financial resources used at the start of the Camaçari petrochemical 
complex, in 1977, in percentages 
Figure 4.2. Origin of president directors of Abiquim in the period between 1977 and 
1989 
Figure 5.1. The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
Figure 5.2. Origin of BNDES resources between 1972 and 1983, in percentages 
Figure 6.1. Participation of transnational corporations in joint ventures and in 100% 
ownership firms in the petrochemical complex of Camaçari according to 
country of origin in 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1989 
Figure 6.2. Participating foreign firms in former or existing joint ventures located at 
the complex of Camaçari, according to country of origin 
Figure 6.3. Reasons for changing ownership structures of Camaçari based petroche-
mical firms, according to the managers 
Figure 6.4. Shareholders composi tion in Metanor and Pronor in the years 1979 and 
1989 in percentages of shares 
Figure 6.5. The origin of technology for respectively the initial plant, the expansion 
of capacity or/and the diversification of production of petrochemical 
firms in Camaçari with actual or former foreign participation in 1989 
Figure 6.6. Origin of newly acquired technology for expansion or diversification of 
the production of the petrochemical firms of Camaçari with present 
foreign participation in 1989 
Figure 6.7. Origin of newly acquired technology for expansion or diversification of 
the production of the petrochemical firms of Camaçari with past foreign 
participation in 1989 
Figure 7.1. Yearly foreign investments in Brazil between 1950 and 1985 in US$ 
millions 
Figure 7.2. Direct foreign investment in the manufacturing industry according to 
industrial sector in Brazil in 1987 in percentages 
xiv 
List of photographs 
Photograph 1 : The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
Photograph 2 : The special infrastructure of the basic material complex 
Photograph 3 : Various foreign subsidiaries invested on the Camaçari complex; 
BASF 
Photograph 4 : Various foreign subsidiaries invested on the Camaçari complex; 
Ciba Geigy 
Photograph 5 : Fiscal incentives of the CDI and financial support of the FINEP to 
the triparite firm Polialden 
Photograph 6 : Even 100% foreign firms on the Camaçari complex obtain financial 
support from Sudene and Finor 
Photograph 7 : Special transport service increases labour costs substantially 
Photograph 8 : Indirect employment opportunities on the Camaçari complex: 
selling ice cream 
Photograph 9 : Barriers to diversification: construction of a fine chemical plant 
interrupted 
Photograph 10: Regional development benefitting the happy few, appartments and 
slums in Salvador 
xv 
List of abbreviations 
ABIFINA Associacâo Brasileira das Industrias de Química Fina; Brazilian 
Association of Fine Chemical Industry 
ABIQUIM Associacâo Brasileiro da Industria Químicas y de Produtos Deriva-
dos; Brazilian Association of Chemical Industrial Products and 
Derivates 
BEICIP Bureau des Estudes Industrielles et de Cooperación; Office of 
Industrial Research and Cooperation 
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social; Nacional 
Bank for Economic and Social Development 
CDI/SDI Conseilho/Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Industrial; Council/ 
Secretary of Industrial Development 
CEPED Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento; Research and Development 
Institute 
CIA Centro Industrial de Aratú; Industrial Centre of Aratú 
CIP Conselho Interministerial de Precos; Interministerial Council of 
Prices 
CLAN Consultora e Planejamento; Consultancy and Planning 
CENPES Centro de Pesquisa de Petrobras; Research Centre of Pctrobras 
CNP Conseiho Nacional de Petróleo; National Council of Oil Industry 
CNPq Centro Nacional de Pesquisa; Nacional Research Centre 
COFIC Comité de Fomento Industrial de Camaçari; Committee of the 
Industrial Foundation of Camaçari 
COPEC Complexo Petroquimico de Camaçari 
COPENE Companhia Petroquímica do Nordeste; Northeastern Petrochemical 
Company 
COPESUL Companhia de Petroquímica do Sul; Southem petrochemical 
company 
COPPER] Companhia de Polo Petroquimico de Estado de Rio de Janeiro; 
Company of the Petrochemical Complex of the State Rio de Janeiro 
CUT Central Unica dos Trabalhadores, National Workers Organization 
FIERGS Federaçâo das Industrias de Estado Rio Grande do Sul; Federation 
of Industries of the State Rio Grande do Sul 
FIESP Federaçâo das Industrias de Estado de Sâo Paulo; Federation of 
Industries of the State Sao Paulo 
FINAC Programma de Financiamento de Acionistas; Financing Programme 
for Shareholders 
FINEP Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos; Financing Institute of Research 
and Projects 
FINOR Fundo de Investimento do Nordeste, Investment Fund for the 
Northeast 
xvi 
IBASE Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Económicas; Brazilian 
Institute of Social and Economic Analysis 
IBGE Fundaçâo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estetistica; Geographi-
cal and Statistical Brazilian Institute 
INPI Instituto Nacional de Programma Industrial; Nacional Institute of 
Industrial Programmes 
IUPERJ Instituto de Posgraduaçao de Rio de Janeiro; Post Graduate 
Institute of Rio de Janeiro 
ICM Imposto sobre Circulaçao de Mercadorias; Value Added Tax 
MOL Werkgroep Multinationale Ondernemingen Latijns Amerika; 
Committee of Multinational Enterprises in Latin America 
Petrobras Petróleo Brasileiro 
PIS/PASEB Programmas de Integraçâo Social/ Formaçâo de Patrimonio de 
Servidor Publico; Programme of Social Integrating/ Formation of 
Patrimony of Public Services 
PqU Petroquímica Uniäo 
Sindipetro Sindicato de Produtos Petróleos; Employers Union of Petrochemical 
products 
Sinproquim Sindicato das Industriais de Produtos Químicos para Fins In-
dustriais da Petroquímica; Employers Union of Chemical Products 
used in the Petrchemical Industry 
SNI Servicio Nacional de Informaçâo; National Information Service 
SOMO Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen; Centre for 
Research on Multinational Corporations 
STI Secretaria de Tecnologia Industrial; Secretary of Industrial Technol-
ogy 
SUDENE Superintendencia Desenvolvimento do Nordeste; Secretary of 
Development of the Northeast 
UFBA University Federal de Bahia; Federal University of Bahia 
xvii 

1 
INTRODUCTION 
Oí all Latin American countries, Brazil is a favourite of foreign investors. Much has 
been written about the attractiveness of this huge country: its large elite, eager to 
buy durable consumer goods and its extensive mineral resources, varying from rare 
kinds of wood to iron ore. During the so-called Brazilian miracle in particular, the 
period between 1967 and 1973, when GNP growth exceeded 10% annually, Brazil 
was highly attractive to foreign investors. Even in the period thereafter, when the 
favourable growth figures were replaced by booming inflation and an insurmoun-
table external debt, foreign entrepreneurs were still optimistic about the profitability 
of investments in this country, which is illustrated by the common expression: 
"Brazil is the country of the future". After the external debt mounted to 118 billion 
US dollars in 1989 this expression could still be heard, though with one alteration: 
"Brazil is the country of the future, and it will always remain the country of the 
future". Undoubtedly, Brazilian and foreign entrepreneurs were no longer certain 
that Brazil would have a brilliant future. 
Despite the deteriorating economic situation in the country, the economic miracle 
has been so remarkable that it inspired many scientists to search for explanations of 
the impressive economic growth and the role of foreign firms. 
In chapter two, the theoretical part, the work of some of these researchers, in 
particular Evans will be examined. Based on theories of dependent development, 
Evans analyses the industrial development of Brazil using the concept of the triple 
alliance, i.e. alliances between state capital, national private capital and foreign 
capital. Evans evaluates this concept on an empirical level in the petrochemical 
sector in Brazil where tripartite joint ventures were stimulated by the Brazilian 
government. Tripartite joint ventures are companies in which state, national and 
foreign firms participate with a more or less equal number of shares. The role 
foreign firms played in the industrial growth of Brazil is a central issue in the 
research of Evans, which is why his ideas provide a good starting point for the 
analysis of this present research. A brief description of the ideas of Evans will be 
presented, with special reference of the concept of the triple alliance. 
Although Evans provides an extensive description of the extent to which foreign 
firms contributed to the dependent development of the country, he makes little 
distinction between foreign firms from different countries. Pointing to the fact that 
historically investment patterns of foreign countries have differed, Evans stresses 
that foreign firms have one common goal, which is global capital accumulation. 
According to him, differences between foreign investors, as far as they exist, will 
not have a significant impact on development in Brazil. 
Since this view insufficiently explains the role played by different foreign firms in 
Brazil, theories of international business will be examined as well. The first impor-
tant contribution providing insight into the impact of foreign firm origin on 
1 
economie development, is from Kojima. He compares the impact of Japanese and 
American foreign investments on economic development in host countries. 
His hypothesis is solely macro-economic in nature, however, and neglects the 
micro-economic aspects of firms. These micro-economic aspects are important for 
understanding the role of foreign firms in Brazilian industrial development. In 
chapter two attention will be paid to scientists who focus on firm level on aspects 
such as firm organisation, management structure and corporate culture. Special 
emphasis will be given to the performance of joint ventures, since the tripartite joint 
venture is a crucial element of the triple alliance concept. Authors such as Beamish, 
Kogut, Dunning and Nakasc will be discussed. 
Following from these theoretical assumptions, the research objective is formulated. 
This research departs from the theoretical assumptions of Evans in order to compare 
his findings with those of authors of the international business theories, such as 
Kojima and Dunning. To enable an empirical evaluation of the concept of the triple 
alliance, an analysis will be made of the way the Brazilian government applied the 
strategy of the triple alliance to stimulate the development of the petrochemical 
industry. The objective of this research can be summarized as follows: 
"To analyze the contribution of the constellation of the triple alliance to the 
development of the petrochemical industry of Brazil in general and the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari in particular in the previous fifteen years 
with special emphasis on the implications of the origin of the foreign partner." 
The petrochemical industry in Brazil has been chosen for this case study for two 
reasons: first, in order to examine the extent to which the theories of international 
business can increase understanding of the triple alliance concept, as developed by 
Evans; and second to examine the degree to which the government policy of using 
tripartite joint ventures to stimulate industrial growth, has been successful. The 
development of the petrochemical industry in Brazil will be the subject of chapter 
three. The integrated character of the chemical sector -to which the petrochemical 
branch belongs- will be outlined, followed by a brief description of the development 
of this industry on a world scale and Brazil's place in the global ranking of 
petrochemical producers. Figures relating to the demand and production of the 
various petrochemical products, import and export, and balance of trade will be 
presented to illustrate Brazil's position. The petrochemical firms responsible for the 
production of petrochemical products in Brazil are located in three petrochemical 
complexes. The first complex spontaneously developed in the sixties in the Sâo 
Paulo region; the second complex, situated in the northeast of Brazil, was planned 
by the government in the seventies, as was the third petrochemical complex in Rio 
Grande do Sul, in the extreme south of the country, which came on stream in the 
beginning of the eighties. At present, as part of the National Petrochemical Program-
me (PNP), a fourth complex is planned to accommodate the increased demand for 
petrochemicals. This programme includes a proposal to duplicate the size of the 
second complex as well. 
The emphasis of chapter four will be on the importance of the triple alliance 
strategy for the development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry. Evans con-
2 
dudes that alliances between state enterprises, national private enterprises and 
foreign firms determined the development of the petrochemical industry of Brazil. In 
this chapter, attention will be paid to the role played by this triple alliance. During 
the creation of the second and third petrochemical complex explicit efforts were 
made by the government to apply a tripartite model. As a result, all new petroche-
mical companies must be tripartite joint ventures. Ten years after the second 
petrochemical complex came on stream, it became dear that the functioning of the 
tripartite model is not static by nature. The relationship between the three participa-
ting partners is subject to drastic and continuous change. A closer look at the 
changing relative importance of the partidpating companies provides a better 
understanding of the fundioning of the tripartite model and the role foreign firms 
play in this model. Before an overall evaluation can be made, it is necessary to 
describe the respective partners. The state partner will first be examined, including 
the creation of state institutes, the changing importance of the state technocracy and, 
finally, the state enterprise in the chemical sector, Petroquisa. 
Second, the role of the national private entrepreneur will be outlined. Before the 
tripartite model was implemented, the petrochemical industry was dominated by 
foreign firms and a few national entrepreneurs. The launching of the second and 
third complex provided the impetus for national entrepreneurs to invest in petroche-
mical companies. In addition to existing national entrepreneurs in the sector, several 
newcomers, from other sectors of the economy such as the financial and construc-
tion sector, started to invest in the petrochemical complexes. 
The third and -for this research- most important partner in the tripartite model, is 
the foreign company. The final section of chapter four is dedicated to the role of 
foreign firms in the Brazilian petrochemical production. Spicciai emphasis is placed 
on the increasing relative importance of Japanese companies within this sector. 
Before the two petrochemical complexes were established in Brazil, Japanese 
chemical companies were completely absent. After a request from the Brazilian 
government they invested in several petrochemical firms. Nonetheless, European 
and American firms remain the largest contributors to Brazil's petrochemical 
industry. 
The impact of the tripartite model on industrial development and the role of 
foreign firms, will be examined on the basis of one petrochemical complex of Brazil, 
the second complex of Camaçari, located in north eastern state of Bahia. In chapter 
five, facts and figures concerning the Camaçari complex and the companies located 
in this complex will be presented, beginning with the number of firms and the 
chemical branch to which they belong. Second, produdion volume, net profits and 
profitability of all individual firms in the complex will illustrate the importance of 
the complex in the petrochemical sedor. Finally, the duplication of the Camaçari 
complex as designed in the National Petrochemical Programme (PNP), will be 
examined. 
The government policy of stimulating tripartite joint ventures largely influenced 
the ownership structure of the Camaçari firms. Despite this policy, not all companies 
on the complex are owned by three partners. Some of the firms are bipartite joint 
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ventures and some are even completely privately owned. More details about the 
fluctuating nature of the tripartite model will be given in chapter six. Regarding the 
origin of capital investments, the participating companies as well as various 
government and private finance institutions played a decisive role in the provision 
of capital. Of these, the National Development Bank and the Developmental 
Organization Sudene will be described in more detail. 
Finally, the regional impact of the Camaçari petrochemical complex will be descri-
bed. The Brazilian government located the complex in a sparsely industrialized 
region, far away from the industrial heart of the country, in order to stimulate 
regional development. It was assumed that the positive spread effects and the 
forward and backward linkages of the petrochemical firms would stimulate in-
dustrial activities in the northeast of Brazil. In order to illustrate the impact of the 
complex on regional development, the origin of resources, destination of production, 
and employment figures will be examined, as well as the location of decisionmaking 
centers and the impact of the complex on technological development in the region. 
Finally, the contribution of value added taxes (ICM) to the income of the Bahian 
state government is used as an indication of regional development. 
The actual functioning of the tripartite model in the Camaçari complex will be 
analyzed in chapter six. Stability of the model is the first aspect that will be dealt 
with. The theoretical chapter included a discussion of the influence of joint venture 
stability on the {performance of industrial firms. Since the Camaçari firms are largely 
joint venture structures, the question of their stability is a very interesting one. 
Changes in the types of joint ventures and completely privately owned companies 
represented in Camaçari, will be described, with special reference to the participa-
tion of foreign transnational companies. Questions related to the nature of the 
transnationale found on the complex, changes in their number, and the differences 
between American, European and Japanese participants will be considered. In most 
cases the relationship between the partners is the cause of joint venture failure or 
changes in shareholder composition. Based on interviews with general managers and 
entrepreneurs, the factors responsible for the degree of stability of joint venture 
firms will be discussed in this chapter. 
A second important aspect in the functioning of the tripartite model is technology 
transfer between joint venture partners in the Camaçari complex. As will be seen, 
the Brazilian government, in adapting the tripartite model, had certain objectives 
relating to technology transfer. The findings of various researchers who have 
measured the impact of the tripartite model on technological development will be 
presented, and compared with the results of the present research. Three aspects: the 
origin of the first used technology, investments in R&D and the origin of technology 
used for the expansion of production capacity will be examined. 
All three participants play a role in the transfer of technology. It is, therefore, 
important to look more closely at the influence of these three partners on techno-
logy transfer. Firstly, the role of government policy and state participation will be 
described. Secondly, attention will be paid to the attitude of the national petroche-
mical firms toward national R&D. Finally, the most important partner in technology 
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transfer will be looked at: the foreign partner which is the provider of almost all 
technology needed in the petrochemical firms. Can differences be discerned in the 
behaviour of European, Japanese and American transnationals? The impact of 
foreign firm origin will be looked at in relation to the three aspects of technology 
transfer: purchase of first technology, investments in R&D and the possibility of 
expanding production with self improved technology. 
Chapter seven provides more detail about the attitudes of participating transnatio-
nals and special attention is paid to differences between various foreign firms. First, 
investment patterns of the European, Japanese and American transnationals in Brazil 
will be compared, focussing on the different periods in which investments were 
made as well as sectoral preferences of the respective foreign firms. 
After describing this general pattern, the remainder part of the chapter concentrates 
on foreign participation in the joint ventures at the Camaçari complex, with special 
attention to firm organization. First, the motives for investing in the joint ventures at 
Camaçari will be compared. In the theoretical chapter it is argued that motives for 
entering a joint venture can have a decisive impact on its stability. Second, the 
decisionmaking structure and the corporate culture of the Brazilian participant, on 
the one hand, and the European, American and Japanese participant on the other, 
will be dealt with. 
This chapter ends by analyzing the extent to which differences in investment 
patterns, attitude towards participation in joint ventures, organizational structure and 
corporate culture determine stability and technology transfer. In the final chapter, a 
summary is presented and conclusions are drawn. The assumptions in the theoreti-
cal chapter are compared with the results of the empirical case study, providing a 
brief picture of development prospects for the tripartite model in the petrochemical 
complex of Camaçari. 
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THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS: THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES IN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE IN BRAZIL 
2.1. Introduction 
The impressive industrial development of Brazil during the seventies, has gained the 
attention of scientists dealing with questions of development and Third World 
countries. A developing country, characterized by GNP growth figures averaging 
10% in the seventies, with an industrial sector producing advanced capital goods as 
well as durable and non-durable consumer goods, is a rare phenomenon in the 
Third World. Brazil not only reached a stage in which internal consumption was 
largely satisfied by national produced goods; the share of manufactured products in 
the total exports also increased considerably. Various authors have analysed 
explanations for this impressive industrial development. In sections 2.3. and 2.4. of 
chapter two the work of some of these authors will be examined. Special emphasis 
will be placed on authors belonging to the dependencia tradition and, above all, on 
the dependent development school. Although Cardoso introduced Ihe theory of 
'associated dependent developmenf, Peter Evans1, using the theoretical concept of 
the 'triple alliance', provided a starting point for analyzing industrial development 
of Brazil in this present research. According to Evans industrial development in a 
peripheral country is possible if alliances are created between foreign capital, 
national private capital and state capital, the triple alliances. This industrial develop-
ment is still largely determined by the so-called center countries, however. The 
findings of Evans have been used and analysed by several other authors, among 
others, in publications dealing with industrial development in Mexico (Gereffi, 
Manghalagiri)2 and in other Latin American countries (Gwynn).3 Although Evans 
consideres the contribution of the triple alliance to be one of the most important 
aspects of dependent development, he also remarks that this alliance consists of a 
rather delicate balance: the three partners certainly have common interests but at the 
same time they are strongly divided by conflicts. These conflicts could, in the end, 
result in a failure of the strategy of triple alliance. 
Evans pays a great deal of attention to contradictions within the state capital and 
within the national industrial bourgeoisie which he consideres to be a threat to the 
continuation of the triple alliance strategy. The role of the foreign partner has, 
however, been somewhat neglected in his analysis: he refers to the third participant 
as a homogeneous group of foreign firms characterized by one common goal: the 
maximalisation of global capital accumulation. Although certain similarities between 
the investing foreign firms cannot be denied, differences should not be underes-
timated. Increasing internationalization has meant that foreign firms from a number 
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of different countries are investing in the periphery. During the thirties and forties 
primarily American companies invested their capital in countries outside the US; in 
the fifties and sixties foreign direct investments from Europe became increasingly 
important. When in the sixties and seventies Japan began to ensure the access to 
raw materials and cheap labour outside their own country, for their expanding 
manufacturing sector, Japanese firms also started to look for external investment 
opportunities. 
It cannot be denied that the interests of companies from different countries do not 
diverge considerably. As Evans remarked, the reason for internationalization relates 
above all to the possibilities for large scale capital accumulation. The way to achieve 
this goal, differs, however, considerably between American, European and Japanese 
companies. The authors belonging to the dependencia tradition did not pay much 
attention to these differences and their consequences for development in Third 
World countries. For this reason, sections 2.5. to 2.8. will deal with some authors 
exposing the theory of international business for whom a distinction between foreign 
enterprises and their way of internationalization are the central point of analysis. In 
section 2.6. special emphasis will be given to the Japanese author, Kojima, who 
defends the hypothesis that Japanese foreign investments influence development in 
Third World countries in a more beneficial way than American investments do. 
Although some of the findings of Kojima are interesting and help to explain the 
role of foreign firm origin in Third World development, his analysis is limited to 
macro-economic factors only. Kojima did not adequately address micro-economic 
aspects which is one of the reasons why his theory provides an insufficient analysis 
of the role of foreign firms in the triple alliance concept. It is, therefore, necessary to 
concentrate especially on theories that examine processes of internationalization at 
the firm level with differences between foreign investments as their central theme. 
Because the strategy of the triple alliance emphasizes the formation of business 
joint ventures, it is self evident that authors who analyze the creation of joint 
ventures, will be the focus. Authors like Beamish and Kogut, discussed in section 
2.7., consider different aspects of joint ventures, such as stability of joint venture 
structures, dependency of joint ventures on parent companies, adaptation to the 
local culture and the individual corporate cultures of foreign partners in joint 
ventures. Other authors such as Negandhi, Nakase, Hladik and Barlett and Goshal 
focus on the same aspects but point more explicitly to differences between Ameri-
can, Japanese and European companies. Although some of these authors indeed 
relate the origin of a foreign enterprise to behaviour in the joint venture, they do 
not go a step further and relate differences to the performance of the joint venture 
and more indirect influence on industrial development in the host country. To 
obtain a clear view of the functioning of the tripartite model and the contribution of 
this model to the industrial development of Brazil, this relation is necessary. 
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2.2. From dependency to dependent development 
Despite a number of critics4 of the dependency school, aspects of these theories can 
contribute to an explanation of the role of foreign enterprises in the impressive 
industrialization of some Third World countries. Or, like Peter Evans remarks: 
"Whether it is used as a source of methodological orientation or of specific 
propositions, the work of the dependency school is an essential resource for 
research on the social and political impact of mnc's."5 
Theories of imperialism which argue that the so-called renter countries accumulate 
capital by transferring surplus from countries in the periphery to countries in the 
center, is the point of departure for the dependency theories. Significant political 
and military control exercised by the center over the periphery, is a necessary 
condition for capital accumulation in the center. Relations between center and 
periphery benefit only the center countries and limit development in the periphery. 
The industrial development of some Third World countries during the fifties and 
sixties could not be explained by the authors of theories of Leninist imperialism, 
however. The national industrial growth of these peripheral countries was developed 
to such extent that they began to produce capital goods and more advanced durable 
consumer goods. Moreover, due to the increasing internationalization of production, 
the number of direct foreign investors increased in this period. It appeared that to a 
certain extent industrial development was possible in the periphery as well. Building 
on the theories of imperialism, several reseachers, predominantly from the Third 
World itself and living in Latin America, developed the so-called dependencia 
theories. These depedentistas, including authors such as Frank and Furtado,' start 
from the argument that underdevelopment in Third World countries is shaped by 
the creation of external relations between countries in the periphery and countries in 
the center. According to the dependencia school, center-periphery relations are 
incorporated in the internal class structure of the Third World country. This relation 
is asymmetrical because economic instability in the center countries has severe 
implications for the periphery while a crisis in the periphery will leave the center 
countries untouched.7 In addition, the means of production in the peripheral 
countries are owned by representatives of the center countries. As a result, the 
control of capital accumulation is largely influenced by center countries. 
According to the dependency school, national industrial development in periphe-
ral countries is limited in several ways. In the first place the specific character of the 
industrialization, which is the result of asymmetrical relations between center and 
periphery, can be seen as a limitation. Industrialization in the periphery is of 
'disarticulated nature'8 which means that companies investing in the periphery do 
not create multiplier effects the way they do in center countries. The forward and 
backward linkages' which in the countries of the center arc the main impetus for 
self-generating industrialization, are lacking to some extent in the periphery. Western 
companies that open up subsidiaries in the periphery maintain the center of 
production and the control over this production in their country or origin. At the 
8 
same time, feedstock and capital goods are largely imported from these Western 
countries and, if the market is located in the industrialized world as well, the end 
products and intermediary products are exported from the periphery to the center. 
In this way, multiplier effects are transferred to the center where industrial growth 
is generated. 
A consequence of the disarticulated character of peripheral industrial development 
is that this development benefits only a small part of the population, the dominant 
elite. The exclusion of the masses of the fruits of consumption is the second 
limitation of dependent development. The majority in this situation becomes a 
source of cheap labour which increases the attractiveness of the Third World 
country to foreign investors. Due to this exclusion, industrial development requires 
the support of a repressive state apparatus. 
However, dependency is not a static phenomenon. Changing center/periphery 
relations and internal alliances contribute to a continuous change in the nature of 
dependency. Cardoso10 distinguishes two different phases of dependency: the phase 
of classic dependency, in which dependent relations between center and periphery 
are based on the export of predominantly primary goods, such as agricultural 
products and minerals, and the phase of associated dependent development, which 
is characterized by simultaneous and differentiated expansion of three sectors of the 
economy: the national private sector, the foreign sector and the public sector." 
According to the theory of dependent development, development in peripheral 
countries is not characterized by stagnation. A new theoretical framework of 
explaining capital accumulation and industrialization is needed. 
One of the most important authors in the dependent development school is 
Evans. Starting from the dependent development theories, Evans tries to provide a 
tool of analysis for the impressive industrialization of Brazil during the seventies. 
He argues that industrialization can be explained by the alliances that developed 
between various groups of the dominant class which, despite their sometimes 
conflicting interests, have a common interest in local capital accumulation: 
"Dependent development is a special instance of dependency, characterized by 
the association or alliance of international and local capital. The state also joins 
the alliance as an active partner, and the resulting triple alliance is a fun-
damental factor in the emergence of dependent development."" 
Some aspects of Evans' analysis contribute to a better understanding of the role of 
foreign firms in the industrialization of Brazil. In the next part of this chapter these 
aspects will be described in somewhat more detail. 
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23. The triple alliance as fundamental factor In dependent development 
In those countries of the periphery in which the process of dependent development 
plays an important role, all three types of capital forming the triple alliance, can be 
found. Evans concludes that the distribution of these three types of capital over the 
various industrial sectors is dependent on their individual comparative advantage. 
While in some industrial sectors foreign capital dominates, in other sectors national 
private capital is more important. 
2.3.1. Multinational capital 
During the fifties and sixties direct foreign investments played an increasingly 
important role in international manufacturing. While during the colonial period 
foreign investments in the overseas colonies has been focussed above all on the 
production of primary export commodities and the stimulation of direct trade with 
center countries, in the period thereafter the manufacturing potential of the Third 
World became attractive to international investors. Especially in Latin American 
countries experiencing a phase of import substitution, the extensive internal market 
and the relatively stability of labour made the production of durable and non-
durable consumer goods profitable. Because of the increasing importance of 
manufacturing production in the internationalization process, it became desirable to 
create alliances with local capital already involved to some extent in this production. 
As a result foreign enterprises became more assimilated into Third World countries. 
Certain substantial differences between foreign capital and local private capital 
can be discerned. The first difference relates to capital accumulation. Multinational 
corporations are known for their global strategy which means that they transfer the 
revenues they obtain from the periphery to countries in the center. The immediate 
result is that internal capital accumulation in the periphery is limited. Possibilities 
for stimulating foreign corporations to increase their local capital accumulation are 
dependent on certain factors. The most important factor is the bargaining position of 
the peripheral country. The ability of local government to impose conditions on 
investments will depend on the exte.it to which Third World countries are found to 
be attractive. Countries with a substantial internal market and increasing GNP 
figures are in a better position to negotiate with foreign investors than countries 
without. The bargaining position is also improved if state-controlled resources are 
available in the country. It is easier for countries in possession of large oil reserves 
to subsidize energy and feedstock prices, which can increase their attractiveness to 
foreign investments. 
A second characteristic differentiating foreign investments from local private 
investments is the access of foreign firms to technological innovations. Because the 
monopolistic position of transnational corporations is largely due to their tech-
nological lead, they arc very reluctant to invest in the transfer of this technology. 
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Most R&D is carried out in Western countries and when up-to-date technology is 
sold to companies in peripheral countries, in most cases it is in the form of so-
called 'black boxes'." Expansion of production or innovation of this transferred 
technology is further hampered by restrictive technology contracts. 
Because of these characteristics of foreign capital, the majority of foreign enter-
prises in the Third World are found in industrial sectors in which advanced 
technological processes dominate, or in industrial sectors in which the foreign 
companies possess a comparative advantage in commercial sense. Examples of the 
first are the chemical and the automobile sector and of the latter the tobacco 
industry. 
2.3.2. Local capital 
Third World countries in which foreign investments are important, have their local 
capital strongly attached to center economies. But despite their relations with center 
countries and international firms, national capital accumulation is primarily a local 
interest. Access to technological knowledge gives foreign companies their compara-
tive advantage. This does not mean, however, that local firms do not possess 
comparative advantages which explain their presence in other industrial sectors of 
the economy.14 Firstly the local industrial bourgeoisie has close relations with the 
state bureaucracy which gives them a political legitimacy that can result in certain 
advantages. Second, local firms often possess access to markets that are relatively 
inaccessible to foreign firms. Given these particular comparative advantages, local 
companies are predominantly found in industrial sectors such as shoe manufactur-
ing, food and machinery. 
2.3.3. State capital 
The third pillar of the tripartite model is state capital. State capital is not linked to 
productive activities alone like the other two types of capital. The function of the 
state in a peripheral country is threefold: firstly, the state supports national in-
dustrialization by stimulating national capital accumulation, particularly with respect 
to foreign firms which seek global capital accumulation. In addition to this regula-
ting role, the state also plays a more direct role in the industrialization process. 
State companies can participate in the productive sectors of the economy by 
investing in joint ventures with private capital or by creating 100% state owned 
companies. Access to natural resources and the possibility of carrying out large 
capital investments are the main comparative advantages of the state. State participa-
tion in the productive sector focusses predominantly on industrial sectors involved 
in the extraction and processing of mineral resources such as iron ore and petro-
leum. A third function of the state is directly related to the exclusion the majority of 
the population from the benefits of dependent development. The state has to play a 
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repressive role in order to guarantee internal stability which is necessary for the 
process of dependent development. Evans remarked in this regard: 
"Repression is especially necessary in those countries which have passed 
through the phase of 'easy import substitution' and are trying to push the 
process of dependent industrialization further. (-) In the context of dependent 
development the need for repression is great while the need for democracy is 
втаН."
15 
In summary, dependent development is characterized by a situation in which an 
alliance is formed between the three types of capital which together form the 
dominant class in the periphery. The form of alliance can vary from mere participa­
tion in one and the same industrial sector to the creation of joint venture structures 
between the various types of capital. The joint goal of capital accumulation and the 
united effort to politically and socially repress the majority of the population can be 
seen as the common interests of foreign, state and national private capital. 
2.3.4. External conditions 
For a successful implementation of the triple alliance strategy, certain conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, there is the need for a large international capital market in 
which an abundance of financial capital makes it possible to provide financial loans 
on large scale. When this condition is fulfilled, like in the case of oil dollars in the 
early seventies, peripheral states can chose to realize an internal growth of the 
capital goods industry without neglecting the internal demand for consumer goods 
and without relying too much on internal savings." This enables the peripheral state 
to support the industrialization process by carrying out activities in the productive 
sphere and by providing subsidies and incentives. Another condition for a successful 
implementation of dependent development, mentioned by Evans, is the fact that: 
"Dependent development is viable only if it had support from the larger system 
of imperialism. The entire success of the dependent development is predicated 
on multinationals willing to invest, international bankers willing to extend 
credit, and other countries willing to consume an ever increasing volume of (-) 
exports."17 
Following in the footsteps of Cardoso and Evans, several other authors investigated 
the triple alliance strategy in other countries. Gwynn" analyzed this model in 
various Latin American countries and came to the conclusion that, in addition to 
conditions mentioned by Evans, a further condition must be fulfilled before one 
could speak of a successful triple alliance strategy. According to Gwynn, certain 
factors, such as a large rich upper class or important minerals, attract foreign 
investors and thus facilitates the forming of alliances between state capital, national 
private capital and foreign capital. If the internal market of a peripheral country is 
too small and the country has little to offer to a potential foreign investor, a 
transnational corporation will not be very willing to create alliances with national 
capital and will prefer to act independently. 
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2.4. The strategy of the triple alliance in Brazil: contribution and constraints 
2.4.1. Contribution of the triple alliance 
Evans uses his research on the functioning of the triple alliance in the process of 
dependent development to explain the impressive industrial growth of Brazil in the 
sixties and seventies. He concludes that the triple alliance above all stimulated the 
substantial national capital accumulation during this period. The strategy of the 
triple alliance contributed in two ways to the dependent development of Brazil. 
Firstly, the internal capital accumulation was to a large extent stimulated through 
an industrial structure including all three types of capital. The first type of capital, 
foreign capital, was attracted during the fifties and sixties by the large internal 
market of Brazil, due to the substantial demand for consumer goods. The import 
substitution policy of the Brazilian government, which restricted the import of 
products that could be produced locally, increased the number of foreign companies 
investing directly in the country. 
The second type of capital, local industrial capital, was also an important factor in 
Brazil during this period. A large number of entrepreneurs in the industrial sector 
immigrated to Brazil in the nineteenth century. Some of these immigrants had not 
only managerial and technological knowledge, but also financial capital which could 
be used for manufacturing investments. In addition to this group of entrepreneurs, a 
large number of industrial entrepreneurs came from the agrarian and commercial 
sector and wanted to diversify their activities in the industrial sector. 
State capital in Brazil, finally, gained importance in the period of the 'Estado 
Novo', when the state participated for the first time in production activities. During 
the military regime from 1964 to 1985 state enterprises, like the oil company 
'Petrobras' and the siderurgica! company 'Vale do Rio Doce', assumed a dominant 
role in industrial development. The Brazilian state also supported industrial 
development indirectly, for instance, by creating an intensive network of infrastruc-
tural facilities such as electricity and means of transport and by subsidizing 
industrial activities through development banks. 
The triple alliance strategy also stimulates industrial development in Brazil with 
technology transfer. It was thought that the formation of alliances between com-
panies would facilitate the transfer of technology from the foreign partner to local 
companies. In addition, it was assumed that foreign capital participating in direct 
business joint ventures would find it to their advantage to transfer up-to-date 
technology. State enterprises participating in tripartite joint ventures provided a 
further contribution to technological development with their relatively high tech-
nological level. 
Despite these positive conditions for technology transfer, Evans concludes that the 
degree of technology transfer in Brazil was less than expected. Foreign investors, 
which have a monopoly position based largely on their technological lead, proved to 
be very reluctant to transfer all technological knowledge, nor were they very willing 
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to сапу out R&D outside Western countries.1* 
It is important to realize, however, that dependent development is not a static 
phenomenon and that the balance between the three types of capital is subject to 
continuous change. Based on research in Brazil, Evans distinguishes two simul­
taneously occurring processes. First, he examines 'denationalization processes'.20 
When industrialization is based on technologically advanced, capital-intensive 
industrial sectors, the chance exists that the local industrial bourgeoisie will be 
increasingly marginalized.21 In recent research over the role of foreign investments in 
Mexico, Manghalagiri22 concludes that the Mexican strategy of the triple alliance did 
result in denationalization and that an autonomous development of the Mexican 
manufacturing sector was severely restricted by this process. 
A different conclusion is reached by Gereffi23 in his research which was also 
carried out in Mexico. Unlike Manghalagiri, Gereffi concentrates on one industrial 
sector, i. e. the pharmaceutical. He concludes that, although the policy of 'mexicani-
zation'24, was not as successful as the Mexican government had anticipated, it did 
reduce the threat of marginalization of the local industrial bourgeoisie. 
The ideas of Gereffi are largely in agreement with those of Evans, who argues 
that denationalization does not form a threat to the process of dependent develop­
ment. Although local entrepreneurs probable cannot compete with foreign companies 
in some industrial sectors, they reinvest their capital in other industrial sectors, 
decreasing the chance that they will be marginalized. Evans calls this second process 
of change 'differentiation'. Increasing differentiation does not necessarily mean 
serious limits on the survival of the strategy of triple alliance. In later publications, 
Evans presented the example of the micro computer industry in Brazil to demon­
strate that, even in more technologically advanced industrial sectors, the local 
industrial bourgeoisie will not necessarily be marginalized and, when sufficiently 
protected by government regulations, can play an important role.25 
2.4.2. Constraints of the strategy of the triple alliance 
The remarks of Evans do not imply however that the strategy of the triple alliance 
does not face any difficulties. The first threat to the strategy of the triple alliance 
considered by Evans, is the exclusion of the majority of the population from the 
benefits of dependent development. Because of the alliances between the different 
groups of the dominant class, these groups profit most from industrial and econo­
mic growth. Apparently, the benefits are not distributed to the larger population. 
This excluded part of the population could threaten political stability which is 
necessary for a high level of accumulation. Declining accumulation figures could 
disturb the balance between the three partners of the alliance.3' 
A second threat, which is viewed more as an economically undesirable effect of 
this strategy, is the increasing gap in the Brazilian balance of trade due to the 
disarticulated character of industrialization in a situation of dependent development. 
Despite the high level of industrialization in the phase of dependent development, 
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the needed capital and intermediary goods cannot yet be produced in the country 
itself and have to be imported. Since industrial production is intended primarily for 
the internal market, the low export figures cannot compensate for the increased 
imports, resulting in a negative balance of trade. 
Not only the above mentioned conflicts and difficulties restrict the functioning of 
the tripartite model, however. A third difficulty which threatens the strategy to fail, 
are the internal characteristics of individual partners. The local industrial bour­
geoisie, for instance, was divided, after one part created alliances with international 
and state capital and alienated itself from the other part of the local bourgeoisie. 
This process was reinforced by government policy providing subsidies and incen­
tives to only part of the local bourgeoisie. On the one hand, Evans considers this 
internal division to be a necessary condition for a successful strategy of triple 
alliance; on the other, he is also clearly aware of the problems provoked by this 
division.77 The alienated part of the industrial bourgeoisie presents a threat to 
internal stability of the alliance to the point that these entrepreneurs protest against 
the more favourable treatment of the companies participating in the triple alliance. 
The internal characteristics of the state partner can also pose a threat to the 
process of dependent development. A successful triple alliance strategy requires that 
the state partner plays an active role in manufacturing production and in alliances 
with foreign and national private capital. However, this role is in conflict with the 
function of the state, a conflict which could in the end lead to a collapse of the 
strategy. On the one hand, the state fulfills a productive role and, as a result is 
interested in a high level of national capital accumulation; on the other, it has to 
cany out a regulative role, which, in a society characterized by dependent devclopb 
ment, will be largely repressive in nature. Evans remarks in this regard: 
"The contradictions of dependent development are reflected in the paradoxical 
nature of the dependent capitalist state. It is a nationalist state whose strategy 
of accumulation is conditioned by its relation to the international economy and 
depends in the first instance on the cooperation with the multinational согрюга-
tion. It is a state whose repressive protection of the interest of the dominant 
class is blatant, yet is excludes most of the national bourgeoisie from рюШісаІ 
participation just as it excludes the mass of the рюриІаНоп."28 
2.43. The foreign partner, a neglected participant? 
Evans points to a number of obstacles to the success of the strategy of the triple 
alliance. The foreign partners' responsibility for these difficulties has been, however, 
highly underestimated. Given the special attention p>aid to the foreign participants, 
by various publications,29 it is somewhat surprising that little reference is made to 
the individual roles of foreign companies. While Evans and others refer to the 
internal conflicts of the state partner and consider the division of the national 
industrial bourgeoisie to be a threat to the triple alliance strategy, transnational 
investors are presented as a homogeneous group of firms interested in the common 
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goal of global capital accumulation. Although Evans examines the uneven invest-
ment patterns of American investors, on the one hand and European and Japanese 
investors, on the other,30 he does not go a step further to analyze the significance of 
these differences for the role of foreign firms in the functioning of the tripartite 
model. In several publications Evans refers to American transnationals as 'the' 
foreign companies, and considers their behaviour to be representative.31 
Evans' statement had certain validity in the period before the dependent develop-
ment phase, when most foreign investments in the industrial sector were by 
American companies, which are fairly homogeneous. However, since the second half 
of the twentieth century investments from Europe and Japan have played an 
increasingly important role in the internationalization of production. Given the 
declining hegemony of American transnationals outside their own country, it is 
important to reconsider the strategy of the triple alliance. 
It is necessary to ask whether dependent development is not influenced by the 
origin of the foreign partner and whether in fact American investors in Brazil do 
behave in the same way as European and Japanese subsidiaries. Most scholars 
belonging to the dependent development tradition do not attempt to answer this 
question. Continuous reference to one ideal type of multinational, without any 
distinction between foreign firms from different origin, oversimplifies the process of 
national capital accumulation in countries such as Brazil. 
Evans uses the concept of the triple alliance to analyze dependent development 
on a high level of abstraction. The opportunity for a more empirical analysis of this 
concept appeared in the early seventies when the Brazilian government decided to 
adopt a triple alliance strategy in order to stimulate national growth in the petroche-
mical sector. From than on, the formation of tripartite joint ventures -the so-called 
tripartite model- became a condition for investing in the sector. Although Evans 
discusses the Camaçari complex in depth,32 he does not evaluate the internal 
dynamics of this petrochemical complex at the firm level. As a result, he misses an 
opportunity to further define and verify the theory of 'dependent development' on 
the basis of empirical research. 
For this reason, in the second part of this chapter theories explaining processes at 
the firm level will be examined in the expectation that they will shed more light on 
the impact of the triple alliance strategy on dependent development. In order to 
evaluate this strategy empirically, it is necessary to define the concept 'develop-
ment'. For the purpose of this research, emphasis will be placed on industrial 
development. It is argued that industrial development is stimulated when it is based 
in dynamic industrial sectors, characterized by their ability to generate industrial 
expansion by means of more or less autonomous technological development and the 
possibility of vertical diversification. 
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2.5. Theories of international business 
The role and the functioning of multinational enterprises is explained by various 
economists in what can be called the theories of international business. In the past 
three decades these theories increased in importance in response to the inter-
nationalization of manufacturing production. The first efforts to explain inter-
nationalization are made by the more conventional economists, who start from 
Ricardo's international trade theory of comparative advantage, which emphasizes 
that industrial production must be located where relative production costs are 
lowest.33 Heckschler and Ohlin are among the representatives of this conventional 
view.34 They, however, neglect the role of the state in international production. This 
changed in the mid-seventies when Williamson explored the organization of 
economic activities between markets and non-market institutions such as govern-
ments. His transaction cost model focusses on the proposition that firms choose how 
to transact based on the priority of minimizing total production and transaction 
costs.35 Advocates of these economic theories share a view that multinational 
enterprises are most able to efficiency organize world production.3* 
A critical appraisal of the role of multinational enterprises and their impact on 
nation-states is articulated by neo-conventional economists, who include the question 
of national benefit in their research on multinational operations. With the conven-
tional economists they share the view that multinational enterprises are most able to 
further generate national development; they state, however, that global welfare is 
not always congruent with increasing national benefit. One of the most important 
representatives of this school is Raymond Vernon, who links the idea of 'product 
life cycle' to a geographical division of labour.37 
Another representative of this tradition is Dunning who tries to combine ques-
tions of internationalization with concepts of monopolistic competition.38 He pays 
special attention to factors of ownership, location and internalization advantages, 
which he believes to be decisive for activities of multinational corporations. 
Neither the conventional nor the neo-conventional tradition provide sufficient 
explanation for the impact of foreign firm origin on dependent development. One of 
the limitations of these theories is that they mainly focus on macro-economic 
explanations of multinational production and neglect certain micro-economic aspects. 
This limitation can be overcome drawing on the micro-economic tradition of 
international business theories. In this tradition the emphasis lies on organizational 
factors of the firm itself in explaining the organization of international production. 
Examples include the behavioural model and the firm strategy model. 
Hymer is one of the important authors to acknowledge the importance of micro 
aspects of the firm. He argues that a focus on the internal motivations of the 
individual firms provides a better framework for the understanding of direct foreign 
investment.3' Hymer drew attention to the importance of differences between 
multinational enterprises. Not all internationalizing firms have the same characteris-
tics, he stated; some firms certainly have advantages over others, such as larger 
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economies of scale, the ability to differentiate absolute production costs and the 
possession of patent rights.*0 It was Hymer who first noticed that these differences 
had a cultural basis. With the increasing internationalization of world production 
multinationals were originating from more and more countries and it was no longer 
possible to speak of one homogeneous group of multinationals.41 Hymer suggested 
that the increasingly diverse origin of foreign companies could have -although 
temporarily- a positive influence on the bargaining power of host countries." 
2.6. Kojima's hypothesis 
Researchers in the line of Hymer argue that multinational companies should not be 
viewed as a homogeneous group of enterprises, since they all possess various 
national characteristics. But because authors subscribing to theories of inter-
nationalization are above all trying to explain multinational production, they do not 
pay much attention to the development prospective of multinational enterprises in 
Third World countries, nor do they take into account the unequal development 
patterns that emerge worldwide as a result of international production. 
Only a few authors have linked the development of less developed countries to 
different internationalization patterns and characteristics of foreign enterprises. One 
of them is Kojima who proposed an explanatory model of direct foreign invest-
ments. In his model the differences between Japanese and American direct invest-
ments and their impact on development in Third World and other host countries 
were emphasized. Although Kojima bases his conclusions largely on the analysis of 
macro-economic processes, and fails to establish a plausible micro-economic basis for 
this macro-economic theory," his research can contribute to a better understanding 
of dependent development theories. Kojima' hypothesis is that Japanese foreign 
investments, because of their specific characteristics, are more easily incorporated 
into the developing economies and will have a more beneficial impact on develop-
ment in Third World countries than American foreign investments. The latter do not 
become incorporated into the economies of these countries but maintain an isolated 
enclave position without having a significant beneficial impact on development. 
2.6.1. Development impact of Japanese investments 
Kojima distinguishes various characteristics of direct foreign investments that may 
influence development in Third World countries.44 The first characteristic is the 
difference in geographical destination of the direct foreign investments. Kojima 
remarks that Japanese foreign investments focus much more on developing coun-
tries, in particular South East Asian countries, than American investments, which 
largely concentrate on Western countries. Two other Japanese authors, Nakasc45 and 
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Ogure4* notice the same trend. In the 1980s this pattern changed slightly, however, 
and Latin America became an important target for increasing Japanese foreign 
investments.47 As far as the industrialized part of the world is concerned, the US is 
the main at tractor of Japanese foreign investments. 
In contrast, American and European investments focus much more on Western 
countries. In the forties, the US started to invest in European countries, especially 
the UK, Canada and, to a lesser extent Latin America. After the Second World War 
a shift in targets of investment countries became apparent. In addition to invest-
ments in Europe, emphasis was placed on investments in Asia, resulting in a 
relative decline in the importance of Latin America and Canada. In overall terms the 
foreign direct investments of US corporations declined in comparison to European 
and Japanese foreign direct investments. 
Though it is a bit simplifying to treat the European countries as one block 
because of the differences between the various countries, it is nonetheless for the 
purpose of this research not useful to make a distinction between them all.48 The 
early investments of the United Kingdom focussed predominantly on the Common-
wealth Countries as well as to the United States. After the Second World War a 
new target became apparent: South Africa. It was not until the 1960s, and even 
more in the 1970s, that British multinationals finally started to invest in European 
countries, continuing their investments in the US.49 Latin America was never very 
important for British companies, however, in contrast to West Germany. One-fifth of 
West Germany's total foreign investments was in the developing world, predomi-
nantly in Brazil. At the end of the eighties, the increase in European investments, 
especially from West Germany and the UK, was among the most significant.™ 
The second important characteristic in Kojima's hypothesis is the difference in 
industrial-sector preference of the various multinational enterprises. According to 
Kojima multinationals from the United States tend to concentrate their foreign 
investments in industrial sectors in which they have the largest comparative 
advantage. In this way they are able to assume a monopoly position which enables 
them to maximize capital accumulation. Because of their relatively long history in 
the manufacturing industry -especially in comparison to Japanese companies- the 
comparative advantage of US transnationals is largely in their greater technological 
knowledge. Most American foreign firms, therefore, invest in the more sophisticated 
and technologically advanced industrial sectors, including the chemical industries, 
mechanical and instrumental engineering and electrical and electronic engineering. 
This is in contrast to Japanese foreign investments which are in the technologically 
less advanced industrial sectors, like metals and textiles. 
Nakase makes the same observation and remarks: 
"Japan's overseas investments in manufacturing, still concentrate in mainly 
labour-intensive industries, or industries with standard technology, while US 
and West German overseas investment centers around such capital intensive or 
high technology industries as chemicals, automobiles and computers.(-) Japanese 
companies are obviously at an advantage in standardized products."51 
Although Kojima does not include European investments in his hypothesis, different 
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sectoral patterns do exist and are even evident within Europe. For instance, British 
firms which invested predominantly in the less advanced technological sectors, 
resemble more the Japanese firms.52 West German enterprises, on the other hand, are 
more or less comparable to US multinationals, showing preference for investing in 
higher-technology sectors.53 
A third important characteristic mentioned by Kojima, is the differing size of 
American and Japanese overseas investments. Japanese foreign investors tend to be 
smaller than their American and European competitors.51 Because of their smaller 
size, Japanese enterprises more easily connect with the economic sector of the Third 
World country whereas the multiplier effects of the American giants are minimal. 
Nakase added that the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
overseas expansion of Japanese capital was largely influenced by the organizational 
structure of foreign investments. Only a few of these small and medium-sized 
enterprises are 'independenf investments; most of them are organized by the so-
called 'sogo shosha'.55 Because of their extended trading experience overseas, the 
'sogo shosha' were quite familiar with local cultural habits, the language and 
management style of enterprises in host countries and they were able to act as an 
intermediary between the Japanese firm on the one hand and local private com-
panies, state companies and foreign governments, on the other. 
2.6.2. The role of technology transfer 
An important aspect of direct foreign investments in developing countries, -also 
emphasized in dependent development theories- is technology transfer from foreign 
to local firms. Evans starts from the view that the transfer of technology is stimu-
lated by dependent development, although on a limited scale. However, he does not 
make any distinction between foreign firms from different countries in regard to 
technology transfer. Kojima also considers technology transfer to be a crucial factor 
in the growth of manufacturing in developing countries. He is of the opinion that 
governments of developing host countries have to be aware of the importance of 
technology and carefully choose the type of foreign investment that will provide the 
best opportunities for technology transfer. At the same time he admits that host 
countries express considerably more interest in technology transfer than foreign 
firms. On the one hand, foreign firms are not very willing to transfer their technolo-
gy with the risk of losing their comparative advantage. On the other hand, develop-
ing countries seek full technology transfer, in order to diminish their dependency on 
Western countries.56 
Before proceeding further it is necessary to more closely examine the concept of 
'transfer of technology'; which is a vague description of a rather complex phenome-
non. In the first place the concept 'technology' is very broad, applying to the more 
technical processes, embedded in the production machinery, as well as more indirect 
technology like management skills and knowledge of market relations. In this book, 
'technology transfer' refers explicitly to the more technical processes. In a technical 
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sense it is necessary to make a distinction between different aspects of technology 
transfer. When a company acquires new technology, either purchased from a 
technology supplier, or obtained from a participating (foreign) firm, it has to absorb 
and master this technology, adapting it to its needs. Once the new technology is 
absorbed, the technology needs to be 'debottlenecked' in order to improve product-
ion. This implies that all initial difficulties need to be overcome and minor tech-
nological improvements, necessary for adjusting to local circumstances, need to be 
made. The final phase involves innovating the production process with the absorbed 
and debottlenecked technology. In this phase the company needs to carry out its 
own R&D in order to keep up with the rapidly changing technological development 
on a world scale. 
The concept technology transfer plays an important role in Kojima's hypothesis. 
Kojima distinguishes two types of technology transfer: the orderly transfer of 
technology which he characterizes as the Japanese type, and technology transfer in 
reverse order, the American type.57 American foreign investments, he argues, can 
mainly be found in technologically advanced industrial sectors, which are highly 
innovative and strongly oligopolistic in character. The American comparative 
advantage is largely in the generation of innovations, rather than the more conven-
tional notion of relatively cheap capital goods. As a consequence, the transfer of 
technology from American firms is limited because the larger the technology gap, 
the more difficult the transfer of technology will be.58 
The American form of direct foreign investment is not beneficial to the receiving 
developing country: enclaves of technologically advanced production generate few 
linkages with the more traditional industries and the industrial development of the 
host country is not stimulated. Kojima is much more a supporter of the Japanese 
type of foreign direct investment and technology transfer which, in his view, is 
closer to the technology of developing countries and, therefore, more easily trans-
ferablc.59 The orderly transfer of technology does, however, keep the host country at 
a lower and inferior stage of industrialization relative to the investing country. But, 
according to Kojima, the benefits for the developing country are larger than the 
costs.60 
In addition to Kojima several other researchers have analyzed the implications of 
technology transfer for developing countries. One of them is Dunning, who bases 
his conclusions on a comparative analysis of Japanese and American foreign 
investments in a Western country -the United Kingdom- and comes to slightly 
different conclusions than Kojima." Dunning agrees with Kojima that Japanese and 
American investments are different. The main difference he notices is that US 
investments focus on the innovating capacities of the companies while Japanese 
investments put more emphasis on quality control, product differentiation, cost 
advantages, and good industrial relations.62 In contrast to Kojima, Dunning does not 
notice more technology transfer from Japanese foreign firms. Instead he remarks that 
they do not invest as much on R&D as their American competitors. Of course, it is 
possible that the lack of similarity in the findings stems from the fact that Dunning 
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conducts his research in a Western country while the conclusions of Kojima are 
largely based on developing countries. 
But local R&D is only one way of stimulating the local development of technolo-
gy; training of local engineers is another. With respect to this subject, different 
opinions can be found in the literature. Kojima has a dear position on the relation-
ship between foreign firm origin and the degree of training local engineers receive. 
In his view, the Japanese type of foreign investments logically results in more 
training possibilities for local engineers since it involves more person-to-person 
contact, from management down to routine operations.63 Nakase, on the other hand, 
came to the conclusion that Japanese foreign enterprises are not very interested in 
the training of local staff." 
Another author who did not agree with Kojima is Taddesse". In his research on 
Japanese joint ventures in the Asean countries, Taddesse points to the restrictive 
technology contracts, as well as some positive aspects for developing countries of 
Japanese technology transfer. He sees a two fold strategy of technology transfer 
from Japanese firms: 
"The transfer of old techniques of declining importance in Japan, to the 
neighbouring east Asian countries, producing standardized and conventional 
products such as textiles and plywood, and a R&D based high technology in 
the sectors of electronics, chemicals and petrochemicals, to the advanced 
countries."" 
According to Taddesse, the technology sold by Japanese firms was much cheaper 
than the technology sold by American firms. The standardized nature of the 
technology and the fact that it was sold at cheaper prices did not mean, however, 
that technology transfer from Japanese firms was better arranged than from 
American firms. In addition, Japanese technology contracts proved to be very 
restrictive.67 The hypothesis of Kojima is not undisputed and several authors have 
come to different conclusions. It is worthwhile to consider these critical comments in 
somewhat more detail. 
2.63. Some critical comments on Kojima 
Summarized briefly, the hypothesis of Kojima makes a distinction between, on the 
one hand, the more traditional Japanese investments, carried out by small and 
medium-sized firms, in industrial sectors favouring the developing country, which 
are more easily incorporated into developing countries and, on the other, large 
American investments in sophisticated industrial sectors, which they monopolize and 
which remain isolated phenomena, more difficult to incorporate.™ 
Most of the authors who criticize Kojima emphasize the fact that he largely 
ignores the dynamic aspects. Kojima bases his conclusions on a static situation in 
which he compares recently internationalized Japanese multinationals with American 
multinationals which possess a much longer history of international production. 
Dunning remarks with respect to the ideas of Kojima: 
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"Empirically, the alleged dichotomy between the patterns of Japanese and US 
direct investment is a false one. (-) Such differences as do exist reflect the 
different stages in the evolution of Japanese and American MNEs as much as 
anything else."® 
Sekiguchi and Krause70 also question the results of Kojima's research. They compare 
American and Japanese foreign investments in the Asean countries, and criticize 
Kojima's claim that there is a difference in the impact of Japanese and American 
multinationals on development: 
"The welfare approach of the Kojima hypothesis is not persuasive and probably 
wrong. (-) It is essentially a partial and static analysis that does not fit the 
dynamics of direct investments. Our belief is that the classical analysis is 
correct and that all direct investment improves welfare unless determined by 
government or private distortions. In particular Kojima may exaggerate the 
welfare benefits of Japanese investments and certainly underestimates welfare 
gains of American investments."71 
Findly, while emphasizing the importance of Kojima's results for further research, 
also suggests that Kojima's hypothesis is based on false assumptions and will have 
only temporary validity. Once Japan graduates from the rank of investor in 
relatively low-wage countries, the suggested benefits of Japanese foreign investments 
will probably be a thing of the past.72 In other words, it is doubtful that Japanese 
firms will continue to concentrate their investments in lower income countries if 
they have more opportunities to invest in Western countries. The figures from the 
United Nations Report on transnational corporations demonstrate that Findle/s 
prediction has already became true: 
"The share of developing countries in Japanese FDI declined from 57 per cent 
in 1975 to 33 per cent in 1986".73 
The focus of Kojima, and with him several other researchers like Sekiguchi and 
Krause, on Japanese foreign investments in South East Asian countries, despite the 
increasing importance of Latin American countries, may also result in biased 
conclusions. Finally, the preference of Japanese companies for investing abroad in 
more traditional industrial sectors was beyond dispute in the seventies. In that 
decade, Japanese companies investing abroad either did not possess the most recent 
technologies, or were not willing to transfer these technologies to overseas sub-
sidiaries, beyond their control. It is questionable whether this is still the practice 
today. 
Despite the absence of dynamic aspects in Kojima's hypothesis, his analysis 
provides an interesting starting point for considering how differences between 
foreign investors in developing countries influence the strategy of the triple alliance 
and the process of dependent development. 
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2.7. The importance of joint ventures for development 
Kojima is clear in that foreign investments are not homogeneous and that a 
difference need to be made between the US type of investments and the Japanese 
type of investments. In order to make the link between the dependent development 
theory and theories of international business, it is necessary to examine the forma-
tion of alliances on firm level. Is it possible that foreign companies origin relates to 
the ability to form and maintain alliances? To answer this question it is necessary to 
correlate the formation of alliances or joint ventures with development of Third 
World countries. One of the authors that makes this connection is Beamish (1988) 
who analyses the impact of joint ventures on development in Third World countries. 
According to Beamish, theories of international business have neglected the impor-
tance of joint venture structures. This is a serious shortcoming since, in the last 
decades, joint ventures have become increasingly important in world production, 
especially in Third World countries.74 Beamish considers investments in the form of 
joint ventures much more beneficial for development than 100% ownership invest-
ments because joint ventures can act as agents for the transfer of technology." 
Taddesse provides a clear definition of joint venture structures: 
"A joint venture is a separately incorporated enterprise in which investors from 
two or more countries commit capital assets, share some degree of management 
responsibility at some level and {participate jointly with full risks of the 
enterprise and when possible neither party receives benefits from the enterprise 
other than through a share of net earning".76 
2.7.1. Motivations for starting joint ventures 
To understand the impact of joint venture ownership on the firm performance of 
subsidiaries in Third World countries, it is important to consider the motives for 
entering into a joint venture. Kogut77 distinguishes different firm motives for 
deciding to share ownership. First, he argues, economic motives are responsible for 
the decision to form a joint venture. Companies want to minimize production costs 
and will only enter into a joint venture structure if the production costs, as a result, 
will be reduced.78 
Strategic motives are the second factor mentioned by Kogut. By entering into a 
joint venture, a company tries to improve its competitive position in comparison to 
other companies in the same branch.7' Third is an organizational motive: the desire 
to obtain what he calls 'tacit knowledge', i.e. knowledge that is organizationally 
embedded and only transferable through joint venture structures, stimulates 
enterprises to share ownership.80 
Kogut's analysis is based on joint venture structures of a general nature and does 
not distinguish different types of joint ventures such as those between two Western 
companies, and between Western companies and local Third World firms, i.e. the 
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so-called foreign/local joint ventures."1 In contrast. Beamish, who concentrates on 
foreign/local joint ventures, mentions five 'needs' which provide an incentive for 
entering a joint venture. Of these five needs, the first three correspond more or less 
to the economic motives identified by Kogut. In the first place, the need for what he 
called 'items readily capitalized' can be a motive for sharing ownership. These items 
consist, for example, of raw materials that are otherwise not available, special 
technologies or equipment. A second need is the availability of human resources, or 
access to a low-cost labour force and the third is access to the market. The fourth 
need, probably of more importance in developing countries than in Western 
countries, is the government/political need. Firms that would otherwise prefer 100% 
ownership, decide to enter into a joint venture because they are induced by certain 
government regulations.'2 Finally, the fifth need Beamish mentions, the need for 
knowledge, corresponds with the final motive of Kogut. But, unlike Kogut, Beamish 
refers with this motive to external knowledge of society more than to knowledge 
embedded in the company itself. General knowledge of the local economy, customs 
and policies are important for a foreign company investing in a developing coun-
try." 
2.7.2. Impact of origin on joint venture participation 
Various reasons for deciding to enter into a joint venture have been mentioned. The 
remarks of Kojima, Dunning and others suggest that foreign firms originating from 
different countries do not necessarily behave in the same way. A further question is 
whether cultural differences between the various foreign investors influence the 
motives of these firms for starting a joint venture. Kogut hypothesizes that: 
"Entry (into joint ventures) could be influenced by cultural characteristics of a 
firms's country of origin".*4 
According to Kogut, American firms, in contrast to European firms, have a negative 
attitude towards participating in joint ventures. The reluctant attitude of American 
companies is well known among researchers who analyze joint venture patterns. In 
research about the attitude of British multinationals, Jones*5 remarks that non-
American multinationals were much more willing to have a local partner or to 
admit local equity participation than American companies. Hladik", who invest-
igated joint venture patterns between American and non-American companies, also 
points to the preference of US multinationals for majority ownership. 
If Japanese companies are compared with American transnational, some authors 
notice a different attitude about entering into joint ventures. Kojima considers 
cultural differences to be a decisive factor in the willingness of Japanese firms to 
enter into joint ventures and he relates these differences to the motives for inter-
nationalizing. According to Kojima, a foreign company prefers direct foreign 
investments so that it can have a strong influence on the ownership pattern of its 
venture. Kojima distinguishes three different motives for direct foreign investments: 
natural resource-oriented foreign investment, labour-oriented investment and market-
25 
oriented investment. He relates these different motives to the origin of the foreign 
firm and identifies a clear difference between the motives of American firms and 
Japanese firms for internationalizing. American firms, he states, invest abroad as part 
of a global strategy in order to maximize monopolistic or oligopolistic profits. 
Therefore, they prefer complete ownership of subsidiaries so that they can protect 
their technological monopoly with patents and prevent technology transfer and 
spread effects.87 The market-oriented motive of American foreign investments 
contrasts strongly with the resource-oriented and labour-oriented motive of Japanese 
foreign investments. According to Kojima, Japanese companies started to invest 
abroad because of a shortage of natural resources in Japan and the relatively high 
labour costs in their country. Due to these different interests, Japanese companies 
show a much more positive attitude toward entering into joint ventures than 
American companies. Another researcher who compares the internal decisionmaking 
processes of Japanese, American and German companies is Negandhi88. Based on his 
survey of 158 subsidiaries in countries all over the world, he concludes that 
Japanese companies in general demonstrate greater willingness to share ownership. 
In Kojima 's footsteps, Sekiguchi and Krause link the different motives of Japanese 
and American firms for internationalizing to attitude about entering into joint 
venture structures. They add, however, an additional motive, not mentioned by 
Kojima, namely the greater responsiveness of Japanese firms to government incen-
tives in host countries or in their own country, which also contributes to the larger 
number of Japanese joint ventures relative to American-shared companies." Taddesse 
also points to the latter motive as a decisive factor for Japanese multinationals 
entering joint ventures: 
"In view of the constraint in the foreign exchange position and anxious to 
minimize the Japanese investors' risks, the (Japanese) government decided to 
encourage joint venture type of investment when approving case by case 
Japanese investors' request for foreign exchange permits.90 
However, the above-mentioned differences between Japanese and American com-
panies suggest a very static view of the attitude of foreign enterprises towards 
shared ownership. Only Jones, who studied British foreign firms, notices that 
attitudes towards participating in joint ventures are subject to change over time. He 
discovers a declining willingness on the part of British transnational corporations to 
form joint ventures which he explains as due to the increasing confidence of these 
international corporations and their increasing knowledge of international markets.91 
It would be interesting to examine whether the changing attitude of British firms 
applies to other foreign companies as well. 
26 
2.8. Stability of joint ventures 
The performance of the foreign/local joint ventures and the stability of these 
ownership structures is significant for industrial development. According to Beamish, 
joint ventures in developing countries are very unstable and frequently -much more 
than in developed countries- end in failures. The stability of joint ventures is 
decisive for developing countries. Stable joint venture structures can form an 
important stimulus for development whereas unstable joint ventures can hinder 
future industrialization in a Third World country.™ Several factors influence the 
stability of a foreign/local joint venture. The first factor, which will be considered in 
the next section, is the participation of state companies in joint ventures. Other 
important factors include the autonomy of the subsidiary, adaptation to local 
circumstances and corporate culture. 
2.8.1. Different attitudes toward state participation 
According to Beamish, state involvement in a joint venture may have a disruptive 
effect. Joint ventures with government partners are characterized by a high degree 
of instability.*3 For the present research which focusses on the strategy of triple 
alliance joint ventures involving one government partner, this statement is of great 
importance. If Beamish is correct, tripe joint ventures are not the most stable 
ownership structures. Although tripe joint ventures are not included in his research, 
Beamish' conclusions about government participation in joint ventures are worth 
mentioning: 
"Most of the time the foreign partners are not very satisfied with the perfor-
mance of the JV when government partners are participating. MNE executives 
favour forming JV with local private firms, over all other forms of foreign 
equi ty-investment."" 
It is doubtful, however, that this attitude will be the same for all foreign enterprises, 
as Beamish seems to assume. One can question whether the stability of a joint 
venture structure will be influenced by the attitude of the foreign participant 
towards state participation. Various authors who analyzed the relationship between 
multinationals and state companies are quite unanimous in their opinion that in 
general Japanese companies have a much more positive attitude towards state 
intervention and participation of state firms in productive sectors than their 
American and European competitors. In part this difference in attitude can be 
ascribed to the close link between the state and the 'sogo shosha', which were 
Japan's pioneering companies in the area of foreign investments. In the overseas 
expansion of Japanese manufacturing, maximum use was made of state capital, due 
to the large overall involvement of the state in the Japanese economy." Dicken'4 
points to the Japanese historical tradition in which the Japanese government is given 
a legitimate role in shaping industrial policy. In his view, Japanese businessmen 
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expect government intervention to stimulate industrialization. In comparison to 
Japan, European countries and the United States have experienced minimal govern-
ment intervention in economic activities. Although the phenomenon of 'state 
enterprise', is almost absent in the Japanese world*7 unlike in European countries, 
the role of the state in the economy in Europe and the United States is relatively 
small compared to Japan. 
It is not exactly clear how this different attitude towards state intervention and 
direct state participation effects the willingness of foreign firms to enter into joint 
ventures with state enterprises and the stability of the joint venture structure. Hladik 
identifies a difference between US and European multinationals with respect to state 
participation: 
"US firms tended to view such arrangements with a great deal of suspicion. 
Unlike European firms, US firms were inclined to reject any such associations 
as inherently evil, as a token of socialization and unacceptable to a free 
enterprise economy."*" 
2.8.2. Control over the joint venture 
The success or failure of a local/foreign joint venture is influenced by the degree to 
which the foreign subsidiary is tied to its parent company. Beamish argues that the 
autonomy of a joint venture is decisive for its performance and that autonomously 
managed ventures had much more positive growth figures than dependent com-
panies." He also notices a negative correlation between dominant foreign control 
and the performance of a company.100 According to Kogut one of the most important 
sources of instability, often resulting in termination of the joint venture, is conflict 
between the foreign parent and the joint venture. These conflicts increase with the 
degree of coordination desired by the parents.10' 
A more autonomous position for the joint venture is, however, not a sufficient 
condition for success. The way in which the shares are divided between the various 
partners is also of importance. Beamish found that shared ownership structures with 
a 50/50 division never worked out very well. The decisionmaking process in the 
company was severely strained by the equal sharing of power. He found instead 
that joint ventures performed better when the foreign partner possessed minority 
shares."" 
With respect to the impact of autonomy on joint venture performance, no 
distinction has been made on the basis of foreign firm origin. Nevertheless, some 
authors point to a correlation between the autonomy of subsidiaries and origin of 
the company. Negandhi found that American subsidiaries have the least autonomy, 
the Japanese the most and the German subsidiaries are somewhere in the middle."D 
Japanese companies rely much more on informal networks between parents and 
subsidiary while European and American firms make use of formalized reporting, 
tying their subsidiaries more closely to the parent. In contrast. Dunning found a 
large degree of autonomy in American companies.,<M Two other authors who 
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disagree with the conclusions of Negandhi are Barlett and Ghoshal.105 These two 
researchers, who analyzed the possibilities of improving management practices in 
global companies, made a clear distinction between the organizational structures of 
Japanese, American and European international companies. They found that Japanese 
multinationals are characterized by a highly centralized organization which ties the 
subsidiaries closely to the parent companies. American companies instead rely on 
professional overseas managers, who have a certain degree of autonomy but are still 
controlled by the US parent. For European multinationals, which originated in 
closely related family conglomerates, informal management practices are very 
important. In many cases managers of European firms who are sent overseas are 
family members or close friends of the family. A high degree of autonomy and 
responsibility for production is delegated to them.104 
Taddesse argues that, despite the minority shares often held by Japanese foreign 
firms, the level of control they execute is rather high. Japanese companies have 
other mechanisms for influencing firm decisions of the joint ventures in which they 
participate. One mechanism for maintaining control is to arrange a high debt equity 
rate for the company. Another method is to appoint a large number of Japanese 
expatriates to vital positions.107 
Barlett and Ghoshal also discuss the use of expatriate managers1™ by the various 
multinational corporations. The degree to which a subsidiary is tied to its parent 
company can be influenced by the number and experience of expatriates that work 
in the company. The number of expatriates is dependent on various factors. The 
first factor is the expense: given the large costs of maintaining expatriates in foreign 
countries, many foreign companies try to minimize the use of foreign managers.109 
Especially larger foreign firms can afford to employ expatriates. Secondly, the 
control factor provides an incentive for the use of expatriates. Most foreign firms do 
not like the idea that a subsidiary is producing beyond the reach of their tight 
control.110 A third factor -which also encourages the use of expatriates- is the lack of 
experienced managers in the host country. In developing countries, this factor is of 
particular importance.111 
The frequency with which expatriates are used and their number may also vary 
by origin of the country. Most authors dealing with the issue, share the opinion that 
Japanese companies make relatively more use of expatriates than European and 
American firms. Dunning states: 
"Whereas the chief executive of 30% of the US subsidiaries in the 1950 was an 
US expatriate, the corresponding figure for Japanese subsidiaries in the mid 
1980s was 85%."112 
Sekiguchi and Krause also emphasize the concentration of decisionmaking in the 
hands of a relatively large staff of Japanese managers.'" Barlett and Ghoshal 
conclude that European companies make much more use of local managers who 
have a relatively large degree of responsibility.114 
Three reasons explain the large number of Japanese managers. Firstly, there is the 
ownership structure of the companies. According to Nakase, the absolute control by 
American parent companies is ensured by a pattern of exclusive ownership over 
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subsidiaries. By contrast, the Japanese subsidiaries are often only partly owned by 
the parent company which makes it necessary to place Japanese personnel in 
various important positions in the subsidiary organization.115 Secondly language and 
cultural differences in part explain the large number of Japanese expatriates. For 
effective communication -and control- between subsidiary and parent company 
knowledge of each other's languages is essential. Japanese executives, however, have 
significant difficulties learning foreign languages, compared to their American or 
European colleagues.1" Thirdly the centralized organizational structure of Japanese 
multinationals provide an explanation. Because all firm decisions need to be taken in 
the headquarters of the company, expatriates form an indispensable link between 
subsidiary and parent."7 Kojima and Negandhi argue that too much dependence of 
the foreign/local joint venture on its foreign parent company leads to negative 
performance by the joint venture. According to Kojima, the large number of 
Japanese expatriates is not positive: 
"Behaviour of the foreign firms and their staff are condemned from various 
points of view: too many Japanese expatriates are present; they herd together 
and do not mingle with the local people; they look forward only to returning 
to the parent company headquarters; local staff are not properly promoted or 
not used in important decision making."11' 
He concludes that much dependence of the subsidiary on the parent company may 
eventually result in failure of the joint venture. This conclusion is supported by 
Negandhi who states that a subsidiary with a high degree of autonomy is better 
accepted by the host country because of the improved growth and survival potential 
of the company."' 
2.8J. Adaptation to local circumstances 
The stability and performance of a foreign/local joint venture is determined by the 
ability of the foreign partner to adapt to the culture of the host country. Adaptation 
is seen as a way to reduce or stabilize conflicts between joint venture partners.120 
The ability and willingness of a foreign firm to comply with local circumstances in 
the host country can be a decisive factor in the success or failure of a joint venture, 
especially if the local situation does not resemble that of the country where the 
parent company is located. Joint ventures in developing countries in particular, 
where cultural values differ most from Western countries, are vulnerable to failures 
caused by different cultural values. 
A number of authors comment on the ability of American, Japanese and Europe-
an enterprises to adapt to local cultures. Nakase, for example, observes that Japanese 
firms had some difficulties adjusting to a completely different cultural situation. 
Racial discrimination against local people and a lack of understanding of the local 
culture, manners, customs, religion, language and the situation of labour unions was 
more characteristic of Japanese subsidiaries. Barlett and Ghoshal also notice cultural 
barriers to the integration of Japanese multinationals in a non-Japanese environ-
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ment.,J1 This is in sharp contrast to European and American companies, which, 
because of their long tradition of overseas involvement, show a much more 
cooperative attitude towards local social and cultural circumstances.122 
Dunning argues that American firms had more difficulty adjusting to the treat-
ment of local employees. American subsidiaries have a very aggressive style of 
labour recruitment and are willing to pay well above the local average wage to 
attract the right kind of labour. This contrasts with Japanese affiliates which are 
highly sensitive to local criticism of their labour policies.123 There is no agreement 
about the differing ability of foreign enterprises to adapt to foreign countries. Even 
less can be said about the impact of differences in adaptation on the success or 
failure of joint ventures in these countries. 
2.8.4. Corporate culture 
Finally, the corporate culture of participating firms is important for the performance 
of foreign/local joint venture structures.124 The success of a joint venture requires 
that the corporate culture of the foreign firm is connected to the corporate culture of 
the local firm in the host country. There are noteworthy differences in the corporate 
cultures of Japanese companies, on the one hand, and European and American 
companies, on the other. The unique 'Japanese management style' is mentioned in 
several publications. Nakase writes for example, about the 'Japanese style of 
management' which consists of 'senior group loyalty' and 'the collective respon-
sibility system."25 
What distinguishes the management style of Japanese from American and 
European firms? Dunning tries to explain the dominance of Japanese management 
style in many joint venture firms: 
"In general, Japanese affiliates in the 1980s would seem to exercise closer 
influence and control over general management philosophy and style than did 
their US counterparts in the 1950s. This is partly a function of the type of 
activity, pattern of ownership and age of the affiliate, but, perhaps more 
significantly, the more holistic approach adopted by the Japanese to decision 
making. The attention paid to encouraging the right work ethic, group be-
haviour and team support, requires an integrated organizational policy, the 
control and monitoring of which must be centralized."126 
In a guide for entrepreneurs who wish to start joint ventures with Japanese 
entrepreneurs, Rowland127 stresses the holistic approach and the group behaviour of 
Japanese managers. Decisions in Japan are never personal decisions; a consensus 
always has to be reached within a large group of participants. Responsibilities must 
be shared and decisions must be unanimous. Rowland compares the group be-
haviour of Japanese managers with the more individualistic style of Western 
decisionmaking and concludes that in the West, more prestige is attached to 
individual desicionmaking, while in Japan such individualistic behaviour would be 
'punished' by the larger group. The different corporate culture of Japanese com-
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panics can create some problems in foreign/local joint ventures when two or more 
kinds of firm management need to be combined. 
Negandhi, finally, draws attention to the fact that these phenomenon are dynamic 
factors which are subject to change. He found that, due to the negative impact of 
the Japanese management style on foreign investments, the Japanese learned to 
restrict the use of this particular characteristic of their corporate culture in order to 
avoid conflicts.1™ 
2.9. Purpose of this research 
Evans' use of the theory of dependent development and the concept of the tripartite 
alliance has contributed to a better understanding of the impressive industrial 
development of Brazil during the seventies. There are some weaknesses in his 
research, however, especially with respect to the role of the foreign partner in the 
triple alliance. Evans bases his conclusions in part on the assumption that all foreign 
enterprises have the common goal of global capital accumulation. The fact that the 
different foreign partners exhibit a different behaviour, which can possibly influence 
the functioning of triple alliances, is, however, neglected. It is, therefore, worthwhile 
to examine the research of Evans in light of the differences between foreign 
enterprises as expressed in theories of international business. 
To facilitate a comparison between the findings of Evans and the findings of this 
research, I chose to conduct research on the firm level in the same country and the 
same industrial sector i.e. the petrochemical sector of Brazil, with special emphasis 
on one petrochemical complex, the complex of Camaçari. This petrochemical 
complex is the most important in Brazil, in economic as well as in political sense, 
and was the main example analyzed by Evans.'29 
2.9.1. Research objective and research questions 
This research starts from the theoretical assumptions of Evans in order to compare 
his findings with those of theorists of international business, such as Kojima and 
Dunning. A second purpose is to evaluate the effectiveness of the triple alliance 
model as used by the Brazilian government for development and to stimulate the 
national petrochemical industry. The objective of this research can be summarized as 
follows: 
"To analyze the contribution of the constellation of the triple alliance to the 
development of the petrochemical industry of Brazil in general and the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari in particular in the previous fifteen years 
with special emphasis on the implications of the origin of the foreign partner." 
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The following research questions are dealt with: 
1. What has been the contribution of the state, the national private bourgeoisie and 
the multinational corporation, in short all participants of the triple alliance, to the 
development of the petrochemical industry in Brazil since the 1950s? 
2. What is the contribution of the triple alliance to the development of the petroche-
mical complex of Camaçari and which changes can be noticed in the respective roles 
of the three partners in the ten years the complex has functioned (1979-1989)? 
3. To what extent have the objectives of the Brazilian government with respect to 
the implementation of the Camaçari petrochemical complex been accomplished? 
4. What has the contribution of the foreign partner in the Camaçari complex been 
with respect to participation in tripartite joint ventures and transfer of technology? 
5. Is it possible to discern differences between American, European and Japanese 
foreign investors in the Camaçari petrochemical complex with respect to participa-
tion in tripartite joint ventures and transfer of technology? 
6. If differences can be discerned, what are the implications of these differences for 
the functioning of the triple alliance model in the petrochemical complex of 
Camaçari? 
2.9.2. Research methods 
To answer these research questions, the following research methods were used. 
Firstly, secondary sources were examined at University libraries in the Netherlands, 
as well as libraries from other institutes like the library of the Economic Information 
Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the documentation of the Dutch 
research institutes 'Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen' (SOMO) and 
Onderzoeksgroep Multinationale Ondernemingen Latijns Amerika' (MOL). 
Field work was carried out in Brazil, periods of three months and of five months 
in 1988 and 1989 respectively. Several institutes in Rio de Janeiro were visited to 
collect secondary data.130 In Sào Paulo, useful secondary data was found in the 
Roberto Simonson library and the library of DIFESE and, in the capital Brasilia, the 
Congress library and the libraries of the Banco do Brasil and the Secretary of 
Industrial Development (SDI) provided useful articles and statistics. Furthermore, 
many newspaper clippings from the Gazeta Mercantil and Folha de Säo Paulo, in 
particular, were used. 
Secondly, in-depth interviews and questionnaires were conducted. To obtain more 
insight into recent developments of the petrochemical industry and to compare 
different opinions, a total of 99 in-depth interviews were held with key informants. 
In the first place, these key informants represented the three kinds of enterprises 
participating in the triple alliance of the petrochemical industry. Nineteen represen-
tatives of the state enterprises Petroquisa, Petrobras and the 'Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social' (ENDES) were interviewed as well as 
representatives of the seven most important national private petrochemical firms. Of 
the foreign petrochemical enterprises, representatives of four American, eight 
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European as well as six Japanese companies contributed to the collection of data. In 
most cases, the president director or one of the other presented directors par-
ticipated in the interviews which took approximately between 1 and 2 hours. 
Furthermore, the opinions of the state bureaucracy were obtained from representa-
tives of relevant Ministries and government institutes such as the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, the Department of Industrial Technology and the SDI. 
Finally, informants of other relevant institutes were interviewed.131 
All executive managers of the chemical firms located on the complex were asked 
for an interview involving a formal questionnaire. From a total number of 44 
operating firms there was a very high response rate- only one firm refused to 
participate- and a total of 43 questionnaires were completed. In 29 cases the General 
Manager answered the questions, in 14 cases one of the other executive managers. 
In genera] the questionnaire took 2 to 2 hour to complete. 
Since the collection of data ended in October 1989, the analysis in this research 
will be limited to this period only. Neither the government policy of President 
Femando Collor de Mello nor his new stabilization programme, nor the influence of 
the Golf crisis which influences the petrochemical industry, will be taken into 
consideration. 
2.10. Summary and conclusions 
The role of multinational enterprises in the industrial development process of Third 
World countries has been researched by dependent development authors. The 
research carried out by Evans in Brazil provides a good understanding of the reason 
why some Third World countries managed to achieve impressive industrial growth 
while others only stagnate. According to Evans, the constellation in which state 
capital, national private capital and foreign capital played complementary roles -the 
so-called triple alliance- was a decisive factor in the explanation of the Brazilian 
economic miracle. 
However, Evans notices some potential threats to the stability of the model which 
could hamper further national capital accumulation and industrial development in 
the Third World country. Only a part of the private national companies was able to 
form alliances with international capital. The exclusion of the other part of the 
national industrial bourgeoisie could be a potential source of conflicts. Also the 
conflicting roles of the state partner, which acts simultaneously as a productive 
entrepreneur, a regulating state institution and a repressive apparatus, could cause 
the triple alliance to fail. 
Although Evans pays a great deal of attention to the role of the foreign partner 
in the triple alliance, he fails to distinguish any difference between companies 
originating from different countries. In his view the multinational companies 
parbcipating in the triple alliance have one common purpose -the global accumula-
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tion of capital. It is questionable whether this assumption still holds true in an 
increasingly globalized economy. 
Since other authors from the dependent development tradition have not answered 
this question either, theories of international business were examined. Kojima, for 
instance, distinguishes dear differences between American and Japanese companies, 
and relates these differences to industrial development in Third World countries. 
Drawing predominantly on macro-economic assumptions, Kojima concludes that the 
influence of Japanese companies on industrial development in Third World countries 
is much more positive than that of American companies. Japanese companies not 
only direct a larger part of their foreign investments to developing countries; their 
foreign subsidiaries also tend to be smaller and invest in more traditional industrial 
sectors, more compatible with existing industries in the host country. According to 
Kojima, Japanese companies are generally more willing to transfer technology. The 
lack of attention to dynamic aspects in his analysis and failure to identify the 
different phases of industrialization of Japanese and American multinationals are 
serious shortcomings. Nevertheless, his hypothesis provides a valuable contribution 
to understanding the role of foreign enterprises in the industrial development of 
Third World countries. 
Because the purpose of this research is to obtain a better understanding of the 
functioning of the triple alliance model, it is necessary to consider the relations of 
foreign capital with private national or state capital. Since these relations are the 
most clear cut in the so-called joint venture structures, literature relating to joint 
ventures was consulted. Several authors examined cultural differences between 
American, European and Japanese multinationals and their attitude towards joint 
ventures. 
Most authors referred to in this chapter agree with the proposition that Japanese 
companies are more willing to participate in joint venture structures than American 
companies. Their more positive attitude towards joint ventures could result in more 
stable joint ventures. Several other factors influence the stability of the joint venture 
as well. In the first place the influence of state partners is thought to be negative. It 
is unclear whether the more positive attitude of Japanese companies towards state 
involvement results in more stable joint ventures. The autonomy of the subsidiary 
versus control of the parent company, is another factor influencing the stability of 
the joint venture. While Negandhi stresses the autonomous character of the Japanese 
subsidiaries, Barlctt and Ghoshal come to slightly different conclusions. Japanese 
companies have a highly centralized organizational structure which ties the sub-
sidiary closely to the parent company. Also, there was no agreement in the litera-
ture about differences in the ability to adapt to local circumstances, the third factor 
influencing the stability of the joint venture. While Nakase stresses the difficulties 
Japanese companies have adapting to local habits. Dunning emphasizes the problem 
of American companies, especially with respect to treatment of local employees. 
A final factor in the stability of joint ventures is the corporate culture. The very 
specific corporate culture of Japanese companies can present some problems when 
two different companies are combined in a joint venture. American and European 
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companies seem to possess a corporate culture that is less particular and more easily 
combined with other firms. 
Although many differences can be distinguished between American, European and 
Japanese foreign companies, a dear understanding of the influence of these differen-
ces on the performance and stability of joint ventures in developing countries cannot 
be distilled. Furthermore, little reference has been made to the role these differences 
play in the functioning of the triple alliance constellation. The purpose of this book 
is, therefore, to elaborate on the correlation of attitudes of multinational enterprises 
from different origins and the functioning of the triple alliance model in the 
petrochemical industry in Brazil. 
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3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, theoretical assumptions with respect to the role multinatio-
nal enterprises play in the industrialisation process of Third World countries were 
presented. The research of Evans, in which he explains the impressive industrial 
growth of Brazil due to the occurrence of a so-called triple alliance, received con-
siderable attention. Although Evans describes several industrial sectors in his 
research, he emphasizes that the petrochemical sector in Brazil was the most 
outstanding example of a triple alliance agreement. In addition to the fact that the 
different types of capital are more or less equally present in the petrochemical 
sector, it is also a sector of a considerable magnitude. For this reason the petroche-
mical sector in Brazil is a good example for investigating the functioning and the 
impact of the triple alliance in a developing country. 
In this chapter the highly integrated character of the chemical sector in general 
will be discussed. The petrochemical branch is strongly related to other branches: 
the petroleum branch and the final chemical branch. Together these branches form 
the chemical sector. The characteristics of the three branches will be described 
respectively in the first section. Since the petrochemical branch is the main subject in 
this book, the remainder of this chapter will concentrate on this branch only. 
A brief view of the international development of petrochemical production can 
give some idea of the role and position of the Brazilian petrochemical industry in 
the world. Therefore in section 3.3. the development of petrochemical production on 
a global scale will be outlined. From this part of the chapter it is possible to see 
that Brazil is ranked as 11th largest petrochemical producer in the world. This is 
noteworthy because Brazil can neither be included among the large oil producing 
developing countries, like Mexico, Venezuela and Indonesia, nor can it be compared 
with Western countries that base their petrochemical industry on imported oil. 
How Brazil reached the 11th place and the manner in which the petrochemical 
industry in Brazil developed, are interesting questions. To answer these questions, 
some general economic figures concerning the demand structure, the production 
structure and the balance of trade of the petrochemical industry will be presented in 
section 3.4. From these figures it is clear that the petrochemical industry experienced 
a tremendous growth from the sixties to the end of the eighties. 
In section 3.5. some reasons for this growth will be presented: in the period 1960 -
1980 three petrochemical complexes were created with a present total ethylene 
capacity of over 12 million tons annually. In the sixties, the petrochemical industry 
began in the Sâo Paulo region where separate enterprises developed around the 
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metropolis. The second impulse for the petrochemical industry was given by the 
Camaçari petrochemical complex, which started production in 1979 and is situated 
in the north-eastern region, in the state of Bahia. Finally, the third petrochemical 
complex was constructed in the extreme south of Brazil, in the state Rio Grande do 
Sul. This Polosul complex started production in 1982. 
Despite the fluctuating demand and production figures in the petrochemical 
industry during the seventies, prospects looked so bright by the second half of the 
eighties that a National Petrochemical Programme was implemented in 1987 which 
included a plan for the expansion of petrochemical production. The details of this 
programme can be found in section 3.6. 
Finally, for a better understanding of the development of the Brazilian petrochemi-
cal industry, the shift from basic and intermediary chemicals to fine chemicals is 
important. World wide petrochemical producers seem to have increased their 
investments in fine chemical production such as pharmaceuticals and agricultural 
chemicals. This tendency is also of great significance in Brazil. 
3.2. Characteristics of the chemical and petrochemical industry 
Vertically, the chemical sector is a highly integrated sector; the output of one 
chemical branch forms the input for another chemical branch. In order to have a 
good understanding of the development and the role of the petrochemical branch, it 
is necessary to have a clear view of the chemical sector in general and the interrela-
tions between the various branches within this sector. The petroleum branch can be 
found at the beginning of the chemical chain, followed by the petrochemical branch. 
The chain is closed by the final chemical branch. 
3.2.1. The petroleum branch 
The basic materials used by the chemical sector are provided by the petroleum 
branch which constitutes an important part of the chemical sector in regard to 
production value and value added. The activities of this branch consist of the 
exploration for crude oil and gas, the refining of oil and gas, and the distribution of 
gasoline and diesel. The most important raw material is crude oil. After refining, 
products like naphtha, gasoline, petrol and diesel, amongst others, are obtained. 
(see figure 3.1.). A large number of these products are used as input for other 
chemical branches and are not sold directly to consumers. 
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Figure 3.1. ¡Derivatives from one barrel crude oil in 1985 in percentages 
Щ LPG-8% 
Q Gasoline-17% 
Ц Naphta-11% 
0 Kerosine- 6% 
• Diesel- 32% 
Щ others- 26% 
source: Petrobras, 1986 
This branch is highly capital intensive in nature and production takes place on a 
large scale. A sophisticated technology is used which is not subject to rapid 
changes. This implies that only very large firms are able to participate due to the 
high capital risks. Therefore, worldwide, the petroleum branch is dominated by 
either large transnational corporations or by state-owned companies. 
3.2.2. The petrochemical branch 
The petrochemical industry can be defined as an industry producing synthetic 
organic chemicals using petroleum or gas fractions.' The inputs used in the petro­
chemical branch can vary: the most commonly used are naphtha and natural gas. 
Alcohol however, may form an alternative input as well as other sub-products 
derived from refining oil, like residual gas. While naphtha, as stated earlier, 
originates from oil refineries, natural gas is a direct feed-stock that docs not need 
any further treatment. Gas is less flexible in use and the range of products that can 
be produced is limited.2 
Petrochemical production includes more than 1000 individual products that are 
arranged in a particular industrial chain. In this chain a distinction is made between 
three different production groups: the basic production group or first generation; the 
intermediate production group or second generation and the final production group 
or third generation. The first generation of products is produced in a central 
cracking unit. Here, at the heart of the petrochemical complex, feedstock such as 
naphtha - which can be used as input for the second generation, the down stream 
petrochemical firms - is transformed. Several products can be derived: firstly the 
olefines such as benzene, ethylene, propylene, butane and the like; secondly, 
43 
aromatics such as esthyrene, toluene and xylene; and, finally, the products distilled 
from synthetic gas. (see figure 3.2.) 
In the second generation firms, the olefines and aromatics are transformed into 
intermediary products like, for example, the styrene, vinyl chloride, caprolactam and 
monomers. The output of the second generation firms may be used as input for the 
third generation firms but third generation firms can make direct use of output 
from the first generation as well. In the third generation, a large range of final 
chemicals are produced, divided into five sub-group«: thermoplastics such as 
polyethylene, PVC, polystyrene and polypropylene; synthetic rubbers; synthetic 
fibers, like nylon and polyester; fertilizers, like urea; and detergents.' 
The bulk of the goods produced by the petrochemical industry can not be con-
sidered final products. They serve as input for the secondary processing industries, 
which are called the fourth generation. The automotive industry that is supplied 
with syntectic rubber tires is an example of a fourth generation branch; the textile 
industry using nylon threads another. 
Three characteristics are of importance in the petrochemical branch. Firstly, the 
branch is highly capital intensive which means that a large scale is needed for 
efficient production. Investment costs per produced unit are, therefore, relatively 
high. Smaller firms are less able to participate, given the need to mobilize large 
capital resources and take on substantial financial risks. Secondly, the petrochemical 
industry requires sophisticated Research and Development. To obtain a better 
understanding of the technology requirements of the chemical sector, it is necessary 
to analyze the concept 'technology' in somewhat more detail. A distinction needs to 
be made between process technology and product technology. 
Process technology is the technology needed for the improvement of the produc-
tion process in order to obtain higher production figures at lower costs. For the 
petrochemical industry, this type of technology is the most important. In general, 
the improvement of the production process in the petrochemical industry focuses on 
reducing the energy costs, for two reasons. First is the enormously high energy 
needs of the petrochemical industry and second is the relatively small variation in 
inputs. In the last decades, good progress has been made with respect to technologi-
cal process improvement. As a result, in order to reduce energy costs further, an 
even more sophisticated and thorough R&D is needed.4 Firms that wish to par-
ticipate in this branch must either have access to the newest developed technologies 
or must heavily invest in Research and Development themselves. 
The second type of technology, product technology, is of minor importance for the 
petrochemical industry. Product technology is the technology needed to innovate 
products themselves; in other words, to invent new products in order to conquer 
new markets or to beat competitors. Logically, this kind of technology is more 
important in industrial branches closer to the consumer, such as the pharmaceutical 
branch. The petrochemical branch, however, as a supplier of inputs to the consumer 
industry, is less dependent on product innovation. 
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Figure 3.2. The different petrochemical generations and their interrelations with the petroleum 
and the fínal chemical branch 
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Finally, the third characteristic of the petrochemical branch is the specific nature of 
the labour force. In order to reach high efficiency levels, well-trained employees are 
needed. Compared to other industrial branches, the labour force in petrochemical 
production is rather small but highly skilled. The place of the petrochemical branch 
in the industrial sector as a whole is characterized by the relatively large importance 
of its backward and forward linkages. Backward linkages are generated in the 
capital goods industry in particular, while forward linkages can be found in the 
fourth generation, i.e. the secondary processing industry. 
3.2.3. The final chemical branch 
The last group of firms that composes the chemical industry is formed by the final 
chemicals. Suarez5 makes a distinction between fine chemicals and other final 
chemicals like textile, plastics, fertilizers and the like. The names are the source of 
some confusion but fine chemicals can be considered a sub-branch of the final 
chemical branch, (see figure 3.2.) The definition 'fine chemicals' is used to indicate 
the more sophisticated final chemical products, such as pharmaceutical products, 
insecticides and the like. The inputs of this branch of final products are formed, 
although not exclusively, by the intermediary products from the second and third 
generation of the petrochemical branch. Because of its disparate nature, a wide 
variety of products can be found in this branch, varying from insecticides or plastic 
bags to aspirins. 
Although it is difficult to generalise about the final chemical branch as a whole, it 
can be said that its characteristics differ from those of other branches in the 
chemical sector. Among these characteristics is the relatively low level of capital 
investment per unit produced. As a result, economies scale are of less importance 
and smaller firms are, therefore, more easily able to participate. However, the high 
level of product technology and the necessarily high costs of Research and Develop-
ment are a barrier to participation by small firms in some sub-branches, such as the 
fine chemical and pharmaceutical sub-branch. In addition to the high technological 
level, the applied technologies change very rapidly, making it difficult for smaller 
firms to compete with large transnational corporations. Exceptions include the plastic 
-except for the engineering plastics- and the fertilizer sub-branch, with their 
relatively simple technology. 
The high value added of some of the final chemical sub-branches distinguishes 
this branch from the petroleum and petrochemical branch. The value added of the 
fine chemical sub-branch in particular is substantial. Again, the plastic and fertilizer 
sub-branch are exceptions. As in the petrochemical branch the labour force is small 
but highly skilled; except for mass production in the plastic industry, in which a 
large number of unskilled labourers can be found. Patent and mark registration and 
advertizing are especially important for the fine chemical sub-branch. According to 
Hagenauer, these present greater barriers to participation in the branch than the 
high technological level.' The marketing of pharmaceuticals, for example, is largely 
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based on commercials and advertisements. This makes it very difficult for smaller, 
unknown firms, to enter the market 
Due to its specific characteristics, the fine chemical sub-branch is dominated by 
transnational corporations. This contrasts with the plastic and fertilizer sub-branch in 
which smaller nationally owned firms can also be found. Hagenauer states that only 
5% of all firms producing fertilizers are in foreign hands and the production of 
plastic consumer goods takes place in some 2.600 small private national firms and 
only a few large transnationals.7 
3.3. The development of the petrochemical industry on a world scale 
The petrochemical industry is a relatively young sector of production. The produc-
tion of isopropyl alcohol out of refinery gas by Standard Oil of Ohio in 1920 is 
generally seen as the first step in the direction of petrochemical production.8 The 
Second World War provided an enormous stimulus for this industrial branch -the 
rate in which new technologies for petrochemical production were invented was 
impressive- and in the United States in particular, production increased considerably. 
From the start of petrochemical production, the United States was considered the 
world leader, a position which it still maintains. After World War 11 the production 
of petrochemicals began in European countries as well, but this production was 
based on the feedstock naphtha. Because of the higher costs involved in this 
production process, production increasingly took place in integrated petrochemical 
complexes.' The dominance of US and European companies diminished when 
Japanese firms started producing at the beginning of the sixties. Based on imported 
technology Japan began to construct its own petrochemical complexes. In the 
eighties, another group of participants joined the international producers of petro-
chemicals: the developing countries and the countries of the Middle East. In figure 
3.3. the importance of different regions based on the production of ethylene" is 
presented. Noteworthy is the increasing share in the category of Others' during the 
last decades. Developing countries and the Middle East are included in this 
category. 
With such a large number of players in the international petrochemical scene, the 
production increased considerably. In 1920, the world production of petrochemicals 
was only a few hundred tons; in 1950 production had increased to 3.5 million andin 
1976 it reached 70 million tons. Between 1953 and 1978 the annual growth averaged 
14%." At the end of the seventies, the boom in petrochemical production began to 
slow down, however. The first oil crisis of 1973 resulted in an increase in feedstock 
prices and the overcapacity of production led to saturation of the market. Further-
more, the rate of innovations slowed down considerably as it became apparent that 
the benefits of the economies of scale had reached their limits. 
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Figure 3.3. Regional share of ethylene capacity in percentages 
100%-
L 
year 1960 
СП- US 
B S - Europe 
(SS- Jnpan 
^Ш- others 
1965 1970 1976 1985* 
1985: estimated production capacity source: Tcixeira, 1987 
To give an idea of Brazil's place in international petrochemical production, ethylene 
production is once again referred to. In table 3.1. ethylene production in several 
countries is presented, demonstrating the absolute dominance of the US and the 
important place of Japan as the second largest producer. Also, the position of up 
and coming countries like such as Saudi Arabia, China, Mexico and Taiwan, is 
shown. In the ranking of ethylene producing countries, Brazil is 11th. 
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3.4. The economic development of the Brazilian petrochemical branch 
In order to provide more information on the development of the Brazilian petroche 
mical sector, the demand for petrochemical products, the production figures of the 
petrochemical industry and the balance of trade of the branch will be described in 
this paragraph. 
Table 3.1. The most important installations of ethylene in the world in 1985 (X 1000 ton/ 
annually) 
US 
Japan 
Germany 
USSR 
Holland/Belgium 
France 
Canada 
16.300 
4.500 
4.000 
2.800 
2.700 
2.500 
2.200 
Saudi Arabia 
Italy 
Brazil 
China 
Taiwan 
Spain 
Mexico 
1.600 
1.500 
1.400 
1.300 
1.000 
950 
940 
source: Petro & Gas, 1986 
3.4.1. Fluctuating demand for petrochemical products 
In the sixties, the Brazilian industrial sector experienced a period of impressive 
growth. In this period, known as Brazil's 'economic miracle', GNP growth figures of 
more than 10% where reached. As a rule of thumb the petrochemical sector will 
experience a growth of 1.5% with a GNP growth of 1%. So, due to the large degree 
of industrialisation, the internal demand for petrochemical products increased 
rapidly. In figure 3.5. the internal demand for the most important petrochemical 
products - thermoplastics originating from the third generation - for the seventies 
and early eighties is presented. The increase in demand for low density polyethyle-
ne (PEBD) was particularly impressive. The average growth rate in the demand for 
petrochemical thermoplastics between 1968 and 1983 was 13.7%." Between 1979 and 
1982, however, a relative stagnation occurred. The growth of demand increased only 
slightly for low density polyethylene and polypropylene. The demand for polys-
tyrene declined sharply. This stagnation was due to the two oil crises of 1973 and 
1979, which dragged Brazil into a heavy recession at the beginning of the eighties." 
In the second half of the eighties, the economy recovered and the internal demand 
began to rise once again: in 1987, the internal demand for petrochemical inter-
mediate products increased by 15 to 20%. 
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Figure 3.4. Brazilian internal demand of thermoplastics between 1970 and 1985, (X 1000 ton) 
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3.4.2. Production growth and stagnation 
National production of petrochemicals in Brazil grew significantly in the seventies. 
As can be seen in figure 35., the production of the five major thermoplastics 
increased considerably. During the eighties this growth slowed down, however. In 
addition to the economic recession, this stagnation was caused by the low profitabi­
lity of petrochemical production due to heavy price controls implemented by the 
government agency CIP.14 While inflation increased continuously during this period 
and unions demanded salary increases in line with this high inflation rate, the CIP 
allowed the petrochemical firms only moderate price increases. 
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Figure 3.5. Brazilian petrochemical production of thermoplastics between 1970 and 1985, (X 
1000 ton) 
High Donbity I'olyvmyldonde Low Density Polypropylene Polystyrene 
Polyethylene Polyethylene 
source: Annual reports Petroquisa and Abiquim 
Furthermore, the increasing prices of input after the two oil-shocks heavily effected 
the Brazilian petrochemical industry since petroleum was both the main source of 
feedstock and the most important energy supplier. 
In the second half of the eighties the prospects for the petrochemical industry 
seemed to brighten. While in 1984 the growth of petrochemical production was only 
4%, in 1985 a growth of 10% was realised.15 Some products such as polypropylene, 
even experienced a growth of 25%." But looking at the growth figures for basic 
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petrochemical production and the production of some thermoplastics during the 
years 1984 to 1988, the increase in production proved very temporary (see table 
3.2.). At the end of the decade, the situation for the petrochemical industry as a 
whole appeared once again to be precarious. Although there was eventually a 
growth in production, it was very moderate indeed and was interrupted by 
stagnation. There was a slightly upward trend in the production of most of the 
basic petrochemicals; with respect to the production of the major thermoplastics, 
however, only the production of PVC increased from 1984 to 1988, while production 
of the other thermoplastics decreased. 
An explanation for the production figures which lagged behind expectations can 
once again be found in the strict G P regulations, which negatively effected the 
profitability of the petrochemical industry. With salary adjustments in 1988 and 1989 
totalling 5000%, price adjustments of 'only' 3000% were considered highly insuffi-
cient17. The low profitability did not provide an incentive for increasing production. 
Table 3.2. Production figures for basic petrochemicals and thermoplastics in the Brazilian 
petrochemical industry, 1984-1988 (X 1000 ton) 
year/ 
basic 
petrochemicals 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Ethylene 
Butane 
Propene 
Benzene 
Toluene 
Xylene 
Naphthalene 
1.262 
197 
674 
490 
141 
362 
11 
1.304 
220 
824 
515 
184 
363 
13 
1.306 
205 
719 
524 
174 
151 
14 
1.291 
193 
684 
469 
125 
169 
9 
1.307 
203 
710 
484 
135 
84 
10 
Thermoplastics 
PEAD· 
PEBD 
PS 
PVC 
208 
508 
116 
326 
214 
585 
151 
361 
234 
698 
185 
406 
194 
450 
80 
334 
188 
442 
75 
346 
PEBD = Low Density Polyethylene 
PEAD = High Density Polyethylene 
PVC = Polyvinylcloride 
PS = Polystyrene 
source: Veja, may 1989 
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3.4.3. Impressive change in balance of trade 
The influence of the petrochemical industry on the Brazilian balance of trade was 
negative during the seventies but has shown a positive trend during the last decade. 
In the seventies the growth of national petrochemical production proved to be 
insufficient to satisfy the high internal demand, which resulted in an increase in 
petrochemical imports. As the export of petrochemicals was negligible, the balance 
of trade for petrochemicals during these years highly deteriorated, (see figure 3.7.). 
From the beginning of the eighties, this situation gradually changed. After 1980, the 
export of petrochemicals started to increase rapidly. Whereas the export coefficient 
was a negligible 2.7% in 1980, it has increased to 40% in 1984, turning the petroche­
mical branch into a very important export sector." 
The reasons for this change can be found in the demand/production structure of 
the petrochemical industry. The second oil shock in 1979 not only effected the 
petrochemical industry negatively, but also resulted temporarily in overall stagnation 
of the Brazilian economy. Just at that time, the petrochemical industry had increased 
itscapacity considerably and not enough customers could be found to buy its 
products. The solution was found outside the country. During this particular period, 
the international demand for petrochemical products was relatively high and, 
although world market prices were much lower than internal Brazilian prices, export 
of excess production was seen by the petrochemical branch as the only solution. 
"The Brazilian petrochemical industry (-) developed a vigorous force as exporter by 
using its overcapacity during a recessive period. The exports constituted an adequate 
solution for the observed reduction in the internal consumption."19 Thus from the 
beginning of the 80s, Brazil started to export part of its petrochemical production. 
As can be seen in figure 3.7. the balance of trade for all major petrochemical plastics 
was positive in 1982. 
In the second half of the eighties, and especially after the Cruzado plans20, the 
situation changed. As part of the Cruzado plans, the government installed a restric­
tive price policy in 1986 which resulted, among other things, in prices for 
petrochemical products that were far below world market prices. As a result of the 
general freeze of almost all prices, internal demand, especially for consumer goods, 
increased rapidly and became difficult to satisfy. Consequently, in the second half of 
the 80s the demand for petrochemical products, a necessary input for the production 
of a large amount of durable consumer goods, started to rise as well. Because the 
petrochemical producers were afraid to loose important market segments, they had 
to fulfill this internal demand. Thus, despite the more attractive prices paid on the 
international market, compared to the Brazilian internal market, the amount of 
exports declined. Whereas in 1985 the total amount of petrochemical exports reached 
over 1.6 million US dollars, in the year thereafter this figure fell to 1.3 million US 
dollars.21 The export coefficient, which was 40% in 1984 and 1985, declined sharply 
to only 20% in 1986.и 
From the above is clear that, despite periods of severe instability during previous 
decades, the overall trend within the petrochemical branch has been positive: 
53 
production is still increasing moderately and the surplus in the balance of trade 
although smaller than at the beginning of the eighties- is still significant. How did a 
developing country like Brazil realize such impressive petrochemical development, 
transforming it from a net importer to an exporter of petrochemical products? How 
did Brazil manage to change its petrochemical balance of trade from a total deficit 
of 380 million US dollars in 1980 into a surplus of 609 million US dollars in 1985?23 
Figure 3.6. The commercial balance of the Brazilian petrochemical industry between 1970 and 
1985, (X 1000 ton) 
R R К L _ 
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I Imports 
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• balance 
source: Pctroquisa and Abiquim 
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3.5. The construction of the petrochemical complexes 
The impressive development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry is largely due 
to the creation of three petrochemical complexes. In this section, the history of the 
three petrochemical complexes that were constructed between 1960 and 1982 will be 
outlined, followed by the description of the National Petrochemical Programme 
(PNP) including the further development of the industry. 
3.5.1. The Säo Paulo complex, the first petrochemical producers 
The first petrochemical firms in Brazil were established in Sâo Paulo, the industrial 
heart of Brazil. In 1959 a rubber firm was constructed under the control of the state 
company Petrobras, with technical know how obtained from the American trans-
nationals Goodyear and Firestone. Because the petrochemical intermediaries, used as 
input for this rubber-plant, needed to be imported, two petrochemical projects were 
designed in order to substitute for these imports. Union Carbide, an American-based 
transnational, constructed a plant with a production capacity of 120.000 tons 
ethylene per year, which made use of a new type of cracker known as the Wulff 
cracker. Capuava, a national firm with experience in the oil-refining sector, decided 
to build an ethylene plant with an annual production capacity of 167.000 ton. 
Although for both projects the initial period was marked by many technical 
problems, they can be considered the pioneering companies in what later became 
the first petrochemical complex in Brazil. 
In 1985 the Sâo Paulo complex consisted of 25 petrochemical down stream 
enterprises scattered throughout this huge industrial metropolis. The Capuava 
company became the heart of the petrochemical complex: the central cracking unit, 
Petroquímica Uniäo (PqU). PqU began operation in 1972 with a capacity, measured 
in ethylene production, of 360 thousand tons annually. In 1982 the company suc-
ceeded in reaching a production level slightly higher than full capacity: in that year 
369 thousand tons of ethylene were produced, all of which were sold to the 
Brazilian down stream enterprises.24 In addition to ethylene, the Säo Paulo complex 
produces benzene, polypropylene, butane, toluene and several petrochemical 
intermediary products. At the central cracking unit 770 persons were employed in 
1986.* Investments in the Sâo Paulo complex totalled 2.1 billion US dollar. 
3.5.2. The Camaçari complex: an integrated complex 
Although the establishment of the Sâo Paulo petrochemical firms was an important 
step in the direction of the national production of petrochemicals, production was 
not sufficient to satisfy the increasing demand in the seventies. 
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Figure 3.7. Location of petrochemical complexes in Brazil 
source: Petrobras,1987 
Therefore, the policy of import substitution -which had already been introduced in 
other industrial sectors under the government of President Vargas (1937-1954)M, and 
was continued by President Kubitscheck (1956-1960)- was extended to other branches 
of the industrial sector such as the petrochemical branch. The main objective was to 
increase national petrochemical production in order to reduce imports and satisfy 
national demand. The government institution CNP27 supported this objective with 
the creation of a refinery in Cuba tao, which made use of the process of 'craqua-
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mento termico'. Using this method, a larger amount of gas, which can be used as 
basic material for the petrochemical industry, can be refined. 
In the early seventies, during the administration of President Geisel (1974-1981), 
plans were made to construct a second petrochemical complex in Brazil. The 
decision concerning the location of the complex provoked extensive discussions 
between the federal bureaucracy and the institutions of the state Bahia supported by 
regional entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and the entrepreneurs from Sâo Paulo, on 
the other." The first groups used their political influence to persuade the national 
government that the establishment of a new petrochemical complex should take 
place in Bahia. They used three kinds of arguments: firstly, an economic argument 
pointing to the fact that 80% of all oil production in Brazil originates from Bahia. 
Secondly, a security argument, stating that further petrochemical development in the 
Sâo Paulo region would increase the countries vulnerability during wartime. Finally, 
a development argument, focussed on the status of Bahia as one of the most 
backward states in the country. The dynamic petrochemical sector, with its extensive 
forward and backward linkages, could trigger regional development. 
The dispute was settled in favour of the first groups and at the end of the sixties 
the decision was taken to construct a second petrochemical complex in the state of 
Bahia near the state capital Salvador. In 1970 a special committee within the CD! 
was formed to plan the implementation of the complex. A French consultant was 
contracted, the BEICIP,B to conduct a feasibility study and to research basic 
engineering possibilities.30 The north-east petrochemical complex is situated in an 
area between the villages Camaçari, (from which the complex has its name) and 
Dias D'Avila. It is located at a distance of approximately 80 kilometer from the state 
capital Salvador in a more or less flat area, large enough to locate a petrochemical 
complex and far enough from population centers to reduce the danger of pollution. 
In 1974 construction of the central cracking unit, Copene, began. This first genera-
tion firm, with a capacity to produce 388 thousand tons ethylene annually, started 
production in 1979. More or less simultaneously, 17 downstream enterprises were 
constructed. 
The complex faced an extremely difficult start. Despite all favourable projections, 
the internal market did not develop as predicted. In 1978, before the complex even 
started production, it was estimated that the approximately 300.000 tons of petroche-
micals it would produce could not be absorbed by the internal market.31 To solve 
this problem of internal oversupply an export strategy was designed. This strategy 
worked successfully and the petrochemical complex was able to start production for 
both the internal and the international market. However, in 1980 internal demand 
diminished drastically resulting in a decrease in the volume of the internal market 
by 30%. In this period, it seemed impossible to solve the problem just by increasing 
exports because the projections of international demand for petrochemical products 
were not as favourable as it had been two years earlier. Since it seemed unlikely 
that the export strategy would work again, the firms in the petrochemical complex 
came into serious problems: their initial investment costs were not yet paid off and 
large debts weighed heavily on the financial balances of the enterprises. The 
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national government was inclined to subsidize exports of petrochemicals in order to 
make Brazilian exports competitive internationally and to increase the profitability of 
the firms. The CACEX, a government institution which coordinates foreign trade, 
had to implement measures for the purpose of providing incentives to petrochemical 
enterprises. These incentives made it worthwhile for the petrochemical firms to 
export which guaranteed the continuation of full production in the complex.32 As a 
consequence, not only the downstream enterprises exported their products; the 
central cracking unit, Copene, which reached its full capacity in 1982, also exported 
over 10 thousand tons of ethylene that year.33 
Increasing internal demand for petrochemicals during the second half of the 
eighties stimulated the production of the Bahian complex and, by 1986, Camaçari 
was already the most important petrochemical complex of the country. In that year 
1.081.000 tons of basic materials were produced, consisting of 416.000 tons ethylene, 
240.000 tons propylene, 70.000 tons butone, 197.000 tons benzene, 48.000 tons or-
thoxylene and 110.000 tons propyxylene. In 1987, Camaçari was responsible for 55% 
of the national production of petrochemicals. 
In the first generation plant, Copene, 1.603 persons were employed, and in the 
complex as a whole, 24.500 persons. During the 10 years of its existence, the 
number of down stream enterprises increased considerably and in 1989 some 50 
firms were located within its borders. Total investments between 1972 and 1987 
were equivalent to 5 billion US dollars.3* 
3.53. The Rio Grande do Sul complex: Polosul 
Due to the good prospects for Brazil's petrochemical industry at the beginning of 
the seventies, the national government decided to plan a third complex. The equip-
ping of the new complex with a central cracking unit, Copesul, with the largest 
production capacity in Brazil was an indication of the high expectations of the 
Brazilian entrepreneurs at that time. With an annual capacity of 420 thousand tons 
ethylene, future expansions of the downstream enterprises could take place without 
any problem. 
As in the case of the Camaçari complex, extended discussions were necessary 
before a decision could be made regarding the location of the new complex. The 
extreme south of Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, was considered to be the most accep-
table location for a third integrated petrochemical complex. The most important 
reason for this decision was that 20% of the internal market for petrochemical 
products was located in the southern states. In addition to this, international 
markets in the southern cone of Latin America could easily be reached from Rio 
Grande do Sul. Furthermore, the strengthening of regional entrepreneurial groups 
was considered to be an important factor in industrial decentralization. A fourth 
factor in this decision was the political lobby exercised by state technocrats and 
entrepreneurs of Rio Grande do Sul. As early as 1965 a group of researchers, 
originating primarily from the BDRE (Banco de Desenvolvimento Regional Economi-
se 
co), designed a project for the construction of the petrochemical complex in Rio 
Grande do Sul. Finally, the Federal government -Rio Grande do Sul is the home 
state of President Geisel- together with the regional state bureaucracy can be 
credited with the decision to locate the complex in Rio Grande do Sul.35 
The petrochemical complex "Polo Petroquimico do Sul" -Polosul as it is called- is 
located between the villages Triunfo, Montenegro and Canoas, approximately 55 
kilometers north-west of Porto Alegre, the state capital of Rio Grande do Sul. In 
1982, the central cracking unit, Copesul, started the production of ethylene, propyle-
ne, butane and benzene. Polosul began production at an unfortunate moment in 
Brazil's recent history. The economic recession was most severe and internal demand 
for petrochemicals had drastically fallen. As a result, many of the petrochemical 
firms projected for the Polosul complex had to be cancelled and Copesul produced 
at only 45% of its capacity. Like the Camaçari complex, Polosul had to look for a 
solution outside Brazil, in the international market. Aided by the export subsidies of 
the CACEX, Polosul started to export part of its ethylene production. In relative 
figures, the southern complex became the Brazilian complex with the highest export 
figures. In 1984, 29.7% of total production of Copesul was exported, as compared to 
15% of the production of Copene and 9.3% of PqU.36 This did not result, however, 
in positive financial outcomes. Although a positive balance was reached in 1985, the 
following year once again showed a deficit and things only began to clear up 
somewhat at the end of the decade. In 1986, the total production of the central 
cracking unit increased and full capacity of 453.000 tons of ethylene was reached. 
Angrisani, the director of Copesul, remarked: 
"For 1987 we hope that the results of the complex will compensate the losses of 
past year. Maybe it will be possible to zero the negative results at the end of 
1987".37 Because of the fluctuating economic situation, in 1988, six years after the 
complex came on stream, only 6 downstream plants began production.38 In the 
central cracking unit, 1.551 persons are employed as compared to 6,300 in the 
total complex. Total investments between 1975 and 1985 were 1.3 billion US 
dollar." 
3.6. The National Petrochemical Programme (PNP) 1987-1995 
As mentioned before, by the end of the eighties prospects for expansion of the 
petrochemical branch were once again favourable: the internal and international 
demand for petrochemical intermediate products increased. Since the ethylene 
capacity of the central cracking units of the three petrochemical complexes proved 
insufficient to satisfy this demand, the Brazilian government decided that an 
expansion of the petrochemical production was most necessary. Several seminars 
and congresses were organised during which representatives of the government and 
the private petrochemical industry discussed the various possibilities for expansion. 
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Photograph 1: The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
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Photograph 2: The special infrastructure of the basic material 
complex 
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As if history was repeating itself, the main point of discussion was where to realise 
this expansion. Two possible options were proposed. The first consisted of the 
expansion of one of the three already existing central cracking units and the increase 
of the number of downstream enterprises in the existing petrochemical complexes. 
The second option implied the creation of a new complex near Rio de Janeiro. 
The respective governors of the states involved were anxious to attract future 
industries and all of them highlighted the favourable prospects that the petrochemi-
cal industry would find in their state. The governor of Rio Grande do Sul argued 
that in the Polosul complex not enough second generation plants were established to 
guarantee a sufficient outlet for the ethylene capacity of the central cracking unit. 
The existing excess capacity of this plant made expansion of the downstream firms 
necessary. He was supported by Pedro Simon, then the deputy of state, who would 
later become governor. 
Waldir Pires, the governor of Bahia tried to convince the federal bureaucracy that 
the Camaçari complex would offer the most propitious solution. He was supported 
by Molinos, the commercial director of Copene, who predicted only disadvantages 
for the petrochemical branch if a completely new petrochemical complex in Rio de 
Janeiro was created. Molinos argued that the majority of second generation firms in 
the Brazilian petrochemical branch was concentrated in Bahia. And because of the 
steadily increasing demand for products from already existing down stream 
enterprises expansion of the production capacity of Copene was necessary. Further-
more, the fact that the infrastructure already existed in the Bahian complex could 
reduce the time necessary to complete expansion. Whereas it would take seven years 
to construct a new complex, expansion of Camaçari could be realised within only 
four years. Consequently, investment costs would be much lower compared to the 
costs of the Rio de Janeiro alternative. A further disadvantage of a future Rio 
complex would be that gas, which would be used as a raw material in the new Rio 
complex, limits the range of intermediaries that can be produced to olefines only. 
The use of naphtha in Camaçari offered a much broader range of products.40 
Naturally the proposal to construct the new complex near Rio de Janeiro was 
heavily supported by the bureaucracy of the state of Rio de Janeiro. More surprising 
was the support received from some important entrepreneurs of petrochemical firms 
located in Sâo Paulo. The reason that the latter in particular, the so-called 'paulista' 
entrepreneurs, were in favour of the Rio de Janeiro complex is clear. Physical 
expansion of the existing petrochemical firms in the Sio Paulo region is almost 
impossible due to the lack of space. Furthermore, the danger of increasing pollution 
curtailed further industrial growth in the Sao Paulo region. 
An important entrepreneur of the Sao Paulo petrochemical complex, Michael 
Hartveld41, was one of the main advocators of the Rio location, not in the least 
because of his own interests in investing in the new complex. His position was 
supported by the governor of Rio de Janeiro, Moreiro Franco, who pointed out that 
in 1980 the dispute over location of the petrochemical industry was settled by Rio 
Grande do Sul. According to him, it was time to stimulate industrial development 
in Rio de Janeiro. The same opinion could be heard from the mayor of Rio de 
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Janeiro, Saturno Braga, who argued that the decision to locate the second and third 
petrochemical complex in Camaçari and Triunfo, respectively, was not based on 
economic arguments but was purely political. Thus, he argued why not locate the 
fourth petrochemical complex in Rio de Janeiro for political reasons as well. Another 
argument was that the hegemony of the Camaçari complex would be diminished 
with the construction of a fourth complex. 
There were not only political reasons for changing the decision in favour of Rio 
de Janeiro, however. According to its supporters, the creation of a new petrochemi-
cal complex provided larger economic advantages in comparison with the expansion 
of one of the existing complexes. The new complex would be based on gas as raw 
material input which would have many advantages over the naphtha used in the 
other complexes. The first advantage was that the new complex would not face a 
scarcity of naphtha and consequent imports of expensive naphtha. The costs of the 
import of naphtha amounted to 280 million US dollars in 1986." Prognoses were 
that demand for this feedstock would increase by 40% in the following years. The 
existing refining capacity in Brazil limits the increase in the production of naphtha 
by 12 to 15% only, which is insufficient to satisfy demand. In addition, the price of 
naphtha is highly subsidized: national entrepreneurs pay 70 to 75% of the import 
price for a barrel of naphtha.43 Consequently, the use of gas as a feedstock would 
result in a large reduction in government expenses to the petrochemical sector. 
Moreover, the exploitation of oil in the bay of Campos, near Rio de Janeiro, will 
result in an abundance of natural gas. 
That production based on gas would limit the range of products to olefincs was 
seen as an advantage by the supporters of the Rio complex: whereas in the 
downstream enterprises the demand for olefines increased 13%, the demand for 
other petrochemical intermediaries increased only 9%." By using gas, the internal 
demand structure of the downstream enterprises could be more efficiently satisfied 
and there would be no oversupply of, for example, butane45. The second advantage 
of using gas as raw material is the low investment cost per tons of intermediaries 
produced: the cost is only 600 US dollars per tons in stead of 800 US dollars44. 
Thirdly, in the Rio complex transport costs would be lowest. Because a large part of 
the basic material used in the existing complex of Bahia was transported from Rio 
de Janeiro to Bahia, and an even larger part of the final products was transported 
back to the south, an additional 50 million US dollar annually must be added to the 
total production costs if expansion were to take place in Bahia.47 Finally, an 
important reason for locating the fourth petrochemical complex in the state of Rio 
de Janeiro can be found in the rapidly deteriorating economic situation of this state. 
As in Bahia, it was believed that the backward and forward linkages of a petroche-
mical complex would offer a major stimulus to industrialisation in the state. 
The intensive lobby campaign of the representatives of petrochemical state 
institutions, government agencies, political representatives and entrepreneurs of 
petrochemical firms resulted in a detailed government programme, presented in 
1987, in which expansion of the petrochemical complexes between 1987 and 1995 
was described: the National Petrochemical Programme (PNP). The total investment 
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costs forecasted in the PNP will be 3.6 - 4 billion US dollars, of which 1.8 billion 
US dollars will be financed by the National Development Fund (FND). Those 
enterprises that wish to invest in the future petrochemical complex have to furnish 
40% of the total investment costs from their own capital. Ten percent of the total 
investment costs can be derived from import of capital goods, the remaining 50% 
will be provided by development banks and the FND.48 In 1987 a total of 66 projects 
were approved by the CDI, the majority of which would begin in 1988. (see figure 
3.8.) In the PNP, future development of the four different complexes are described 
as follows: 
- In the Sao Paulo region the petrochemical industry will be modernized but not 
expanded. The production capacity of Sâo Paulo's central cracking unit PqU will 
be increased slightly: from 360.000 to 412.000 tons ethylene annually. Total 
investment costs for this expansion are not allowed to exceed 25 million US 
dollars. No investments will be reserved for the down stream plants. 
- In Rio Grande do Sul the petrochemical industry will be consolidated and not 
expanded; nevertheless, the CDI approved expansion projects for some down-
stream enterprises. In addition, the central cracking unit Copesul will expand its 
ethylene production by 25%: from 430.000 to 512.000 ton/annually. Total invest-
ment costs are calculated to be 35 million US dollar for Copesul and 350 million 
US dollar for the second generation plants. 
- In Bahia the central cracking unit Copene and most of the downstream firms in 
the petrochemical complex will be expanded. The production of ethylene will 
almost double from 460.000 to 800.000 tons/annually. Most of the down stream 
enterprises will also expand capacity or implement new projects. Total investment 
costs for this expansion will be around 1 billion US dollars, of which 400 million 
US dollars will be allocated to the central cracking unit Copene and 600 million 
US dollars to second generation firms.4' In 1989 several projects had already been 
approved by the CDI. More details concerning this expansion will be provided in 
chapter S.50 
- Finally, in Rio de Janeiro a complete new complex will be created, based on gas 
as feedstock. In August 1986 President Samey signed the decree declaring the 
establishment of a new petrochemical complex in the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
Construction was expected to begin in December 1988 and the start of production 
was projected for 1992.51 Due to economic and political constraints32 the construc-
tion of the Rio complex was delayed to such extent that in 1989 several entrepre-
neurs wondered whether the complex would be realised at all. A common expres-
sion that could be heard was: "Complexo do Rio? Ano dos mil!" ( Rio Complex? 
year two thousand!) In fact only the exact location of the new complex was 
known in 1989. Extended discussions resulted in the choice of Itaguaï as the 
optimum site. 
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Figure 3.8. Petrochemical projects approved by the CDI in 1987 
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Total investments for the new complex in Rio de Janeiro will be around 2 billion 
US dollars, of which 820 million US dollars will be used to construct the central 
cracking unit and the remaining amount will be used to establish the downstream 
enterprises.53 The director of the coordinating committee, the COPPERJ,54 Rodrigo 
Lopez, remarked that despite all delays many firms expressed interest in investing 
in the future complex. Among the enterprises that are interested, are some of the 
largest petrochemical producers: the list of applying firms included 19 national 
groups and 23 foreign enterprises.55 
3.7. Shift from petrochemicals to fine chemicals 
Up to this point in the chapter special emphasis has been placed on the role of the 
petrochemical branch within the chemical sector of Brazil. One aspect of the 
development of the chemical sector that is of significance for the petrochemical 
sector is the shift from petrochemicals to fine chemicals. All over the world 
petrochemical companies are turning their investments in the production of basic 
and intermediary chemicals into investments in the production of fine chemicals, 
because it is more profitable to invest in activities closer to the consumer that have 
a large growth potential. Especially industrial branches with a relative high level of 
product technology are becoming more attractive. An example is the production of 
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pharmaceuticals, a product close to the consumer with high internal returns and 
relatively low investment costs. 
Brazil is no exception and also in this country this shift can be observed. For 
decades the Brazilian fine chemical industry was dominated by transnational 
companies, but at the end of the eighties national entrepreneurs also began to invest 
in this sub-branch. The large profitability of the fine chemical branch was one of the 
most important stimuli for its national development. Strategic arguments provided 
another stimulus. From the point of view of the Brazilian government the under-
representation of national enterprises in this branch was not only a severe limit on 
national development of the chemical sector as a whole, but it could also make the 
country very vulnerable in times of war; Brazil must be able to provide its own 
medicine. One lesson from the Falkland war between Argentine and Great Britain 
was that a country can become dependent and vulnerable if it does not have its 
own pharmaceutical firms." Finally, before the PNP was designed, further expansion 
in the petrochemical industry was not possible. The capacities of the central cracking 
units were insufficient to cope with enlarged production of the downstream 
enterprises. Therefore, the solution to the idle investment capacity of the 
entrepreneurs of the downstream petrochemical companies was to invest capital in 
another chemical branch: the fine chemical industry. 
The increased interest in the fine chemical sub-branch in particular can clearly be 
seen in the development of the investments between 1965 and 1981 (see table 3.3.). 
In the period 1965-1970 total investments were only 9.7 million US dollars; in the 
period 1975-1981 they increased to 381.6 million US dollars. 
Table 3.3. CDI approvals for investments in fine chemicals in the period between 1965 and 
1981 in number of projects and investments in million US dollars in Brazil 
number of projects 
national projects 
foreign projects 
total number 
1965-1970 
4 
12 
16 
1971-1975 
6 
34 
40 
1975-1981 
20 
13 
37 
tot 
30 
63 
93 
investments million US $ 
national projects 
foreign projects 
total number 
0.7 
9.0 
9.7 
13.6 
48.6 
62.2 
111.1 
270.5 
381.6 
125.4 
328.1 
453.5 
source: Suarez, 1986 
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Logically, most of the firms investing in the fine chemical branch originated from 
the petrochemical branch. Two factors contributing to this phenomenon were the 
former experience with chemical production and the availability of relatively large 
financial reserves that could be reinvested. In some cases investments in the fine 
chemical branch were made by entrepreneurs who owned petrochemical firms but 
wanted to expand their business. However, entrepreneurs also sold their shares in 
the petrochemical branch and bought shares in the fine chemical branch. Transna-
tional corporations in particular were selling shares of petrochemicals companies in 
order to buy shares in fine chemical firms. According to Suarez, several foreign 
entrepreneurs in the Camaçari complex decided to leave petrochemical production 
and to concentrate their activities on fine chemicals: 
Obviously, the transnationals do not leave their participation because of 
nationalistic emancipation. In all four cases, their shares were sold at 'gold 
prices' to generate the necessary resources for the migration to fine chemicals".57 
Э.8. Summary and conclusions 
The development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry has been influenced by 
large fluctuations in demand figures, high expectations and ambitious expansion 
programmes. During the last two decades these were responsible for an impressive 
increase in national petrochemical production that brought Brazil to the 11th place 
in the ranking of petrochemical world producers. During the Brazilian economic 
miracle, from 1967 to 1973, the impressive growth in the GNP resulted in an 
enormous increase in the demand for petrochemicals. The production capacity of the 
already existing petrochemical firms in the state of Sao Paulo did not prove to be 
sufficient to satisfy the demand. Therefore, extended discussions were held during 
the first years of the seventies on how to expand petrochemical production. These 
discussions resulted in the design of a new petrochemical complex in the 
northeastern state of Bahia; the Camaçari complex. Because of high expectations for 
the development in demand for petrochemicals at that time, shortly after the 
construction of the Camaçari complex had started a new petrochemical complex was 
planned, this time in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. The new complex 
became known as the Polosul. 
Both complexes experienced a difficult start, however, due to the fact that between 
the first plans to construct a new complex and the moment that this complex finally 
began production a period of at least five years passed by. When the Camaçari 
complex came on stream in 1979 Brazil was still experiencing serious repercussions 
of the first oil crisis in 1973. The decline in internal demand for petrochemical 
products, resulting from this oil crisis, could, however, be solved by exporting part 
of the product. When the Rio Grande do Sul complex started to produce in 1982, 
the economic situation of Brazil had deteriorated even more due to the second oil 
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shock in 1979. This time it proved to be difficult to solve the problem of oversupply 
by exporting petrochemicals: international demand was too low to guarantee 
reasonable prices. Although Polosul, supported by government export subsidies, 
became the largest exporter of all the petrochemical complexes, several downstream 
projects were never realised. 
During the second half of the eighties prospects for petrochemical production 
improved noticeably. Internal demand increased and international prices started to 
rise. It was in this period that the foundation was laid for the National Petrochemi-
cal Programme, the PNP. In this programme the expansion of the petrochemical 
industry of Brazil was outlined, consisting of the creation of a new complex near 
Rio de Janeiro and the extension of the Camaçari complex. The other two com-
plexes, Säo Paulo and Polosul, were allowed to modernise and to increase their 
production slightly. 
Despite the fluctuating profits of the petrochemical industry during the last two 
decades, the overall trend has been positive. Nevertheless, several entrepreneurs 
shifted the emphasis of their production to a chemical sector that they expected to 
be more profitable: the fine chemical sector. 
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4 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRIPARTITE MODEL IN THE 
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry was 
outlined. The remarkable growth figures for petrochemical production and the 
impressive change in the balance of trade of the petrochemical industry were partly 
explained by the creation of three petrochemical complexes. But it is interesting to 
ask how the Brazilian petrochemical industry managed to consolidate its growth 
figures despite severe economic recessions and two oil-shocks, and how it managed 
exporting a considerable part of its total production. Why did petrochemical 
complexes in other Latin American countries, such as Bahia Blanca1 complex in 
Argentine, fail while the Brazilian petrochemical complexes flourished? 
As described in chapter 2, Evans analyses the development in the Brazilian 
petrochemical industry using the constellation of the triple alliance.2 In chapter 2, the 
ways in which the alliance between state capital, multinational capital and national 
private capital has shaped industrial development in several underdeveloped 
countries and has stimulated national capital accumulation, were described. In 
Brazil, the government, together with representatives of the private sector, decided 
to use the triple alliance as a development model for the petrochemical industry and 
in this way created the tripartite model. In this chapter, this model and the way it 
was implemented in the Brazilian petrochemical industry, will be discussed into 
more detail. 
The first petrochemical complex developed in Sâo Paulo during the sixties and was 
largely dominated by foreign firms. At the end of the decade, when the petrochemi-
cal entrepreneurs began looking for expansion possibilities, this foreign dominance 
came under attack and debate developed over the entrepreneurial model that should 
be used in future expansions. Although both the state bureaucracy and the private 
national entrepreneurs wanted to reduce the foreign presence in the petrochemical 
industry, alternatives with less of a foreign presence were not that easy to find. A 
totally state-owned complex was out of the question: the state would lose it 
legitimacy with respect to the national bourgeoisie. In addition a totally national 
private complex was impossible simply because local technological knowledge was 
insufficient. With the construction of the Camaçari complex, a solution to this 
problem was found in the form of the tripartite model. Different aspects of this 
tripartite model, government aims and the way it was implemented will be 
described in section 4.2. 
Within the tripartite model, the three partners of the triple alliance are linked in a 
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formal way and form the so-called tripartite joint ventures. In this chapter, the 
respective roles of these three partners will be described. First, in section 4.3., the 
changing role of the various state institutions will be dealt with. After a brief 
description of the creation of important state institutions, their changing influence in 
the petrochemical industry will be outlined. A distinction will be made between 
state technocratic institutions such as the National Development Bank, BNDES, and 
the ministerial-linked industrial council GDI; and state enterprises such as Pctrobras 
and Petroquisa. 
Before the tripartite model was implemented, few entrepreneurs of Brazilian origin 
invested in the petrochemical industry. With the construction of the Camaçari 
complex this changed and several, regionally based entrepreneurs started to invest 
in this sector. In this chapter, they are called the non-scctor-related petrochemical 
entrepreneurs. Unlike sector-related entrepreneurs, non-sector-related entrepreneurs 
did not originate initially from the chemical sector, for instance, the petroleum 
branch or the plastic branch, but from other industrial or even service sectors. The 
difference in attitude, the internal relations and the relative power distinguishing 
these two types of entrepreneurs are of importance for the functioning of the 
tripartite model. The formal and informal relations of the national petrochemical 
bourgeoisie are described in section 4.3. 
The third partner in the tripartite model is the foreign corporation. Almost all 
chemical transnationale in the world are represented in the Brazilian petrochemical 
industry. In section 4.5., a brief description will be given of the four most important 
foreign participants in the Brazilian petrochemical industry and their role in the 
tripartite model. First, the strategy of Dow Chemical, an American petrochemical 
conglomerate that tried to stay out of the tripartite model as long as possible, will 
be described. Second, Shell, an Anglo-Dutch transnational that wanted to participate 
in the tripartite model only when certain conditions were met. Third, the position of 
the French Rhone Poulenc, which participated early in the tripartite model but 
changed its mind after a couple of years is presented. Finally, the case of the 
Japanese Mitsubishi, which probably would not be present in Brazil if the tripartite 
model had not been used, will be explained. 
4.2. The creation of the tripartite model 
As described in the previous chapter, the development of the Brazilian petrochemi-
cal industry can be divided into four stages, corresponding with the three existing 
petrochemical complexes and the complex, which is planned. Before it became 
official government policy, during the first and the second stage of development, the 
tripartite model was subject to lengthy discussions at several chemical and petroche-
mical congresses. In the following paragraph this process will be discussed. 
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4.2.1. The first tripartite firms in Sao Paulo 
The first step toward the tripartite model was taken when joint ventures between 
national and foreign firms were formed in the Sâo Paulo complex. One of the 
projects in the complex, which was briefly described in the previous chapter, was 
created by a joint venture: the national company Capuava joined with the American 
Phillips Petroleum. In a later stage two more national partners entered the ethylene-
producing company. The incentive for the tripartite joint venture can be found in 
severe financial problems. The profit margins of the company were too low to repay 
the start-up costs and a large number of additional investments was needed to 
complete the project. These problems forced Phillips Petroleum to sell its shares to 
another firm. No single firm could be found that was able to buy the shares, 
however, and a considerable loss threatened the company. Because the Brazilian 
state considered the petrochemical sector to be of strategic importance, the solution 
was found in state participation. Thus, the state-owned oil company, Petrobras, 
decided to buy all shares of Phillips Petroleum. The only problem was that a state 
firm was not allowed to participate in a firm on a minority basis. As a result, a 
new juridical construction was needed. In 1968 Petrobras created a 100% subsidiary, 
Petroquisa, which was not restricted by this clause. Petroquisa could participate on a 
minority basis in any firm. 
As a result, a completely new joint venture with three partners was created. The 
first partner was Petroquisa, the second included two national private alliances; the 
one consisting of the Capuava Group, Moreiro Sales and Hanna mining company, 
named UNIPAR, and the other one was formed by the Ultra Group, belonging to 
the Igel family. A conglomerate of foreign financial institutions, including the 
International Finance Corporation (IPC) together with a group of French banks, 
participated as the third party. The financial institutions were invited in order to 
solve the continuing financial problems. The participation of the state increased 
considerably when the UNIPAR group had to sell most of its shares to Petroquisa 
due to financial problems. After this transaction Petroquisa possessed 75% of all 
shares.3 Thus, at the end of the sixties, the first tripartite joint venture firm in the 
history of the Brazilian petrochemical branch was a fact. Marcus Alban Suarez, who 
concentrated his comprehensive study on the involvement of the state technocracy, 
posed: 
"In this way the main lines were drawn of a tripartite model consisting of an 
association between local private, state and multinational capital by means of a 
combination of assets to form independent companies.'4 
The tripartite firm, named Petroquímica Uniou (PqU), became the central cracking 
unit of the petrochemical complex of Sâo Paulo. After the initial success of this 
entrepreneurial model in the PqU firm, the same model was utilized in several of 
the second generation firms in Sao Paulo. For example, the state firm Petroquisa 
participated in the firm Poliolefinas, together with the US-based transnational 
corporation. National Distillers, the IFC and a national partner. Another second 
generation tripartite firm was Polibrasil, a conglomerate of Shell, Petroquisa and a 
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national partner. Finally, in the Sâo Paulo region Oxiteno was created, a tripartite 
joint venture between Scientific Design, Petroquisa and the Brazilian Grupo Ultra. 
4.2Л. Conflicting interests converted into a model: Camaçari 
At the end of the sixties the second stage of the petrochemical development in 
Brazil began and the petrochemical industry sought expansion possibilities. Lengthy 
discussions took place in which the main issue was whether to choose an entrepre-
neurial model in these expansions. On the one hand, the already established 
entrepreneurs in Sao Paulo preferred the expansion of the existing petrochemical 
firms in their region. In the Sâo Paulo complex various distinct ownership structures 
can be found: tripartite companies, 100% foreign firms and joint ventures between 
foreign and national firms. On the other hand, the state institutions of Bahia, 
supported by the techno-bureaucrats of Petrobras and the National Development 
Bank the BNDES, promoted the idea of a completely new complex in Camaçari in 
which the ownership structure would be different from that of Sâo Paulo. Although 
this alternative would be more costly, it provided an opportunity to diminish the 
absolute foreign domination in the petrochemical industry. 
It proved difficult, however, to decide which entrepreneurial model should be 
used. A state monopoly in the petrochemical industry was out of the question: 
firstly, because of the lack of up-to-date nationally owned technology and, secondly, 
because of significant opposition from the national private entrepreneurs. A 
completely state-owned petrochemical complex would seriously threaten the 
legitimacy of the state with respect to local entrepreneurs. If involvement of the 
state in the productive sphere were to exceed certain limits, severe opposition from 
national entrepreneurs could be expected. A second option was a completely 
foreign-owned complex. This was not feasible, however, because of strong nationalist 
tendencies: national private as well as technocratic interests eliminated this pos-
sibility. A third option was to design a complex that was fully owned by private 
national entrepreneurs. This was not seen as a viable option either, since the 
national petrochemical industry possessed limited technological capability. In 
addition, a lack of capital prevented the national entrepreneurs from constructing a 
complex on their own. The establishment of joint ventures was seen as a fourth 
option. Since none of the three parties involved wanted to lose interest in the 
petrochemical industry, joint ventures in which all three participated would be the 
best entrepreneurial model for the Camaçari complex. Moreover, the positive results 
of the tripartite joint ventures in Sao Paulo gave the Brazilian government the idea 
that this model could perfectly function in the Camaçari complex as well. 
The merits of the tripartite model could be found in the fact that all three 
participating enterprises, in one way or another, would benefit from participation. 
The advantages for state and national enterprises of inviting transnational corpora-
tions to participate in petrochemical tripartite joint ventures were obvious: national 
firms could obtain access to foreign technology as well as to foreign capital. Another 
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advantage was that the national firms could benefit from the management expertise 
of transnational corporations and could profit from their strong market position and 
export opportunities. It was also beneficial for the transnational corporations to 
participate in a tripartite joint venture. For them, access to raw materials, which 
were monopolised by the state, increased. State participation increased, furthermore, 
the confidence of the foreign firms that the relatively small and unknown national 
partners would keep their promises in the joint venture. A very important ad-
vantage was that, by participating in a joint venture structure, foreign firms could 
obtain access to financial incentives and local financing sources otherwise not 
available to transnational corporations. And last, but certainly not least, the political 
influence of foreign firms increased, which fostered goodwill. 
4.23. Government aims in the implementation of the tripartite model 
The government decided that all downstream enterprises should apply the tripartite 
model, which meant that all partners would receive one third of the voting shares. 
In order to guarantee the tripartite structure a number of criteria were set. One of 
the regulations was that Petroquisa could not participate with a smaller share than 
the largest private partner. Another was that no single partner would be allowed to 
possess the majority of the shares.5 In this way, a private majority could always be 
formed to influence decisions of the state partner and, likewise, a nationalist 
majority could always be formed to influence decisions made by the foreign partner. 
The state was guaranteed control and meanwhile the supply of technology was 
secured. Furthermore, the interests of national private entrepreneurs were not 
neglected. 
Although no explicit government aims were defined when the tripartite model was 
implemented in the Camaçari complex, a number of implicit objectives existed. 
Import substitution was the first and most important goal of the Brazilian govern-
ment. To satisfy the rising internal demand for petrochemicals without disturbing 
the petrochemical balance of trade, required a considerable increase in national 
petrochemical production. 
"In the following phase of the Brazilian petrochemical industry there was an 
almost exclusive concern with import substitution, especially in the creation of a 
local production capacity. (-) At that time, the only aim of the industry was to 
substitute imports of intermediate or final products".' 
Secondly, the government wanted to stimulate the creation of a nationally controlled 
petrochemical industry that was not dominated by foreign enterprises. With the 
application of the tripartite model, a national majority was always secured.7 The 
third objective, implicit in the implementation of the Camaçari complex but more 
explicitly stated when the third complex was created, was the transfer of technology. 
Since foreign technology suppliers participated directly in the joint ventures, 
bringing with them the most up-to-date technology, it was assumed that a smooth 
process of technology transfer would occur.' A fourth important objective, which is 
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related to the previous one, was the creation of a strong national petrochemical 
enterprise system.' Due to the relatively recent development of the Brazilian 
petrochemical industry and the domination of foreign enterprises in the sixties and 
seventies, national private petrochemical firms were scarce in Brazil. With the 
implementation of the tripartite model the knowledge and experience of transnation-
al firms would be transferred to national participants who formerly had not been 
interested in the petrochemical industry, thus creating a new group of national 
petrochemical producers. Moreover, the involvement of a group of regional entrepre-
neurs, originating from other sectors, would enlarge the number of petrochemical 
entrepreneurs in the country. Finally, regional development could be seen as one of 
the more state-supported objectives. Evans remarks, in this respect, that: 
"Brazil was attempting not just to build a petrochemical complex, but to plant a 
dynamic industrial pole in an area where less extreme attempts to create in-
dustrialisation did not seem to have worked. The Camaçari pole was an am-
bitious attempt at the kind of linkage-generating strategy of 'unbalanced growth' 
that Albert Hirschmann might have suggested."10 
Once government policy and objectives were clearly defined and construction plans 
for the complex had been developed, negotiations with firms wishing to participate 
could begin. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) determined which 
projects could be constructed on the complex as well as the products they should 
produce. Firms that were interested could apply for participation. After extensive 
negotiation and harsh competition, 20 projects were formed in 1975: twelve tripartite 
joint ventures, five bipartite joint ventures and three 100% owned companies. In the 
majority of cases, the transnational corporations brought in the technology with an 
equivalent value of 10-12% of the shares. The small contribution of foreign firms in 
terms of finance capital can be seen in figure 4.1. Nevertheless, according to the 
regulations, they received one third of the voting shares.11 The national partner 
contributed approximately 9% of the total investment costs and received, like the 
other partners, a third of all shares in return. It is clear that most of the invested 
capital came from other resources. Although Petroquisa provided a relatively large 
part of the finance capital, most capital was obtained from the development 
programme for the northeast: FINOR," and from credits supplied under very 
favourable conditions by the National Development Bank BNDES. Both national and 
international firms benefited from this government policy to stimulate the petroche-
mical industry by providing the financial means. In chapter 5, the investment 
structure of the Camaçari complex will be described in more detail. 
Though in most of the downstream enterprises the tripartite model was used, the 
central cracking unit, Copene, had a somewhat different structure. The state 
enterprise Petroquisa owned 51% and the 17 joint venture enterprises that were 
constructed in the initial period of the complex owned 49%. Despite the fact that all 
three partners in the tripartite model were indirectly represented in the central 
cracking unit, during the first period most influence was exercised by Petroquisa, 
until Copene was privatised in 1980. 
75 
Figure 4.1. Financial resources used at the start of the Camaçari petrochemical complex, in 
1977, in percentages 
state resources-12% 
national private- 9% 
foreign participant- 3% 
HNOR-17% 
BNDES- 48% 
internal others-1 % 
foreign loans-10% 
source: Suarez, 1985 
During the third stage of development of the petrochemical industry in Brazil, when 
the Triunfo petrochemical complex was constructed, the tripartite model was again 
used as the dominant entrepreneurial model. This time, in contrast to the Camaçari 
complex, an attempt was made to increase the share of national private capital." 
Since the petrochemical and petroleum industry did not play a very important role 
in Rio Grande do Sul before the petrochemical complex was constructed, and given 
the lack of technological know how and the lack of financial resources on the part 
of the national enterprises, it was impossible for the national local entrepreneurs to 
play a leading role. More or less on request of the national partners, a decision was 
made to use the tripartite model once again. The regulation that each partner should 
possess one third of the voting shares was applied less strictly, however. Thus, five 
of the six enterprises constructed in Triunfo were established in accordance with the 
tripartite model. 
With the construction of the Camaçari and the Triunfo complexes, state capital, 
private national capital and foreign capital became equally involved in the petroche-
mical industry. The role of the petrochemical technocracy in particular is worth 
mentioning; the two private partners also played an important role. The contribution 
of all three partners was, however, subject to certain fluctuations. 
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43. The changing contribution of the state to the petrochemical industry 
4.3.1. The creation of state institutions 
Within the tripartite model, the state played a decisive role. The first step in the 
direction of state involvement in the petrochemical sector was taken in 1938 when 
the National Petroleum Council, (CNP) the government institution responsible for 
petroleum policy, was created. At the end of the forties, the CNP launched a 
nationalist campaign to stimulate the national development of petroleum exploration 
and refinery, using the slogan: 'O petróleo e nosso' (the oil is ours). This campaign 
resulted in the creation of the state oil company, Petrobras, in 1953, which is among 
the one hundred largest companies in the world." 
During the fifties, the state companies of Brazil further enlarged their influence. As 
part of President Kubitschek's (1956-1960) 'Programa de Metas', investments in state 
enterprises increased. Since the government emphasised the development of the 
durable consumer goods sector in that particular period, the petrochemical industry 
did not receive the impulse it needed for large scale development. 
The ambitious government plans to generate autonomous growth in Brazil resulted 
in an economic crisis, however and while escalating inflation and an increasing 
foreign debt afflicted the country, the government retreated. The government of 
Goulart15 heavily restricted government spending and, consequently, investments in 
state enterprises declined. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to solve the huge 
problems Brazil was facing. 
After the military coup d'etat of 1964, the populist alliance was replaced by an 
alliance of amongst others state technocracy and representatives of transnational 
enterprises. In order to increase the efficiency of the industrial sector, a denationali-
sation campaign evolved and the importance of transnational capital increased. 
Suarez remarks in this respect: 
"The new military government maintained, in this form, the integration of an 
economic development model that, because of the incapability of local industrial 
bourgeoisie, privileged multinational capital and limited the function of the state 
firms to support the private accumulation."14 
The military government was supported by several state institutions that were 
created directly after the coup. The creation of these institutions was an important 
stimulus in the development of the petrochemical industry. The most important 
institution, which was created in the very same year that the coup took place, was 
the Industrial Development Council (CDI). The CDI was subordinated to the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) and its main objective was to stimulate 
industrial activities by private firms. After its creation, all industrial projects needed 
CDI approval before construction could begin.17 
An institution, also established in 1964, that made a significant contribution to the 
growth of the petrochemical sector was the GEIQUIM: 'Executive Group for the 
Chemical Industry', later changed into the 'Executive Group III' (GS III). This 
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institution represented several ministries: the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Mining and several banks." The tasks of 
the GS III were limited to the chemical sector, all petrochemical projects had to be 
approved by the GS III before they were allowed to obtain finançai or fiscal 
incentives. 
The third state institution that played an important role in the development of the 
petrochemical industry in particular, was the National Development Bank, BNDE 
(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico). Founded in 1953, long before the 
coup d'Etat, the BNDE's objective was to support economic growth by financing 
projects it considered of great importance. In the sixties the 'S' of Social was added 
to the abbreviation in the name of the development bank; from then on the BNDES 
also financed more social-economic projects and was not restricted to purely 
economic projects alone. 
In 1965 the BNDE acknowledged the importance of a national petrochemical 
industry and investigated the possibilities for the development of such an industry 
in Brazil. In that year, the Bank published a document, titled: "Perspectiva da 
participaçâo do BNDE no financiamento da industria química." (Perspectives of the 
participation of the BNDE in the financing of the chemical industry)." Based on the 
conclusions of this document, and in cooperation with the state enterprise Pctrobras, 
the BNDE decided to establish a "cooperation programme BNDE/Petrobras, for the 
development of the petrochemical industry, by means of specific projects that were 
recommended by Petrobras and financed by the BNDE".M Various opportunities 
existed to obtain a BNDE loan but acceptance of a project always depended on 
approval from the CDI. Real interest rates were low, between 4 and 6%, and the 
amortisation period was between 4 and 15 years. To provide technical assistance the 
BNDE created the FUNTEC, which had to support technological scientific research 
in the country, as well as be a center for the formation and training of human 
resources on the graduate and post-graduate level.n 
The focus on state institutions for the purpose of stimulating private initiative did 
not mean that the military rulers paid less attention to the development of state 
enterprises. Evans states: 
"A greater role for state enterprises was quite consistent with the military's 
general strategy of increasing political and economic centralisation. Instead of 
diminishing under the military, the number of state enterprises increased more 
rapidly than in any previous era."22 
Petroquisa was one of these state enterprises that played a decisive role in the 
Brazilian petrochemical industry. Created in 1968 as a 100% subsidiary of Petrobras, 
Petroquisa enabled minority participation of the state in national and even foreign 
joint ventures. 
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4.3.2. Specific nature of the state technocracy 
At the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, the various state 
institutions and petrochemical state enterprises together formed the so-called 
petrochemical technocracy. This petrochemical technocracy was characterised by the 
relatively strong linkages that existed between the various institutions. One of these 
linkages was formed by the already mentioned 'working group', consisting of the 
BNDES and Petrobras. Several linkages between CDI and BNDES were of impor-
tance as well: the BNDES participated, for example, in the executive council of the 
CDI. Linkages between these institutions were reinforced by the regular exchange of 
executive officials between the different institutions.33 
The fact that the petrochemical technocracy stimulated the development of the 
petrochemical industry to such a large extent was mainly due to the specific nature 
of these institutions. Nunes and Geddes speak of insulated bureaucracies: 
"By referring to bureaucratic agencies as insulated, we do not imply that they are 
cut off from all outside influences and free from party politics; we mean rather 
that although information and resources flow between an insulated agency and 
its environment, the agency is able to maintain its organisational integrity and to 
pursue its own goals. The insulated bureaucracy includes some of the state 
enterprises, some state controlled banks as the BNDES, the executive groups -in 
short many, though certainly not all - of the state agencies outside the traditional 
federal bureaucracy".2* 
According to their opinion, employees in these insulated bureaucracies possessed 
more specific knowledge and clientilist practices were unknown. This was the main 
reason for the efficient functioning of these institutions, which resulted in increased 
government intervention in the industrial sector in general and the petrochemical 
branch in particular. 
Evans also stresses the managerial capacities of the Petrobras technocratic staff: 
"Petrobras is known in the industry as a 'school for petrochemical management'. 
The Brazilians it has trained not only staff its own operations, but also fill 
important positions in the private sector, where there is a heavy demand for 
competent Brazilian executives."(-) "Petrobras and Petroquisa personnel are 
recognised as having a 'strong profit orientation'. The technical competence of the 
state managers is also recognized by their private sector counterparts."25 
Suarez is of the opinion that the specific characteristics of the technocrats participa-
ting in the petrochemical industry, provided a strong stimulus to petrochemical 
development. However, he mentions two further factors that he considers to be of 
great importance for the successful role of the petrochemical technocracy. 
First, the autonomy of state companies increased significantly in the early seven-
ties. This is not exclusively the case in the petrochemical and petroleum branch but 
took place in the productive industrial sector as a whole. The person responsible for 
this change is Helio Beltrâo, who replaced the liberal Roberto Campos as Minister of 
Planning at the end of the sixties. 
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"Apparently only a simple swap of names, but in reality this fact represented a 
significant transformation in the economic policy of the government. (-) By his 
'administrative reform' he assured the productive state sector and its techno-
bureaucracy an autonomy that till that moment did not exist."26 
Beltrâo had been director of the National Petroleum Council and had played an 
important role in the creation of Petrobras. 
The second important factor was the choice of Ernesto Geisel in 1969, who had 
been minister of the Higher Military Court, as president director of Petrobras, a 
position he would occupy until 1974.27 In order to reorganise Petrobras and change 
it into a more efficient institution he liberalised financial control and changed the 
upper echelons of the staff.28 This strategy resulted in the increased autonomy of 
Petrobras. In his policy Geisel concentrated on the most lucrative petroleum 
activities and on the stimulation of the petrochemical industry. The autonomy of 
Petrobras was further increased when Geisel concentrated more on his future 
political career -he was to become president of the republic in 1974- giving Petro-
bras an opportunity to define its own strategy. 
4.3.3. Relations between petrochemical technocracy and Bahian state bureaucracy: 
increasing influence of the state 
Not only linkages between members of the petrochemical technocracy were of 
importance for the development of the petrochemical industry in Brazil. The existing 
linkages between the petrochemical technocracy and the bureaucracy of the state 
Bahia also played a decisive role. Some experience in the chemical sector existed in 
the north-eastern state of Bahia before the Camaçari complex was constructed: it was 
the most important oil-producing state and possessed a large oil refinery, the 
RLAM29. Not surprisingly this state tried to establish the second petrochemical 
complex within its borders. An important person in the formulation and realisation 
of the Bahian initiative was Romulo Almeida: director of a consultant agency 
CLAN30. In 1969, CLAN was asked by the state administrators of Bahia to conduct a 
feasibility study regarding the possibilities for establishing a Bahian petrochemical 
complex. This research, financed by the federal government, and executed in 
cooperation with some important members of the petrochemical technocracy, such as 
Paulo Bellotti of the BNDES and Otto Perroni of Petrobras, resulted in the publica-
tion of a document titled: "Desenvolvimento da industria petroquímica no estado de 
Bahia" (Development of the petrochemical industry in the state of Bahia). 
The petrochemical technocrats saw in the initiative of the state Bahia an important 
opportunity for increasing their strength and influence in Brazil's petrochemical 
industry. They feared a declining influence in the profitable petrochemical industry 
if the federal government were to give preference to the expansion of existing firms 
in Sao Paulo. Private national and multinational interests in the enterprises situated 
in the Säo Paulo region were relatively long established and it would be difficult for 
state enterprises to enlarge their influence there.31 The important linkages that 
80 
developed between the petrochemical technocracy and the Bahian supporters 
resulted in the 1971 decision of the MIC to create a 'working group for the 
petrochemical complex in Bahia'. This working group asked the French research 
institute BEICIP to investigate the possibilities for petrochemical production in the 
Bahian region. The positive recommendations of the BEICIP provided the take off 
for the construction of the petrochemical complex in the state Bahia. 
The decision to locate the new complex in this state strengthened the position of 
the petrochemical technocracy; not only because half of the central cracking unit was 
owned by Petroquisa, but above all because the application of the tripartite model 
gave Petroquisa one third of the voting shares of all seventeen downstream 
enterprises on the complex. 
Before Geisel became president in 1974 the petrochemical technocracy could 
maintain its autonomous position rather well. This situation apparently changed 
somewhat when Geisel implemented the Second National Development Plan (PND 
II), with the objective of consolidating growth figures at the same level as those 
reached during the Brazilian miracle. One of the most important means to do this 
was strengthening the national bourgeoisie since it was considered a weak element 
in the tripartite alliance. Various institutions of the BNDES were created to supply 
the national bourgeoisie with financial means and to provide incentives for tech-
nological development. Although this policy did not diminish the importance of 
state enterprises, it placed greater emphasis on private national companies than 
before. This change became clearly visible when the third petrochemical complex 
was constructed in Triunfo. Petroquisa was prepared to decrease its shares in favour 
of private interests in this complex. Instead, the rather small regional groups that 
planned to participate in the complex asked Petroquisa to support them in tripartite 
joint ventures, in the same way that Camaçari had been implemented. When the 
Triunfo complex started production in the beginning of the eighties, Petroquisa 
participated in the five new downstream projects of the Triunfo complex and owned 
47.22% of the central cracking unit, Copesul. As a result, the influence of Petroquisa 
in the petrochemical industry increased rather than decreased. 
4.3.4. The changing role of Petroquisa 
Not everyone was satisfied with the heavy involvement of the state technocracy in 
petrochemical production. During the eighties complaints could increasingly be 
heard with respect to restrictions imposed upon petrochemical firms. In 1986 and 
1987 the participation of the state in the petrochemical industry was extensively 
discussed in the preparations of the National Petrochemical Programme, PNP, for 
example, during a petrochemical congress32 held in Salvador, the capital of Bahia. 
Thomas Unger" remarks that state vigilance in the petrochemical branch was so 
overbearing that it was almost impossible for firms to make their own decisions. 
They were too dependent on the state and their flexibility to react to external 
developments was limited." Some of the national petrochemical entrepreneurs 
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preferred that the state withdraw from activities that could better be confined to the 
private sector. In particular, private enterprises desired a larger role in the expan-
sion of existing firms and in new firms. But, since the Brazilian government needs 
the dividends generated by the profitable petrochemical industry, it is unlikely that 
it will voluntarily decrease its participation in the near future. In 1985 the director 
of Petroquisa, José Juca Neto stated in an interview with the magazine Petro & 
Química: 
"We believe that the withdrawal of the government from the petrochemical 
enterprises will result in negative figures for these enterprises."15 
He further declared that Petroquisa had acted in the past and will continue to act in 
the future as an arbiter between the national private partner and the foreign partner. 
Without this intermediary, the joint ventures would almost certainly end in failure. 
An indication of the increasing involvement of Petroquisa in the petrochemical 
industry is the joint venture Petroquimico Triunfo SA, located on the Polosul 
complex. This tripartite joint venture is characterised by a rather turbulent history 
concerning changes in ownership structure. The initial participating firms were the 
French Ato Chimie, which possessed 25% of all shares in 1980, Petroquisa, which 
possessed 24% of the shares, and two national private firms, which held the 
remaining shares. Due to various problems, the French transnational as well as 
Petroaplub, one of the local partners, wanted to sell their shares in 1989. The 
American Dow Chemical wanted to expand their production of low-density 
polyethylene and was very eager to buy all available shares. Petroquisa wanted, 
however, to avoid a too much foreign domination and Dow obtained permission to 
buy only 25% of Ato Chimie. With this move Petroquisa maneuvered itself into a 
somewhat difficult position because it had to buy the remaining shares and became, 
with 45%, the majority shareholder of Petroquimico Triunfo.36 The implicit rule that 
Petroquisa was not allowed to held more shares than the majority shareholder was 
broken and, as a result, the influence of Petroquisa in the Polosul increased. 
Within the group of national private entrepreneurs that invested in the petrochemi-
cal sector, no common agreement with respect to state participation existed. Some of 
the local entrepreneurs supported the view of José Juca Neto and were in fact rather 
satisfied with the participation of Petroquisa. An example is the director president of 
the Sâo Paulo based Unipar, Michael Hartveld, who remarked in the magazine 
Bolsa: 
"Many of the leaders of the sector admit that the future configuration of the 
national petrochemical park is still dependent on the presence of the state as a 
shareholder in the central cracking unit and the second generation plants."37 
4.3.5. The importance of Norquisa 
A clear example of the changing role of Petroquisa can be seen in the creation of 
the holding company Norquisa out of the Camaçari-based central cracking unit 
Copene, at the end of 1979. Petroquisa owned 52.49% of Copene and the 17 first 
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established downstream enterprises owned 47.51%. The fact that private interests 
were dispersed between 17 enterprises meant it was impossible to form a counter-
vailing balance against state participation. Another disadvantage of the ownership 
structure was that Petroquisa possessed more than half of all shares, making Copene 
a state enterprise which restricted it in many ways. Profits generated by Copene, for 
example, could not directly be used for investment in other projects since extensive 
government screening always had to take place. Another disadvantage felt by the 
private participants in Copene was that the dividends they received for their share 
in Copene were too small to invest in a profitable way. 
In order to overcome the problems related to the dispersed nature of Copene, a 
complex reorganisation took place in 1980. As part of this reorganisation the 
individual shares of all down-stream enterprises were united in a newly created 
holding, Norquisa (Nordeste Química SA) (see table 4.1.). Because the shares of 
Petroquisa diminished to 48.16%, Copene could, from that moment on, no longer be 
considered a state company. This made it possible to use the profits of Copene 
without succumbing to bureaucratic regulations. Moreover, with the creation of 
Norquisa the dividends that were initially divided between all 17 participating firms 
could be reinvested together in a more profitable way. These reinvestments focused 
in particular on the fine chemical sector. 
Although Norquisa is a private holding, it is heavily influenced by the petroche-
mical technocracy. One reason is that some important former directors of Petroquisa, 
Copene and Petrobras are appointed to the board of the new holding company. The 
most important of them. Emesto Geisel, the former director of Petrobras and the 
former president of the Brazilian Republic is President of the board. Another is 
Peronni, a former member of the board of directors of Petrobras, who became one 
of Norquisa's directors in 1983. In this way, the bureaucratic interests coopt the 
national entrepreneurs of Camaçari, alienating the transnational corporations. As the 
most important supporter of stimulation of national investments in the fine chemical 
branch, Norquisa represents a threat to foreign firms.38 According to the petroche-
mical technocrats, heavily supported by Norquisa, it is necessary to reduce foreign 
domination in this branch. 
The board of directors of the two other central cracking units, i.e. Copesul in the 
Polosul and PqU in Säo Paulo, also expressed the wish to privatise their state 
owned company. Copesul, 67.22% of which was owned by Petroquisa, 30.72% by 
the BNDESpar and 2.06% by private enterprises, was privatised in 1987 when a 
change in shareholder composition resulted in minority participation of the state.39 
With respect to PqU things seem to be more complicated. Despite several serious 
proposals from the board of directors of this central cracking unit to the Brazilian 
government, PqU was still state dominated by the end of 1990. 
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Table 4.1. Reorganization of the composition of shareholders of Copene 
percentages/ 1978 1980 
shareholders 
Petroquisa 52.49 48.16 
CPC 6.19 
Edn 4.82 
Politeno 4.82 
Ciquine petroquímica 4.84 
Oxiteno 3.65 
Polialden 3.65 
Acrinor 3.45 
Nitrocarbono 3.45 
Polipropileno 3.45 
Pronor 3.45 
Isiocianatcos 2.75 
Ciquine química 0.37 
Copenor 0.34 
Deten 0.34 
Melamina 0.34 
Metanor 0.34 
Sulfab 0.03 
others 1.06 4.61 
Norquisa - 47.19 
source: Suarez, 1985 
4.4. The increasing importance of national petrochemical entrepreneurs 
One of the objectives behind the choice to apply the tripartite model was to 
stimulate national entrepreneurial groups to invest in the petrochemical industry. A 
number of Brazilian entrepreneurs - although this was rather limited - was already 
involved in the chemical sector before the second petrochemical complex was 
constructed. In this chapter they are referred to as sector-related entrepreneurs. It 
was only after the implementation of the Camaçari complex that new industrial 
groups started to invest in the petrochemical sector. These groups of non-sector 
related entrepreneurs apparently had nothing to do with the chemical sector but in 
a relatively short time they became rather important. 
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4.4.1. Some sector-related firms: Unipar, Ultra, Ipiranga and Cevekol 
As was described briefly in chapter 4.2.1., the first national companies to invest in 
the petrochemical industry were the Capuava/Unipar group, headed by Paulo 
Geyer, and the Ultra group which belonged to the Igel family. Both were represen-
ted in the first central cracking unit PqU. 
The Capuava company, which later became the Unipar holding, consisted of a 
conglomerate of two Brazilian families, the Geyer family and the Soares family. 
They joined with the financial group, Moreira Sales, and the national company, 
Ultra, to take part in the PqU initiative. Evans remarks about the Unipar group: 
"The most surprising thing about the sequence of events that led to the creation 
of the Unipar group is that the entrepreneurial inputs came from local capital. 
Paulo Geyer and the Capuava group are universally acknowledged, by both 
Brazilians and foreigners in the industry, to have taken a risk that few multina-
tionals would have dared, despite their greater resources."40 
When Paulo Geyer decided to appoint Roberto Campos, the former minister of 
planning, as one of the directors of his group, the influence of Unipar began to 
wither. Geyer/Campos based their strategy on an increase in private influence on 
the petrochemical industry; they wanted state influence to diminish. When it 
appeared that this strategy was not going to work, the Moreira Sales group decided 
to leave Unipar, causing serious financial problems for the group. They had to 
reduce their share in PqU and at the end of 1974 the only involvement of the 
Capuava group in petrochemicals was voting control of the Unipar holding com-
pany.41 Due to the failure of this strategy, Paulo Geyer decided to step aside and 
handed the leadership of Unipar over to Michael Hartveld, a first-line technocrat. 
Before his assignment to Unipar, Hartveld worked closely with the petrochemical 
technocracy. In cooperation with Clemente de Oliveira, at that time director of 
Copene, he designed a development programme for the petrochemical industry for 
the period 1960-1976.42 The appointment of Hartveld was a turning point for Unipar 
and the company began to grow again. Hartveld decided to follow a completely 
different strategy and linked Unipar much more to Petroquisa than Geyer had 
done.43 
Despite the difficulties experienced by Unipar in the seventies, the company can 
now be considered one of the largest national petrochemical companies in Brazil. 
Since it began selling shares in the stock-market in 1969, Unipar has become the 
petrochemical company with the largest number of individual shareholders: in 1988 
it counted 20.000 shareholders.44 In that year the company consisted of 16 sub-
sidiaries. Seven more projects, worth 320 million US dollars, were planned for the 
near future.45 Unipar's activities are mainly concentrated in the chemical sector as its 
participation in the chemical firms PqU, Poliolefinas, Carbocloro, Brasivil and Deten 
shows. Outside the chemical sector Unipar also invests in electronics by means of 
Cirpress SA and manages commercial activities by means of 'Unipar commercial e 
distribuidora'.46 
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Another sector related firm is Grupo Ultra, a company that began with Peiy Igel's 
successful distribution of bottled gas. In the sixties and the seventies the Ultra group 
highly diversified its activities. Its affiliates varied from Ultrafertil, producing 
fertilizer, to Ultralar, a supermarket chain. At the end of the sixties, Bclträo, the 
former minister of planning during the government of president Costa e Silva, was 
appointed to reorganise the company and to define its future strategy. Bclträo 
stopped the diversification of Ultra and decided to concentrate investments in the 
petrochemical industry. The first step taken under his direction was to sell the 
Ultralar supermarket chain.47 The strategy of the Ultra group was just the opposite 
of the strategy initially followed by Geyer and Campos from the Unipar group. 
Instead of alienating itself from the petrochemical technocracy, they entered into a 
strong relationship with Petroquisa. Evans writes: 
"(Ultra) depends on personnel who have been trained in state enterprises. Aside, 
from Beltrâo, with its experience in the state apparatus, there are perhaps a 
dozen executives trained by Petrobras, including Paulo A. G. Cunha, who is the 
vice president of the group's holding company Cobrapar."4* 
Beltrâo expanded the activities of Ultra that were associated with Petroquisa. To a 
larger extent than Unipar, Ultra associated itself with foreign firms and undertook 
tripartite joint ventures. The most important Ultra firm was tripartite: the company 
Oxiteno, which consisted of a joint venture between the national groups Ultra, 
Monteiro Aranha and Rosemberg, the state company Petroquisa and the foreign firm 
Halcón. Oxiteno is the only company that participates in all three petrochemical 
complexes.4* Another activity of Ultra is Ultratec, a technological Research and 
Development (R&D) center. The R&D that is undertaken in this center focuses 
mainly on the petrochemical sector. 
The next important sector-related petrochemical firm cannot easily be overlooked; 
when driving alongside Brazil's highways one always runs into one of the 2.984 
petrol service stations of Ipiranga. Hierarchically directly following Petrobras, Shell 
and Esso, Ipiranga is the fourth largest petrol distributer in Brazil. The company 
started as an oil refinery, founded by an Argentine/Brazilian group of investors in 
1933. When in 1938 the government declared by decree that oil production was 
restricted to Brazilian-bom citizens only, the company was bought by Pedro Gouveia 
Vieira, a lawyer from the south of Brazil. The family Gouveia Vieira succeeded in 
building up a diversified company that can be included among the five largest 
national firms in Brazil. The activities of Ipiranga are no longer limited to oil 
refining and distribution; a large range of industrial and service activities are carried 
out by the 24 different firms that are headed by the Ipiranga holding. These 
activities vary from petrochemical production to insurance, hotels and transport 
facilities. When in the seventies the petrochemical industry became more important 
Ipiranga decided to concentrate on this branch. In 1989 the majority of their new 
investments went to their petrochemical associated firms. Petrol distribution 
remained their most important activity, however, which is illustrated by the fact that 
from a total annual revenue of 1.8 billion US dollars in 1988, 80% still came from 
petrol distribution and was responsible for a Brazilian market share of 11%. 
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Ipiranga is the company that is most involved in the tripartite model. In Polosul, 
Ipiranga is, for example, associated in one firm with Rhodia/Petroquisa and in 
another firm with Hoechst/Petroquisa. Furthermore, the company possesses its own 
R&D center, Isa tec, which is dedicated in particular to the research of petrochemical 
and chemical production processes." In addition, Ipiranga is interested in the 
production of fine chemicals. 
The fourth of the national companies that were already linked to the chemical 
sector, is Peixote de Castro. This firm originated with one of the private-owned 
refineries that existed in Brazil before Petrobras monopolised oil refining: Maguinhas 
Refiniria SA, which was located near Rio de Janeiro. In the sixties, the company 
moved into the production of methanol and formed Prosint SA. With the implemen-
tation of the Camaçari complex, Peixote de Castro strengthened its position in the 
petrochemical sector but it still did not enter into tripartite joint ventures.51 
Finally, Cevekol is a national petrochemical group originating from a sector-related 
branch. This company was created by Ralph Rosemberg, a Jewish refugee who fled 
from Germany to Brazil in the early forties. Having left behind all of his property, 
he started a plastic toy distribution center in the garage of his house: Companhia 
Plastico Trol. This business grew into a mayor plastic-producing conglomerate that 
eventually entered into petrochemical production as well. The strategy of Ralph 
Rosemberg was much more focussed on alliances with foreign enterprises than with 
the petrochemical technocracy; almost all of his ventures involved foreign participa-
tion, but state participation was of much less importance. The activities of Cevekol 
are very dispersed. Although the company concentrates on chemical and petrochemi-
cal production, other activities, such as for instance, the selling of real estate and the 
management of shopping centers and hotels are carried out as well. When Ralph 
Rosemberg died in 1986, the leadership of the company was taken over by his only 
child Monica Rosemberg. 
4.4.2. Some non-sector related firms: Mariani, Odebrecht, Banco Economico 
In deciding which national private firm would be allowed to participate in the 
Camaçari complex, the government gave priority to regionally based entrepreneurial 
groups. This resulted in the entry of non-sector related firms into the petrochemical 
business or as Evans puts it: 
"One effect of the tripe has been to bring local groups into the petrochemical 
industry that have no obvious reasons for being there."52 
And Suarez states in his book: 
"When we analyze private national participation, it is clear that a division can be 
seen between various groups. Most of these groups did not possess any past 
experience in the chemical or petrochemical sector, not even in the industrial 
sector."53 
Evans presents three examples of non-sector related firms. The first is the construc-
tion firm, Camargo Correia, which participated with Mitsubishi and Petroquisa in 
87 
Ciquine Químico. Evans' second example is the Coimbra Bueno group, which 
became a partner in Polibrasil SA along with Royal Dutch Shell and Petroquisa. 
Euvaldo Cruz, which is Dupont's partner in Salgema, is a third non sector-related 
participant.5* 
Evans' remark that local partners like these may create problems55 is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that ten years after Evans finished his research, not one of 
these three local firms is operating anymore in the petrochemical sector. Camargo 
Correia encountered severe financial problems and decided to sell its shares in 
Ciquine; Shell bought out the Coimbra Bueno group because it could not keep pace 
with technological developments and Dupont urgently asked Petroquisa to take over 
the shares of Euvaldo Luz because of severe managerial problems.56 Despite the 
veracity of the statement 'local partners who prove to be liabilities are one of the 
risks inherent in the tripe'57, not all alliances with local non-sector related firms 
encountered this many problems. 
An example of a still successful non-sector related firm is the Odebrecht group: a 
family that started the construction company 'Construction Norberto Odebrecht' in 
1944 in the state Bahia. The company was involved in some of the largest construc-
tion works in Brazil, like the nuclear power plant Angra dos Reis II, the internation-
al airport of Rio de Janeiro and the Itaïpu hydroelectric dam. The construction 
activities made Odebrecht one of the largest exporters in Brazil. Various kinds of 
construction services were exported to Peru, Chile and Argentina in Latin America 
and to Gabon, Nigeria and Angola in West Africa. Although construction comprised 
80% of the annual return of the company, it showed the smallest growth figures in 
the eighties. The reason for this was that Odebrecht became involved in petrochemi-
cal production in 1979 and started to concentrate most of its new investments in 
this sector. When Camaçari came on stream, Odebrecht was not among the first 
regional groups involved in the petrochemical complex. When the regional group 
Camargo Correia could no longer keep its shares in the petrochemical companies, 
CPC and Ciquine Petroquímica, because of financial problems, Petroquisa asked 
Odebrecht to buy these shares. In this way, Odebrecht associated with both 
Petroquisa and the Japanese Mitsubishi. Once involved in petrochemicals, Odebrecht 
expanded its activities to the oil exploration and exploitation sector and even 
decided to go into the mineral sector. In 1985 the company possessed eight sea 
platforms and two more oil-exploitation sites on land, all managed by its subsidiary 
Odebrecht Perfuraçoes Ltda (OPL) making it the largest national oil exploiting 
company in Brazil. With respect to the exploitation of minerals, Odebrecht is 
involved in the copper mines of the mineral company Caraiba Metais in Bahia, and 
in the potassium mines of Petrobras in Sergipe. Odebrecht is now the 14th largest 
non-financial company of Brazil.™ 
A second non-sector related company that entered into petrochemical production in 
1971 is the Banco Economico. Founded by the family Calmon de Sä, the Banco 
Economico is a financial institute of importance in Bahia. The company was closely 
attached to the technocracy, which is illustrated by the fact that one of its founders, 
Angelo Calmon de Sa, became minister of Industry and Commerce, at the end of 
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the seventies." The company, now headed by the three brothers Calmon de Sä, 
highly diversified its activities. The financial activities, distributed among 284 
banking branches, still form the major part of its business, but petrochemical 
production and real estate are two other main activities. With respect to petrochemi-
cals, the Banco Economico, by means of its holding company Conepar, is involved 
in Polialden, associated with Sumitomo and Petroquisa; and in Ciquine Química, 
associated with Mitsubishi and Petroquisa. Estimates in 1990 show that its future 
projects in the petrochemical sector will involve around 152 million US dollars. 
Several luxurious residential areas as well as some of the most outstanding hotels in 
Salvador are owned by the Banco Economico. 
Grupo Mariani or Banco Mariani Bittencourt (BBM) is a financial company that 
also started to invest in petrochemicals when Camaçari was about to be imple-
mented. BBM is a family conglomerate, with the family Mariani Bittencourt domina-
ting 83.6% of its shares. The imperium of Mariani has grown to its present size 
because its banking activities are spread throughout the whole country. As a 
regional Bahian group, BBM was at the end of the sixties asked by Petroquisa to 
begin investments in some of the petrochemical ventures of Camaçari. At the end of 
the eighties, the largest part of its investments went into the petrochemical sector by 
means of its subsidiary BBM Petroquímica. This division of Grupo Mariani is 
involved in seven petrochemical projects, in most cases associated with Petroquisa as 
well as with foreign partners. The Camaçari based firms in which BBM participates 
are Nitrocarbono, (with Petroquisa and DSM) Sulfab, (a subsidiary from Ni trocar-
bono) Pronor (with Petroquisa and Dynamit Nobel) Isiocianaticos (with Petroquisa 
and DuPont) and Policarbonatos (a subsidiary of Pronor). The president of BBM, 
Carlos Mariani, became a powerful person in the national petrochemical scene due 
to the high level of involvement of the company in the tripartite model. In 1988 he 
was elected as president of the petrochemical association ABIQU1M for the second 
time. 
4.43. Relative power between national entrepreneurs: ABIQUIM 
So far the most important representatives of the petrochemical national producers 
have been described. Together they form the Brazilian petrochemical bourgeoisie; 
one of the pillars of the tripartite model. This petrochemical bourgeoisie is closely 
interrelated and among its members several formal and informal relational patterns 
exist. One of the most important formal institutions in which national petrochemical 
representatives coordinate their activities and interests is ABIQUIM which was 
founded in 1964,*' at the instigation of private firms, national as well as internation-
al. The reason for its creation was, amongst others, that the regional federations, like 
the FIESP and the FIERGS," were too much bound to regional interests and paid 
little attention to sectoral interests. Negotiations on the national level about the 
interests of the chemical sector proved to be difficult. The members of ABIQUIM are 
first and second generation petrochemical companies. Because most of the 260 
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enterprises represented are of considerable size, ABIQUIM can act as spokesman for 
90% of the chemical sector.0 
When ABIQUIM was founded in 1964 the chemical sector was almost completely 
dominated by foreign enterprises. As a result, the chemical association also consisted 
primarily of foreign members.0 ABIQUIM can be seen as a product of the first 
transnational corporations in the chemical industry." The national companies that 
were participating in the association during the sixties were mostly of Paulista (Sâo 
Paulo) origin. As can be seen in table 4.2., only four of the 24 directors represented 
Bahian companies in 1977. The petrochemical technocracy also had a minor repre-
sentation: Otto Perroni of Petrobras was the only state participant among the 24 
directors. When the petrochemical complex in Camaçari reached completion, the 
composition of the directory of ABIQUIM, especially the division between par-
ticipants of the state technocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie, changed considerab-
ly. From the beginning of the eighties onwards, the division of the representatives 
of the association was slightly more in accordance with the division in the tripartite 
model. This meant, in the first place, that the importance of petrochemical tech-
nocracy increased ending the hegemony of the private, predominantly foreign, 
dominance. In the second place, the greater importance of the Paulista entrepreneurs 
in the petrochemical association changed somewhat as a more equal regional 
distribution of ABIQUIM directors developed, (see table 4.2. and figure 4.2.) At the 
end of the eighties this situation changed again: the Paulista entrepreneurs recovered 
their former position while the importance of the petrochemical technocracy declined 
in a relative sense. When the various president directors of ABIQUIM are compared, 
the initial importance of the state technocracy becomes clear: in 1985 Otto Perroni, a 
representative of the petrochemical technocracy46 was elected president. 
The actual division of petrochemical production, in which the Bahian complex 
compromised more than 50%, is reflected in the election of president directors of 
ABIQUIM: in two different periods, 1983-1985 and 1987-1989, ABIQUIM was headed 
by Carlos Mariani, the president director of the Bahia based BBM. 
The role of foreign companies in ABIQUIM is also subject to change. While in the 
sixties transnationals dominated the association, their influence seemed to lessen 
during the seventies. In the eighties, the situation changed again and although after 
1977 no foreign representative was appointed president, or even vice president, the 
number of representatives of foreign petrochemical firms increased considerably. 
This is in strong contradiction to the analysis of Suarez, who states that the 
petrochemical technocracy in particular, linked to the national private bourgeoisie, is 
gaining in importance." It is not unlikely that Suarez bases his conclusions on the 
more informal relational patterns that existed among the Brazilian members of 
ABIQUIM. In his book he mentions, for example, a dinner that took place the 
evening before Carlos Mariani Bittencourt was elected president of ABIQUIM, on the 
21th of May 1983: 
"On the night before the solemnity (-) Geisel and Belträo had dinner - lasting 
four hours - in the house of Pery Igel (patriarch of the Ultra Group) together 
with a select group of members of the technocracy and the bourgeoisie, among 
90 
them Paulo Cunha, Otto Perroni, Marcos Viana (ex-president of BNDE during 
president Geisel), Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter, Gaudio Bárdela, Olavo Setubal, 
Abilio Diniz and Carlos Mariani. Of course, we do not have exact data to 
evaluate the nature of articulations that were brought forward during these 
'gastronomic events'. But when we consider the facts succeeding, we believe that 
during these events the unification between the technocracy and the 'grand' 
bourgeoisie was effectuated."47 
Table 4.2. Composition of ABIQUIM Board of Directors and successive President Directors 
according to origin of representatives in the period 1977-1969 in absolute numbers and 
percentages 
years 
origin repre-
sentatives 
1977 1981/3 1983/5 1985/7 1987/9 
% % % 
Sao Paulo 
Bahia 
Technocracy 
Foreign firms 
Others 
total 
8 33 8 32 6 25 7 24 10 30 
4 
1 
7 
4 
24 
17 
4 
29 
17 
100 
3 
2 
9 
3 
25 
12 
8 
36 
12 
100 
5 
4 
9 
1 
24 
21 
17 
37 
0 
100 
7 
4 
10 
1 
29 
24 
13 
34 
5 
100 
7 
4 
12 
0 
33 
21 
12 
36 
0 
100 
source: deducted from annual reports ABIQUIM 
Figure 4.2. Origin of President Directors of Abiquim in the period between 1977 and 1989 
director 
1977 
1981/3 
1983/5 
1985/7 
1887/9 
presidents 
Edgardo de Azevedo 
Suarez Junior 
Paulo Cunha 
Carlos Mariani 
Bittencourt 
Otto Perroni 
Carlos Mariani 
Bittencourt 
firm 
Elekeiroz 
Oxiteno 
BBM 
Norquisa 
BBM 
origin 
foreign 
company 
Sao Paulo 
Bahia 
technocracy 
Bahia 
source: deducted from annual reports ABIQUIM 
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It is not uncommon to make important decisions during informal meetings such as 
this dinner, thus eroding the influence of foreign representatives. Evans also 
mentions the importance of informal, personal relations between the technocrats and 
national entrepreneurs: 
"The shaping was done less by overall policy decision, than by informal personal 
contacts among the individuals involved."" 
Another informal network, linking important national private petrochemical firms 
together and excluding foreign companies, was to be found among several, mostly 
Bahian-based petrochemical entrepreneurs. Once every fortnight a selected group of 
entrepreneurs met for dinner. Among them Eduardo Gouveira Vieira of the Banco 
Economico, Monica Rosemberg of Cevekol, Carlos Mariani of BBM, Angelo de Sa 
Neto of Odebrecht, Paulo Cunha of Ultra and Michael Hartveld of Unipar.™ These 
informal meetings were organised to exchange some -but of course not all- informa-
tion concerning firm strategies and are for the purpose of defining common 
interests. 
4.5. The third partner in the tripartite model: the transnational corporation 
The third partner in the tripartite model is the multinational enterprise. As can be 
seen in table 4.3. practically all existing chemical transnational corporations are 
represented in Brazil but not all of them participate in the tripartite model. In this 
section a brief view will be given of four of the most important foreign chemical 
enterprises in the country; Dow Chemical, which purposefully stayed outside the 
tripartite model for a reasonably long period of time; Shell do Brasil, which only 
hesitantly participated; Rhone Poulenc, with its relatively large involvement in tripe 
joint ventures and Mitsubishi, which participated exclusively in tripartite joint 
ventures. Furthermore, the opinion of several members of the technocracy and 
national bourgeoisie with respect to the participation of foreign firms in the 
tripartite model will be compared. 
4.5.1. Foreign enterprises outside the tripartite model: Dow Chemical 
The American-owned Dow Chemical is an example of an important chemical 
enterprise that operated for quite some time outside the tripartite model. Worldwide 
Dow Chemical is one of the most important petrochemical conglomerates with 
petrochemical complexes all over the globe. In most of its complexes, Dow Chemical 
owns the various succeeding generations itself, from the central cracking unit to the 
third generation plant.™ 
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Table 4.3. Most important multinational chemical enterprises in Brazil present in the three 
petrochemical complexes in 1987 
Complex Sao Paulo 
Dow Chemical 
Union Carbide 
Hoechst 
Atlas 
Electro Cloro 
Rhodia 
Shell 
EMCA 
Ciba Geigy 
ICI 
Bayer 
Basf 
AKZO 
Montsanto 
Vulcan 
Dupont 
Camaçari/CIA 
Dow Chemical 
Mitsubishi 
Sumitomo 
Idemitsu 
Rhodia 
EMCA 
Ciba Geigy 
Liquid Carbonics 
AKZO 
Dupont 
Triunfo 
Ato Chimie 
Hoechst 
Rhodia 
Hercules 
Scientific-
Design 
source: Química e derivados, Julho 1987 
Dow Chemical entered Brazil at the beginning of the seventies, at the time when 
plans were being made to expand the petrochemical industry outside Sâo Paulo. 
Since various foreign enterprises were already present and competing with each 
other in Sâo Paulo, Dow Chemical decided to focus its strategy on Bahia. In 
conformance with its, until then, always successful concept, Dow Chemical wished 
to establish a petrochemical firm in Bahia to produce ethylene and vinyl chloride 
monomers of which it would be the sole owner. With this in mind, the American 
company ignored government policy which at that time had the objective of 
implementing the tripartite model in an integrated complex in Bahia. The way in 
which Dow Chemical succeeded in obtaining the final approval for its 100% foreign-
owned petrochemical complex is rather peculiar.71 At the instigation of Angelo 
Calmon de Sä, Dow appointed General Golbery do Couto e Silva, founder of the 
National Information Service,71 to be president of its Brazilian subsidiary. With the 
support of this influential person, Dow succeeded in 1972 in obtaining permission 
for the construction of a propane oxide producing company in the Industrial Center 
of Aratu (CIA)". The second phase was to be the construction of a soda-chloride 
plant which was rejected by the CDI because not enough feedstock, caustic soda, 
was available. When in Alagoas a tripartite project between DuPont, the BNDE and 
the national group, Euvaldo Luz, began, under the name of Salgema, Dow received 
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approval for its factory under the condition that it participated in this tripartite joint 
venture. Dow refused, however, and discovered a reservoir of caustic soda only a 
few months later on the island Matarandiba, right in front of the already con-
structed Dow harbour. Once again Dow applied to the CDI for approval of a 100% 
owned Dow project. Attracted by promising export figures -the exports could reach 
500-800 million US dollars in a period of about ten years- and stimulated by well 
established relations between the company management, headed by Colbery Couto y 
Silva and the state technocracy, the government approved this project in 1975 and 
even promised subsidies of $ 173 million.74 In this way Dow succeeded in operating 
outside the tripartite model and in establishing a 100% owned petrochemical 
downstream complex in the industrial center of Aratu (CIA), near the Camaçari 
complex. In this complex four production entities were constructed, using their own 
feedstock, caustic soda.75 At the end of the eighties, the attitude of Dow changed to 
such extent that the company even decided to participate in two tripartite joint 
ventures, in the Camaçari and the Polosul complex, respectively. This remarkable 
change will be further discussed in chapter 73.3.. 
In Brazil Dow Chemical had an annual turnover of 530 million US dollars in 1989 
which makes it the Ιό"1 largest company in this country. The transnational is 
represented in five production sectors -petrochemicals, plastics, pharmaceuticals, 
agrochemicals and chemical consumption goods- and possessed 19 production 
companies in 1986." Its further investment plans for the period 1989-1999 involve 
500 million US dollar.77 Most expansion projects will be dedicated to the substitution 
of imports and product diversification. 
4.5.2. Hesitant participants: Shell do Brasil 
An example of a foreign firm that did enter into the tripartite structure, but only 
hesitantly, and in a very modest form, is the Anglo/Dutch company Shell do Brasil. 
Shell is one of the foreign multinationals that not only has a long history in Brazil, 
but is also considered to be the largest enterprise in the country. The corporation 
started to invest in Brazil in 1919, when it was involved in oil exploration. 
Nowadays Shell's ventures are not limited to oil exploitation, but embrace a large 
variation of activities in the production as well as in the distribution sphere. The 
investments of Shell in Brazil vary from oil exploration and distribution to plant 
breeding, from tourism to the manufacturing of minerals. The most important share 
of the annual return of Shell comes from its petrol distribution centers. Three 
thousand Shell service stations can be found all over Brazil and are good for a 
market share of 21%. A second important activity is the exploration and exploitation 
of minerals which is carried out by the subsidiary Billiton. In several locations, 
amongst others, the Amazona Forest, Billiton possesses huge concessionary areas in 
which important minerals such as bauxite are excavated and sold to other com­
panies for further processing. Oil exploration and exploitation have diminished in 
importance since the Brazilian government introduced the so-called risk contracts. 
94 
Photograph 3: Various foreign subsidiaries invested in the 
Camaçari complex: BASF 
Photograph 4: Various foreign subsidiaries invested in the 
Camaçari complex: Ciba Geigy 
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In 1975 Petrobras restricted the involvement of transnational corporations in oil 
exploitation, allowing them to participate with so-called risk contracts only." 
Petrochemical production is another area in which Shell is involved, although on a 
rather limited scale in comparison to their other activities. In 1977 only 10% of their 
worldwide sales of 36.680 million US dollars consisted of petrochemicals.'' That 
petrochemical production is not the first priority of Shell is reflected in their 
involvement in the Brazilian petrochemical complexes. Shell started to invest in the 
petrochemical industry in 1978 when Polibrasil, a polypropylene producing joint 
venture with the participation of Petroquisa, was constructed in the Sào Paulo 
region. More than ten years later, in 1989, Shell invested again in a petrochemical 
tripartite joint venture, this time in Rio de Janeiro. The long interval between these 
two investments can be explained by the rather reluctant attitude of Shell to 
compromise itself within the tripartite model. The opinion of Shell is expressed by 
its management: 
"Shell has nothing against participating in joint ventures, but they will participate 
only when they see the advantages of this participation. For example when 
capital investments in the petroleum branch are too large, and hence too risky for 
one firm. Shell shall happily join with other petroleum firms to execute the large 
scale operation together and share the risks. But to sign a joint venture agree-
ment not out of financial reasons, but out of technological and political reasons is 
something else and Shell is not very eager to step into this kind of business"80. 
Certain advantages, however, regarding the government policy" concerning the 
chemical industry in particular, could not be denied by Shell. As a result the 
chemical giant tried to obtain shares in the complex of Camaçari and Polosul on its 
own conditions. However, they did not succeed in either of the two complexes. In 
the second half of the seventies they began negotiations to obtain a percentage of 
the shares in Deten, a firm located in the Camaçari complex and producing acyl 
benzene. The negotiations did not bring the expected results, however, and Shell did 
not continue. According to the present managing director of Deten, Shell was afraid 
of the competitive power of his firm and did not want to sell its technology. Deten, 
therefore, purchased the needed technology from the US-based technology transna-
tional, Universal Oil Products (UOP). 
"Shell was trying to hinder production of our firm primarily because they were 
afraid that Deten and Shell would conquer similar markets, which can be true, as 
we export 40% of our production and 25% is going to European markets, 
predominantly the Netherlands."82 
In another firm on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari, Ciquine Química, Shell 
tried to associate with a national partner. In this case as well negotiations proved to 
be a dead end and Shell decided to step out before construction even began0. 
When observing the relative success of the petrochemical tripartite joint ventures, 
Shell admitted to have 'missed the train'. When, in the National Petrochemical 
Programme (PNP), the expansion of the petrochemical industry was announced, 
Shell was among the first firms to react. Together with Ipiranga and Polipropileno 
SA based in Camaçari, the transnational presented an investment proposal to the 
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GDI, to construct a high density polypropylene producing firm near Rio de Janeiro.*4 
Like the other transnational companies. Shell is extremely interested in the fine 
chemical sector. So far the company did not make much technological progress in 
this sector, but, nevertheless, they started a fine chemical producing unit in Paulinia, 
Sâo Paulo, with total investments of 10 million US dollars. In this company the fine 
chemical ional oxidant will be produced, which is meant to serve as a raw material 
for food, cosmetics, additives, rubber and polymers.85 
The total number of production units in Brazil possessed by Shell in 1986 was 36.u 
While the total turnover of this transnational in 1988 amounted 3.8 billion US 
dollars, the net revenue accumulated in the same year was 130 million US dollars.87 
New projects planned in the next couple of years made it necessary for Shell to 
double its investments: in 1989 total investments amounted to 213 million US 
dollars, of which 25 million US dollars will be invested to create Braspol.88 
4.53. Early participants: Rhodia 
One of the foreign enterprises that seemed less reluctant to enter into the tripartite 
model and actually participated in several different projects, is Rhodia do Brazil, the 
Brazilian subsidiary of the French Rhone Poulenc. While already present in the Säo 
Paulo petrochemical complex in several different plants, Rhodia was willing to 
participate in the Camaçari tripartite companies as well, and it began to take part in 
two different joint venture firms: Unirhodia and Acrinor. When the third petroche-
mical complex was announced, Rhodia again signed up and joined in the tripartite 
joint venture Polivinil. This involvement within the framework of the tripartite 
model linked Rhodia to some extent to the petrochemical technocracy. The president 
of the French company in Brazil, Paulo Somers, is respected within the technocracy 
and has represented the opinion of the foreign companies at several petrochemical 
congresses. Despite their rather firm position within the Brazilian petrochemical 
industry, the attitude of Rhodia towards participating in the tripartite model 
changed during the eighties, however. One of the reasons for this change is the 
restrictive Brazilian policy with respect to the fine chemical industry, that is 
becoming an increasingly important production activity of Rhodia. Due to the strict 
observation of import substitution regulations regarding, in particular, the produc-
tion of intermediary fine chemicals, Rhodia has a choice between buying inter-
mediaries from Brazilian-owned fine chemical firms, which have recently begun 
operation, or transferring its subsidiaries that produce fine chemical intermediaries 
to locations in Brazil. 
Although the largest part of its annual return is still provided by the petrochemi-
cal sector, the fine chemical division -divided into pharmaceuticals, agricultural 
chemicals and animal feedstock- is already the second most important division of 
Rhodia. Together these sub-divisions were worth 14.9% of the total annual revenue 
in 1986." The rather ambitious expansion plans of Rhodia -it plans to invest a total 
of 450 million US dollars in the next five years- focus on the area of fine chemicals. 
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These investments are meant to replace the rather large imports of this chemical 
transnational. In 1986, Rhodia imported raw materials, primarily for its fine chemical 
plants, worth 31.2 million US dollars.90 The most important project in this import-
substitution program, and at the same time the most controversial one, was the new 
salicylic acid plant -the raw material for aspirins- which has been built near Sâo 
Paulo. Although construction began as early as 1983, by 1987 the CDI still had not 
given permission to start production.91 The reason for this delay can be found in the 
construction of another salicylic acid plant in the Camaçari complex by a tripartite 
joint venture, which purchased its technology from the Mexican Salicilatos de 
Mexico, a former partner of the German Bayer. The Brazilian market was considered 
too small for two salicylic acid plants and the CDI urged Rhodia to produce for 
export only.92 The assistant Secretary General of the CDI, Cassare, is of the opinion 
that: 
"Rhodia does not want to substitute imports, but to destroy local competition. 
We've been importing aspirin for 90 years, but Rhodia only started its factory 
when a local company appeared with technology bought from Mexico."93 
This matter could also jeopardize Rhodia's rather good position within the tripartite 
model. 
Rhodia do Brasil is one of the most important chemical enterprises in Brazil and in 
1986 it even was the enterprise with the best overall performance. The total annual 
return in 1986 was 770 million US dollars.94 The new investment plans of Rhodia in 
Brazil are rather ambitious: in the next ten years the transnational plans to invest 2 
billion US dollars. Part of this money will come from capital owned by the sub-
sidiaries and part of it will be provided by the parent company.95 Most noteworthy 
is the intention to dedicate increases in production realised from these investments 
to the export market. Rhodia is planning to increase its export share from 10 to 20% 
of total company's sales in five years time.9* 
4.5.4. Eager participants: Mitsubishi 
The last important participant in the chemical industry that will be described in this 
chapter is the Japanese Mitsubishi. This foreign participant, which did not possess 
any investments in Brazilian pwtrochemical companies before the Camaçari complex 
came on stream, would probably not be represented in Brazil if the tripartite model 
did not exist. It was only within the construction sector that Mitsubishi was 
represented in Brazil for a longer period. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries entered Brazil 
in 1963 and established a joint venture with the Brazilian 'Companhia Brasileira de 
Caldeiras e Equipamentas Pesadas'.97 Mitsubishi did not begin investing in the 
p>etrochemical industry until the end of the sixties, by means of Mitsubishi Chemi-
cals, a firm transformed into Mitsubishi Kasei in 1989. Because the state technocracy 
wanted to diminish the dominance of American and European companies in the 
petrochemical industry, it invited Japanese companies to invest in the new Camaçari 
complex. Mitsubishi was the Japanese firm that responded most positively to this 
98 
request and, in the beginning of the seventies, began to participate in five different 
joint ventures, all located in Camaçari, including, for instance, Ciquine and CPC. In 
all of these joint ventures Mitsubishi is associated with Petroquisa and a local 
national company. Mitsubishi did not start participating in any other petrochemical 
complex. 
For Mitsubishi, Brazil is one of the single most important countries for expansion 
of overseas investments: in the period 1989-1993, 45% of investments of Mitsubishi 
world wide will be realised in Brazil which means that investments in this country 
will double." Compared to the other chemical transnationals investing in Brazil, 
Mitsubishi is only a small investor; it does not appear on the list of the 20 largest 
chemical enterprises in Brazil, nor can it be found among the 500 largest companies 
in the country." 
4.5.5. Foreign participation in the petrochemical industry: a polemic question 
Although an indispensible partner in the tripartite model, the presence of the 
foreign participant in the chemical joint ventures was not welcomed with equal 
enthusiasm by every party concerned. In an article about the Brazilian petrochemical 
industry, Evans remarks: 
"Scarcely one month after the official inauguration of the Camaçari pole, its 
organisers were shaken by unexpected accusations. Joâo Cunha, an opposition 
deputy from Sâo Paulo, rose in the house of representatives to denounce the 
petrochemical pole, saying: 'The Camaçari pole is in the service of foreign 
interests'. (-) Consequently, in Cunha's view, the financial incentives provided by 
FINOR and others to tripe firms were illegitimate, if not illegal, since such 
incentives were reserved for locally controlled firms."1™ 
Not only directly after the inauguration, but also ten years later, in 1989, nationalis-
tic Brazilians were still opposed to the overall presence of foreign participants in the 
tripartite model. Nationalistic entrepreneurs and technocrats prefer a restriction on 
the participation of transnational companies and claim that up-to-date technology 
can easily be developed by national R&D centers or bought from international 
centers. They consider the contribution of transnationals as unnecessary from the 
technological point of view and even harmful since profits are transferred across the 
border, out of the country. Bautista Vidal, a consultant of the federal government, is 
very concerned about this process: 
"(Transnational corporations) occupy economic space in peripheral countries 
without giving these countries the possibility to protect or preserve this space for 
national firms. The worst thing however is that (-) in this way cultural and 
political space is also occupied and technological packages are imposed as new 
forms of domination."10' 
But another group of entrepreneurs and technocrats do not consider the participa-
tion of transnational corporations as merely negative. They are of the opinion that 
especially in the provision of technology, the presence of foreign enterprises can be 
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advantageous. Because of the fast changes in the technology process they believe 
that the absorption and development of up-to-date technology is too expensive for 
national enterprises. Adary de Oliveira, director supervisor of the Companhia 
Petroquímica de Camaçari, is of the opinion that: 
"Although the tripartite model is slowing down the process of nationalisation of 
the sector, the participation of transnational corporations is still necessary, 
especially in the new Rio complex. The participation of transnational corporations 
will even increase because of the debt conversion".1™ 
In the next chapters, the participation and the contribution of the foreign firms will 
be looked at in more detail. 
4.6. Summary and conclusions 
The coexistence of state enterprises, national private enterprises and foreign com-
panies in the Brazilian chemical industry is used by the government to design a 
development model that will increase the national production of petrochemicals. 
Especially with respect to the second and third petrochemical complex, the Camaçari 
and Polosul complex, the tripartite model was an explicit government tool. 
Several factors make it possible to implement this model. In the first place, in the 
period between 1964 and 1985 military rulers laid the foundations for the emergence 
of a petrochemical technocracy consisting of relatively autonomous institutes. It is 
partly thanks to the efforts of the state-owned company, Petroquisa, the National 
Development Bank, BNDES, and the Industrial Development Council, CDI, that the 
third pillar of the tripartite model plays a significant role. It can not be denied, 
however, that the important role of these state institutions is subject to changes. The 
first signs of an actual decline in direct state involvement in the petrochemical 
industry could be noticed at the end of the seventies when the strict regulations 
concerning state participation changed. With the implementation of the Camaçari 
complex the rule was that Petroquisa could not participate with a smaller share than 
the largest partner. When the projects for the Polosul complex were designed, this 
rule was no longer necessary. Despite this change in regulation, the actual participa-
tion of Petroquisa did not decline at that time because the national entrepreneurs 
asked Petroquisa to participate. During the first half of the eighties positive 
developments in the petrochemical industry made it unnecessary for Petroquisa to 
further diminish its shares in this sector. And despite serious opposition on the part 
of the national private bourgeoisie, Petroquisa still used this policy in the second 
half of the eighties. 
The national private bourgeoisie was only slightly involved in the petrochemical 
industry before the Camaçari complex was constructed. The few sector-related 
national companies that could be found in the Sao Paulo complex or elsewhere in 
Brazil were: Unipar, Ultra, Peixote de Castro, Cevekol and Ipiranga. The government 
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objective to reinforce the national petrochemical bourgeoisie in the seventies can be 
called successful, however. After the establishment of the Camaçari complex, several 
non-sector related firms began to invest in petrochemical firms. Most of these firms 
originated from non-industrial sectors such as Odebrecht, which originates from the 
construction sector, and Grupo Mariani and Banco Economico, both originating from 
the financial sector. In a relatively short period of time the influence of these non-
sector-related companies increased considerably, which is evidenced in the appoint-
ment of Carlos Mariani as president-director of the most important petrochemical 
association, ABIQUIM. Informal relations between several national private entrepre-
neurs further strengthened their position in relation to foreign companies. 
The last partner in the tripartite model is the multinational company. Because of 
the attractive conditions provided by the government and the rather favourable 
prospects of the petrochemical industry in the seventies, many foreign companies 
were interested in participating. However, not all of them liked the idea of par-
ticipating in tripartite joint ventures with the state. Supported by their good 
relations within the state technocracy, the American multinational Dow Chemical 
succeeded in remaining outside the tripartite model for a long time. 
The efforts of Shell to invest outside of the model were less successful. In several 
projects. Shell began negotiations with certain conditions for participation, but in 
most of these cases the negotiations failed and their place was occupied by another 
foreign company. It was only in 1989 that they signed a contract to participate in a 
tripartite joint venture. A multinational that seems to encounter less problems with 
the tripartite structure is the French Rhodia. Their involvement in tripartite joint 
ventures is significant. Furthermore, their president director Paulo Somers is a well-
known representative of ABIQUIM and his opinion can be heard at several petro-
chemical congresses. Because of the restrictive policy of the Brazilian government 
with respect to foreign investments in the fine chemical industry, the attitude of 
Rhodia is changing in a negative sense. The last multinational that is described in 
this chapter is the Japanese Mitsubishi. At the request of the Brazilian government, 
this Japanese multinational started to participate in tripartite joint ventures. As a 
consequence of their recent history in the Brazilian petrochemical industry, their 
influence among the petrochemical multinationals has been relatively small. In 
contrast to the other foreign participants, the Japanese firms, and with them 
Mitsubishi, only invested in the petrochemical industry in the form of joint ventures, 
mostly of the tripartite kind. 
From this chapter, it becomes clear that the role of state technocracy, national 
private partners and foreign participating firms is rather dynamic and subject to 
change. The extent to which this dynamic process influences on the functioning of 
the tripartite model is, however, not yet clear. More light will be shed on this 
subject in the next chapters, when a more detailed view of the Camaçari complex 
will be presented. 
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5 
THE PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX OF CAMAÇARI 
5.1. Introduction 
When driving by car from Salvador, the state capital of Bahia, to the north the 
landscape changes rather rapidly; leaving the green palmy coastline behind you, you 
approach the desert of northeast Brazil. Approximately 60 kilometers away from 
Salvador the bright white sand dunes are quite suddenly interrupted by a complete-
ly different view. Situated on a large flat area, the petrochemical complex of 
Camaçari appears in front of you like a huge smokey island. In this totally deprived 
region, where small farmers and villagers try to survive the extreme drought, the 
government decided to locate what is now known as the largest one-time invest-
ment in a fully integrated petrochemical complex in the world: the Camaçari 
complex.1 
In order to understand the functioning of the tripartite model on the level of the 
firm, the characteristics of the individual companies in the Camaçari complex need 
to be outlined. In the first place, it is necessary to present a clear picture of the total 
number of firms located in the Camaçari complex and fluctuations in the number 
since the complex began. In addition to their absolute number, it is important to 
pay attention to the activities of the firms: to which industrial branch do they 
belong, what products do they produce and what is the volume of their production? 
A very important aspect of firm production can naturally be found in the revenues 
of the companies: their annual turnover, profits and profitability. One last interesting 
aspect that will be described in this chapter is the expansion of production of 
almost all Camaçari firms which will take place as part of the National Petrochemi-
cal Programme. 
The Camaçari complex is distinguished from other complexes by the specific 
ownership structure of the companies. Due to the various investment structures, 
different ownership structures exist side by side. Tripartite joint ventures, bipartite 
joint ventures and 100% owned companies can all be found in the Camaçari 
complex. Although the various participating firm partners are responsible for capital 
input, most of the financial capital originates from external sources such as the 
National Development Bank, BNDES, and the Development Corporation, Sudene. 
Both capital suppliers will be described in more detail in section 5.4. 
There was a rationale for locating the Camaçari complex in the relatively back-
ward region of northeast Brazil, in the state of Bahia. It was hoped that the complex 
would stimulate regional development. In section 5.5. various regional development 
possibilities will be described, beginning with the input/output linkages: what is the 
origin of the raw material used by the Camaçari firms, and what is the destination 
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of their products? The employment possibilities, a second important aspect relating 
to regional development, will be described next. To what extent does the complex 
generate a large number of jobs? Finally, linkages to the location of decision-making 
centers and R&D laboratories will be described.2 
5.2. The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
The petrochemical complex of Camaçari is located in between the two small and 
insignificant villages Camaçari and Dias ТУ Avila. The state government chose this 
location because of the flatness of the area surrounded by slope hills, the availability 
of ground water reservoirs and because at the moment the decision was made three 
firms already existed there. Several roads and one railway connect the complex with 
the outside region. Because the complex itself is not located near a harbour, the 
main road leads to the harbour of Aratu.1 Transport by road and water are the most 
important means of transport for the firms in the complex. 
The complex is divided into four different zones, (see figure 5.1.) The central 
zone, the basic complex, was constructed first and is the most important part, 
housing the central cracking unit, Copene, and most of the downstream firms. Also 
the Ceman, the 'Central de Manutençâo' which takes care of maintenance at the 
complex and the CETREL, 'Central de Tratamento de Efluentes Líquidos SA', which 
takes care of all industrial waste, can be found in this area. The infrastructural 
facilities have the highest standard in this area and consist of an extended network 
of various types of water, electricity, telephone connections, resource and products 
pipes and a sewage system. 
The northern part of the complex is reserved for sector-related firms such as fine 
chemical and fertilizer companies. It is a short distance from the basic complex, 
where less infrastructure is available. Water supplies are limited and only one type 
of water can be obtained. These firms are not directly connected to Copene. Because 
lot prices are lower in this region, other types of enterprises are attracted to the 
area. For instance, firms that need a large area - like the steel company. Caraiba 
Metais - and firms that do not need the inputs from Copene - the fine chemical 
firms, for example - are located here. 
According to the projected development of the complex, as designed by COPEC, 
the third zone of the complex, located on the eastern side, was reserved for the 
third generation branch. In this region, the establishment of the plastic transforma-
tion firms was projected. These firms were to make use of the output of the 
petrochemical firms, produce for the regional market and provide employment 
opportunities to the villages located nearby. For several reasons, and in contrast to 
the early plans, few plastic transformation firms were established in this area. 
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Figure 5.1. The petrochemical complex of Camaçari 
с Ata biduiliixl Norte 
1 = northern industrial area 
2 = eastern industrial area 
3 = basic complex arca 
4 = western industrial area 
5 = special use area 
6 = transportsector 
source: COPEQ 1989 
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The fourth part of the complex, finally, the so-called special area, is located at some 
distance from the heart of the complex, hidden behind large hills. Here, situated in 
the relative green surroundings of an old fazenda, the coordinating and supporting 
units can be found. These institutions are partly govemment-owned and partly 
owned by private subcontracted firms. The most important one is the COPEC: 
'Complexo Petroquimico de Camaçari'. This coordinating institute was created in 
1973 in order to coordinate the administration and promotion of the complex. The 
work of the 161 employees can be compared to the work of municipal employees. 
In short, the tasks of the COPEC consist of area planning, monitoring of construc-
tion activities, guaranteeing security, securing environmental protection, selecting and 
training of human resources, maintaining the infrastructure and relocating ambulant 
street vendors. The COPEC obtains its resources from the Bahian government, 
supplemented by a compulsory contribution from all firms located on the complex. 
Technology used by the firms is the main responsibility of another institution 
located on the special area, the CEPED, 'Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento'. 
Other government institutions located on the complex include the electricity 
company, Coelba, 'Companhia de Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia', the telephone 
company, Telebahia, and some institutions providing social services and educational 
facilities. 
A coordinating committees which directly serves the petrochemical firms, the 
COFIC; 'Comité de Fomento Industrial de Camaçari' is located close to the COPEC 
buildings. The eighteen persons employed here are mainly occupied with defending 
the interests of patrons. The directory consists of representatives of Camaçari-based 
firms. The employers union, SINPER, 'Sindicato da Industria Petroquímica e de 
Resinas Sintéticas do Estado da Bahia' and the SINPAQ, 'Sindicato da Produto 
Químicos para Fins Industriais de Camaçari', are two institutions that defend the 
interests of employers and negotiate with trade unions. Finally, the subcontracted 
firms, providing services to all firms located on the complex, such as the highway 
bus companies, can be found in the special area. Six of these privately owned 
companies provide transport 24 hours a day between the Camaçari complex and 
Salvador. 
5.3. Economic characteristics of the petrochemical firms 
on the complex of Camaçari 
In order to analyse the functioning of the tripartite model, it is important to 
consider the characteristics of the chemical firms located on the complex of Camaça-
ri. Firms belonging to the service sector, such as engineering firms, transport 
companies and cleaning firms, are not included in this analysis. State companies 
located in the central zone of the complex, like Copcne, Cetrel and Ceman, are also 
not taken into consideration. Copene is not included because, as the central cracking 
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unit, its specific characteristics differ too much from the downstream chemical 
companies to make fair comparison possible. Cetrel and Ceman are excluded 
because their activities are more focused on the service sector. Finally, non-chemical 
related industrial companies, such as the three construction fírms which played an 
important role in the construction of the chemical firms during the implementation 
of the complex, and the metallurgical company. Caraiba Metais, are excluded. Also, 
the two beverages firms located on the complex. Industria de Bebidas Antartica do 
Nordeste SA and CIBEB, Companhia de Bebidas da Bahia, will not be included in 
the analysis. 
5.3.1. Number and industrial branches 
At the time the petrochemical complex was planned in Camaçari a couple of firms 
had already been established at the projected location. In the beginning of the 
sixties, when neither the concept of tripartite joint ventures nor the idea of a 
petrochemical complex existed, three companies started a production plant at some 
distance from Camaçari. These firms established themselves at this specific location 
because of the availability of water and the existence of a flat area. The first firm 
established here was the brewery Antartica which was constructed in 1967 and 
began production in 1970. A second firm, constructed in 1968, was Nitrofertil, a 
company producing fertilizer owned by Petrobras; one year later, in 1969, the 
synthetic fibre company FISIBA, presently named Celbras, was constructed. In 1974, 
the Camaçari project became a reality and several firms began to construct their 
production units. Except for one firm, all were completely new companies.4 
As can be seen in Table 5.1. twenty-seven firms began operation around 1979. 
During the ten years that the complex has existed the total number of firms steadily 
increased. Between 1985 and 1988, this increase stopped temporarily, however. In 
1985, 43 firms were operating on the complex and, despite the fact that the 12 firms 
projected had already been approved by the SDI, the number of productive firms in 
1988 remained the same. This stagnation is directly related to the economic recession 
during the early eighties. Because of this recession entrepreneurs were reluctant to 
begin construction of new projects that had already been approved and preferred to 
wait until conditions cleared up. In 1989 the number of producing firms increased 
to 50 firms. This increase did not quite correspond with the number of projected 
firms which was 12 in 1985 and 15 in 1988. This means that a relatively large 
number of firms that had already been approved never began production or 
stopped production shortly after they started.5 In fact, only 5 of the 15 projected 
firms in 1988 were indeed realized in 1989.' According to these figures, many 
projects did not succeed. Later on in this chapter the reasons for this phenomenon 
will be analyzed. 
The increase in the number of firms is somewhat misleading since some of those 
firms can considered to be juridical expansions. The incentives that had stimulated 
the construction of the Camaçari complex, such as the ten year tax holiday, also 
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provided a stimulus for the creation of 100% subsidiaries of existing Camaçari-based 
firms. Even when the enlargement of a firm was no more than a expansion of firm 
capacity, it was more propitious for entrepreneurs to create a new affiliate. By 
giving the new subsidiary another name the entrepreneur could once again benefit 
from existing fiscal incentives and tax holidays. For this reason, several firms chose 
to expand production creating a new company -the so-called 'juridical expansions'. 
Ciquine Petroquímica, Unirhodia, СВР and Firene are examples of these juridical 
expansions. 
Table 5.1. The number of firms located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari between 
1979 and 1989 
year 1979 1980 1985 1988 1989 
operating 27 28 43 43 50 
projected 12 n.a. 12* 15* 4 
cancelled - 15 3 10 
source: annual reports of COPEC, firm survey 1989 
* : these two figures do not refer to the same firms. 
n.a. : non available 
The total number of firms has increased, but what are the production activities of 
these companies and in which industrial branch can the largest increase be noticed? 
The majority of all firms located on the complex consist of downstream petrochemi-
cal enterprises. In 1989 almost half of the total number of firms belonged to the 
petrochemical branch. It is remarkable, however, that their number barely increased 
between 1980 and 1989. (See table 5.2.) The limited capacity of the central cracking 
unit Copcne from which almost all petrochemical plants obtained their input, may 
be one reason for this phenomenon. In the ten years the petrochemical complex has 
been functioning, the ethylene capacity of Copene has not increased which directly 
limited the number of downstream plants. Only after the realization of the Petroche-
mical National Programme in 1991, when Copene should have doubled its capacity, 
can it be expected that the number of down stream plants will increase. In the 
initial project 'Camaçari' was designed as a totally integrated petrochemical complex 
which meant that all three generations of the chemical sector had to be located in 
one area. The first generation would be formed by Copene, the central cracking 
unit; the second generation by the downstream plants, the third generation would 
consist of the chemical transformation industry such as the plastic industry. It 
seems, however, that this integration concept has so far not worked for the chemical 
transformation industry, which in 1989 was still of minor importance in Camaçari. 
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Table 5.2. The number of firms located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari according 
to industrial branch 
year 1980 1985 1988 1989 
branch 
petrochemical 
petro/fine 
fine chemical 
plastic/rubber 
others 
20 
1 
2 
0 
5 
20 
3 
9 
4 
9 
20 
3 
7 
3 
10 
21 
3 
13 
3 
10 
total 28 45 43 50 
source: annual reports of COPEC, firm survey 1989 
The most important reason for this is that location on the complex is too expensive 
for the relatively small transformation firms. In particular, average labour costs on 
the complex are higher than the labour costs elsewhere. In the first place the wages 
are very high, due to the influence of the nearby petrochemical firms which have a 
well organized labour force demanding high salaries. Second, the complex is located 
a large distance from population areas which means that the patrons have to supply 
daily transportation for their workers to and from the plants. Furthermore, given the 
isolation of the complex, employees can not go home for lunch, which means the 
factory has to provide meals for the workers. Managers of the plastic transformation 
firms estimated that total expenses in this area amounted to between one and two 
extra minimum wages per employee per month. Of course, every firm located on 
the complex encounters these extra labour costs; but the relatively large number of 
labourers and the annual turnover, which is much lower than that of petrochemical 
firms, make these costs insurmountable for the plastic transformation industry. As a 
result, several construction projects for firms belonging to this branch have been 
cancelled. Only nationally famous companies such as Tubos Tigre and Sansuy are 
large enough to adjust to these conditions.7 
Copec is pessimistic about the prospects for the plastic transformation industry on 
the complex and from the early eighties onwards it shifted its emphasis from the 
transformation industry to the fine chemical industry. In an article written to 
commemorate ten years Copec it was said: 
"After 1981 the transformation industry showed very bad results. (-) This 
situation made it clear to the state government that they had to re-evaluate their 
policy and concentrate their efforts on attracting investments to more promising 
branches like the fine chemical branch."* 
Ill 
The figures in table 5.2. show that this shift in policy was not without result. The 
importance of the fine chemical branch increased considerably after 1980, and in 
1989 the fine chemical branch could be considered the second most important 
chemical branch on the complex. Though the number of firms is promising, quantity 
alone does not say anything about the performance of these firms which has not 
been good. The fine chemical branch will be described in more detail below. 
5.3.2. Output figures 
In addition to the dynamics of various industrial branches, the various characteris-
tics of production by individual companies can provide a clear picture of the 
functioning of these companies: what are their production activities, what is the 
volume of production, the annual turnover and the profit rate? 
The petrochemical complex of Camaçari has a diverse range of products. Apart 
from basic chemicals such as polypropylene, benzene and butadene, production 
consists of thermoplastics like PVC, high density polyethylene, low density polyethy-
lene and polyestyrene; fibers, pharmaceutical products and engineering plastics. A 
last category consists of products of the chemical transformation industry, varying 
from large plastics coverings for agricultural use to tiny plastic tubes. 
An analysis of figures of the increase and decline in volume of production is not 
of interest because the production capacity of the downstream petrochemical firms 
depends on the output capacity of the central cracking unit, Copene. The Brazilian 
government agency, SDI, the former CDI, has determined the production capacity of 
all petrochemical firms in Camaçari according to the maximum output of Copene. In 
most firms on the complex, full capacity of production was reached a couple of 
years after its start. Despite the fact that the SDI finally decided about the size of 
the firm, this did not mean there was a uniformity in firm size. The variety of firms 
located on the complex can be seen in the differences in volume of production: the 
smallest firm produced 600 tons in 1988, and the largest 480 thousand tons (see 
table 5.3.). 
The volume of production corresponds to industrial branch; the more specialized 
the production, the smaller the volume. Companies with the largest production 
volume can be found in the petrochemical branch: two thirds of all petrochemical 
firms produced more than 50 thousand tons in 1988. Only the metallurgical firm 
Caraiba Metais exceeded the volume of the largest petrochemical firm. Logically this 
is a direct result of the nature of production; metallurgical products are more 
voluminous than petrochemical products. On the other hand, the more specialized 
fine chemical firms showed the smallest production volumes: all fine chemical firms 
produced less than 50 thousand tons in 1988. And finally, the transformation branch 
and the firms belonging to the other branches can all be found in the smaller 
production categories with an average production less than 100 thousand tons. 
Annual turnover, profit figures and profitability of each firm are of importance, as 
well as production volume. Since the response to the questionnaire asking for 
112 
financial data proved to be unsatisfactory9, a choice was made to base the analyses 
of profitability on financial figures obtained from the magazine Visäo (see table 5.3.). 
Of the 43 companies included in the firm survey, 38 could be found in the 1989 
edition of Visâo's 'Quem é Quem na Industrial Brasileira'. The annual turnover 
figures, the value of the profits and the profitability" of these 38 companies are 
compared. Three of the 38 companies could not provide a turnover figure because 
of their recent start or because of production problems. Nitroclor is an example of a 
company that encountered severe problems. This fine chemical plant, considered the 
most modem factory on the complex, is owned by the 17 first established firms on 
the complex, united in the holding company Norquisa. The average turnover of all 
38 companies in 1988 was 79 million US dollars. If the annual turnover for the 
different industrial branches is compared, it can be seen that the petrochemical firms 
were among the firms with the highest turnover. The downstream petrochemical 
firms registered average turnover figures of 82.4 million US dollars. The companies 
producing fine chemicals showed much lower turnover figures; they did not surpass 
the average of 22.2 million US dollars. The two transformation firms, with an 
average yearly turnover of 28 million US dollars, also did not achieve the high 
figures of the downstream plants. The firm with the largest turnover figure on the 
complex was the state-owned fertilizer company, Nitrofertil, with a turnover of 248.5 
million US dollars in 1988. The firm with the smallest turnover was Silinor with 7 
million US dollars in the same year, (see table 5.3.) 
Profit figures of industrial firms in Brazil are largely determined by the price 
policy of the government. On one hand, the most important prices of the petroche-
mical input are fixed by the federal government: the price of naphtha as input for 
Copene, the price of ethylene coming from Copene, the price of the electricity 
provided by Coelba, and the price of the water supply. On the other hand, the 
output prices are to a certain extent fixed as well. The prices of most petrochemical 
products are subject to CIP" regulations, which means that they are determined by 
government policy. Despite this, profit figures can provide some insight into the 
relative success of the various firms. 
With respect to the profit figures of the Camaçari-based firms registered in the 
Visäo edition of 1989, figures for four companies were not available while five 
companies recorded negative figures. These last five firms did not make any profit 
at all in 1988. Some of these firms were newly established which explains their 
negative figures. Most of these companies could be found in the fine chemical 
branch; only three of the eight fine chemical firms recorded profits for 1988: an 
average amount of 7.7 million US dollars. Although the fine chemical firms located 
in Camaçari were recently established, it is obvious that certain obstacles prevent 
them from making profits. In chapter 6 the situation of the fine chemical firms will 
be described in more detail. The profits made in the fine chemical industry are high 
compared to profits of the plastic transformation industry: the two plastic producing 
companies on the complex of Camaçari had an average profit of 2.7. million US 
dollars. 
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Table 5.3. Production volume, turnover, profits and profitability of 38 companies located on 
the Camaçari complex in 1988 (1000 tons, million US dollars and percentages) 
name firm production turnover profits profitability 
volume* million US$ million US$ % 
Copene 
CPC 
Ciquine Petro 
Ciquine Quimi 
EDN 
Pronor 
Politeno 
Nitrofertil 
Polialden 
Oxiteno 
Nitrocarbono 
Polibrasil 
Celbras 
White Martins 
Acrinor 
CQR 
Deten 
Rhodia Bahia 
Unirhodia 
СРВ 
Etoxilados 
Silinor 
Metanor 
Copenor 
Nitriflex 
Norcom DuPont 
Policarbonatos 
Cobafl 
Sulfab 
Liquid Carb. 
Carbonor 
Nitroclor 
Ciba Geigy 
Basf 
Química Bahia 
Nitronor 
Ricinor 
EMCA 
Cata Nordeste 
Sansuy 
η .a. 
209 
150 
39 
150 
122 
138 
480 
102 
141 
54 
96 
-
35 
78 
100 
101 
30 
10 
18 
18 
. 
60 
23 
. 
7 
5 
17 
100 
8 
28 
-
5 
15 
7.6 
0.6 
-
25 
5 
18 
686 
189 
105 
31.5 
154 
157.5 
147 
2485 
126 
161 
119 
94.5 
1015 
63 
73.5 
28 
91 
70 
42 
25.5 
38.5 
7 
14 
21 
n.a. 
17.5 
24.5 
91 
14 
52.5 
14 
n.a 
49 
21 
21 
7 
n.a. 
21 
10.5 
45.5 
434 
70 
245 
1.7 
63 
70 
66.5 
14 
875 
1295 
245 
56 
10.5 
105 
28 
3.5 
42 
315 
7 
-
17.5 
. 
7 
105 
n.a 
1.54 
2.8 
17.5 
-
28 
_ 
n.a. 
n.a. 
17.5 
3.5 
. 
n.a. 
2.1 
2.5 
2.8 
7.9 
5.6 
2.8 
1.4 
7.7 
9.5 
10.8 
3.7 
20.2 
30.0 
6.1 
18.1 
5.5 
6.8 
9.6 
1.1 
23.5 
27.7 
8.3 
0.6 
11 
n.a. 
10 
12.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
6.1 
2.5 
0.84 
34.5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
39.6 
7.1 
n.a. 
n.a. 
5.7 
n.a. 
5.6 
n.a. : Not available due to recent start of the company or impossible to extract form annual 
report 
: negative figures 
* : firm survey 1989 
Source: Quern é Quem na economia Brasileira, Visâo, September 1989, year XXXVIII, No. 36A 
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The downstream petrochemical firms show higher profit figures: the average profit 
recorded in 1988 was 33 million US dollars. Only three petrochemical firms did not 
register any profit at all: Sulfab, СРВ and Silinor. From its start in 1978, it was 
obvious to the owners of Sulfab that it was not a viable firm and would never 
make large profits. The firm had an important function, however, since all of its 
products were used by other petrochemical firms on the complex. Because this input 
is indispensable, Sulfab was in 1986 sold to Ni troca rbono and Metacril," which 
wanted to safeguard their input. The company with the largest profit in 1988 was 
Oxiteno, with 129 million US dollars, and the lowest profit figure, 2.1 million US 
dollars belonged to EMCA. 
Profitability figures are an indication of the performance of the Camaçari-based 
firms. For nine companies, no profitability figures were available in the Visâo 
edition of 1989. For the remaining chemical firms the profitability was rather high: 
the downstream petrochemical firms showed an average of 9.5% and the fine 
chemical companies an average of 17%. This relatively high rate in the latter 
category can be attributed to only one fine chemical firm: the 100% foreign owned 
BASF. The other two fine chemical firms, EMCA and Química da Bahia, showed 
much lower rates. When the average of these two branches is compared to the 
national average of chemical companies it becomes clear that the Camaçari-based 
chemical companies are doing rather well. The average profitability rate of the 
Camaçari chemical firms was 10.8% for 1988 while the national average for chemical 
companies in the same year was 8.7% only. A few petrochemical companies showed 
profitability rates that were well above the national average: Oxiteno is one of them 
with 30% and Liquid Carbonice with 43.5% another. 
When the profitability rates for various successive years are considered, the same 
observation can be made: the average profitability rate of the Camaçari firms for the 
years between 1983 and 1989 was well above the national index for all chemical 
firms in Brazil. But this does not mean that fluctuations in profitability did not exist. 
Especially 1984 proved to be a rather bad year for the Camaçari companies; their 
average profitability decreased by ten points from 17% to 7.8%. while the national 
average decreased by one point only. Unfortunately, no rates could be obtained for 
1985 and 1986, but in 1987 the profitability of the Camaçari firms increased again by 
3.3%. For the last two years for which figures were available, profitability was stable 
at 2% above the national average. 
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Table 5.4. Profitability of 38 companies located on the Camaçari complex in 1983, 1984, 1987, 
1988 and 1989 (percentages) 
profitability 
1983 1984 1987 1988 1989 
11 6.4 8.8 8.6 8.7 
17.4 9.8 13.1 10.2 10.8 
Source: extracted from Quern é Quem na economia Brasileira, Visäo, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988 
and 1989 
533. Expansion plans 
With the approval of the National Petrochemical Programme, 1987-1995, the firms of 
the petrochemical complex of Camaçari prepared for expansion. A large number of 
operating firms immediately applied for new projects and tried to get them 
approved by the SDI. Among other factors, approval depends on the projected 
capacity after the expansion of the central cracking unit, Copene. All firms which 
obtain part of their inputs from Copene must adjust their inventories in order to 
avoid scarcity or increased imports of feedstock. The expansion of Camaçari is 
coordinated by the COPEC. The employees of this institute investigated the 
possibilities for expansion and will coordinate the infrastructural expansion. Further-
more, for the first time investigations measuring the impact of the complex and its 
expansion on the environment of Bahia were carried out. 
To make it possible for the downstream enterprises to expand, Copene will have 
to increase its capacity during the first two years of the Petrochemical National 
Programme. The present capacity of Copene will almost double: from 460 thousand 
tons ethylene annually in 1989, Copene must produce 910 thousand tons in 1991. 
Total investment costs for this expansion are estimated at 680 million US dollars." 
But in addition to ethylene, Copene is also going to produce 415 thousand tons of 
propane, 135 thousand tons of butane and 292 thousand tons of benzene." 
Most of the downstream enterprises located in Camaçari - 34 firms or 79% of the 
total - have plans to expand. Only nine firms said they have no expansion plans at 
all. Most of the latter firms, such as Quimica do Bahia and Ricinor, started their 
production very recently. Above all firms in the petrochemical branch intend to 
expand their capacity; those firms producing intermediary petrochemicals seem to 
have the most ambitious plans. More specifically, twelve out of the fourteen firms 
belonging to the intermediary petrochemical producers will expand production. In 
year 
national 
index: 
average 
Camaçari 
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the fine chemical branch this picture is the same and ten of the thirteen firms that 
produce fine chemicals intend to begin expansion projects. Finally, even in the 
transformation industry Sansuy and Cata Nordeste have applied for expansion. 
Sansuy will expand its production in cooperation with its main suppliers of raw 
material: the two Camaçari based firms CPC and Politeno. The reason for this 
cooperation is that the petrochemical firms want to safeguard their market pos-
sibilities by keeping the transformation industry within the complex. Relocation of 
the firms in this branch would not be in their interest. 
For the realization of the expansion of the petrochemical complex of Camaçari an 
investment sum of 1,2 billion US dollar will be needed. According to the 'Revista 
Petro & Quimica"5 40% of the investments will be generated by the companies 
themselves while 50% will be supplied by the BNDES. The remaining 10% will be 
obtained from external financing, but most of this will be related to the import of 
capital goods. Part of the external financing will come from the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). From the firm survey it was learned that more than half 
of the total number of expanding firms, nineteen, financed part of their expansion 
with BNDES capital. Commercial loans are not very popular among the expanding 
firms -only eight firms approached commercial banks. On the average about 40% of 
all investments will be generated by the firms themselves." 
The relatively high figure for self-generated investments can be explained by two 
factors. First, eight 100% foreign-owned subsidiaries can be found among the 34 
firms with expansion plans. These firms depend primarily on their own financial 
resources, since they are not able to receive the same financial incentives as 
nationally controlled firms and repatriation of profits is relatively expensive. As a 
result, the reinvestment of profits is more lucrative for them. 
Second, the nationally controlled petrochemical firms are highly capitalized and do 
not seem to encounter problems with investment in expansion.17 Or, as stated by the 
Jornal da Bahia in an article, concerning the expansion of the complex of Camaçari: 
"E näo se fala em falta de dinheiro. (-) O dinheiro näo e problema". (It is not 
necessary to talk about money. (-) Money is not a problem)18 
The expansion of the complex, and especially the improvement of the infrastructure, 
will drain state and federal resources. A total of 300 million US dollars will be 
invested by the government during the period of expansion, of which 120 million 
US dollars will be provided by the state government, while the federal treasury will 
be responsible for the remaining part. 
Various different types of expansion can be found in Camaçari: expansion of 
existing production capacity, production of new chemicals in the same factory or the 
construction of a new factory in order to expand production capacity or to start 
production of a new good. In 21 of the firms that expand, new products will be 
produced while in 27 firms the expansion means an increase in capacity. The total 
number of expanding firms seems to be more than 43, due to the fact that various 
firms obtained SDI permission for more than one project. Nine firms had plans to 
construct a completely new factory for their expansion but, as already mentioned in 
chapter 5.3.1., most of these new factories are mere expansions of already existing 
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faetones decorated with a new name. An example of this kind of expansion is 
Firene, the expansion project of Celbras. The new factory is located on the same 
terrain as Celbras but it will produce another product: PET chemicals". The new 
firm will be a 100% subsidiary of Celbras. In four cases the new firm will be 
constructed in the vicinity of the already existing firm. In anticipation of future 
expansions most entrepreneurs reserved an area twice the size of the factory they 
intended to establish. As a result, none of the firms will have to buy new terrain 
for the expansion. In five cases the expansion will take place in another region: in 
Rio de Janeiro, Alagoas and Sao Paulo. 
5.4. The ownership structure and financial investments 
By now some insight has been obtained into the production activities of the 
Camaçari-based firms. One of the most specific characteristics of these firms, 
however, still needs to be described in more detail: the ownership structure of the 
companies, which is partly the result of the various sources of investment. In this 
section attention will be paid to the ownership structure resulting from the division 
of voting shares, the actual investments and the two most important capital 
suppliers of the petrochemical complex: the National Development Bank, BNDES, 
and the development organization, SUDENE.20 
5.4.1. Total financial investments 
As previously stated, the petrochemical industry is a very capital intensive industry. 
To give an idea of the high capital investment costs of the petrochemical complex of 
Camaçari, total capital investments of the enterprises located on the complex 
amounted to 3.926 million US dollars in 1985.n With the implementation of the 
Petrochemical National Programme, these investments will nearly double to 6.384 
million US dollar.11 
According to the firm survey, nine of the 43 firms are considered the smaller 
firms on the complex: their capital investments did not exceed 25 million US dollars. 
A total of eleven firms registered capital investments of more than 100 million US 
dollars. As expected, firms belonging to the fine chemical branch and the plastic 
transformation branch, in particular, were included among the smaller firms on the 
complex: of the nine firms with investments below 25 million US dollars, six belong 
to these two branches. 
For the Camaçari-based petrochemical firms, these large capital investments 
originate from different resources. In the first place, the respective partners of the 
companies are involved. The voting shares are divided between the participating 
companies according to a division that need not correspond with the respective 
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input of financial capital. It is possible that a company, for example, invested 3% of 
the total capital and obtained 333% of all shares. Apart from the division of voting 
shares, financial resources are obtained from the distribution of preferential shares. 
The holders of preferential shares -issued through the development agency Sudene-
are not allowed to influence decisionmaking processes. A third source of financial 
input to the Camaçari-based companies is loans and credits provided by the 
National Development Bank, BNDES. 
5.4.2. Investment structure and ownership structure 
When visiting the Camaçari petrochemical area it is immediately clear that a great 
number of different entrepreneurs are involved in the companies that form the 
complex. At the entrance of almost all 50 firms, huge signs display the names of the 
different companies participating in the firms. A characteristic phenomenon of the 
Camaçari complex is that various types of ownership structures exist side by side. 
Of the 50 firms located on the complex in 1989, eight firms, mostly belonging to the 
fine chemical branch, were completely under transnational ownership. Seventeen 
firms were national privately owned. These firms were almost equally divided 
between the petrochemical and the fine chemical branch. In between these two types 
of firms, that are 100% privately owned, various types of joint ventures can be 
found. Of course, the most interesting kind of joint venture in Camaçari is the 
tripartite joint venture; a total of eleven firms are owned by a joint venture between 
a national state firm, one or more private national firms and a foreign firm. Almost 
all these tripes belong to the petrochemical branch. In addition to tripes, bipartite 
joint ventures are represented on the complex, including six joint ventures between 
national private firms and foreign firms and seven joint ventures between national 
private and state firms, (see annex 1.) 
The division of shareholders does not give a clear view of the origin of various 
capital investments. A further step is, therefore, to define the sources of these capital 
investments and the contribution from the respective partners of the triple alliance. 
Although several relatively large private Brazilian groups participate in the 
petrochemical firms of Bahia it is obvious that they are not the main suppliers of 
capital. Only 9% of total capital investments in 1987 originated from national private 
participants. Only 3% of the investments is provided by the foreign partners.0 
Although Petroquisa is the largest capital investor of all partners, their investments 
comprised only 12% of the total capital investments. The largest part of these 
investments, 76%, was provided by external suppliers. 
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Photograph 5: Fiscal incentives of the CDI and financial support of 
the FINEP to the tripartite firm Polialden 
Photograph 6: Even 100% foreign firms on the Camaçari complex 
obtain financial support from Sudene and FINOR 
FÌDERAL 
DO INTERIC 
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One of the external sources that contributed to the construction of the petrochemical 
complex of Camaçari are the international banks. It proved difficult, however, to 
calculate the amount of financial capital that originates from international sources. 
Evans mentioned that in the first years that the complex existed, 1,2 billion US 
dollars came from the international banking community, almost half of the total 
capital investment.24 It is not, however, clear whether Evans included only foreign 
loans or direct foreign investment as well because the figure he mentions in his 
book seem rather high: according to COPEC data, 10% of total capital investments 
originated from foreign loans in 1987. The most important external suppliers 
involved in the Camaçari complex were the National Development Bank, BNDES, 
and the Development Corporation for the North East, SUDENE. Below a more 
comprehensive view of the financial involvement of these government institutions 
will be presented." 
5.43. The National Development Bank, BNDES 
As previously stated, the main objective of the National Development Bank is the 
stimulation of social and economic development in Brazil. In order to realize its 
objectives, the BNDES can make use of several instruments. As part of the BNDES, 
the FINAC26, created in 1977, provides finance capital in the form of loans. Physical 
or juridical persons can apply for these loans with an amortization period of 10 
years. Firms that apply for these loans need to supply between 30% and 50% of the 
total amount of investments from their own resources. The interest rates are fixed 
but a monetary correction is applied in accordance with the inflation rate. This latter 
regulation did not exist at the time most petrochemical firms in Camaçari applied 
for FINAC loans, in the period 1973-1978. The effects became apparent at the end of 
the seventies when inflation boomed,17 resulting in a rapid devaluation of the loans. 
This, in tum, was highly advantageous for the entrepreneurs of the Camaçari 
companies who could easily service their debts. 
Apart from the financial programmes based on the provision of loans with low 
interest rates, the BNDES also participated directly as a shareholder in some of the 
Camaçari firms. In 1974 the BNDES created three subsidiaries which were united in 
one subsidiary, the BNDESpar, in 1982.a The purpose of the BNDESpar was to 
diminish the risk of capital-intensive firms. Firms that encounter financial problems 
can ask the BNDESpar to participate. The privately owned metallurgical firm 
Caraiba Metais is one example. After severe financial problems, the BNDESpar 
saved this firm from bankruptcy by buying 33% of all shares.29 Another function of 
the BNDESpar is to complete tripartite joint ventures. When two partners wishing to 
form a joint venture cannot reach agreement on the division of shares, the 
BNDESpar can solve the problem by participating as the third partner. COBAFI, a 
former tripartite firm producing synthetic fibers, is one example of this. Since 
COBAFI is not an intermediary petrochemical firm, it did not need the participation 
of Petroquisa.30 SDI, however, did not want to approve a fifty/fifty joint venture 
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between the national private group, Roche Miranda, and the Dutch-based, AKZO. 
To solve this problem the BNDESpar decided to buy one third of the assets of 
СОВАИ, thereby enabling the establishment of a joint venture adjusted to the 
tripartite model. 
The BNDES was not created for the sole purpose of stimulating industrial 
development, nor does it support only petrochemical activities. But because of their 
large interests in the chemical branch, previously described in chapter 4.3.1., BNDES 
has contributed loans of considerable magnitude to this sector. In the seventies 
almost a quarter of all loans reserved for the basic production goods sector31 were 
directed to the chemical sector; in 1975 this was 23%. In 1983 the percentage of 
BNDES loans in the petrochemical branch declined to 11%.M 
But where do the financial resources of the BNDES come from? Three sources can 
be identified, (see figure 5.2.) During the most important period, as concerns this 
book, the period of the implementation of the Camaçari complex, the largest 
contribution of financial capital was of national origin, amongst others, from the so-
called PIS/PASEP programme.33 This programme was of great importance during 
the mid seventies but has declined ever since. The PIS/PASEP system is a national 
tax to which every entity in the country contributes: all firms contribute 0,5% of 
their annual turnover, all juridical persons apply 5% of their income taxes and all 
state and municipal entities transfer 2% of their revenues. Besides these taxes, the 
national contribution to the BNDES funds takes the form of loans and donations. 
The second source of income for the Development Bank are foreign loans which 
were relatively high at the end of the seventies. After 1980 this share declined to a 
percentage of only 8% in 1983. Thirdly, the BNDES obtains its capital, like every 
bank, through the internal return of its own financial capital. This source was 
important in the beginning of the seventies. During the mid-seventies the impor-
tance declined until in 1977 a low point was reached. Since then it has increased in 
importance again and, six years later, in 1983, half of all capital resources of the 
BNDES was being generated by the bank itself. 
The large involvement of the BNDES in the Camaçari complex is obvious when 
observing its share of the investments of the firms belonging to the second genera-
tion. In 1987, 48% of these investments, 1.146 million US dollars was provided by 
the BNDES.* In 1989, 17 firms claimed to have used BNDES loans, varying from 1 
to 80% of their total investments. On average the percentage of investments 
provided by the Development Bank was 32%. 
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Figure 5.2. Origin of BNDES resources between 1972 and 1983, in percentages 
source: Annual reports of the BNDES 1972-1983 
5.4.4. Development Corporation SUDENE 
Another government institution that played a role in the supply of finance capital to 
the Camaçari complex, although of less significance than the BNDES, is SUDENE. 
This federal agency, created in 1959, is directly related to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. Its main objective is to stimulate development in the backward northeastern 
region of Brazil.35 The instruments used by SUDENE are numerous. Besides fiscal 
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incentives like an import duty tax exemption and income tax exemption or deduc-
tion, SUDENE also provides financial investments in the form of preferential shares 
through FINOR.36 Up to a certain percentage of total capital investments -not 
surpassing 75%- preferential shares of the company can be purchased by external 
juridical persons. 
SUDENE finances different industrial sectors of which the petrochemical branch is 
the most important. Until 1981, 18% of all SUDENE's resources was directed to this 
branch.37 Because most industrial development in the northeast can be found in the 
Bahian region -not in the least because of the location of the petrochemical complex 
in this state- a substantial portion of the SUDENE/FINOR incentives are spent in 
this state: for example in the first part of 1989 the percentage was 23%. 
Compared to other financial resources, however, the SUDENE/FINOR played a 
rather insignificant role in the petrochemical complex of Camaçari. In 1987, 17% of 
all capital investments came from FINOR investments, in accordance with the 
figures found in the firm survey of 1989. Of the 29 managers that answered the 
question concerning the origin of their investments, ten remembered or discovered 
the contribution of the FINOR. In fact, the percentage of capital investments covered 
by the FINOR proved to be very small. The average contribution of the 
SUDENE/FINOR in the initial capital investments of all firms located on the 
complex was only 19%. The reason for the relatively small use of FINOR funds was 
that although most of the petrochemical entrepreneurs applied for the loans, the 
need to actually capitalize on the FINOR assets did not appear.3* This was partly 
due to the BNDES loans which provided the petrochemical firms with sufficient 
liquidity. 
5.5. Regional impact of the petrochemical complex 
The petrochemical complex was located in a social-economically deprived region so 
that it could function as an industrial growth center spreading its beneficial effects 
throughout the whole region. Fifteen years after the initial birth of the complex a 
debate took place with respect to these presumably favourable aspects for regional 
development. The question regarded the extent to which the Camaçari complex 
indeed fulfilled its role as growth center and whether it was worthwhile to locate a 
highly capital intensive industry so far away from the industrial heart of the 
country.39 Opponents of the location in Bahia argued that because of high transport 
costs the Camaçari complex could never be economically viable and that individual 
firms would only accumulate a profit if they were heavily subsidized. One of the 
directors of Shell remarked: 
"Almost all input to the Camaçari complex originates from the south of Brazil, 
from areas near Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and almost all products are 
transported to the same area of Rio de Janeiro and Sâo Paulo where the 
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chemical transformation industry is concentrated. Why locate a petrochemical 
complex in Bahia?"40 
To understand whether the Camaçari complex can be considered a rich enclave in a 
continuously poor surrounding and the extent to which the government can 
influence the developmental impact of the complex, it is necessary to have a closer 
look at linkages that the chemical firms have developed within the region. Several 
types of linkages between the petrochemical complex and its surroundings are 
considered to be of importance: origin of resources, market destination of products, 
employment possibilities, location of decisionmaking centers and technology 
linkages. 
5.5.1. Origin of resources 
In the beginning of the seventies, when the petrochemical complex of Camaçari was 
planned, the main goal was to establish a completely integrated complex in which 
the output of one firm in the complex would form the input of another firm in the 
complex. In this way transport costs of feedstock could be minimized and regional 
development, it was thought, could be stimulated. In 1985, 44% of all enterprises 
obtained their inputs, such as ethylene, benzene and toluene, from the central 
cracking unit Copene.41 Table 5.5., in which the origin of all inputs is given, 
demonstrates the high degree of integration. Indeed, the majority of the firms on the 
complex obtained a large part of its inputs from other firms on the complex. In 
1989, 84% of the firms used raw materials from either the central cracking unit, 
Copene, or from other petrochemical firms on the complex. In addition to Copene, 
some downstream firms played a very significant role in the provision of inputs. To 
these types of firms belong for instance Nitrofertil, Sulfab and Acrinor producing, 
amongst others, ammonia, urea and sulphur. The integrated character of the 
complex becomes even more clear when the amount of input is considered; more 
than half of the total number of firms obtained between 76 and 100% of their inputs 
from other firms within the complex. The input linkages within the state Bahia are 
of a totally different magnitude: only 21% of all firms purchased part of their input 
from firms located outside the complex in the state Bahia. This is not surprising 
since the degree of industrialization of the state Bahia is very low. Besides the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari, the only industrial area of significance is the 
Centro Industrial de Aratu (Industrial Center of Aratu, CIA), where the majority of 
firms are non-chemical producers, which lessens the possibility for linkages with 
Camaçari-based firms. Linkages with supplier firms in other states of Brazil were 
more significant: 64% of the Camaçari firms obtained certain inputs from firms 
located in other states. Most of these supplier firms can be found in the southern 
states. The import of input is rather modest: only 30% of the firms imported a very 
small percentage of the total input they used. 
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Table 55. The origin of resources of the firms functioning on the petrochemical complex of 
Camaçari in 1989 in number of firms and in percentages 
complex state Brazil imported 
% of the * % » % · % » % 
input 
0 
01-25 
26-50 
51-75 
76-100 
total 
7 
4 
5 
2 
24 
42 
16 
9 
12 
5 
58 
100% 
33 
3 
0 
2 
4 
42 
79 
7 
0 
5 
9 
100% 
15 
18 
4 
3 
2 
42 
36 
43 
9 
7 
5 
100% 
29 
10 
0 
0 
3 
42 
70 
24 
0 
0 
7 
100% 
source: firm survey 1989 
* = number of firms 
5.5.2. Market destination of the production 
Another linkage that is of importance when investigating the influence of the 
complex on regional development is the destination of the goods produced. Of all 
firms, 69% did not sell their output in the complex itself but elsewhere. This 
'elsewhere' was not within the state Bahia; only half of the firms sold part of their 
production in Bahia. However, this part was very small; in 62% of the cases, the 
production sold in the state was less than 10% and only 9% of the firms sold more 
than half of their total production in the state. More than half of the firms marketed 
at least 65% of their output in other states, mostly in the industrial south of Brazil. 
Besides the internal market, the external market is also of significance. The export of 
chemical products is increasingly important. As described in chapter 3.4.3., and as 
can be seen in table 5.6., the petrochemical industry increased its exports considerab-
ly after the economic crisis of 1982. In 1988, the vice-president of COFIC expected to 
increase exports to 1,5 billion US dollars within the next few years." Due to an 
increase in petrochemical exports the export composition of the state Bahia as a 
whole changed significantly after 1981. Until that year, Bahian exports were 
predominantly agricultural, consisting mostly of cacao and tobacco. While in 1979 
the petrochemical exports were only 3% of all state exports, in 1987 this figure 
increased to 24% and petrochemical products must now be considered one of the 
most important export products of the state.*3 
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Table 5.6. Exports from the petrochemical complex of Camaçari between 1979 and 1987, in US 
dollars and as percentage of total exports from the state Bahia' 
year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
value 
(1.000 US$) 
33.833 
82575 
234.145 
243565 
287.767 
349.177 
298.336 
212.443 
300.370 
com; 
3% 
8% 
21% 
21% 
21% 
21% 
18% 
18% 
24% 
source: COPEC 1988 
the total value of exported products for the state includes those of the petrochemical firms 
located on the CIA complex like Dow Chemical." 
Of all 43 firms included in the firm survey, 72% exported part of their production 
in 1988. The percentage of exported products was modest, however: almost two 
thirds of these exporting firms exported less than 25% of their product and only 
13% exported more than half. The importing countries cover the globe, although a 
large number are located in Europe, where the most important single importer of 
petrochemicals from the petrochemical complex can be found: the Netherlands.*5 In 
1987, one third of the total export of petrochemical products produced in Camaçari 
was transported to the Netherlands. The US occupied the second place with 19% of 
the total export. The 12 other most important importing countries for the complex 
were, in order of decreasing importance: Argentine, India, China, Japan, Taiwan, 
Colombia, Iraq, Peru, Belgium, South Africa, Chili and Australia." 
From these input and output figures it can be concluded that the petrochemical 
complex is a highly integrated entity with very limited production linkages within 
the state of Bahia. Recalling the words of the Shell director: most inputs indeed 
originated from the complex itself or from other states in the south of Brazil while 
most of the products were either sold to other states or exported. 
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Photograph 7: Special transport service increases labour costs 
substantially 
Photograph 8: Indirect employment opportunities on the Camaçari 
complex: selling ice cream 
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5.53. Employment figures 
Another assumed beneficial influence on regional development, generated by the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari, was the provision of a large number of 
employment possibilities. Although petrochemical firms are much more capital 
intensive than labour intensive, the impact of the chemical firms in the complex on 
employment in Bahia was, nonetheless, considerable. 
Due to the high demand for labour resulting from construction of the complex, 
two different migration streams could be discerned. The first migration stream 
occurred during the implementation phase of the complex and consisted of unskilled 
labourers from the deprived agricultural areas in the northeast. Thousands of 
'nordestinos' moved to the village nearest to the complex: Camaçari. The abundance 
of jobs in the construction industry secured employment for a large number of these 
migrants. After the initial construction period, which lasted more or less 5 years, the 
first firms began production and the labour situation changed drastically. The 
petrochemical industry demanded relatively highly skilled labour while the construc-
tion industry used unskilled workers only. Due to the low educational level of the 
construction workers, they could not easily be trained for employment in the 
petrochemical industry which resulted in high unemployment in the town of 
Camaçari. Originally a tiny village with less than 12 thousand inhabitants, Camaçari 
changed within a period of 10 years into a heavily populated area with more than 
120 thousand inhabitants. 
The second stream of migrants consisted of skilled employees coming from the 
south of Brazil to Salvador, the state capital of Bahia. AH technicians and engineers 
working on the complex live in Salvador and commute daily to and from the 
Camaçari complex. The construction of a new housing area in the vicinity of the 
complex especially for the higher paid employees did not change this daily commut-
ing. The employees were not attracted by the idea of living in a new town with few 
entertainment and recreation facilities. Therefore, most firms provide their employees 
with daily transportation. Private bus companies provide a shuttle service between 
Salvador and the complex, twenty-four hours a day. 
Although the petrochemical industry is characterized by high capital intensity and 
relatively low labour intensity, the total number of labourers employed in the 
complex is quite high. In 1985 a total of 19,179 persons were employed in firms 
located on the complex. In 1989 this figure increased to 22,975.47 In addition to these 
employees a considerable number works in subcontracted firms on the petrochemical 
complex such as the bus companies, cleaning services, security services and catering 
services. It is estimated that the number of indirect employees reached 20,000 
persons in 1987." 
With respect to the total number of employees per firm, the majority of the 
Camaçari firms, 55%, employed between 101 and 400 employees. The average figure 
for all chemical firms in Camaçari was 468 employees per firm but for the fine 
chemical industry the average was somewhat lower, i.e. 220 employees per firm. 
The plastic transformation companies are clearly labour intensive: the two plastic 
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producing companies on the complex employ, respectively, 550 and 1000 employees. 
The largest firm and the smallest firms on the complex do not belong to the 
petrochemical sector. The largest firm on the complex, based on employment figures, 
is the metallurgical firm. Caraiba Metais, with 2260 employees and the smallest firm 
is the fine chemical firm. Liquid Carbonics, with 50 employees. 
As stated earlier, employees in the petrochemical industry have a rather high level 
of education. The number of unskilled workers is small relative to the number of 
technicians and engineers. All but two firms said they employed between 2 and 90 
engineers in 1989. About three quarter of the firms employed between 2 and 27 
engineers." All firms, with the exception of three, employed between 3 and 483 
technicians. Some managers stated that all their employees were technicians, because 
they would be of no use if they had not completed some sort of technical educa-
tion. Of the total number of firms, 75% employed between 3 and 150 technically 
educated employees.50 Given the large number of transnational firms in the complex, 
it was to be expected that many of the skilled technicians would be expatriates. In 
most of the firms, however, the number of foreign employees (besides the directory) 
was not very large. Foreigners were only employed in 13 firms and in most of these 
the number was limited to one. In general, the foreign employees came from other 
Latin American countries like Chile and Argentine rather than the country of origin 
of the foreign partner. Occasionally, a technical expatriate could be found, for 
instance in Politeno, a tripartite joint venture with the Japanese Sumitomo. 
5.5.4. Decisionmaking centers 
To complete the picture of linkages by the petrochemical complex within the state 
Bahia it is necessary to investigate the extent to which decisionmaking processes 
take place or are coordinated inside the state itself. Decisionmaking processes, 
however, cannot be understood without explaining the power structures within the 
firms. The lowest level of decisionmaking is formed by the management board of 
directors of the individual firms. In general, this management board consists of three 
to five executives of which the most important executive is the general manager or 
superintendent, assisted by a vice general manager. Responsibilities are restricted to 
the daily operation of the enterprise. All matters relating to daily production, such 
as maintenance of the machines, human resources, commercial activities, and 
coordination of infrastructure, are dealt with by these executives. While the mana-
ging directors are responsible for the daily operation of the firm, more far-reaching, 
strategic decisions are taken at a higher level in the firm structure by the board of 
directors. Strategic decisions are discussed here. All partners to a joint venture are 
represented in the board of directors, according to a division that is agreed upon by 
the respective partners. 
The management structure described above has certain implications for the 
decisionmaking process and the influence of the state of Bahia on firm decisions. 
Strategic decisions are most often taken in the head offices of participating firms. 
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Since most partners to the joint venture firms have their head office in Brazil's 
industrial south, the decisionmaking center of the Camaçari complex is also located 
in the south of Brazil: sometimes in Rio de Janeiro but more often in Sâo Paulo. 
The head office of Petroquisa, for example, participating partner in 38% of the firms, 
is located in Rio de Janeiro. The offices of Mitsubishi and Ipiranga can also be 
found in this state capital. Even one of the firms from Bahia, the Mariani group, has 
its head quarters in Rio de Janeiro.51 The head offices of participating firms located 
in Sâo Paulo are numerous. The national companies Unipar, Ultra, Cevekol and the 
foreign firms Shell, Dow, Rhodia, Dupont, Idemitsu and Sumitomo are located here, 
to mention only a few. Another indication that important decisions are taken in the 
south of Brazil or in the capital Brasilia is the fact that institutions that can play a 
role in these decisions, such as the BNDES, CIP, SDI and CNP, are all located 
outside the northeast. Most of these institutions are located either in Rio de Janeiro 
or in Brasilia. Furthermore, the most influential private institution of the petrochemi-
cal industry, ABIQUIM, is situated in Sâo Paulo. 
Most of the actors that are of importance in the decisionmaking process relating to 
the Camaçari petrochemical firms can be found in the south of Brazil. As a result, 
most of the strategic decisions with respect to the development of the petrochemical 
firms arc not taken in the petrochemical complex itself nor in Salvador. Consequent-
ly, the influence of the state of Bahia in decisionmaking processes of the firms 
located in the complex is limited. 
5.5.5. Technology linkages 
The last linkage that is of importance with respect to regional development is the 
linkage to technological institutions. Due to the rather high technological require-
ments of the petrochemical complex, it was expected that the location of the 
complex would have a positive influence on the level of technological knowledge 
within the state of Bahia. To a certain extent, development of the complex has 
indeed stimulated research possibilities as is shown by the R&D programme of 
COPEC: in this R&D programme every firm located on the complex is obliged to 
pay a certain percentage of its annual turnover to COPEC who further distributes 
this donation to R&D centers located in Bahia. One of the centers that took ad-
vantage of this arrangement is the research center Ceped.52 Ceped was created in 
1971 in the state capital Salvador, at the instigation of the local government. At the 
time it was financed by the federal government. The aim was to establish a training 
center for the local population in order to support industrial development in the 
northeast of Brazil. When the petrochemical complex was constructed, Ceped was 
transferred to the industrial area of the complex. From that moment on, part of the 
R&D was financed by the chemical firms in the complex and was executed for these 
firms. Most of the research of Ceped is dedicated to process improvement and 
chemical analysis. In 1988 the total number of people working in this research 
center numbered 758. Because of the relatively low wages it pays, Ceped encounters 
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some difficulties in finding technical researchers. Many experts, among them several 
foreign scientists, were attracted by the rather high salaries in the petrochemical 
firms and quit their research jobs for an executive job. 
Besides the Ceped, the research and educational programme of the University of 
Salvador has also been stimulated by the existence of the petrochemical complex. At 
the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) several faculties specialize in technological 
and engineering education and for some students of these faculties the possibility 
exists to obtain training in one of the firms in the complex. On the other hand, 
some executives of these firms give lectures at the university. In this way, practical 
experiences can be transferred to engineering students. The organization of congres-
ses and seminars in the Bahian region has further stimulated technological develop-
ment. An example of this was a congress concerning automatization processes 
organized by the UFBA in September 1989. A congress like this would never have 
been organized in Bahia without the firms in the complex or at least their sponsor-
ship. 
However, if the overall impact of the petrochemical complex on technological 
development in Bahia is examined, the outlook is not too bright. Only half of the 
firms included in the firm survey said they have some relations with state univer-
sities or the state R&D center, CEPED. When asked about the nature of these 
relations the answers were very unclear. Although firms sometimes have technical 
trainees from the university, fundamental research, such as process innovation, was 
not carried out at all by university researchers. In fact, several executives charac-
terized the educational standard of the university as mediocre. In a way the same 
can be said about the Ceped. Only 13 managers claimed to have relations with this 
research institute. In most cases the managers referred to the official agreement of 
the coordinating committee, COPEC, to distribute part of its contribution from the 
chemical firms in the complex to Ceped. Only a few firms said that they regularly 
use the possibilities offered by COPEC to perform chemical analyses. These analyses 
were mostly used to remove bottlenecks in the production process. In sum, despite 
the creation of the petrochemical R&D programme, Ceped does not seem to have a 
considerable impact on local R&D actìvities. 
It is remarkable that R&D was not considered very important by the individual 
petrochemical firms of Camaçari.53 From the firm survey it appeared that almost no 
fundamental research had been executed within the complex. Most R&D beyond 
application and removing bottlenecks, was done either in Brazilian research centers 
of the participating companies, or, more often, in the R&D center of the participat-
ing foreign firms.54 
It appears that foreign managers in particular did not see any necessity in executing 
R&D in their subsidiaries and even less when these subsidiaries were located in 
backward regions of Third World countries. The executives of the foreign firms 
claimed that the technological level of the region was too low, universities were not 
compatible with their own level of research and well-educated researchers were not 
available. Thus they concluded that the research climate was not sufficient, in 
addition the 'reserved market' introduced in 1982, restricted the import and 
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production of computers and additional products.55 This policy made it difficult for 
transnational subsidiaries located in Brazil to synchronize R&D all over the world. It 
was mentioned several times that the obligation to buy Brazilian hardware seriously 
hampered communication processes between different subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
A problem mentioned several times by executives of foreign firms was that 
transnational firms are afraid to loose control over their newly developed tech-
nologies. A director of the French-based Rhodia complained: 
"There is almost no country in the world where patent rights are so badly 
protected as in Brazil".5* 
The bad reputation of Brazil regarding international patent rights played a con-
siderable role in the decision of the foreign partners to locate most of the research 
of joint ventures involving transnational participation in Westem-based R&D centers. 
It can be concluded that most technology linkages of the petrochemical firms of 
Camaçari were established in institutions outside the state of Bahia. The technologi-
cal potential of Bahia appeared to be too limited. 
5.5.6. The contribution of value added taxes (ICM taxes) 
Supporters of the Camaçari location for the petrochemical complex stress the 
positive impact of the complex on development of the region given the high amount 
of value-added tax, (ICM57) generated by the complex what can be used for 
development projects in the region. No doubt a considerable amount of tax is 
generated by the complex: of the total amount of ICM in Bahia in 1988, 30% came 
from the petrochemical complex.58 Copene, for instance, which is responsible for 24% 
of the total turnover of the complex, generated 80 million US dollars of ICM in that 
year. 
Although it cannot be denied that the complex generated large amounts of ICM, 
given the distribution of these resources less regional development is stimulated 
than many would like to make us believe. In the first place, part of the ICM is 
allocated for infrastructural works in the complex itself. For the expansion of the 
petrochemical complex alone, the state will have to pay 120 million US dollars. 
Secondly, a considerable part of the ICM goes to the village of Camaçari; next to 
the state capital Salvador, Camaçari is the largest consumer of ICM resources. This 
is not surprising given the problems of this former tiny village such as the tremen-
dous increase in its inhabitants. By 1988 six new families were still arriving daily in 
search of employment. The majority of the inhabitants, 70%, migrated to Camaçari 
from other areas of Brazil. Almost the entire population of Camaçari, 90%, earns an 
income between 0 and 3 minimum wages, and an equal percentage have not 
completed a primary education.5' For these people it is almost impossible to obtain 
employment in the modem sector of the economy and, therefore, they depend 
largely on the informal sector. The town itself is not equipped to absorb such large 
numbers of inhabitants. As a result there is an enormous shortage of social and 
infrastructural facilities. The only hospital in Camaçari is in a lamentable state; not 
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surprisingly, infant mortality is among the highest in Brazil. Another problem 
Camaçari and its surroundings have to deal with is the environmental pollution 
caused by the petrochemical firms. Not much research has been done with respect 
to this, but no doubt the levels of surface, water and air pollution are of con-
siderable magnitude. Despite the fact that Camaçari obtains a relative high per-
centage of ICM, it is not enough to compensate all of the problems caused by the 
petrochemical complex. 
It seems that the only place in Bahia that has received benefits from the creation 
of the complex is the state capital Salvador. Not only is a considerable amount of 
ICM destined for Salvador, but also a large number of skilled employees from the 
petrochemical firms live in this city. The salary of these highly skilled employees 
and, consequently, their consumption level, is much higher than that of inhabitants 
living in Camaçari. The impact on the community has been great. Before the 
petrochemical complex was constructed, no large shopping center could be found in 
Salvador. Nowadays the happy few of Salvador can choose between several 
paradises of luxury consumption. Fifteen years ago, Salvador consisted of a colonial 
center, a commercial center near the harbour, a relatively small corridor of more or 
less reasonable apartments, and a large area of deprived slums. Nowadays, along 
the extended beaches large luxury neighbourhoods have been created, providing 
space for the wealthy employees of the chemical firms. Because of the capital 
accumulation of the Bahian-based chemical firms and because of the high demand 
for precious houses, hotels and shopping centers, the construction industry in 
Salvador has boomed. Also, the impact of the complex on the cultural atmosphere 
of Salvador has been considerable; the increase in the number of well-to-do people 
who are used to the cultural level of Säo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro has stimulated 
the creation of theatres and increased the number of musical performances. 
It is doubtful whether one can speak of regional development. The people that 
benefitted from the creation of the complex are not the large number of poor 
inhabitants from the northeast of Brazil. For them there are only limited oppor-
tunities for employment in the chemical firms -only the lower paid jobs in sub-
contracting firms are reserved for them. They do not have money to spend in the 
luxury shopping centers; they cannot afford to live in the wealthy new apartments; 
and they cannot attend musical performances. Of course, some possible spillover 
effects will without any doubt reach a few of the poor Bahianas. The construction 
contract workers and labourers, the housemaids and the shopkeepers all have a 
clientele they could not dream of fifteen years ago. On the other hand, the employ-
ment opportunities in subcontracting firms or in the informal sector, as limited as 
they are, also have negative side-effects. Many people living in the impoverished 
rural areas are still attracted to and migrate to the state capital. As a result, the 
number of slums in the city continues to increase, the unemployment level is rising 
and inflation is among the highest in Brazil.60 
The future prospects for the regional development due to the petrochemical 
complex are also not very bright. Firstly, the expansion of the complex is not likely 
to result in an increase in employment opportunities. Most of the firms will expand 
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their capacity by improving production processes or will develop new products out 
of formerly useless by-products. Both types of expansion do not generate a large 
increase in labour input. Secondly, the amount of ICM received by the state will 
diminish in the near future. The orientation of petrochemical firms is going to shift 
towards export markets, while ICM is only levied on internally commercialized 
goods. For the Camaçari firms, the export figure will further increase when the Rio 
de Janeiro complex is finished. This complex will be located in the industrial south 
and the vicinity of the markets will make its products much cheaper. The harsh 
competition that may result from this, will force Camaçari to increase its exports. 
For the petrochemical firms this could be an advantage if export prices are higher 
than internal prices, but the income of the state will certainly suffer from this 
market shift. Instead of a more equal regional distribution of wealth, the creation of 
the Camaçari complex resulted in the creation of a rich enclave within an increas-
ingly impoverished state. 
5.6. Summary and conclusions 
To gain a clear understanding of the functioning of the tripartite model in the 
Camaçari complex, it is necessary to outline the characteristics of the chemical firms 
on the complex in more detail. A first important aspect to consider is the fluctuation 
in number of firms located in the complex. There is a noticeable increase in the 
number of firms in the ten years the complex has been functioning. Many of the 
new firms do not belong to the downstream petrochemical branch, however, but to 
the fine chemical branch. In 1989 almost half of the operating firms in Camaçari 
were fine chemical firms (the category with the largest increase in number), plastic 
transformation companies and non-chemical, sector related firms, such as construc-
tion and metallurgical companies. 
Despite the unfavourable economic situation in Brazil during the eighties, the 
performance of the petrochemical firms of Camaçari has been satisfactory. In 1988 
the average turnover of 38 Camaçari companies was 82.4 million US dollars for the 
downstream petrochemical firms, 22.2 million US dollars for the fine chemical 
companies and 28 million US dollars for the plastic transformation industry. The 
profit figures that were registered in 1988 were also quite high. The downstream 
petrochemical firms in particular were responsible for these high figures. Of the fine 
chemical enterprises the figures were either not available, due to production 
problems, or they were negative. When the profitability of the Camaçari firms is 
compared to the average profitability of all chemical companies in Brazil, the 
Camaçari firms perform better than the national average. For 1989 the profitability 
of the Camaçari firms proved to be 2% higher than the national index. A similar 
phenomenon can be seen when successive years are compared. Although the 
profitability figures of the Camaçari firms fluctuated more than the national figures, 
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their average profitability for the years 1983-1989 was higher than the national 
average. 
The satisfactory performance of the Camaçari companies is reflected in their 
anxious desire to expand. As part of the National Petrochemical Programme, 34 
companies located in the Camaçari complex will expand their production capacity or 
are planning to produce other chemical intermediaries. The financial capital input of 
these investments, a total of 1.2 billion US dollars, is not considered a problem 
since, on the average, 40% of these investment can be provided by the firms 
themselves. The remaining 60% comes either from the National Development Bank 
and other development organizations, or from external sources. The Brazilian 
government will provide 300 million US dollars. 
The most remarkable characteristic of the Camaçari firms is, of course, their 
specific ownership structure. In the majority of the companies more than one 
shareholder is responsible for the capital investments and, as a result, different 
ownership structures, such as tripartite joint ventures, bipartite joint ventures and 
100% owned firms, can be found side by side. Often the voting shares arc more or 
less equally divided between the various partners, which does not mean that the 
financial inputs of all partners is in accordance with this division. The largest part 
of the capital invested in the Camaçari complex comes from the federal government, 
either by the direct participation of state-owned companies, or by means of cheap 
loans and credits supplied by the National Development Bank, BNDES, and the 
Development Corporation, Sudene. The foreign companies contributed technological-
ly and their financial input was negligible. 
Certain characteristics of the Camaçari firms are important for the impact of the 
complex on regional development, which was one of the government objectives in 
implementing the Camaçari complex. Several different aspects have been considered 
in this chapter - the input/output linkages, the employment possibilities, the 
location of decision making centers and R&D centers and the contribution of value 
added taxes - in attempt to measure the development potential of the complex. 
After considering the different kinds of linkages of the petrochemical complex 
within the state of Bahia, it is not possible to speak of a positive contribution to 
regional development. The large and integrated character of the complex, on the one 
hand, and rather recent industrialization in the state of Bahia on the other, make the 
complex a rich, well-developed enclave in an increasingly underdeveloped region. 
Most of the inputs of the firms located on the complex come either from the 
complex itself, or from outside the region. The lack of sufficient demand obliged the 
Camaçari firms to sell the largest part of their output to the industrial south of 
Brazil. Because of the high capital intensity of the petrochemical industry, employ-
ment possibilities proved to be rather limited as well. Although the number of 
indirectly employed - working for example, for bus companies, catering services and 
cleaning companies - is more or less the same as the number of directly contracted 
employees, the wage differences between these two groups are considerable. 
Approximately 40,000 employees were able to obtain a job in the chemical firms or 
service firms of the complex, leaving thousands of former construction workers and 
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unskilled migrants unemployed. Attracting labour-intensive industry did not prove 
to be a solution either. The rather high labour costs on the complex forced the 
labour intensive plastic transformation companies to look for other locations outside 
the complex. All important decisions concerning the companies are taken outside 
Bahia, in the headquarters of the participating companies in Rio de Janeiro, Säo 
Paulo or in the state institutions of Brasilia. Due to recent technological tradition 
within the state of Bahia, technological linkages between the Camaçari firms and 
Bahian institutions, such as the university and the CEPED, have been almost non 
existent. Finally, one positive aspect for regional development, the large increase in 
ICM tax, can largely be neglected because the largest part is distributed to problem 
areas around the complex, like the town of Camaçari. 
In summary, the petrochemical complex of Camaçari has been a large success in 
regard to economic performance particularly of the downstream companies. The 
regional impact has been rather disappointing, however. It would be interesting to 
examine whether these positive financial figures imply that the tripartite model is 
functioning satisfactory. 
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16. The 'Revista Petro e Química' mentioned a figure of 40%, from the firm survey a 
more or less equal figure can be distilled. Of the 25 firms that answered the question, 
40% claimed to finance their expansion completely out of their own resources. 
17. Most petrochemical firms arc highly capitalized. Firstly, the state guaranteed their 
profits by controlling the input as well as the output prices. Secondly, the initial 
credits and loans could be serviced on favourable terms. Thirdly, hardly any capital is 
spent on technological development. And finally, in the first 15 years almost no 
expansion in the petrochemical branch was possible. Although many entrepreneurs 
started investing in other activities, transferring their profits to attractive investment 
funds or send it abroad, much capital was still available when the expansion of 
petrochemical activities became reality. 
18. Jornal da Bahia, 29-6-1988. 
19. PET chemicals, of which the full chemical name is poly-ethylene-etcre-ftalato are used 
in the production of plastic disposable bottles, like the one liter bottles of coca cola. 
20. It proved rather difficult to define these sources. The various government agencies 
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involved presented large amounts of figures and statistics, none of which really 
covers the whole scope of investments, and the reliability varies. The firm survey 
held in 1989 encountered other difficulties, varying from ignorance about the exact 
data to unwillingness to answer such delicate questions. For the analysis, the financial 
part of the COPEC data and the firm survey of 1989 are used although the questions 
with respect to the origin of capital were answered by only 29 firms. Aggregated data 
are furthermore distilled from statistical material of the COPEC, the development 
bank, BNDES, and the development organization, SUDENE. 
21. COPEC, Profil das empresas, annual report 1985, Camaçari. 
22. COPEC, Profil das empresas, annual report 1988, Camaçari. 
23. In absolute terms the financial contribution of the transnational corporations in the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari was in 1987 slightly more than 81 million US 
dollars. Copec, revisäo e atualizaçâo do plano diretor do Copec, Jan 1987, voi 2. 
24. Evans, P. 1979, ρ 97. 
25. Because the political involvement of the BNDES is already described in chapter 4, in 
this chapter the emphasis will be on the financial role of the BNDES in the Bahian 
complex. 
26. Fl NAC; Programma de Financiamento a Acionistas; the financing program for 
shareholders. 
27. Annual inflation increased after 1973. While the rate before this year was 15.5% , it 
more than doubled to 34.6% in 1973. In 1979 the inflation further increased to 77.2% 
and just before the economic crisis of 1982 it reached 110.3%. Luiz Bresser Peireira; 
Dcsenvolvimcnto e crise no Brasil 1930-1983; ed Brasilense, Säo Paulo, 1987, ρ 225. 
28. The three subsidiaries were FIBASE, EMBRAMEC AND IBRASA. Sergio Faria Alves 
de Assis, a petroquímica e о desenvolvimento economico, BNDES, Rio Grande do Sul, 
undated. 
29. An effort to privatize the huge company only partially succeeded: at present 67% of 
all assets are in the hands of a national private group, Dias D'Avita, while the 
remaining assets are still controlled by the BNDESpar. 
30. Only petrochemical firms producing intermediaries depend on the output of Copene, 
which makes participation of Pctroquisa in these firms desirable. 
31. To the basic production goods sector belong the following industrial branches: 
mineral production; metallurgical industry; siderurgica! industry; fertilizers; paper and 
cellulose and chemical industry. This industrial sector obtained the largest part of all 
BNDES loans in the seventies and the eighties. In 1983 74% of all BNDES loans went 
to this sector. 
32. Annual reports of the BNDES: 1974 till 1982, Relatorio de Atividades do BNDES 1983. 
33. PIS/PASEP; Programmas de Integraçao Social / Fbrmaçao do Patrimonio de Servidor 
Publico; Programme of Social Integrating/ Formation of Patrimony of Public Services. 
34. The COPEC data from 1979 and 1987 as well as the 1989 firm survey show the major 
importance of the BNDES loans. 
35. The SUDENE region consists of the states of Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pemambuco, 
Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceara, Piaui, Maranhäo, part of Minas Gérais and the 
federal territory of Fernando de Noronha. SUDENE, Fiscal and financial incentives for 
investments in Northeastern Brazil, Recife, 1981. 
36. FINOR; Fundo de Investimentos do Nordeste, the Northeast Investment Fund. 
37. SUDENE; Ministry of Interior; Banco do Nordeste do Brasil Sa; Fiscal and financial 
incentives for investments in Northeast Brasil, Recife 1981. 
38. FINOR loans are not given at the beginning of the construction of a factory, but they 
are provided over a certain period of time. When during this period no shortage of 
financial capital appears, the firm can chose not to use its FINOR application. 
39. Because of its capital intensiveness, the petrochemical industry is very difficult to 
relocate. 
40. Interview director Shell, May 1988, Säo Paulo. 
41. COPEC, Perfil das empreses, 1985, Camaçari. 
42. Relatorio de Gazeta Mercantil, 25-27 June 1988, ρ 1. 
43. Desempenho da Conjuctura, junho 1988, issue 1, no 1, ρ 22. 
44. In 1988 40% of the total production of the petrochemical complex was exported. 
Jornal da Bahia, 29-6-1988, ρ 5. 
45. In 1984 the following firms exported part of their production to the Netherlands: 
Copene, Deten, EDN, Nitrofertil, Polialden and Politcno; COPEC, Perfil das empresas, 
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1988, Camaçari. 
46. Jornal da Bahia, 29-6-1988, ρ 5. 
47. COPEC, perfil das empresas, annual report 1985, Camaqari and firm survey 1989. 
48. Desempenho da conjuncture, junho 1988, issue 1, no 1, ρ 15. 
49. This question was answered by 34 managers of petrochemical firms. Nine managers 
did not know the exact number of engineers employed in their company. 
50. In this case the question was answered by 36 managers of petrochemical firms. Seven 
managers did not know the exact number of technical employees working in their 
company. 
51. The other two firms of Bahian origin; Odebrecht and Banco Economico, have their 
office in the state capital Salvador. 
52. CEPED: Centro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento, Research and Development Institute. 
53. In chapter 6 this aspect will be described in more detail, here only a comparison of 
the technological linkages of the firms within and outside the region will be analyzed. 
54. The exact figures concerning R&D will be given in chapter six. 
55. With the introduction of the 'reserved market' it was no longer allowed to import 
mini and micro computers in Brazil, nor were foreign firms allowed to produce them 
in Brazil. 
56. Interview director Unipar, June, 1989, Säo Paulo. 
57. With ICM, 'Imposto sobre Circuiamo de Mercadorias' the value added tax is meant. 
58. Jornal da Bahia, 29-6-1988, ρ 9. 
59. Ibid. 
60. The prices of consumer goods are higher in Bahia than elsewhere in Brazil, on the 
one hand because of the distance to the industrial areas and, on the other, because of 
the high demand. 
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6 
LIMITATIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE MODEL IN THE PETROCHEMICAL 
COMPLEX OF CAMAÇARI: ORIGIN AND CAUSES 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry 
was described with special emphasis on the role of the tripartite model in the 
Camaçari petrochemical complex. In this chapter, the functioning of the model will 
be analyzed in order to measure its success or failure in Camaçari ten years after 
the first firms started to function. Furthermore, reasons for possible limitations will 
be analyzed. Two aspects are considered of importance: 
The first aspect is joint venture stability. From the description in chapter 2.8. 
regarding the functioning of joint ventures, the importance of the stability of joint 
venture structures for questions of firm performance and development became 
apparent. It was concluded, amongst others, by Beamish, that in general stable joint 
ventures have a more positive impact on the development of Third World countries 
than unstable joint ventures. Because the tripartite model in Camaçari consists of 
bipartite and tripartite joint venture structures, it is important to pay attention to the 
stability of these ownership structures. Special reference will be made to the 
changing participation of foreign transnationals in the Camaçari complex. When joint 
ventures have fallen apart or the composition of their shareholders has changed, in 
most cases the reasons for this can be found in the relationship between the 
partners. Among researchers as well as managers, the comparison between a joint 
venture structure and a marriage is quite common: "when the respective partners of 
the joint venture can no longer cope with each other, it is better to separate." This 
chapter will examine the reasons for these separations; which partner was to blame 
for the trouble or are there other, external reasons for the failure of the marriage. 
Spicciai attention will be paid to differences that can be observed between Japanese, 
American and European participants. 
The second aspect is the degree of technology transfer. Although technology 
transfer is not the main objective of the Brazilian government, it did play an 
important role in the decision to use the tripartite model in the establishment of the 
petrochemical complex of Camaçari. It was thought that the model would have a 
positive influence on the transfer of technology and could stimulate nationally 
controlled R&D. In section 6.4. findings from previous research with respect to this 
subject will be presented, followed by results from present research. To measure the 
degree of technology transfer, three phases in this transfer will be dealt with 
successively: the origin of the first used technology, the actual investments in R&D 
in the adaptation phase and the origin of the technology needed for expansion of 
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the production capacity of the firms. Technology transfer is often seen as a crucial 
factor in the industrialization process of a developing country. It is, therefore, 
important to ask why the transfer of technology in a model, which seemingly 
possessed all the necessary characteristics for stimulating a more or less smooth 
process of transfer, turned out to be so limited. Given the existence of three partners 
it is logical to pay attention to the role of these respective participants in the 
process of technology transfer. In this way, more insight will be gained into the 
factors responsible for the limited transfer. Therefore, the role of the national 
participants, the state participant and the foreign partners will be analyzed. With 
respect to the latter, a further question is whether differences can be noticed 
between the behaviour of Japanese, American and European transnationale towards 
technology transfer. 
6.2. The unstable ownership structure of tripartite and bipartite joint ventures 
In chapter 5.4., the ownership structure of all petrochemical firms located in 
Camaçari is described. From the list of firms that was presented, it appeared that in 
1989 different types of ownership existed side by side. To understand the function-
ing and impact of the tripartite model, it is necessary to know whether and to what 
extent the presence of these different ownership structures in the Camaçari complex 
changed after it came on stream. A comparison of data regarding all firms, from the 
moment they started their activities in the petrochemical complex until 1989, will 
provide a comprehensive view of the dynamics of the tripartite model. It may also 
show the usefulness and stability of the model. 
6.2.1. The fading popularity of tripartite joint ventures 
In table 6.1. the ownership structure of the increasing number of firms in the period 
between 1979 and 1989 is looked at in order to identify existing patterns.1 It is clear 
that some remarkable changes occurred in this period. Changes in ownership 
structure can take place in two ways: in the first place, an increase in the absolute 
number of firms influences the relative importance of each type of ownership 
structure. In the second place, the ownership structure of the existing firms is 
subject to changes when one of the partners decides to sell its voting shares.2 
The most remarkable change in the Camaçari complex was that the relative 
number of tripartite joint ventures declined considerably. While in 1980, 42% of all 
firms had a tripartite structure, the percentage dropped to 19% by 1988. The 
absolute decline in the number of tripartite firms -only two- was not that large, 
however. In 1989, three new tripartite firms were created. One of these new 
tripartite firms was Nitroclor, a fine chemical firm with the partial ownership by the 
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Italian transnational, Liquipar. The other two 'new' tripartite firms were not newly 
created but already existing firms that experienced a change in ownership structure 
towards a tripartite joint venture such as the nationally owned firm, Sansuy do 
Nordeste. Part of the assets of this plastic consumer goods producing company were 
bought by the tripartite firm CPC, which wanted to safeguard its nearby market. It 
is obvious that the total increase in number of firms in Camaçari from 23 to 50 did 
not result in more tripartite joint ventures. This suggests that the newly created 
firms in particular were not constructed according to the tripartite model. 
The relative decline of tripartite joint ventures resulted in an increase in the 
relative importance of other types of ownership. The total number of 100% transna-
tionally owned firms increased steadily between 1979 and 1989. In absolute numbers 
this increase was 7 firms, or from 4% to 16%. In part this increase can be attributed 
to a change in government policy: it became easier for 100% subsidiaries of 
transnational firms to obtain permission for the construction of a plant in Camaçari. 
Examples include the fine chemical firms BASF and Ciba Geigy. In other cases, the 
increasing number of 100% foreign subsidiaries was due to changes in ownership 
structure: some firms started as bipartite or tripartite joint ventures but bought out 
their national partners after a couple of years. Examples of this include Unirhodia 
and Cobafi, which became 100% affiliates of Rhone Poulenc and Akzo respectively.3 
The other types of firms did experience some fluctuations in absolute importance 
but in a relative sense no remarkable trends could be detected. In an absolute sense, 
the importance of 100% nationally owned firms and joint ventures between national 
private and state firms increased considerably. 
Table 6.1. Number of firms located in the petrochemical complex of Camaçari, according to 
ownership structure, from 1979 to 1989 
year 
/status 
TNC 
JV 
NJV 
TRIPE 
NAT 
STATE 
total 
1979 
abs 
1 
3 
4 
10 
8 
1 
27 
% 
4 
11 
15 
37 
29 
4 
100 
1980 
abs 
1 
2 
4 
12 
8 
1 
28 
% 
4 
7 
14 
42 
29 
4 
100 
1985 
abs 
5 
5 
7 
10 
15 
1 
43 
% 
12 
12 
16 
23 
35 
2 
100 
1988 
abs 
5 
7 
8 
8 
14 
1 
43 
% 
12 
16 
19 
19 
32 
2 
100 
1989 
abs % 
8 16 
6 12 
7 14 
11 22 
17 34 
1 2 
50 100 
source: annual reports of COPEC, firm survey 1989 
TNC = 100% subsidiary of transnational corporation 
JV = joint venture between Brazilian firm and transnational firm 
NJV = joint venture between Brazilian private firm and Brazilian state firm 
TRIPE = joint venture between a transnational corporation, a private Brazilian firm and 
a state firm 
NAT = 100% Brazilian private firm 
STATE = 100% state owned firm 
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When the number of projected firms is looked at, the tendency towards more 
nationally owned companies is also obvious, (see table 6.2.) The tripartite model lost 
much of its popularity: only four tripartite projects were registered between 1979 
and 1989. Despite the fact that most of the projects were fully nationally owned, the 
total number of nationally owned firms did not increase that fast, due to the 
relatively large number of cancelled projects among this category of firms. In the 
period between 1979 and 1988 twenty nationally owned firms cancelled their project. 
Table 6.2. Number of firms projected and cancelled on the petrochemical complex of 
Camaçari, according to ownership structure, between 1979 and \988f 
year 
/status 
1979-1980 
Ρ С 
1985 
Ρ С 
1988 
Ρ С 
TNC 
JV 
NJV 
TRIPE 
NAT 
4 
0 
1 
1 
6 
0 
4 
0 
1 
8 
0 
1 
1 
2 
8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
12 
0 
1 
0 
0 
9 
total 12 13 12 15 10 
Ρ = projected firms 
С = cancelled firms or projects 
source: annual reports of COPEC, firm survey 1989 
The explanation for the large number of cancelled projects among nationally owned 
firms must be sought in the industrial branch. Most of the cancelled projects were 
not petrochemical projects but projects in the plastic transformation or fine chemical 
branch. As mentioned earlier, the performance of these two branches was not very 
successful on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari, which meant that several 
projects never became reality. 
The fine chemical branch in particular was responsible for the failure of most of 
the projects of the 100% nationally owned firms. Because of the policy of the 
Brazilian government, the number of national projects in the fine chemical branch 
increased considerably after 1980. In 1985, 10 projects in this branch were approved 
by the SDI and in 1988 another 8 projects were added. Almost all of these projects 
were presented by 100% national firms: in 1985 seven projects were 100% national 
in character, two were tripartite projects and one was a joint venture between a 
state firm and a private national firm. In 1988, these figures were only slightly 
different: five fine chemical projects were 100% nationally owned, one firm was a 
tripartite and one firm a bipartite joint venture. Fine chemical projects presented by 
national firms in particular were doomed to fail. Their unsuccessful performance 
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was primarily due to the difficulties in acquiring technology. As mentioned before, 
technology in the fine chemical branch is very difficult to obtain. National Brazilian 
firms that tiy to construct a fine chemical firm without a transnational partner, 
which provides the technology, are largely dependent on the 'free' market. This 
'free' market is very limited, however. The large chemical transnationals, which 
spent huge amounts of capital on R&D activities and are in the possession of the 
most recent technology, are generally not willing to sell this technology. Conse-
quently, the national firms from Camaçari that succeeded in the acquisition of fine 
chemical technology discovered that this technology - bought from countries such as 
Mexico, Rumania and Italy - was neither appropriate nor very up-to-date. Another 
problem that was encountered after the purchase of technology was that the transfer 
of this technology proved to be very difficult. The famous Norquisa daughter, 
Nitroclor, provides one example. Although this national fine chemical enterprise had 
already been in operation for a couple of years, a tremendous number of technical 
problems was encountered. Because the Brazilians were not experienced with the 
type of technology that was necessary to produce fine chemicals, they did not know 
where to obtain this technology. The solution was to ask the Italian Liquipar, which 
already provided a small part of the necessary technology, to look around on the 
'free' market and buy other parts as well. This proved to be a disaster. Liquipar 
was not experienced with the production process itself and various technical 
problems emerged. 
6.2.2. The shaky alliances of joint venture firms 
To what extent can the vanishing popularity of tripartite joint ventures be attributed 
to the creation of new nationally owned firms and to what extent can changes in 
ownership structure be held responsible? Of all firms,5 sixteen managers (38%) stated 
that the ownership structure of their firm had changed fundamentally since its 
beginning. These changes varied, for example, between tripartite and 100% transna-
tionally owned or between bipartite and 100% nationally owned. An even larger 
percentage of managers answered that their firm experienced a change in sharehol-
ders: 27 managers (64%). A change in shareholders does not necessarily result in a 
change of ownership structure. When a foreign shareholder decides to sell its voting 
shares to another foreign shareholder -for instance, Hoechst sold its 33.3% of the 
assets of EDN to the US based Dow Chemical- the firm of course remains a 
tripartite firm. 
Which firms in Camaçari are shaky, in other words: which firms are more stable 
and which firms are more unstable as far as ownership structure is concerned? This 
can be investigated by relating the changes in ownership-structure to the actual 
number of operating firms of a specific type. Differences in stability relating to 
changes in ownership structure between the tripes, the joint ventures and the firms 
with 100% ownership do not appear to be significant. The joint ventures with 
participation of state firms experienced slightly more changes; 57% of these firms 
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experienced a change in ownership structure in comparison to 34% of the other 
firms and 40% of the tripes. When changes in shareholders are looked at, a different 
picture can be seen. All eleven tripartite firms experienced a change in shareholders, 
five of the seven joint ventures with state participation and three of the six bipartite 
joint ventures. This is in major contrast to the 100% transnationale, of which only 
three of the eight changed shareholders. As expected, joint venture firms, and 
especially tripartite joint venture firms, are less stable than 100% foreign owned 
firms. Before looking at the reasons for the instability of these joint ventures, it is 
interesting to look more closely at the participation of especially the foreign partner 
in these joint ventures. 
6.23. Changes in the participation of foreign firms 
Two questions are considered of importance: to what extent is foreign participation 
subject to changes and to what extent do differences exist between transnational 
companies based in different countries. Analyzing the figures with respect to the 
participation of foreign firms for the years that the petrochemical complex has been 
functioning, some remarkable changes can be observed. At its start, fourteen foreign 
firms were participating in the complex. Until 1985 this number did not change. In 
the last four years, however, there has been an increase to a total of 25 foreign 
firms by 1989. What is the origin of the foreign firms that showed a large interest 
in the Camaçari complex and what were their reasons for coming to the complex? 
First, the relatively large number of Japanese participants is noteworthy. The 
preference of the state technocracy for Japanese subsidiaries is one reason, included 
in the description in chapter 4.5.2., for this phenomenon. Despite the fact that 
Japanese firms were complete newcomers to the Brazilian chemical industry, in 1979 
they had seven projects on the Camaçari complex, all in joint venture structures. 
(see figure 6.1.) Second, the relative absence of American firms is remarkable; in the 
initial phase of the complex they formed an absolute minority with only one project. 
Ten years after the creation of the complex this picture has changed considerably. 
While the number of Japanese investors remained the same -seven Japanese firms in 
1979 as well as in 1989- the number of European firms increased from six firms in 
1979 to nine firms in 1989, the majority in 100% ownership. The American firms 
experienced the largest increase: from one firm in 1979 to nine firms in 1989; and, 
more remarkably, 6 of these participated in a joint venture. 
The large number of European and Japanese companies participating in joint 
venture structures suggests that these transnationals are more positive about this 
type of ownership structure than American companies. During the ten years 
Camaçari has functioned, the attitude of American transnationals seems to have 
changed slightly: in 1979 not one American firm agreed to participate in a minority 
joint venture in the Camaçari complex, but in 1989 there were six American joint 
ventures. 
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Figure 6.1. Participation of transnational corporations in joint ventures and in 100% ownership 
firms in the petrochemical complex of Camaçari according to country of origin in 1979, 1980, 
1985 and 1989 
g 100% subsidiaries 
• Joint ventures 
source: COPEC 1979, 1980, 1985, firm survey 1989 
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European companies show the opposite tendency: six European joint ventures were 
present in 1979 and seven in 1985, after which the number declined to only four. 
Joint ventures with Japanese participation remained, aside from small fluctuations, 
equal in number. 
In addition to the changing number of foreign participants from various countries, 
it is interesting to examine which foreign firms participated in the complex and 
changes regarding their participation. Figure 6.2. shows clearly that, with respect to 
Japanese participation, three firms dominate in the joint ventures of Camaçari. After 
the start of the complex, no new Japanese companies invested. Apart from Idemitsu, 
which started to participate somewhat later in a joint venture on the complex, 
Mitsubishi as well as Sumitomo were involved in the very first negotiations. The 
most important Japanese representative is the chemical conglomerate Mitsubishi 
Chemical SA. This company participated in 5 of the 17 joint ventures and possesses 
its own trade firm, which is different from the other Japanese firms, Sumitomo and 
Idemitsu, which participate together with other trade companies, C. Itoh and Nissho 
Iwai, respectively. In official documents, the Japanese conglomerates were usually 
registered as the 'Japanese Group'. 
Of the present seven joint ventures in which Japanese shareholders participate, 
only a few changes can be seen. Mitsubishi decided to leave two firms: the tripartite 
firm, Copenor, became nationally owned and in the other case, Celbras, the Japanese 
firm was replaced by the American City Bank. In another firm it was the other way 
round: when CPC (one of the tripartite joint ventures in which Mitsubishi par-
ticipates) decided to buy shares of Sansuy, a plastic transformation company, 
Mitsubishi automatically became one of the shareholders as well. In all the other 
projects the total percentage of Japanese shares remained the same, 33,3%. In 
Polialden, the share of Mitsubishi declined from 50% to 33% which gave the state 
firm, Petroquisa, an opportunity to participate as well. 
The characteristics of Japanese participation are in contrast to European and 
American participation, in which large variations in the firms present can be seen. 
Only two American joint venture firms did not experience any change; in one case, 
Nitriflex, because the firm was recently constructed. Three American firms left the 
petrochemical complex -Celanese, Morton Norwich and IPC- and three new Ameri-
can firms started to participate: Dow Chemical, Dow Coming and the City Bank. 
The pattern of European firms fluctuates even more: four European firms left the 
complex -ICI (in two firms), DSM, Dynamit Nobel and Hoechst- and only one new 
European firm began investing in Camaçari -Shell, one of the shareholders of 
Polibrasil. In two cases, a former joint venture with European participation changed 
into a 100% transnational firm -Cobafi (AKZO) and Unirhodia (Rhone Poulenc). The 
participating European firm did not change in only three cases: in Acrinor, Rhone 
Poulenc is still participating, Liquipar still forms part of Nitroclor; and the Belgium 
firm, Solvay, is still a shareholder of Carbonor. In fact, the latter is the only firm in 
which European participation remains unchanged, since in Acrinor the share of the 
foreign partner declined form 45.6% to 35% while in Nitroclor the Italian Liquipar 
decided to diminish its shares from 30% to 20%. 
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Figure 6.2. Foreign firms participating in former or existing joint ventures located at the 
complex of Camaçari, according to country of origin 
FIRN NAME PAST FOREIGN PARTNER ACTUAL FOREIGN PARTNER, (1989) 
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION 
Norcom DuPont 
Oxiteno 
Nitriflex 
Silinor 
CQR 
Metanor 
Liquid carbonic 
-
IFC 
Goodyear 
-
Morton 
Celanese 
Liquid Carbonic 
EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION 
EDN 
Pronor 
Etoxilatos 
Polibrasil 
Cobafi 
Unirhodia 
Acrinor 
Nitroclor 
Nitrocarbono 
Carbonor 
Hoechst 
Dynamit Nobel 
ICI 
ICI 
AKZO 
Rhone Poulenc 
Rhone Poulenc 
Liquipar 
DSM 
Solvay 
JAPANESE PARTICIPATION 
Ciquinc Ρ 
Ciquine Q 
CPC 
Cclbras 
Polialden 
Politeno 
Policarbo natos 
Sansuy 
Copenor 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Sumitomo 
Idemitsu 
-
Mitsubishi Kasei 
DuPont 
-
Goodyear 
Dow Coming 
-
-
Liquid Carbonic 
Dow Chemical 
-
-
Shell 
AKZO 
Rhone Poulenc 
Rhone Poulenc 
Liquipar 
-
Solvay 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
City Bank 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
Sumitomo 
Idemitsu 
Mitsubishi Kasei 
-
source: firm survey 1989 
6.3. Reasons for instability: opinion of the managers involved 
In order to throw some light on the instability of the Camaçari-based joint venture 
firms, it is necessary to present the reasons for the changes in ownership structure 
and shareholders composition. Executive managers were asked what they consider 
reasons for the changes in their firm and whether they could identify one participat-
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ing firm as primarily responsible for the change. As previously concluded, not all 
foreign joint ventures were equally instable; the joint ventures with Japanese 
participation proved to be more stable than the joint ventures with American or 
European participation. It is interesting to examine whether there is a correlation 
between the stated reasons for instability and the origin of the partner. 
6.3.1. Foreign, national or state responsibility 
Of all 43 managers included in the firm survey, 27 mentioned a change of sharehol-
ders in their firm. According to one third (9) of these 27 managers, the participating 
foreign firm was the reason for this change: either because the foreign managers or 
the board of directors of the headquarters were disappointed with the results of the 
firm (5 cases), or because of changing firm policy which resulted in a withdrawal of 
the firm from a particular industrial branch (2 cases), or even from Brazil (1 case). 
Pronor is an example of a firm in which a disappointed foreign company played a 
role in a changing ownership pattern. This petrochemical company began in 1978 
with the participation of the European firm Dynamit Nobel. When the transnational 
partner decided to leave the firm, Pronor merged with the Camaçari-based petroche-
mical joint venture, Isiocianaticos. In this firm the foreign company that participated, 
the American DuPont, also withdrew. According to the managing director of Pronor, 
both transnationale "did not come to stay in Camaçari, they only came to make 
money and when this did not succeed in the short run, they withdrew'" Another 
example is Nitrocarbono. A Dutch firm, DSM, participated in this petrochemical 
company which also started production in 1978. The first four years of its existence 
the firm only registered large losses. When in 1982 the economic crisis came to a 
head, DSM no longer believed in the Brazilian market. It sold all its assets to the 
state company, Copene. Because no improvements were expected in the short run 
the national partner, Roche Miranda, followed its footsteps and Nitrocarbono became 
state controlled. After 1984 positive results were once again registered. 
Nine managers pointed to either the state or the national private partner as 
responsible for the change in shareholders or ownership structure. In six firms the 
national private partner encountered financial problems that forced it to withdraw or 
diminish its shares. Carbonor is a clear example of a firm in which financial 
problems resulted in a change of shareholders. The initiative of this firm was taken 
by two Bahian engineers who had the idea to start a chemical firm for the produc-
tion of, amongst other things, sodium bicarbonate. With the participation of 
Norquisa and the Belgium company, Solvay, they started a fine chemical tripartite 
joint venture in 1979. When capital investments continued to be necessary, they 
found out that their financial reserves were insufficient. They had no other choice 
than to withdraw and sell their assets to another national firm, Cabo Branco. 
The state companies also sometimes played a role in changing ownership patterns: 
in one case the shares of the state firm were privatized and, in two other cases, the 
state firm wanted to increase its control. In Polialden, for example, the national firm, 
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Banco Economico, took the initiative to start a petrochemical firm together with the 
Japanese Mitsubishi. They tried to start a bipartite joint venture but were urged to 
let the state company Petroquisa participate. 
Figure 6.3. Reasons for changing ownership structures of Camaçari-based petrochemical firms 
according to the managers 
Reason number of firms 
foreign finn 
tnc disappointed 
changing policy: tnc withdrawal from sector 
changing policy: tnc withdrawal from Brazil 
tnc firm policy 
national or state firm 
insufficient finances national partner 
nationalization 
increase state influence 
other reasons 
conflicts between the various partners 
juridical reasons 
unknown reason 
total 27 
source: firm survey 1989 
In two cases, conflicts between the partners were said to be responsible for the 
changes in ownership structure. An example of this is Polipropileno. In 1979 this 
firm started as a joint venture between Petroquisa, Cevekol, Suzano and the British 
ICI. In 1984, ICI sold its assets to the other three partners after extensive negotia-
tions in which no agreement could be reached. Various reasons were stated for their 
withdrawal. A first explanation was a change in financial priorities of the foreign 
participant. ICI obtained permission to construct a PET bottle producing factory in 
Brazil with the restriction that the foreign company could not use its own external 
capital. The only solution ICI could think of was to sell its assets in Polipropileno 
and to use the capital obtained from this transaction for the construction of the PET 
bottle company. Another explanation mentioned was that ICI did not want to 
participate on a minority basis in a petrochemical joint venture. In the new projected 
PET bottle company they could obtain a 100% ownership.7 
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Five managers mentioned that the changes in ownership structure were due to 
juridical constructions or market/resource guarantees.' An example is the transfor-
mation firm, Sansuy. The petrochemical tripartite company CPC bought part of the 
shares of this firm in order to safeguard its market* 
6.32. Differences between American, Japanese and European companies 
The correlation between the reasons the executive managers gave for the instability 
of their joint ventures and the country of origin of the foreign companies participat-
ing in these firms is interesting. The correlation suggests why the participation rates 
of the various foreign firms fluctuate and why Japanese partners in the Camaçari 
complex change less than American and European partners. 
In most cases, the managers of American joint venture firms pointed to the 
foreign firm as responsible for the failure of the joint venture. Several American 
firms said they were disappointed with the financial results, such as the companies 
DuPont and Celanese. IFC is another American company which withdrew from 
Camaçari, selling its shares to the national partner in Oxiteno, grupo Unipar. It is 
part of the firm strategy of IFC to apply its capital on temporarily basis only. As 
concerned to the failures of the European joint ventures, the financial limitations of 
the national partners were more often mentioned as a responsible factor but the 
changes were also caused by conflicts or disappointed foreign companies. The 
examples of ICI in Polipropileno and Dynamit Nobel in Isiocianaticos were pre-
viously described in this chapter. 
The changes in the two tripartite firms in which Japanese companies participated 
were said to be caused by either a disappointed foreign partner or by conflicts. 
However, a closer look at the causes for the departure of the Japanese partners 
shows a similarity between the two cases. In the joint venture Copenor, the national 
tripartite joint venture, Metanor, and a Japanese company Mitsubishi participated. 
The Japanese firm apparently encountered severe difficulties with the American 
partner in co-shareholder of Metanor, Celanese. The conflict escalated to the point 
that Mitsubishi no longer wanted to participate, not even indirectly, with this 
American company and decided to leave.10 (see figure 6.4.) In the second case, the 
tripartite joint venture Cclbras, the same foreign companies played a role. Besides 
the state partner, BNDES, and the national private firm, Fibase, the Japanese 
Mitsubishi participated in a tripartite firm named Fisiba, constructed in 1971. In 1987 
Fisiba was bought by the same American company. Celanese, which changed the 
name Fisiba into Celbras, and Mitsubishi decided to leave the joint venture. It is not 
clear whether Mitsubishi decided to leave before or after negotiations with Celanese 
had begun. The official reason for the failure of this joint venture and the departure 
of Mitsubishi was said to be a technological problem, but the similarity with the 
first case described is remarkable. It is probable that the relationship of the Japanese 
Mitsubishi with the American Celanese was disturbed to such an extent that the 
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Japanese company did not want to have any relation with the American petrochemi-
cal company." 
Figure 6.4. Shareholders composition in Metanor and Pronor in the years 1979 and 1989 in 
percentages of shares 
Former situation (1979) 
Celanese 33.3% 
Peixote de Castro 33.3% 
Petroquisa 33.3% 
Present situation (1989) 
Copene 5.0% 
Petroquisa 47.5% 
Peixote de Castro 47.5% 
— Mitsubishi 77.3% |— 
+ 
| Mitsubishi 22.7% f" 
^} Copenor | 
(IVlULdllUl ILfU/O | | *_UpC-IHjr IUU70 | | 
source: firm survey 1989 
In summary, one can say that the participation of foreign firms underwent many 
changes during the ten years the petrochemical complex was functioning, with the 
exception of the Japanese firms. Japanese firms that were represented when the 
petrochemical complex in Camaçari began, are still located on the complex. The 
participation of European and American firms showed much more fluctuation: many 
European and American companies invested only temporarily in Camaçari and left 
when problems were encountered. 
>.4. Limitations concerning the transfer of technology 
A second important aspect of the functioning of the tripartite model is technology 
transfer. Can the tripartite model be considered a stimulus for the transfer of 
technology or was its only contribution the purchase of up-to-date technology at low 
prices? 
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The concept 'transfer of technology7 is a vague description of a rather complex 
phenomenon. To clarify this concept it is necessary to distinguish between three 
different phases of technology transfer. The first phase is the purchase of new 
technology, either from an external technology supplier or from a participating 
(foreign) firm. The next phase consists of both absorbing the acquired technology 
and transforming it to meet the needs of the firm at that moment. When the new 
technology is absorbed, the debottlenecking can start. This means that all initial 
difficulties need to be overcome and minor improvements in the technology to 
adjust it to local circumstances need to be made. When the new technology is 
absorbed and debottlenecked, the final phase begins, in which further research and 
innovation can take place. With the newly acquired technology as a starting point, 
R&D makes it possible to construct another plant with improved production 
processes or innovated products. It is necessary to keep these characteristics in mind 
while looking at the technology transfer of the petrochemical firms in Camaçari. 
6.4.1. Attention paid by the government to the role of technology 
One of the aspects in which the contribution of foreign firms is most evident is the 
transfer of technology. As has already been discussed in chapters 4 and 5, transna-
tional firms were allowed to participate in the Camaçari complex predominantly 
because of their supply of technology. The national private enterprises, as well as 
the state firms, could not construct a petrochemical complex without the contribu-
tion of these transnational enterprises. Even the single purchase of technology, 
without direct foreign participation, was not among the possibilities of that par-
ticular period, due to the total lack of experience with petrochemical production on 
the part of the private national partners. Also, from the point of view of the 
transnational firms, it was more desirable to participate with their technology in a 
tripartite joint venture instead of selling their technology. In this way, access to new 
markets could be obtained. 
From the Brazilian point of view, the tripartite model was supposed to be the 
most appropriate model, not only for obtaining up-to-date technology, but also for 
stimulating the transfer of this technology. Although stimulation of the transfer of 
technology was not the main objective of the tripartite model", the complementary 
characteristics of all three partners were thought to influence the transfer of 
technology in a positive way. In the first place, the technology supplier, by par-
ticipating in the firm itself, would supposedly feel responsibility for firm results and 
would, therefore, strive for an optimal application of the new technology. In 
addition, it would be to the disadvantage of the participating foreign company if 
firm results were disappointing due to the inappropriate use of technology. Evans 
puts it as follows: 
"Technology is, of course, one of the multinationals' prime contributions. It 
would have been possible to purchase most of the technology, but buying 
technology has its disadvantages. An engineering firm does not have the same 
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interest in future profits that a partner does. Once a plant is constructed, the 
engineers are not there to deal with the problems. Getting technology from a 
partner, whose local profits depend on its efficient operation, is the best way to 
ensure that it will work."13 
Secondly, the presence of an unexperienced national partner, eager to learn new 
technological processes, would be a stimulating factor in the transfer of technology. 
And finally, the participation of the state was seen as a positive contribution. While 
most national private partners were almost totally ignorant of petrochemical 
production processes, the petrochemical state companies were headed by technocrats 
who had received their training in the technological institutions of Petrobras. 
Consequently, they possessed up-to-date knowledge of the technological require-
ments in the petrochemical industry. Furthermore, the executives from the Petrobras 
staff were better equipped than the national private entrepreneurs to negotiate with 
the transnational technology suppliers. 
Even though the government had already recognized the importance of technology 
transfer by the seventies, it was not translated into direct policy measures. During 
the ten years that the petrochemical complex of Camaçari has been functioning, the 
Brazilian government realized that mere existence of tripartite joint ventures in the 
petrochemical industry was not sufficient to stimulate national technological 
development. A much more active government policy was needed. There are two 
reasons for the increased attention of the government to the role of technology 
transfer. 
Firstly, the very restricted technology contracts proved to be a severe obstacle to 
technology transfer. In the period that the Camaçari complex was created, the 
technological knowledge of the majority of the Brazilian entrepreneurs and tech-
nicians in regards petrochemical products or processes was negligible. As a result, 
they were unable to demand more favourable contract conditions in the negotiations 
over technology. The limits of their technological knowledge is clearly illustrated by 
the fact that special meetings were organized to teach national entrepreneurs how to 
read technology contracts.14 The negotiation of less restrictive contracts, in which the 
transfer of technology was better arranged, was, however, not the main priority of 
the Brazilian entrepreneurs at that moment. The utilization of up-to-date technology 
in their companies was of more importance. Not surprisingly, the technology 
contracts signed to establish the first petrochemical firms in Camaçari were above all 
favourable to the transnational companies and did not include many regulations 
concerning the transfer of the whole package of technology. The last phase of 
technology transfer in particular, involving expansion of the company with the 
acquired technology, was almost never arranged in the contracts. Restrictions 
established in the contracts, include: limits on the maximum production capacity to 
be realized with the acquired technology; restrictions on export of production or the 
production process; and limits on further R&D. When the entrepreneurs, and 
especially the state technocrats, became aware of the impact of these restrictions and 
realized that national R&D was seriously limited, they began to pay more attention 
to technology transfer. 
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The market structure of petrochemical products was a second reason for the 
increased attention to transfer of technology. As described earlier, in chapter 3, 
during the economic crisis in Brazil at the end of the seventies, external markets 
became more attractive to the petrochemical industry. Internal demand dropped 
drastically and petrochemical firms were forced to search for other markets. This 
changed market structure, shifting toward exports, had a negative influence on the 
willingness of foreign firms to sell their up-to-date technology to petrochemical 
firms. The need for a more independent R&D and to stimulate technology transfer 
to national firms became evident. Amida summarizes this as follows: 
"Obliged to export in order to compensate for the loss of the internal market, 
our firms are confronted with the following problem: their foreign technology 
suppliers are not willing to continue negotiation over the supply of their 
technology as before."15 
The need for a more comprehensive government policy with respect to the transfer 
of technology, especially in the exporting industrial sectors, is also clearly stated by 
Coelho: 
"On the level of government policy, one pretends to reward the industrialization 
process supported by the intensification of the incorporation of process technol-
ogy. In this way the advanced technology can have a decisive influence on our 
capacity to compete in international markets"." 
The increased attention paid by the government to technology transfer resulted only 
marginally in more direct policy measures. One of the measures was the rule that, 
before SDI would approve a new petrochemical project, the involved company had 
to design a R&D programme for which 2% of its annual turnover would be spent. 
6.4.2. Different views to technology transfer 
Much research has already been done on the role of the tripartite model in the 
transfer of technology. During the ten years the complex of Camaçari has func-
tioned, several scientists have tried to identify the actual technological development 
of the Camaçari firms. 
A researcher at the Federal University of Salvador in Bahia, (UFBA) Dr. Francisco 
Teixeira," concluded in 1985 that even though the technology contracts of the 
Camaçari firms had been less favourable for the national entrepreneurs than at the 
third petrochemical complex of Triunfo, the transfer of technology could, nonethe-
less, be called successful. Teixeira bases his research on the assumption that with 
increase of the volume of Brazilian-used technical equipment the dependence on 
foreign technology decreases. On the average, 60% of the technological input used in 
the three petrochemical complexes was met by local supply. For the complex of 
Camaçari this figure was 70%.1β More recently, in 1987, Teixeira analyzed the degree 
to which local petrochemical firms in Camaçari carried out their own Research and 
Development. His conclusions demonstrated a diminishing dependence on foreign 
technology. Almost all petrochemical firms in Camaçari increased their production 
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capacity in the eighties by means of 'debottlenecking'; 85% of all firms carried out 
control of production quality; and 68,5% of the firms possessed a R&D center. 
Furthermore, 82% of all firms declared that they were able to make changes in the 
production process; 76% of the firms could copy the production process with small 
alterations; and, in 45% of the cases, firms claimed they had developed new 
production processes on the basis of existing ones." 
In addition to Teixeira, several other researchers have also concluded that the 
tripartite model had positive effects on the technological development of the firms 
involved. Amilcar da Silva Filho, one of the Petroquisa directors, who was respon-
sible for the technological progress of the petrochemical firms until 1987, reached 
the same conclusion as Teixeira.20 Amilcar states that although the basic process 
technologies still need to be imported, the application of this technology and the 
operation of the petrochemical firms can be done autonomously. He is concerned, 
however, about the high degree of dependence on basic technology and know how. 
"Nowadays, if a new petrochemical complex is implemented in our country, we 
still have to import more or less 80% of the basic process technology".21 
Francisco Neves da Rocha (1984) made a case study of technological learning in a 
polypropylene plant in Camaçari.22 Analyzing the transfer of technology from the 
British technology supplier ICI to the tripartite joint venture firm Polipropileno, he 
comes to the following conclusions: 
"The case study provides evidence of a less developed company performing 
remarkably well according to all usual measurement of technological perfor-
mance. As it is totally run by its own staff, there is also evidence of an extreme-
ly successful learning process. Within the limits of the Brazilian petrochemical 
industry, it must be made clear that Polipropileno cannot be considered as 
atypical. Most plants in the Camaçari complex, as an example, perform very well 
both technologically and commercially".23 
But despite the high technological level of this polypropylene plant. Neves da Rocha 
remarks: 
"It has been shown that with the acquisition of the capability to create new 
techniques, Polipropileno is very far from ICI achievements. (-) ICI, only five 
years after the purchase of technological information, was already designing an 
extensively altered and improved process."24 
A researcher who is less optimistic about the contribution of the tripartite model to 
the transfer of technology is Valeria Delgado Bastos,25 who is attached to the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro, (UFRJ). She investigated various technology contracts 
of the Camaçari based firms and concludes: 
"There is nothing in the technology contracts that verifies the fact that better 
conditions of technology transfer are provided if the supplier participates as a 
shareholder in the receiving firm. In several cases just the opposite appeared."26 
Bastos notices that most of the technology contracts were characterized by restric-
tions and limitations. The number and content of these limitations varied per firm 
but in many cases, production capacity with the acquired technology was limited. 
As a result in most cases, new technology had to be purchased for the construction 
157 
of new production entibes. Bastos also remarks that in certain contracts restrictions 
concerning the market of the company were included in order to avoid competition 
with the technology supplier. 
In summary, existing research relating to the contribution of the tripartite model 
to the stimulation of technological development in Camaçari has been relatively 
positive. The various authors agree that not all phases of technology transfer were 
passed through. As a result, national firms were limited in their ability to absorb 
enough technology to construct petrochemical companies without foreign technology. 
They also agree, however, that a certain degree of technological development cannot 
be denied. 
6.4.3. Limited technology transfer: results from present research 
Most research on technological learning has been based on the analyses of technol-
ogy contracts or specific case studies. This book will emphasize another aspect: the 
origin of technology needed for the expansion of the Camaçari firms in order to 
develop a more comprehensive view of the success or failure of technology transfer 
and the extent to which R&D took place in the Camaçari based petrochemical firms. 
It is assumed that technology transfer has been insufficient for a case in which a 
large number of companies purchase new technology in order to expand their 
production capacity. The origin of the initial technology, the investment in technol-
ogy during the operation, and the origin of technology for the expansion of the 
firms -the three phases of technology transfer- will be described. 
The origin of technology used in the establishment of the firm will first be 
examined.27 Of all firms included in the firm survey, the seventeen joint venture 
firms in which a foreign company was currently participating, made use of foreign 
technology in the establishment of their company, (see figure 6.5.) The same holds 
true for firms in which a foreign firm had formerly participated: all ten of these 
firms started production with foreign technology. 
The technology of firms which presently have foreign participants, originated more 
or less equally from American, European and Japanese companies: of the seventeen 
firms, six obtained technology from an American supplier, four from an European 
supplier and seven from a Japanese firm. Of the firms with former foreign participa-
tion, European firms (in six cases) and American firms (in three cases) supplied the 
technology. The number of Japanese technology suppliers in this category of firms is 
small because few Japanese partners decided to leave the joint venture. In most of 
the cases, the provision of technology was taken care of by the present participating 
foreign firm. In the five firms in which this was not the case, the technology 
supplier left the joint venture firm and sold its assets to another foreign firm. For 
example, in the two US joint ventures, EDN and CELERAS, the technology was 
provided by Hoechst and Mitsubishi, respectively. These two firms decided to leave 
and sold their shares to Dow Chemical and City Bank. 
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When initial technology is provided, the petrochemical firm has to adapt the 
technology to local circumstances; first, to debottlencck it and second, to base its 
further R&D on this technology in order to improve the production process or to 
use it for the construction of other plants. For this purpose, it is necessary for the 
petrochemical firms to direct part of their annual turnover to R&D activities. 
The firm survey of 1989 showed that R&D activities of the Camaçari-based firms 
were limited. According to Bastos, but contrary to the figures presented by Teixeira, 
in 1989, almost half of the Camaçari firms did not invest directly in R&D. Of all 
firms, only 22% invested 2% of their annual turnover in R&D (which is the official 
government aim); 30% invested between 0.5% and 1.5%. Also, the number of firms 
with a R&D center was very limited: only 11 firms claimed to do some research in 
their own center. This research consisted primarily of trouble shooting or debottle-
necking. Only three firms actually possessed a laboratory equipped for more 
sophisticated research. Most of the firms, fifteen, sub-contracted their research to 
other R&D centers, mostly centers belonging to the parent company of the foreign 
partner. Fourteen firms claimed to do no research at all. The disparity between the 
findings of Bastos and Teixeira can be partly attributed to the location of the R&D 
center. In this research, a difference is made between 'a company's own R&D 
center', located on the complex and directly attached to the firm, and 'other R&D 
centers', located elsewhere and belonging to one of the partners of the firms, in 
most cases the foreign partner. 
In order to measure the success of technology transfer, the origin of technology 
needed for product expansion and diversification of the respective firms, will be 
examined.28 To what extent do the participating foreign firm stimulate or restrict the 
acquisition of new technology? To answer this question it is first necessary to 
examine the expansion plans of the Camaçari-based petrochemical firms. Of all 
seventeen firms which presently have foreign participation, twelve firms said they 
have plans to expand existing production capacity and ten firms plan to diversify 
by starting production of one or more totally new products. Only four firms did not 
have any short-term expansion plans at all, mostly because they had just begun 
production (see also paragraph 53.3.) More or less the same picture can be seen 
among the firms in which the foreign partner had left the joint venture. Eight out of 
ten firms were going to expand capacity and of these, five were going to make new 
products29 (see figure 6.5.). 
With respect to this expansion and the diversification of production, the 
interesting question is whether the firms need to purchase new technology and, if 
so, what is the source of this new technology: the parent company of the foreign 
participant or other foreign firms. One striking feature demonstrated by the figures, 
is the large number of firms that actually need to buy new technology. Firms with 
former foreign participation were slightly more in need of new technology than 
firms with present foreign participation. Of the former category, six out of eight 
firms with expansion/diversification plans were in need of new technology, for the 
latter category this figure was nine out of thirteen firms. 
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Figure 6.5. The origin of technology for respectively the initial plant, the expansion of capacity 
or/and the diversiñcation of production of petrochemical firms in Camaçari with actual or 
former foreign participation in 1989 
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1* expansion plans for the increase of production 
2* the origin of technology necessary for the expansion of capacity 
3* expansion plans for the diversification of production 
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The number of firms capable of expanding production capacity or diversifying 
production with their own technology is rather small. In most cases, these firms fall 
into the category of firms with present foreign participation. Technology came from 
the parent company but was not sold again as new technology. In Acrinor, for 
example, Rhodia, a subsidiary of Rhone Poulenc, supplied the technology necessary 
for both expansion and diversification, while for the firm Silinor, technology came 
from the parent company, Dow Coming. In only a few cases was the technology 
further developed by the firm itself. In other words, in these firms the third stage of 
technology transfer was reached. The firm Pronor, which purchased technology from 
the two former participants, Dynamit Nobel and DuPont, is an example.30 The 
technology Pronor uses is very scarce and difficult to acquire. The need to develop 
technology within the firm was, therefore, urgent. 
6.5. Reasons for limited technology transfer in Camaçari 
The research findings point to the limited technological development of the petroch-
emical firms in Camaçari. Teixeira and Bastos, as mentioned already, attribute the 
limited transfer of technology to unfavourable technology contracts. Can the 
unsuccessful technological development of the firms on the complex be explained by 
this factor only, or are other mechanisms at work as well? In what way does, for 
example, the tripartite model and the way this model was implemented in Camaçari 
provide an explanation for the limited R&D? Three factors are of importance for 
explaining the limited technological development of the petrochemical firms in 
Camaçari. The first factor that will be discussed is the policy of the Brazilian 
government; the second factor is the attitude of the national entrepreneurs; and the 
last factor is the contribution of the transnational enterprise. 
6.5.1. Policy of the government' a too fragmented petrochemical sector 
Government policy with respect to the use of the tripartite model in the implemen-
tation of the Camaçari complex largely influenced the technology transfer. At the 
time Camaçari was created the first concern of the government was to construct a 
nationally controlled petrochemical complex which possessed up-to-date technology 
to support import-substitution. To achieve this objective at the lowest possible costs, 
preference was given -at least in some projects- to the purchase of cheapest 
technology. Since less attention was paid to technology contracts, these contracts 
turned out to be unfavourable for the national partners. The second way in which 
government policy influenced the transfer of technology was by stimulating the 
creation of many new petrochemical enterprises. The objective of this policy was to 
avoid monopolies in the petrochemical sector and to stimulate the creation of a 
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national petrochemical bourgeoisie.31 However, the result was not only a fragmented 
petrochemical sector, but also a large number of small mono-producing companies. 
A constraint on the development of R&D activities resulting from this policy is 
the size of the firm: the annual turnover per firm is too small to direct a large 
amount of capital to R&D. Of all managers," 30% considered their firms too small 
to invest in R&D and a further 13% claimed that financial resources were insuffi-
cient for R&D activities. Another constraint is due to the mono-producing character 
of the firms. In a large number of firms production is restricted to one kind of 
product and, consequently, the firm only possess technology to produce this 
product. As a result, diversification of production is very difficult, especially in 
combination with the small size of the firm. Amilcar states it as follows: 
"Besides their small size, in comparison to international standards, the firms are 
mono-producers, how can they organize a large R&D center for different kinds 
of research?"33 
Thirdly, the decision of the Brazilian government to locate the petrochemical 
complex far away from the center of industrial development in Brazil, in a back-
ward area of the country where there is little industrial activity, presents a serious 
constraint on further technological development. The region of Bahia has had no 
experience with technological research, which is evident from the insufficient 
functioning of the specially created R&D center, CEPED, and the lack of technologi-
cal infrastructure, such as well equipped universities or well educated technicians 
and engineers. 
6.5.2. Attitude of national petrochemical firms towards R&D 
Not only the policy of establishing a large number of new petrochemical firms 
limited technological development; the decision of the Brazilian government to create 
a national petrochemical bourgeoisie can also be seen as an obstacle to further 
technological development of the Camaçari firms. And not only the total inex-
perience of the new national group» with the technology requirements of the 
petrochemical industry was a problem. Two other reasons are responsible as well. 
The first reason was that national private firms were unaware of the importance of 
technology transfer because they were primarily occupied outside the petrochemical 
branch. As described in chapter 4.4.2., a number of petrochemical firms originates 
either from construction companies or from financial banking conglomerates which 
do not have any core activities in the chemical sector. These companies began to 
invest in the petrochemical industry, in part because they were requested to do so 
by the Brazilian technocracy.31 In addition, investment incentives and cheap loans 
made investing rather lucrative. Because these firms were not used to chemical 
R&D, since their main activity was not their chemical enterprise, they preferred to 
invest their capital and profits in their primary production activities. Or, like the 
investment director of the construction company Grupo Odebrecht puts it: 
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"You must never forget that we are not a chemical operating company, we are 
an investing company, by accident in the chemical sector because that is a 
lucrative sector, but our main concern will always be the construction sector."" 
The second reason why the national private partner was not very interested in R&D 
investments, is the participation of the state partner in the tripartite firms. Given the 
high level of protection provided by the state technocracy, the national partner does 
not need to worry about technological progress. Moreover, they produce for the 
national market and enjoy guaranteed prices. So why innovate? 
National private firms investing in Camaçari with roots in the chemical sector 
does not act in the same way: Oxiteno, for example, a company with headquarters 
in Sâo Paulo, has its own R&D center and is one of the few national petrochemical 
firms that is more or less independent of foreign technology. 
"Oxiteno is the only national company that executes R&D itself, based on 
technology from Scientific Design, and has its own technological policy."3* 
6.5.3. The role of transnational corporations 
The last factor explaining the limited technological development of the Camaçari-
based firms is the role of the foreign firms. One can argue that the behaviour of 
these foreign firms is one of the main obstacles to further technological development 
by the petrochemical firms of Camaçari. Foreign firms restrict the technological 
development of the Camaçari firms in four ways. 
First, as mentioned by several authors, the restrictive technology contracts are a 
serious constraint to further technological development. As previously stated, the 
Brazilian entrepreneurs were so ignorant of the technology needed for petrochemical 
production that they were unable to negotiate favourable contracts. The restricted 
technology contracts resulting from this largely hampered further R&D. Amilcar, one 
of the Petroquisa directors responsible for the stimulation of R&D in the petrochemi-
cal complexes, consideres the restrictive technology contracts a serious disadvantage 
for future Research and Development: 
"It is evident that when restrictions on constructing a new factory with the 
purchased technology are absolute, it makes no sense to assimilate the technol-
ogy"·37 
Secondly, the size of the transnationals is an obstacle. A large gap exists between 
the technological experience of the multinational enterprises and that of the national 
firms. Multinational petrochemical firms are embedded in a world-wide network of 
R&D activities. They are constantly supplied with technological knowledge from 
their own R&D centers which are in most cases located in their home country or in 
other Western countries. It is difficult for them to see the advantage of carrying out 
R&D in Third World countries and especially in peripheral regions of the Third 
World. The most serious limitation on local R&D mentioned by the foreign mana-
gers of petrochemical firms in Camaçari are the largely insufficient technological 
infrastructure of local firms and a scale of research that is far too small to be 
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effective. That the presence of a foreign participant in a joint venture firm may 
seriously discourage national R&D is illustrated by the fact that 46% of the mana-
gers from Camaçari-based firms said they did not need their own R&D center 
because all research was carried out in the R&D center of the foreign partner. 
Thirdly, the fact that the foreign partner did not always participate with its most 
sophisticated technology, may hamper further technological development in the 
petrochemical joint ventures. A petrochemical consultant mentiones: 
"One can say that only transnationals with second rate technology were inter-
ested in participating in the tripartite model"." 
The superior position of transnational companies is due, not the least, to their 
technological lead. Afraid that loss of control over their technology will diminish 
international competitiveness, foreign firms are hesitant to contribute their most up-
to-date technology to joint venture firms. Consequently, the second rate technology 
becomes obsolete after a few years, which not only hampers the international 
competitiveness of the Brazilian petrochemical industry but which may also limit 
future R&D.3* Besides their fear of declining international competitiveness, foreign 
firms were also afraid that nationally controlled joint ventures would sell the 
technology to other petrochemical companies. Nitrocarbono, for example, sold its 
technology to a Mexican firm which provided one of the reasons for the Dutch 
chemical firm, AKZO, not to accept another national partner in its former joint 
venture firm. Coba fi." 
The phenomenon 'technology contamination' underlies the fourth reason for the 
limited technological development of tripartite joint ventures with foreign participa-
tion.41 The concept 'technology contamination' can be described as "the undesirable 
mixing of two or more technologies from different origins"". Most multinational 
conglomerates possess production processes or products which are developed in 
their own R&D centers. The technologies are registered as their own property, with 
their patent or trademark. When two companies have developed technologies for the 
same production process or the same product and arc carrying out further Research 
and Development on this type of technology, they always hesitate to participate in 
one and the same joint venture, because it is extremely difficult to trace the origin 
of new inventions. The possibility always exists that a new invention will be 
claimed by both companies. 
But why is this necessarily disadvantageous for technological development within 
the tripartite model, which includes only joint ventures with one supplier of 
technology? Apparently the risk of 'technology contamination' is not the issue. 
Indeed, during the implementation of the tripartite model, no problems of this kind 
arose since in most cases only one foreign firm supplied the joint venture with 
technology and in general neither the national nor the state partner possessed any 
technology at all. The problems began after some years, and in part because the 
tripartite model was not implemented in an optimal way. On the one hand, the 
creation of a large number of small scale and mono-producing petrochemical 
projects and, on the other hand, the instability of the tripartite joint ventures, are 
responsible for problems of 'technology contamination'. As analyzed above, if the 
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Camaçari firms want to expand their production capacity or diversify their produc-
tion, most firms need to buy new technology. In the petrochemical production 
process technological changes follow one another in rapid succession and, since the 
Camaçari-based petrochemical firms invested little in R&D, they depend almost 
completely on foreign technology suppliers. Here the concept 'technology contamina-
tion' enters as a reason for the difficult technological development. Participation of 
foreign firms in the tripartite joint venture can restrict the choice of new technology. 
If the parent company of the foreign partner possesses the technology needed for 
expansion or diversification, it will try to convince the petrochemical joint venture to 
buy their technology, even if it is not the most up-to-date or the cheapest technol-
ogy. Larger problems will be encountered if the petrochemical joint venture wants 
to produce a good, but the parent of the foreign partner does not possess the 
technology. In this case, the petrochemical firms are obliged to search for know how 
somewhere else. Here again 'technology contamination' limits the possibilities. It can 
be difficult to find a foreign technology supplier willing to sell its technology to a 
joint venture in which another transnational -which may be their competitor- is 
already participating. 
The same situation exists in petrochemical firms with former foreign participants. 
When a former joint venture is nationalized because the foreign technology supplier 
sold its shares -keeping in mind the instability of tripartite joint ventures, this 
happens rather frequently- the national firm must depend on other technology 
suppliers if it wants to expand production or make innovations in the production 
process.43 In these cases, 'technology contamination' can also be a problem: some-
times foreign firms are not willing to sell their technology to a national firm which 
was constructed on the basis of a technology process acquired from another foreign 
firm. In other cases the foreign firm that withdrew may have objections if the 
former technology contract has not yet been suspended and they are able to hinder 
further technology negotiations. 
The fear for 'technology contamination' can result in stagnation of technological 
development at the Camaçari-based petrochemical firms. When no technology 
supplier can be found who is willing to sell up-to-date technology to the (former) 
joint venture, the company has to continue production with apparently obsolete 
technology or it has to depend on second grade technology obtained via illegal 
means or from obscure origins. 
6.6. Technology transfer compared for Japanese, American and European firms 
From the above it can be concluded that foreign firms restrict the optimal transfer 
of technology in the Camaçari-based petrochemical firms in various ways. Based on 
the idea that these firms cannot be seen as a homogeneous group of enterprises 
with one similar perspective, it is interesting to consider the extent to which 
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differences between the foreign subsidiaries in the Camaçari firms are also important 
for the transfer of technology. In the existing research over the technology transfer 
of the petrochemical firms in Camaçari, hardly any reference has been made to 
differences between foreign firms. Only Teixeira observed a difference in behaviour 
between foreign firms of different nationality. Though he was optimistic about 
technology transfer in the Camaçari-petrochemical firms, Teixeira argued that these 
successful figures were reached: 
"(...) Despite the fact that the presence of foreign firms in the tripartite joint 
ventures was frustrating R&D with their unwillingness to invest in growth of 
production. The individual strategies of the foreign groups, with the apparent 
exception of the Japanese firms, does not contribute to the growth (of the 
petrochemical firms, W.R.)"44. 
6.6.1. The three phases of technology transfer compared 
Although Teixeira identifies a difference between firms of Japanese and of other 
origin, does not did pay further attention to this difference nor does he relate it to 
the technological development of the Camaçari firms. Based on examples taken from 
firms in the Camaçari complex, the three phases of technology transfer will be 
compared in relation to the American, Japanese and European partners in the 
petrochemical joint ventures. The purchase of the initial technology, the adaptation 
of this technology and the origin of the technology needed for the expansion of 
production capacity will be successively examined. 
Analyzing the way in which technology was acquired by firms in the complex, 
differences in the willingness of the foreign company to sell its up-to-date technol-
ogy can be observed, between Japanese firms on the one hand and American and 
European firms on the other. Japanese companies were disposed to sell their 
technology on more favourable conditions at lower prices. An example of this is the 
tripartite joint venture Polialden, for which the Japanese Mitsubishi provided 
technology at a relatively cheap price in comparison to American or European 
companies. 
In other cases, the reluctance of American and European transnational firms to sell 
their up-to-date technology was the decisive factor for buying the technology from a 
Japanese firm. For example, the technology needed by Celbras and Policarbonatos 
was already used on a large scale by some European and American firms, but only 
Mitsubishi and Idemitsu were willing to sell it. The non-Japanese transnationale that 
entered into negotiations -DuPont and Basf in the case of Celbras and Bayer and 
General Electric in the case of Policarbonatos- found the conditions with respect to 
protection of technology unfavourable and refused to participate or sell their 
technology. In summary, the difference between the willingness of Japanese 
transnationale to sell or to participate with their up-to-date technology, on the one 
hand and that of the American and European transnationals on the other, is evident. 
After construction of the petrochemical firm with the acquired technology, the 
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technology needs to be adapted and debottlenecked before production can begin. A 
slightly larger number of managers of joint ventures with European participation 
claimed to encounter problems in this phase of technology transfer than managers of 
firms with Japanese and American participation. However, the following examples 
show that the differences between firms with Japanese, European or American 
participation are not significant. 
CPC, a company with a Japanese partner, is an example of a firm that did not 
encounter any problem with the adaptation of technology. According to the manager 
the participating Mitsubishi stimulated a rather smooth process. The firm manager 
of the tripartite Ciquine Petroquímica also did not complain about the Japanese 
partner, again Mitsubishi. From these examples one cannot, however, conclude that 
dealing with Japanese firms in the area of technology transfer is always easy. In 
Policarbonatos and Polialden the Japanese technology suppliers, Idemitsu and 
Mitsubishi, respectively, were said to provoke more problems. In both cases the 
technology contract was said to be restrictive and the managers complained that it 
was difficult to hold the Japanese firms to their promises to transfer all technologi-
cal innovations for the duration of the contract. 
The picture of American transnationals in petrochemical joint ventures is more or 
less the same. Some managers did not encounter any problem with the adaptation 
of technology, such as Oxiteno which acquired its technology from Scientific Design, 
and Química da Bahia to which Virginia Chemy provided technology (in both cases, 
the American technology suppliers are former participants). In the firm Silinor, 
however, the transfer of technology was said to be very strenuous because the 
American multinational Dow Coming refused to transfer all technology. According 
to the manager of Silinor the absorption of technology into the company was 
seriously retarded. 
With respect to technology transfer in joint ventures with past or present Europe-
an participation, slightly more problems were mentioned by the firm managers. 
Among the eight firms in this category, problems with technology transfer were 
recorded in five. A first example is the former Polipropileno (now Polibrasil) to 
which the British partner ICI supplied technology. Afraid of losing control, ICI did 
not want to transfer all of its up-to-date technology.45 A comparable case is Nitrocar-
bono in which the Dutch DSM contributed its technology. This Dutch state company 
did not want to supply technology for expansions and decided to leave the joint 
venture. Another European joint venture, Cobafi, in which the Dutch fibre chemical 
firm AKZO has a partner, encountered similar problems but came up with a 
different solution. The Dutch AKZO desired another payment for the expired 
technology contract of their Brazilian counterpart. When the national partner decided 
to sell all its shares to another national firm, AKZO did not agree with this choice 
and bought all shares from both the national private and the state participant. 
Another firm in which the European partner, in this case the Italian Liquipar, was 
said to cause problems with technology transfer, is Nitroclor. Liquipar promised to 
provide all technology needed for the creation of this fine chemical firm, either from 
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their own R&D center, or from other technology suppliers. As early as the applica-
tion phase there were problems with this technology. 
The examples above show that the adaptation of technology in the petrochemical 
joint ventures of Camaçari is a rather difficult process for Japanese, American and 
European joint ventures alike. 
A second way to measure the different attitudes of foreign participants regarding 
technology transfer is to look at the acquisition of technology for expansions. As is 
described above, the large number of firms needing to purchase new technology for 
the expansion or diversification of their enterprises is an indication that the third 
phase of technology transfer at Camaçari was not very successful. In the figures 6.6. 
and 6.7., all firms that planned to expand or diversify their production are listed, 
according to the origin of their newly acquired technology.44 Some small differences 
appear if the origin of the new technology and the participating foreign partner in 
the joint venture are related. 
The firms with present Japanese partners received slightly more technological 
acquisitions from other non-participating firms than joint ventures with European 
partners. For example, Policarbonatos, a firm in which the Japanese Idemitsu 
participates, was trying to obtain new technology from an European firm. At the 
time the firm survey was carried out, Policarbonatos was negotiating with the Dutch 
DSM which claimed to possess the most appropriate and up-to-date technology in 
the field. Another example, Ciquine Química, in which Mitsubishi is a partner, is 
diversifying its production in the direction of fine chemicals. This company wanted 
to produce acid acetyl, the raw material for aspirins. In August 1989 negotiations 
with BASF reached a final stage. In Politeno, the third case in which technology was 
purchased from a foreign firm, the initial technology came from Sumitomo but the 
technology for expansion of production capacity was obtained from DuPont. A 
fourth example, Polialden, a joint venture including Mitsubishi, tried to obtain 
approval for their linear polypropylene project. Polialden planned to buy the 
technology from British Petroleum. In only two Japanese joint ventures was the 
technology acquired entirely from the parent company of the partner, which in both 
cases was Mitsubishi. 
A comparison of European joint venture firms is difficult because of the small 
number of expanding firms in this category. In fact only three firms can serve for 
this comparison. Of these three firms, two obtained their technology from their 
parent company: in Acrinor from the participating Rhodia and in Polibrasil from the 
participating Shell. In the third European joint venture -Carbonor- the Belgian 
Solvay could not provide the new technology: instead it was obtained from a 
Mexican firm. In this latter example the firm had to purchase technology from 
Mexico despite the participation of the European Solvay, due to the refusal of the 
large pharmaceutical transnationale, like Rhone Poulenc, to sell their technology to a 
joint venture involving an European participation. Thereupon, Carbonor tried to buy 
Rumanian technology but found it to be too expensive. Finally, an agreement was 
reached with a national chemical firm in Mexico. According to the technology 
contract Brazilian technicians were allowed to look around for six months in three 
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fine chemical enterprises in Mexico, filming the production process and registering 
every detail they considered to be important. There the cooperation with the 
Mexicans ended. When problems in the Brazilian project emerged, nobody was able 
to solve them.47 
Similar quantitative limitations apply to American joint ventures; again only three 
of them can be included in the analysis. The technology needed for expansion was 
provided by the parent company in only one case: Silinor. In this American joint 
venture, the parent company, Dow Coming, provides technology for expansion and 
diversification. Comparison of American with European and Japanese joint ventures 
is further hampered because the other two cases are somewhat a-typical. In the 
present American joint venture, EDN, the participating Dow Chemical does not 
provide the technology to expand production. The most important technology parts 
consist of catalyzing agents, however, components that can be easily purchased on 
the international market.4* The manager could not mention yet from which foreign 
technology supplier EDN planned to buy these components. Celbras, finally, is not a 
joint venture that is comparable to the other joint ventures. The foreign participant 
in this firm is not an industrial company but a banking conglomerate; the City 
Bank. Logically this firm was not able to provide technology of any kind so the 
technology needed for the diversification of the production of Celbras came from 
DuPont. 
In summary, although conclusions based on such small numbers are questionable, 
one can state that European and American firms depend slightly more on their 
parent company for the purchase of technology. Japanese partners in the Camaçari 
joint ventures seem to depend somewhat more on outside technology suppliers. 
With respect to joint ventures with former foreign partners, three firms were able 
to expand production with technology they developed themselves. An equal number 
of firms had to buy technology from outside suppliers. No differences between 
former participating foreign transnationals are evident, however. In the first 
example, Copenor, a former joint venture with the Japanese Mitsubishi, Japanese 
technology was not well adapted to the Brazilian environment. The chemical plant 
that was constructed in Camaçari was an exact copy of a Mitsubishi plant in Japan 
where limited space was available. Expansion of production proved difficult in the 
compactly constructed Camaçari plant. Although it was possible in technical and 
juridical sense to copy the Mitsubishi plant, in economic sense it was not effective. 
The next example is the joint venture with the former participation of American 
Morton Norwich. The technology used to construct this company was obtained from 
the Italian DeNora, and was at the time considered the most appropriate technology. 
Changing standards of environmental protection and labour conditions were the 
reasons for purchasing new technology from outside suppliers, in this case a 
German supplier. The last example is the case of Metanor, a former tripartite joint 
venture with participation of the American Celanese, constructed with technology 
from ICI. 
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Figure 6.6. Origin of newly acquired technology for expansion or diversification of the 
production of the petrochemical firms of Camaçan with present foreign participation in 1989 
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Figure 6.7. Origin of newly acquired technology for expansion or diversification of the 
production of the petrochemical firms of Camaçan with past foreign participation in 1989 
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After the departure of Celanese, technology for expansion will be purchased from 
White Martins/Union Carbide and the technology for diversification from the French 
Rhône Poulenc. In three of the former foreign/local joint ventures the technology 
needed for expansion or diversification was provided by the company itself (see 
figure 6.7.). 
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6.62. Reasons for the more outward orientation of Japanese partners 
in regard to technology acquisition 
With respect to the three phases of technology transfer, differences between 
American and European transnationals, on the one hand and Japanese transnatio-
nals, on the other, can above all be noticed in the first and third phase. Why did 
Japanese companies accept less favourable conditions of technology transfer and 
why did joint ventures with European and American participation rely less on 
external technology than joint ventures with Japanese participation? 
The answer to the first question lies in the position of the Japanese petrochemical 
companies in Brazil. The Japanese transnationals considered the tripartite model an 
excellent opportunity to enter a market which until that time had been dominated 
by European and American transnationals. Consequently, they were more willing to 
participate with their technology. 
The explanation for the second phenomenon is also relatively simple: Japanese 
petrochemical transnationals are less afraid of 'technology contamination' and allow 
their joint venture subsidiaries to buy technology from other foreign firms simply 
because they do not posses the needed technology themselves. In contrast, European 
chemical transnationals have a much longer history in the petrochemical sector and 
are, consequently, much more experienced with different kind of production 
processes and technologies. While European and American petrochemical companies 
began production 60 to 70 years ago, the Japanese petrochemical industry recently 
developed. It was only after World War II that Japanese enterprises started to invest 
in the petrochemical industry and to cany out R&D in petrochemical production 
processes. For example, Mitsui Petrochemical began research on polymerization 
processes in 1953. Because of this time lag, the standards of Japanese petrochemical 
technological expertise lag behind those of European and American companies. 
Haku Izawa remarks in this respect that: 
"(-) Actual research and development efforts by Japanese have not yet reached 
the level ofadvanced Western nations, as evidenced by the 1977 figures of 21.6 
billion yen for technology exports against 26.8 billion yen for technology 
imports. (-) The Japanese petrochemical industry has developed on the basis of 
technological licenses from Europe and the United States."49 
There are consequences of this relative technological backwardness of Japanese 
firms. When a joint venture with a Japanese partner wants to expand its production 
capacity or diversify its production, it is less likely that the Japanese parent 
company will posses the needed technology than a European company in the same 
position. In other words, the Japanese joint venture has no other choice than to rely 
on external technology and cannot afford to be afraid of 'technology contamination'. 
On the contrary, it are the firms providing technology that are afraid of 'techno-
logy contamination'. An example is Politeno. In this tripe the Japanese Sumitomo 
did not possess the up-to-date technology for the expansion of the production of 
linear polyethylene. Evidently it was not a viable option to expand production using 
obsolete technology and thus Sumitomo did not object to the idea of buying 
171 
technology from other foreign firms. However, the technology supplier DuPont 
raised objections and agreed to sell its up-to-date technology only after a secrecy 
clause was signed by the Japanese headquarters. According to the contract the 
Japanese technicians and engineers were not allowed to enter the laboratory where 
the technology is adapted. In another case, Policarbonatos negotiated with both 
DuPont and DSM for the acquisition of new technology. To protect its own 
technology, DuPont demanded a contract period of fifteen years.™ The INPI51 allows 
a technology contract with a maximum period of five years, which was the reason 
that DuPont demanded an extra 'Side Letter'52 in which the special conditions of the 
agreement were registered. For this extra 'Side Letter7 the permission of the head 
quarters of the Japanese partner, the participating Idemitsu, was needed. Because 
Japanese firms are not very enthusiastic about the use of 'Side Letters',53 the 
negotiations were retarded and in 1989 a final choice between DuPont and DSM 
had not yet been made. 
While Japanese transnationals were allowed to obtain technology from suppliers 
other than their parent company because they had no other choice, American firms, 
in most cases, possessed enough technology to compel their joint venture sub-
sidiaries to buy technology from them. The fear of 'technology contamination' on 
the part of American companies has much to do with the rather vague Brazilian 
regulations with respect to technological property rights. Or, as a Dow Chemical 
executive puts it: 
"Our headquarters in the US are frightened to death of selling up-to-date Dow 
Chemical technology to other firms in Brazil or even of participating with 
sophisticated technology in Brazilian joint venture firms. They have the idea that 
we are throwing ourselves in front of the wolves by doing so".54 
An example of the cautious attitude of Dow Chemical is their new petrochemical 
project in the Polosul complex. Although Dow Chemical is negotiating with national 
private petrochemical companies, they are hesitant to enter with their own sophisti-
cated and tested technology. During the initial one or two years, they will wait-and-
see how the joint venture works out and only then decide whether to contribute 
their own technology.55 While joint ventures involving American firms were reluctant 
to buy external technology, they seemed less hesitant to sell technology. In no less 
than three cases the same American transnational -DuPont- had sold or was 
planning to sell its technology to a Camaçari-based petrochemical joint venture. The 
reason is that the company has decided to reduce its activities in the petrochemical 
commodities branch and will concentrate on other activities. Still the company tries 
to avoid creating future competition with its own technology.56 
The chemical conglomerates with the most experience can be found in Europe. 
These companies can also be considered the most restricted and isolated chemical 
producers. They were remarkably absent as technology supplying companies or as 
technology buying companies. Only Ciquine Química, a tripe with Japanese 
participation, purchased technology from an European firm; this was technology for 
the production of the acrylic acid absorbent polymer which was bought from the 
German BASF. The German company is a world leader in this kind of technology 
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and, although the contract contains several restrictions, it will be difficult to avoid 
some technological leakage to the Japanese partner Mitsubishi. The reasons that 
BASF accepted this rather risky deal are complicated and predominantly of a 
commercial nature. The competition on the acrylic acid market in Brazil is very 
harsh; because of the very high annual rate of return various Briizilian firms are 
trying to enter this market. The most important competitor of Basf recently signed 
an agreement with the Brazilian Oxiteno to start production of this fine chemical in 
the petrochemical complex Polosul. If BASF does not quickly establish relations with 
a Brazilian-controlled joint venture, the company will lose its right to import this 
kind of raw materials and, consequently, will lose a considerable share of its 
market.57 For Mitsubishi, on the other hand, this deal offers a rather good oppor-
tunity to acquire more insight into the fine chemical production process.3" Other 
European joint ventures have not been involved in the purchase of technology from 
other foreign firms. In most cases the European parent company possesses the most 
up-to-date technology. Also most European companies can acquire technology from 
their own sources. For this reason, these firms will not allow their joint ventures to 
purchase technology from other foreign firms if there is a risk of 'technology 
contamination'. 
6.7. Summary and conclusions 
In 1989 the petrochemical complex of Camaçari had been operating ten years. This 
anniversary provides not only an occasion for cheerful festivals and solemn 
ceremonies, but also for a critical evaluation of the developmental model which had 
been used in the implementation of the complex, the tripartite model. In this 
chapter such an evaluation is made, focusing on two factors: the stability of the joint 
venture structures and the extent of technology transfer. 
In 1979 tripartite joint ventures were seen as an optimum solution for the 
petrochemical industry. Although not every possible partner showed the same 
enthusiasm -the American firms in particular preferred 100% enterprises- ten 
tripartite and seven bipartite joint ventures were created in Camaçari. Ten years 
later, the figures demonstrate that the popularity of tripartite joint ventures had 
declined sharply. Despite the fact that several new chemical plants had been 
constructed at Camaçari, thereby increasing the number of plants from 27 to 50, 
almost no new tripartite joint ventures had been created. On the contrary, several 
joint ventures changed their ownership structure from a tripartite into a bipartite 
joint venture or to 100% ownership. Although not all tripes directly changed their 
ownership structure, most of them did change their shareholder composition. The 
large difference in the degree of stability provided by different foreign partners, is 
noteworthy. Japanese participants proved to be far more stable partners in tripartite 
joint ventures than American or European transnationals. 
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To discover the reasons why tripartite joint ventures are showing such a large 
degree of instability, the responsibility for the change in shareholder composition of 
all three partners was analyzed. The number of managers who blamed the foreign 
enterprise for the difficulties or failure of the joint venture was equal to the number 
of managers that blamed the national or state partner. With respect to the foreign 
company, disappointment with firm results was said to be the most important 
reason for leaving the joint venture. National firms most often mentioned insuffi-
cient financial reserves. Especially the American companies left Camaçari out of 
disappointment with firm results. 
Although the preconditions of the tripartite model were seemingly positive for the 
transfer of technology, and previous research pointed in the direction of a satisfac-
tory transfer, this present research reached other conclusions. When the three phases 
of technology transfer are analyzed separately, the Camaçari firms did not demon-
strate the expected technological development. Although up-to-date technology was 
acquired in the implementation phase, little innovative R&D was carried out at the 
petrochemical firms of Camaçari. Trouble shooting and debottlenecking activities did 
take place in the laboratories of the complex, however. Most firms transferred their 
research to other R&D centers, in general those attached to their participating 
foreign partner. The best indication that not all phases of technology transfer were 
passed through is the origin of the technology for expansion or diversification of 
production. Only a few Camaçari companies were able to expand production on the 
basis of technology they had developed themselves. Most of the companies depen-
ded on external technology, either purchased from the participating foreign transna-
tional, or acquired from external suppliers. 
With respect to the first phase of technology transfer, the purchase of the initial 
technology, the Japanese partners were in general more willing to contribute their 
technology on for them less favourable conditions. American and European com-
panies sometimes refused to participate in a minority joint venture with their up-to-
date technology. There is no noticeable difference between foreign participants in the 
area of R&D and problems during the second phase of technology transfer. If the 
origin of technology needed for the expansion of production is examined, it appjears 
that Japanese companies depended somewhat more often on external technology 
while European and American partners were more likely to purchase technology 
from their parent firms. The relatively weak pjosition of Japanese transnationals in 
the Brazilian petrochemical industry in comparison to their American and European 
competitors, provides an explanation for the first phenomenon. Japanese transnatio-
nals saw the tripartite model as one of the few ways to enter in the Western-
dominated petrochemical market. Japanese companies rely more on external 
technology because they have only recently became involved in petrochemical 
production; as a result their technological know how in the area of petrochemical 
production is less developed than that of American and European petrochemical 
producers which have invested for several decade in this industrial branch. 
It is obvious that the tripartite model did not only exert a pxjsitive influence on 
the development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry. Several limitations such as 
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the instability of joint venture structures and insufficient technology transfer can be 
identified. Differences between Japanese transnationals, on one hand, and American 
and European transnationals on the other, will be further analyzed in the following 
chapter. 
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Notes chapter six 
1. Because the sectoral dynamism is thought to be of importance as well, all Hums 
located on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari were included in the analyses. 
2. The ñgures mentioned for the successive years do not guarantee a complete view of 
the change in ownership structure. For instance it is possible that between 1980 and 
1985 changes occurred that were not registered by Copec. 
3. In Unirhodia the national firm Unipar decided to leave the joint venture even before 
production actually started. The national partner of the synthetic fibre producer 
Cobafi was a former family company that was falling apart. The sons of the founder 
Roche Miranda did not succeed in continuing the successful Arm strategy and they 
decided to sell all their assets in petrochemical firms. The foreign partner Akzo did 
not want another national private firm to participate and in 1989 Cobafi ended up as 
a 100% subsidiary. 
4. In this table only the number of firms that are projected or cancelled is included and 
not the number of firms which changed its ownersnip structure. 
5. Of all firms included in the firm survey, 42 managers responded to the question 
concerning changes in ownership structure. 
6. Firm survey managing director Pronor, July 1989, Camaçari. 
7. Firm survey, managing director Polibrasil, August 1989, Camaçari. 
8. One firm did not know the answer and is registered as a missing case. 
9. The mutual dependency of the two firms is large: Sansuy could be considered one of 
the main clients of С PC; on the other hand CPC was the main supplier of raw 
materials for Sansuy. 
10. Celanese did not stay very much longer in the Mctanor joint venture but also 
decided to leave. 
11. Another remarkable aspect in this case is that Celanese did not participate in 
Mctanor for a long period either. When the firm survey was carried out, no foreign 
firm was participating in either Pronor or Mctanor. 
12. Suarez, M.A., 1986, ρ 136. 
13. Evans, P., 1979, ρ 239. 
14. Gastäo Vítor Casper, Contraçao de tecnologia para a industria petroquímica; first 
Brazilian petrochemical Congress; 8-12 november 1976; organized by the IBP 
(Instituto Brasileíro de Petróleo) in Rio de Janeiro. 
15. Ibid, ρ 5. 
16. Coelho, R.R., Quimica-sciencia tecnologia e politica industrial. Revisto de químico 
industrial, Jan 1986, 8-15, ρ 9. 
17. In 1985 Francisco Tcixeira completed his PhD research for the University of Sussex 
on technology contracts in the Brazilian petrochemical industry. Besides a PhD thesis, 
which is titled 'The political economy of technological learning in the Brazilian 
petrochemical industry', his research resulted in a number of articles including: 
'Incorporaci de tecnologia na industria petroquímica' in Revista Brasileira Tec-
nologica, ν 14 (4), July/August 1983, which is one of the most important. 
18. Teixeira based his conclusions on an analysis of the technology contracts of 21 firms 
on the petrochemical complex of Camaçari. 1985, ρ 284. 
19. Francisco Teixeira, Dinamica empresarial e tecnologia das empresas do complexo 
petroquímico de Camaçari; XV encontró nacional de Economía, Dec 1987, ANPEC 
anais vol II, pp 580-582, Salvador. 
20. Interview Amilcar de Silva Filho, May 1988, Rio de Janeiro. 
21. Amilcar de Silva Filho, Petroquímica se esforca para desenvolver urna tecnología 
brasileira; in: Petro & química Nov 1985, (35-40) ρ 35. 
22. Franscisco Neves da Rocha, a case study on learning of petrochemical technology, 
the polypropylene diluent phase process, PhD thesis. Imperial college, UK, 1984. 
23. Francisco Neves da Rocha, 1984, ρ 158. 
24. Ibid, ρ 162. 
25. Valeria Delgado Bastos, A questäo tecnologica nas joint-ventures petroquímicas 
brasilciras, Rio de Janeiro, 1989. 
26. Valeria Delgado Bastos, 1989, ρ 275. 
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27. Because especially the role of foreign firms in providing the initial technology is 
investigated, in the following analyses only firms with actual or former foreign 
participation are included. 
28. Expansion of production means a mere increase in the production capacity, but when 
diversification of production is at stake, another kind of product will be produced, 
sometimes related to the initial product, sometimes a completely different kind of 
firoduct, like, for example, a fine chemical product. f the total number of firms that designed plans for the future production of new 
chemical goods is examined, it is obvious that the entrepreneurs want to end mono-
production in their firms: fifteen firms planned to start the production of a product 
other than their original. 
30. Pronor is a joint venture that is the compilation of two former companies: Pronor, 
with the participation of Dynamit Nobel and Isiocianaticos, with the participation of 
DuPont. 
31. Given the limited experience of the national bourgeoisie with petrochemical produc­
tion, the national entrepreneurs gave preference to small mono-producing projects. 
32. The question in the firm survey: "why are no R&D activities executed in your firm?" 
was only asked to the 30 managers from firms which had no R&D center or 
laboratory. 
33. Amilcar de Silvo Filho, 1985 ρ 40. 
34. These companies said that they so disliked participating in the, for them unknown, 
petrochemical sector that: "Nem a vontade tinham', which means as much as "they 
did not even want it". 
35. Interview director Odebrecht, August 1989, Salvador. 
36. Interview executive manager Dow Chemical, Aratu, September 1989. 
37. Amilcar de Silva Filho, 1985, ρ 38. 
38. Interview Petrochemical consultant, September 1989, Säo Paulo. 
39. Interview Paulo Somers, July 1989, Säo Paulo. 
40. Interview director AKZO, June 1989, Säo Paulo. 
41. This reason for stagnated technological development will be more acute in future 
expansions of the petrochemical firms. 
42. Interview director Shell do Brazil, June 1989, Sao Paulo. 
43. The firms in Camaçari prove that the needed technology for these expansions or 
innovations in general can not be implemented without foreign assistance. 
44. Tcixeira, 1987, ρ 581. 
45. In the Polipropileno case the manager and interviewed directors emphasized a 
problem with technology transfer that Francisco Neves da Rocha (1984) only briefly 
mentioned in his case study research concerning the technological learning in the 
same firm. 
46. Because it is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the extent to which joint 
venture firms in Camaçari buy their new technology from other foreign enterprises 
or obtain this technology from their mother company, and for the sake of clarity, 
one technology acquisition for every firm is included. Some firms acquired their 
technology from different sources. 
47. Firm survey managing director Carbonor, August 1989, Camaçari. 
48. It is necessary to make some complementary remarks concerning the question of 
technology acquisition. The petrochemical industry is a rather complicated industrial 
branch in this respect. The technological requirements are differentiated to a large 
extent according to product and production process. Some of these technologies can 
be obtained freely on the international market and do not have much intrinsic 
competing value. Other technologies, however, are very scarce and directly possessed 
by one or two multinational firms. This hampers fair comparison between the 
different firms involved in regards to the purchase of technological innovations. One 
must further bear in mind that in this chapter these technological questions are 
simplified somewhat for the sake of clarity. 
49. Haku Izawa, Trend of Japanese petrochemical industry. Chemical Economy & 
Engineering Review, March 1980, vol 12, no 3 (no 136) ρ 21. 
50. In general, the foreign firm is obliged during the contractual period, to guarantee the 
complete transfer of technology. After the expiration of the contract the joint venture 
cannot be restricted anymore to sell this technology to third partners. 
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51. The INPI, 'Instituto Nacional de Programma Industrial', is the government organiza-
tion that, among other functions, has to approve all technology contracts that are 
signed between foreign and national partners. 
52. A 'Side Letter' is an additional part of the contract agreed upon by the various 
partners in the negotiations, which is not officially included in the contract. This 
implies the INPI does not have any Insight into these 'Side Letters' and can not 
express its objections against it. This kind of agreement, which is not allowed by the 
Brazilian government, is registered primarily in 'Side Letters'. 
53. Interview Petrochemical consultant, September 1989, Säo Paulo. 
54. Interview Dow Chemical executives, September 1989, Aratu. 
55. Interview Dow Chemical executives, September 1989, Aratu. 
56. Despite the fact that there are no competitive reasons to object to the selling of 
technology, DuPont is still afraid of 'technology contamination'. Other petrochemical 
foreign firms are much less willing to sell their newly developed technology. Dow 
Chemical, for example, invests largely in petrochemical industries and in petrochemi-
cal R&D. It does not want to give away Its competitive position based on technologi-
cal dominance. Interview petrochemical consultant, September 1989, Säo Paulo. 
57. The same attitude can be found among other foreign firms, in particularly in the fine 
chemical branch. This type of 'backward integration' can be considered an (for the 
Brazilian government) undesirable effect of a policy that is directed to an increase in 
national production of fine chemical commodities. Several foreign chemical transna-
tional import their raw materials from their parent companies or subsidiaries 
located elsewhere. These firms eagerly seek Brazilian joint venture partners in order 
to avoid a situation in which they would have to buy their input from Brazilian 
companies which are inexperienced with the fine chemical production process and 
cannot cope with the quality standards of foreign companies. Examples of these 
backward integrating companies are, besides BASF, the fine chemical firm, Norcom 
DuPont, and the former joint venture, UniRhodia. It is evident that these joint 
ventures can be considered extremely instable: if the foreign company can afford (in 
a political sense) to buy out its national partner, it will not hesitate to do so. 
58. Interview petrochemical consultant, September 1989, Sao Paulo. 
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7 
THE DIFFERENT ORIGIN OF FOREIGN FIRMS 
AS AN EXPLANATORY FACTOR 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the limitations of the tripartite model for the development 
of the petrochemical sector in Brazil were described. It was argued that these 
limitations can in part be attributed to the role of foreign firms in this tripartite 
model, which tend to be large experienced multinational companies in comparison 
the relatively small inexperienced Brazilian firms. An important finding in the 
previous chapter was, however, that not all patterns at the complex of Camaçari are 
applicable to all foreign firms. For instance, Japanese firms proved to be much more 
stable joint venture partners than American and European firms and joint ventures 
with Japanese partners more often rely on new technology from other foreign firms 
for expansion. What are the causes of the differences between foreign participants in 
Camaçari? What role does the origin of a firm play explaining these differences? In 
order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine macro-economic aspects 
as well as aspects at the firm level. 
The extent to which the country of origin influenced the investment pattern of the 
various foreign firms in Brazil is a macro-economic aspect. In chapter 7.2. and 7.3. 
foreign investment processes of Japanese, American and European companies in 
Brazil will be described. Attention will be paid to the period of foreign investment, 
as well as the sectoral preference of the foreign firms. 
The next three aspects that will be dealt with are firm oriented. Firstly, the 
attitude of firms from different countries towards participation in joint venture 
structures will be described in section 7.4. The different motives American, European 
and Japanese transnationals had for entering a joint venture will be compared. In 
the next section, 75., the firm organization of the various companies involved at 
Camaçari will be dealt with. With respect to internal firm organization, the function-
ing of the board of directors and the executive management are important. In 
addition, the external relationship of the companies with, for example, government 
institutions, industrial associations and trade unions is a decisive factor in the 
functioning of the firm organization. Again, a comparison of the various companies 
involved will be made. The corporate culture of the American, Japanese and 
European companies, finally, is the central subject of section 7.6. The influence of 
country of origin on foreign firms' negotiation processes, management practices and 
adaptation to the Brazilian environment will be analyzed respectively. The final 
section of this chapter will focus on the influence of foreign firms on the function-
ing of the tripartite model. The extent to which a correlation between joint venture 
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instability and the origin of the foreign firm can be explained and the degree to 
which origin effects technological development are the subjects of section 7.6. 
7.2. Foreign investments in Brazil 
Before investigating whether the origin of a foreign firms plays a role in the 
instability of a joint venture, it is necessary to describe briefly the development of 
foreign investment in Brazil. Not only the quantitative aspects of foreign investments 
will be considered; the sectoral preferences of various foreign firms, in comparison 
to national and state firms, will also be described. 
7.2.1. Development of foreign investments in Brazil 
The first foreign direct investments (FDD in Brazil were in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. One of the first firms that invested in the country was the 
British/Dutch Shell, arriving in Brazil in 1914. The volume of foreign direct 
investments only began to increase in the mid 50s, during the administrations of 
Presidents Café Filho (1954-1956) and Kubitschek (1956-1961) (see figure 7.1.). In 
these periods foreign investments flourished in part because of government policy: 
both presidents implemented several incentives to attract foreign firms.' In addition 
to a 'developmental' policy, the more specific policy of import substitution con-
tributed to the increase.2 Due to the relative political and social instability during the 
administration of President Goulart (1960-1964), the amount of direct foreign 
investments decreased.3 The military coup in 1964 drastically changed the political-
economic situation in Brazil. After a period of economic stagnation that lasted from 
1964 to 1967, the total net flow of direct foreign investments once again increased 
rapidly. Figure 7.1. shows that during the so-called Brazilian Miracle, the period 
between 1967 and 1979, and the several years thereafter foreign direct investments 
were booming. 
Several factors explain the attractiveness of Brazil during this period, such as the 
impressive growth in GNP. In addition the growth of key industrial sectors, which 
reached over 10%, guaranteed foreign investors satisfactory rates of return. Evans 
remarks: 
"Brazil during this period grew more rapidly than any other major Latin 
American market. Even the European markets which generally grew faster than 
their Latin American counterparts, did not match the growth in Brazilian 
consumption".4 
Secondly government policy during this period was based on a rather open strategy 
in relation to foreign investments. This can be seen in the pliant attitude of the SDI 
toward approval of industrial projects from foreign enterprises. In 1971, the SDI 
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rejected 18 projects out of a total of 773 projects for which foreign enterprises had 
applied. In 1973 this figure was even more positive: only 35 projects out of a total 
of 2.888 applied projects were rejected.5 
The Brazilian Miracle came to an abrupt end after two oil shocks which disturbed 
the promising economic outlook of the country. Indirectly these oil-shocks influenced 
the amount of foreign direct investments. Some years after the first oil shock in 
1973/1974, the increase in the net flow of FDI stopped. The second oil shock of 1979 
had more severe implications and after the economic recession of 1982 a large 
decrease in foreign investments became apparent.' 
Figure 7.1. Yearly foreign investments in Brazil between 1950 and 1985 in US$ millions 
2000 
1000 
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Year 
source: R. Appy, Capital estranjeiro & Brasil, 1987 
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7.2.2. The various industrial sectors attracting foreign Investmente 
Most direct foreign investments in Brazil focused on the manufacturing sector. In 
1971 this figure was 81.8%, only 95% of all investments were in the service sector 
and 5.4% in the public utilities sector. Although these figures changed to some 
extent, in 1979 the manufacturing sector maintained an absolute dominance: total 
foreign investments in this sector decreased to 77% and investments in the services 
sector increased to 17%. (see also table 7.1.). Because this book deals with the 
petrochemical sector, the analysis will concentrate on the manufacturing sector; the 
agricultural or service sector will not be included. In chapter 2.3. the remarks of 
Evans concerning the process of differentiation in which foreign companies invest in 
some industrial sectors and national companies in others were quoted. Worldwide 
transnational companies predominate in three categories of the industrial sector: 
1. technologically more advanced sectors 
2. large volume, medium technology consumer goods industries 
3. mass production, consumer-goods industries supplying branded products7 
These three catagories together form the more dynamic industrial sectors, which 
have large growth potential and relatively high profit rates. National firms are more 
often found in the more traditional industrial sectors in which the potential for 
growth in general is smaller and the profit rates are somewhat lower. These sectors 
comprise a fourth category. 
This general pattern is also clearly visible in Brazil. When sectoral investments of 
national and foreign firms are compared, it appears that in some industrial sectors 
foreign dominance comes close to 100%. As can be seen in figure 7.2., investments 
in the first category, the 'technologically advanced industrial sectors', were largely 
dominated by foreign capital. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, 86% of 
total production in 1987 was dominated by foreign companies. In the electronic and 
engineering plastic sector, foreign representation was 38% and 63% respectively. The 
same is true for the second category, the 'large volume, medium-technology, 
consumer goods industry'. The automobile industry in Brazil, in which foreign 
domination was close to 100%, is representative of this group.' The overwhelming 
presence of foreign companies in the industries belonging to the third category, 'the 
mass production consumer goods', is evident during a superficial walk through a 
super market or shopping center. The well-known international brand names of 
various mass consumer goods do not leave much space for unknown national 
products. Foreign enterprises were responsible for 45% of the production of electrical 
equipment, such as electric shavers. The detergent market was dominated by only a 
few multinational enterprises and some products in the food and beverages sector, 
such as chocolate and tobacco, were produced primarily by foreign firms. 
From the above-mentioned figures it becomes clear that especially the more 
dynamic industrial sectors are dominated by foreign enterprises, leaving the more 
traditional sectors, such as paper and cellulose, plastics, wood products and the shoe 
industry, to nationally owned firms, which suggests that further industrial develop-
ment is to a large extent determined by foreign companies.' 
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Figure 7.2. Direct foreign investment in the manufacturing industry according to industrial 
sector in Brazil in 1987 in percentages 
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source: Exame, ediçâo especial, 1989 
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7.3. Investment patterns of firms of various origin 
In the sixties and seventies Brazil was one of the most attractive Third World 
countries for foreign investors. As a result transnational firms from all over the 
world, including American, European and Japanese, opened subsidiaries in Brazil. 
table 7.1. clearly shows the difference in magnitude of foreign investments originat-
ing from Europe, the United States and Japan, over the last 30 years. 
European firms were among the first investors to arrive in Brazil at the beginning 
of the 20th century. Shell, for instance, came to Brazil in 1914 and Unilever in 1929. 
Nevertheless, the total share of European firms in Brazil's manufacturing firms never 
reached the magnitude of investments by American firms. As can be seen in figure 
7.3. US investments comprised 38% of total foreign investments in 1971, which in 
absolute figures is 544.0 million US$. Although the economic crisis in the early 
eighties severely effected American foreign investments, resulting in a diminution of 
their share from 44% in 1950 to 29% in 1987, they were still the largest foreign 
investing country in Brazil in 1989. It was not until the sixties that Japanese 
investors began to arrive and not until the early seventies that their expansion 
power increased considerably. In 1950 no Japanese company appeared on the list of 
foreign investors but by 1982 they occupied the third position after the United States 
and Germany. It is interesting to look in more detail at the uneven pattern of 
foreign investments by European, American and Japanese investors, paying special 
attention to their quantity and sectoral preference. 
Table 7.3. Foreign investments in Brazil according to country of origin between 1950 and 1987 
(in percentages) 
United States 
Germany 
Japan 
Switzerland 
Canada 
United Kingdom 
France 
The Netherlands 
Italy 
others 
total 
1950 
44 
-
-
-
30 
12 
3 
? 
7 
11 
100 
1971 
38 
11 
4 
7 
10 
9 
4 
3 
1 
13 
100 
1980 
27 
15 
13 
9 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
18 
100 
1982 
31 
15 
13 
9 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
11 
100 
1987 
29 
14 
12 
7 
5 
4 
3 
3 
5 
18 
100 
source: IBASE", Banco Central do Brasil 1973, 1981, 1983 
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7.3.1. Pioneering investments: European countries 
European companies entering Brazil focused largely on the primary sector. Agro-
business and oil exploration were among the most important activities. The invest-
ment pattern of European firms varied according to country of origin. British 
companies were heavily represented among the early investors in Brazil and 
concentrated on a few industrial sectors, namely the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector, the petroleum and tobacco sector. The largest British representatives in these 
sectors were ICI, Souza Cruz, Castrol and Atlantis. Although in 1950 the British 
ranked as the third foreign investor in Brazil, their share declined drastically in the 
following twenty years. This decline was due to a one-sided interest in investing in 
Commonwealth countries.10 By 1976 British investments were ranked six. 
While British companies lost the third place they occupied in 1950, German 
companies succeeded in maintaining the second place. German enterprises arrived 
relatively late in Brazil: before 1950 their share in total FDI was insignificant. From 
1955 onwards investments from Germany increased steadily peaking between 1970 
and 1977. Like others, German investments were not left untouched by the economic 
recessions of 1979 and 1983 after which there is a sharp decline in investments. 
Further German interests were attracted only after 1984 with the recuperation of the 
Brazilian economy." With respect to industrial sectors, German firms concentrated 
above all in the automobile and the chemical/pharmaceutical sector. The two largest 
companies in the Brazilian automobile branch are the German-controlled Volkswagen 
and Mercedez-Benz. According to IBASE figures, in 1983 more than 35% of all 
investments in this industry in Brazil were carried out by German firms. For the 
transport equipment sector, this figure was 50.1%." Another industrial branch that is 
favourite among German investors was the chemical/pharmaceutical one. In 1983 
the German share in total investments was 12.8% for pharmaceuticals and 8.9% for 
basic chemicals." The most important German representatives in this sector arc 
BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and Merck. Besides these two important sectors, German 
investments can also be found in the metallurgical sector -Mannesmann, Krupp- and 
the textile sector -Adidas, Triumph. 
Switzerland, France, the Netherlands and more recently, Italy are other European 
countries with substantial investments in Brazil. In 1977 the investments of Swiss 
companies were the third largest after the US and Germany. Although they were 
surpassed by the Japanese enterprises in 1980, Swiss investments were still the 
fourth largest in 1987. Swiss firms in Brazil are largely concentrated in the chemical 
and food sector. Examples include Ciba Geigy which can be found among the 
largest foreign owners in the pharmaceutical industry, and Nestlé, which is a major 
representative in the food sector." Dutch enterprises have a long history in Brazil. 
Entrepreneurs from the Netherlands began to invest in this country at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In 1987 nine Dutch companies could be found among the 
500 largest enterprises in Brazil. The British/Dutch Shell was the largest company15 
and Gessy Lever, the Brazilian subsidiary of Unilever, was 22nd among the 500 
largest Brazilian companies. Of the foreign companies, Dutch firms in Brazil had the 
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highest expansion figures in 1989." With respect to industrial sectors, most Dutch 
investments can be found in the chemical, electronic and the alimentation sector. 
Representatives are, amongst others, AKZO, Shell, Philips and Unilever. Of French 
investments, those in the chemical sector are most worthy to mention. In 1987 
Rhodia, a subsidiary of Rhone Poulenc, was the most important foreign firm in the 
chemical sector.17 
Table 7.2. Foreign Direct investments for some sectors and countries in 1979 in percentages 
sectors 
services 
agricultural 
Chemicals and 
pharmaceutical 
Vehicles and parts 
Metallurgy 
Mechanics 
Electrical and 
communication 
other industries 
total 
total 
17 
6 
17 
13 
9 
9 
8 
21 
100 
West 
Germany 
7 
3 
10 
35 
15 
14 
8 
8 
100 
United 
Kingdom 
41 
3 
24 
1 
4 
4 
2 
21 
100 
United 
States 
12 
6 
23 
12 
4 
11 
10 
22 
100 
Jar 
20 
6 
3 
4 
16 
10 
11 
30 
100 
source: Schliemann, The strategy of British and German investors in Brazil, 1981, Cower 
7.3.2. Brazil: backgarden for the United States? 
At the end of the eighties, the United States was still the most important foreign 
investor in Brazil. Although their relative position is about to change. The American 
investments, which boomed during the Brazilian Miracle, suffered from the two oil-
shocks in particular. In that period investments were concentrated in Western 
countries and not the least in the United States itself. Not only the unstable political 
and economic situation in Brazil, but also the favourable investment incentives 
provided in the United States itself, are responsible for this change. The sectoral 
preferences of American companies are largely comparable to those of German 
companies. In the first place large American investments can be found in the 
automobile sector. The largest representative of this sector is Ford. The second 
important manufacturing sector is the transport equipment sector. The tire industry 
in Brazil is almost completely dominated by Firestone and Goodyear. IBM and 
XEROX are examples of American representation in the electronic sector. American 
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multinationals can also be found in the chemical sector; Dow Chemical is the most 
important, but DuPont, Johnson & Johnson, White Martins and Liquid Carbonice are 
also worth to mention. 
7.33. The Japanese: fast rising newcomers 
During successive decades at the beginning of the twentieth century, Japanese 
relations with Brazil were limited to trade relations only. The so-called Japanese 
'sogo shosha' (sec chapter 2) imported various products that Japan lacked itself, 
such as iron ore, bauxite, paper and pulp, cotton and food. During that period 
Brazil was Japan's third trading partner." Direct investments from Japan began to 
enter Brazil in the 1950s but were of limited magnitude." In the seventies the 
political as well as economic relationship between Brazil and Japan intensified which 
can be illustrated by the official visit of the Japanese royal heirs to the seventieth 
anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil in 1978. Due to the changing internal 
situation in Japan -rising labour costs, shortages of raw materials- production costs 
increased after the Second World War and Japan started to look for investment 
opportunities overseas. Brazil, in need of investments in order to maintain its high 
growth rates, warmly welcomed the new investors. Moreover, according to Ibase, 
Brazil wanted to diversify its one-sided dependence on American and European 
investments: 
"These considerations in Brazil and the realities of the global economy en-
couraged Brazil to adopt a diversification strategy. They adopted this strategy to 
reduce dependence on any single country. (-) Amicable relations with Japan were 
regarded by Latin governments as a desirable counter to American influence."20 
Bruce points to another reason why Brazil looked to Japan in particular to attract 
more diversified investments: 
"The factor of ethnic ties between (Japan and Brazil) adds an additional element 
that is unique among pairs of LDCs and industrial states. Japanese Brazilians 
number nearly one million and thus can potentially provide a special link to 
Japan."21 
As a result, during the Brazilian Miracle Japanese investments in Brazil sharply 
increased. Despite the fact that Japanese companies arrived relatively late in Brazil, 
within a few years time they occupied the third position on the list of foreign 
investors, behind the United States and Germany. In general Japanese entrepreneurs 
used the so-called 'sogo shosha' as an intermediary for their investments in Brazil. 
Since Japanese companies were unacquainted with the local situation in Brazil, 
trading companies played a decisive role in their Brazilian foreign investments. The 
most important 'sogo shosha' operating in Brazil are C. Itoh, Nissho Iwai and the 
Mitsubishi Trading company. The position of Japanese investing companies in Brazil 
remained stable during the eighties, during which about 13% of all foreign invest-
ments were of Japanese origin. 
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Japanese investors tend to concentrate on different industrial sectors than American 
and European investors. Since the Brazilian automobile industry is largely domina-
ted by a few American and German transnationals this sector is inaccessible to other 
foreign companies limiting the Japanese share of investments in this sector to only 
4%. (see table 7.2.). The industrial sectors in which most Japanese companies can be 
found are the machinery sector, the transport equipment sector, the petrochemical 
sector, the textile sector and the electronic sector. One of the first companies that 
came to Brazil in 1963 was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which established a joint 
venture with the Brazilian 'Companhia Brasileira de Caldeiras e Equipamentas 
Pesadas'.22 One form of Japanese involvement in the textile sector is represented by 
Howe Machinery Ltd., a Japanese company created for the production of machinery 
for the textile industry. The firms Seki and Toboyo invest more directly in textiles. 
A Japanese company in the transportation sector is Yamaha Motor, a company that 
entered Brazil in 1970 and started production of motor bikes.23 Some of the largest 
Japanese companies can be found in the electronic sector such as Asahi Optical, 
Canon, Yashica, Brother, Sharp, Sony and Toshiba.2' Mitsubishi is the most impor-
tant Japanese representative in the petrochemical industry, followed by Sumitomo 
and Idemitsu. Although small in comparison to their European and American 
competitors, Japanese firms can a also be found in the pharmaceutical sector. 
7.4. Attitude of foreign firms towards joint ventures 
So far, attention has been paid to the macro-economic differences in investment 
patterns between foreign firms. However, the extent to which the origin of a foreign 
enterprise influences its behaviour at the micro-level, that is, the level of the firm, is 
not yet clear. Because the tripartite model consists of joint venture structures, the 
first aspect of importance in this regard is the attitude of foreign firms towards joint 
ventures. What, according to the managers, are the advantages of participating in 
joint ventures and what is the influence of national origin on these attitudes. 
7.4.1. Motives of American and European firms for entering into a joint venture 
As described in chapter 2.7.2., (motivations to start joint ventures), the relative 
success of a joint venture depends largely on the rationale for entering a joint 
venture structure and the advantages firms obtain from participation. An examina-
tion of the motives of companies participating in the Camaçari joint ventures will 
provide insight into the observation that Japanese companies in petrochemical joint 
ventures tend to be more stable partners than American and European companies. 
From the point of view of the national private partner, the motivation for par-
ticipating in a joint venture is clear. They possessed neither the technology nor the 
188 
financial capital to start petrochemical enterprises on their own. The managers of 
foreign companies, however, were more ambiguous about participating in a joint 
venture. Especially American and European companies, and to a lesser extent 
Japanese companies, complained that the joint venture structures were more or less 
imposed. The majority of the European and American directors could not think of 
any advantage to participation in petrochemical joint ventures. Firms that agreed 
with participation did not see other possibilities for entering the petrochemical 
sector. Generally, government pressure was the main motive for joining national and 
even state firms in bipartite or tripartite joint ventures. 
According to the American and European managers, the disadvantages of par-
ticipating in a petrochemical joint venture are numerous. The different backgrounds 
of the national private partner, on the one hand, and the American or European 
partners, on the other, was one of the main disadvantages. All participating 
multinationals are subsidiaries of large transnational companies which possess 
extensive management networks and intensive R&D activities, whereas the local 
firms arc very small, often family owned, with little experience in the chemical 
branch. The following example from Shell do Brasil gives an illustration of the 
opinion of transnational managers: 
"Some of the national firms that participate in the petrochemical industry are 
very inexperienced with the branch. They are from other industrial or financial 
sectors and they have to start from zero. But these firms are so small that the 
potential for learning a difficult technological process, like the petrochemical 
production process, is very limited. We once established a joint venture with a 
small Brazilian firm from the agro-sector. This firm's beginning was very curious: 
the Brazilian firm encountered problems with the storage of its agricultural 
products because no company in Brazil could produce plastic bags of the size 
they needed. Because of the reserved market the import of plastic bags was also 
prohibited and thus the firm decided to start its own plastic bag company. To 
obtain the necessary technological expertise, a joint venture with Shell was 
created. Recently our company bought out the Brazilian firm, which could not 
cope with the planned expansions and preferred to focus on agribusiness. When 
I asked the Brazilian entrepreneur what he learned from the previous years in 
the joint venture he answered: petrochemicals are good business!"25 
Another disadvantage mainly mentioned by American directors in tripartite joint 
ventures was the participation of state companies. The American-based foreign firms 
preferred to establish 100% subsidiaries or firms without state participation. Despite 
all the disadvantages mentioned by managers, executives of American and European 
companies incidently pointed to the possibility of obtaining subsidies and incentives, 
which they considered to be the only advantage of participating in a joint venture. 
In Brazil a foreign firm can only obtain subsidies if it agrees to participate in a joint 
venture with a national firm. Nevertheless, the foreign managers viewed the impact 
of these subsidies as minimal: 
"The amount of subsidies and cheap loans is so small if you compare it with the 
amount of total investments it is almost nothing."1* 
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However, a financial incentive, which proved to have large impact, is the provision 
of relative cheap naphtha: 
"When you need a lot of naphtha in your production process, you can diminish 
the production cost substantially compared with the production costs in other 
countries. For Shell the subsidized naphtha means a considerable extra revenue."27 
7.4.2. Motives of Japanese firms for entering into a joint venture 
In contrast to the American and European companies, the Japanese companies 
possessed a totally different attitude: most of the Japanese managers were rather 
positive about their participation in a joint venture structure. Above all, almost all 
Japanese executives interviewed appreciated state participation in the tripartite joint 
ventures. The Japanese executives even considered a joint venture with a state 
partner a more attractive option than a joint venture with a national private partner. 
One of the Japanese directors of Politeno, in which the 'sogo shosha' С Itoh 
participates, remarked: 
"C. Itoh has a lot of experience with foreign investments, but many of our 
foreign ventures ended in failure because of the absence of state participation."28 
The president director of Mitsubishi saw the state partner as a necessary inter­
mediary between the other two partners in a tripartite joint venture: 
"The large differences that exist between large multinational companies and small 
national firms can be overcome in a tripartite joint venture. The state can act as 
an intermediary between the two private investors. And Petroquisa is a very 
well-equipped state company with relatively good managerial experience. When 
problems arise with the national partner, Petroquisa can solve these problems".я 
The same opinion was expressed by one of the directors of Sumitomo in regard to 
the call for privatization of petrochemical joint ventures, which he considered very 
harmful for the industry. The opinion of the general manager of Idemitsu -which 
arrived most recently in Brazil- was an exception; Idemitsu did not need Petroquisa 
as an intermediatory but rather preferred a joint venture with national private 
companies only. This exceptional opinion is probably due to the fact that Idemitsu 
invests in the fine chemical branch, as in Policarbonatos, in which Petroquisa does 
not play an important role. 
7.5. Organizational aspects of the Camaçari-based companies 
Another aspect at the firm level relating to the influence of origin is firm organiza-
tion: decision-making structures within the firm and external relations with outside 
institutions. In chapter 5.5.4. the decision-making structure of the Camaçari-based 
firms was briefly discussed. In this chapter, the management structure of the firms 
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will be discussed in more detail. The most important questions are whether the 
organization of management had implications for the functioning of the tripartite 
model and to what extent differences between Japanese, American and European 
participants in Camaçari influence joint venture decision-making structures. After a 
brief description of the board of directors and their firm management, the external 
relations of the companies will be described. 
7.5.1. Decision-making structures: board of directors and executive management 
As already mentioned, every joint venture firm in Camaçari is managed by a board 
of directors which is responsible for the more important decisions. The composition 
of the board of directors depends on the ownership structure and nationality: the 
board of directors of joint venture firms is somewhat more complicated than the 
board of directors of 100% nationally owned firms. In the latter type, the owner of 
the firm -in fact the entrepreneur- is generally appointed to be president of the 
board. In the case of a family firm, the brothers/sisters or sons/daughters of the 
president from the board along with the general managers or vice general manager. 
In joint venture firms, representatives of all participating companies are represented 
on the board, according to a division that is agreed upon by the respective partners. 
Generally each partner appoints two or three persons to participate in meetings of 
the board. These representatives are usually the president directors or the vice 
directors of each partner firm. Board meetings are held regularly -some firms 
assemble once every two months, others assemble once a month- only when impor-
tant decision needs to be taken, meetings are held more often. Important decisions 
include, for example, new investment projects, changes in the assets of partners, 
changes in the destination of products and the purchase of new technology. 
A lower level of decisionmaking occurs with the management team which is in 
charge of the daily operation of the enterprise. All matters concerning daily 
production such as maintenance of the machines, human resources, commercial 
activities, coordination of infrastructure, are dealt with by these executives. In 
general, the management consists of three to five executives of which the most 
important is the general manager assisted by a vice general manager. The number 
and function of the other executives varies per firm. Most firms possess an in-
dustrial or technical manager and a financial manager. In addition to these persons 
some firms appoint a commercial manager, a human resources manager and a plant 
manager. The most important executives, like the general manager, the financial and 
the technical manager are representatives of the individual partners; the other 
managers are generally appointed and considered as employees. Most joint venture 
firms at Camaçari employ a similar model in constructing a management team: the 
three to five executives, headed by a general manager represent the respective joint 
venture partners. 
To some extent the specific role of the foreign partners in the board of directors, 
as well as direct firm management, is restricted. While the functions 'president' and 
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'vice presidenf rotate between the various partners, they are never occupied by 
representatives of the foreign firms. In this way, Brazilian control over firm 
decisions is increased. With respect to the firm management of joint venture firms, 
the position of general manager is never filled by a foreign representative but 
almost exclusively by representatives of the national partner or, in a few cases, the 
state participant. A similar pattern can be seen for the position of vice general 
manager and commercial director. In general, the commercial director is a represen-
tative of the national partner which can be explained by the fact that most of the 
petrochemical production is still intended for the internal market of which national 
participants tend to be more knowledgeable. There are fewer restrictions on the 
selection of technical directors. Since the foreign enterprises provide most of the 
technology in the Camaçari firms, in most cases the technical director is a represen-
tative of the foreign partner. There are only three exceptions: two in which the 
technical director is a representative of the national partner and one in which the 
state partner appointed the representative.30 These three exceptions involve joint 
ventures with American or European {participation. All joint ventures with a 
Japanese partner appointed a Japanese technical director. 
The influence of national origin on the decision making structure of the Camaçari 
firms is another interesting issue. Although differences seems to exist between 
various foreign representatives on the board of directors and the in-firm manage-
ment, two differences were frequently referred to.31 Firstly, Japanese directors and 
executives were replaced more often than American and European directors and 
secondly, they were considered to be older and more experienced. The first 
difference is due to the acute shortage of experienced directors and managers in 
Japan in the eighties. Because of the expansionist behaviour of Japanese companies 
in this period -not only in Brazil but in many other countries- the large Japanese 
conglomerates were in urgent need of experienced managers. This shortage of 
managers is closely related to the fact that Japanese managers in overseas sub-
sidiaries are mostly the senior, more experienced executives. Japanese companies 
tend to delegate their executives only if they are capable of acting absolutely 
independent of other executives in the parent company. Given the long and 
thorough training of employees and the very hierarchical structure of the Japanese 
companies, this stage is reached only when the executive concerned is somewhat 
older. The shortage of experienced directors in Japan is not an easy problem to 
solve: Japanese companies would rather shift a few managers over the globe than to 
rely on a relatively inexperienced staff.32 By contrast, American and European 
companies view the delegation of employees to their foreign subsidiaries as a kind 
of training. As a result, directors from these countries are in general younger and 
less experienced than their Japanese competitors. 
With respect to the technical directors, the same can be said. Japanese technical 
managers are also somewhat older than American and European technical managers. 
Another difference is the number of foreign representatives in the company. While 
in most firms there is only one representative of the foreign enterprise, the Japanese 
joint ventures all have more than one. At Politeno, for instance, three Japanese 
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executives are present. This can in part be explained by the intermediate role played 
by 'sogo shosha' in the specific investment structure of Japanese companies. The two 
directors at Politene are representatives of the Japanese manufacturing firm, 
Sumitomo and the 'sogo shosha', C. Itoh. The third employee in this firm is a 
Japanese engineer supporting the technical process of the plant. The president 
director of Mitsubishi remarked that it was an active policy of Mitsubishi to put 
two Japanese representatives in every Brazilian joint venture, one director and one 
employee. The function of these two Japanese persons is to transfer their experience 
to the firm.33 
7.5.2. External relations with governmental and private institutions 
In a country like Brazil in which bureaucratic regulations are numerous, foreign 
companies have to maintain good relations with government institutions and private 
national organizations. The most important institutions with respect to government 
regulations are the federal agencies SDI, CIP and CACEX. The Camaçari-based firms 
have to maintain good contacts with the state organization COPEC, which is the 
coordinating committee of the Camaçari complex. The chemical association ABI-
QUIM, a private organization, can also be of importance for the smooth running of 
foreign firms in the chemical industry. Finally, employers unions like SINPER and 
SINPAQ can facilitate the maintenance of optimal relations between the labour force 
and the company management. 
How do joint ventures maintain contact with these external institutions? Is there a 
preference for one partner in the joint venture to delegate representatives to certain 
important meetings? It is also interesting to ask whether there are differences 
between joint ventures in which Japanese, American and European transnationals 
participate. In this way it is possible to show the extent to which joint venture 
management structures are influenced by the participating foreign company. 
The very important role played by SDI in the development of the petrochemical 
industry was already described in chapter 5. A good relationship with this powerful 
government agency is of utmost importance for petrochemical firms because every 
new project needs to be approved by the SDL34 The fact that 15 out of the 43 firms 
in Camaçari said they encountered smaller or larger problems when trying to get 
their project approved, illustrated the importance of maintaining good relations with 
SDI. The difficulties varied from heavy competition with other firms (50% of the 
cases) to problems with so-called 'red tape' to difficulties understanding bureaucratic 
rules of government agencies (20% of the cases). In many cases the final decision of 
the SDI was not thought to be the most logical one. One entrepreneur said it was 
impossible to understand these Extra Terrestrial (E.T.) decisions. Because of the 
delicacy of the SDI decisions, companies must carefully choose representatives to 
negotiate with this federal government organization. Most of the managers of the 
joint venture firms who were sent to negotiate with the SDI were representatives of 
the national partner since it was considered better to maintain relations with the 
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government by means of national executives. Only two joint ventures, both with 
European partners, Rhone Poulenc and Shell, sent their expatriate representative to 
the headquarters of the SDI in Brasilia.35 
СОПС plays more of a coordinating than a political role. Through COFIC all firms 
on the complex can negotiate with federal and state governments on issues such as 
infrastructural services, expansion plans, and environmental protection. Almost all 
firms are represented in COFIC and only four firms did not participate in commit­
tee meetings. More or less the same comments were made about firm relations to 
COFIC as were made about SDI. Generally speaking, the joint ventures delegated 
representatives of the national partners belonging to the firm management to 
committee meetings, again with the exception of two European joint ventures. The 
only foreign representatives at Cofic meetings were from 100% foreign subsidiaries.3* 
A slightly different picture emerges of private institutions. Of the 43 petrochemical 
firms located in Camaçari, 34 were members of the chemical association ABIQUIM37; 
all except one of these can be considered active members of the association.3* Given 
the location of ABIQUIM in Sao Paulo, directors who were delegated to the 
meetings most often came from the board of directors and not from the firm 
management at the Camaçari plant. In general, these representatives were not 
attached to the foreign partner of the joint venture but, instead, to the national 
partner or, sometimes, to the state partner. In only five cases, a foreign representa-
tive participated in the meetings of ABIQUIM. Again, European companies were 
more likely to send an expatriate foreign rather than a national representative to 
ABIQUIM meetings. Of the five expatriate representatives in ABIQUIM, four were 
from European firms; this contrasts sharply with the complete absence of Japanese 
representatives from the Camaçari firms in this association. 
In chapter 4.4.3., the internal power structure of ABIQUIM at the national level 
was extensively described. The difference in influence of the various foreign firms 
has not yet been dealt with, however. Although only a small number of foreign 
petrochemical firms participated directly in the board of directors, there are slight 
differences between American, European and Japanese firms. Between 1987 and 1989 
two representatives of foreign origin could be found on the board of directors of 
ABIQUIM. Somers from Rhodia and Sonder from Hoechst, both of European origin. 
Furthermore, of the fourteen foreign directors who participated in board meetings, 
five were European, seven were American, and two were Japanese. Especially 
European companies, and to a lesser extent American companies, played an 
important role in the association.39 
The union SINPER/SINPAQ represents the interests of the firm management of 
the chemical firms located in Camaçari in negotiations with trade unions. Only one 
firm is not a member of this employers union and most of the firm managers 
consider SINPER/SINPAQ a good representative of their interests. The director 
president of the union is considered to be a powerful person at the petrochemical 
complex. All member firms delegate a representative to negotiations with trade 
unions and in most of the joint venture firms this representative is either the 
national partner, or, in fewer cases, the state partner. 
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A representative of the foreign firm was sent to union meetings in only nine cases, 
six of which involved 100% transnational firms. European dominance is clear -six of 
the nine representatives were delegated from European firms while the remaining 
three came from American companies. Due to the mixed composition of the union 
meetings, there are regular clashes of opinion and conflicts of interest between the 
foreign representatives and national delegates. This can be illustrated by the example 
of Dow Chemical. During wage negotiations in September 1989, the foreign 
representative of Dow Chemical40 caused some commotion when he did not concur 
with the common agreement that only a relatively small wage increase would be 
allowed. Worldwide, Dow Chemical applies its own wage policy, involving relative-
ly high wages compared to those offered by local companies, and several other 
incentives. In part, this policy is used to keep the influence of labour unions at a 
minimum. The other Camaçari firms did not agree to the wage increase of Dow 
Chemical, which became a source of potential conflict. The management of Dow 
Chemical, which as a recent member of the union was participating in negotiations 
for the first time, was disappointed by the rigid behaviour of the other firms and 
the threatening conflict. It became evident to the company that it would be difficult 
to maintain its own strategy within a joint venture structure. 
From the above-described management structures and the organization of external 
relationship it is clear that Japanese management teams, although consisting of more 
senior and experienced executives, were less involved in external-firm relationships 
than their American and European competitors. 
7.6. Corporate culture of the various foreign participants in Camaçari 
For a more in-depth analysis of the impact of firm origin on the functioning of the 
tripartite model it is necessary to look beyond the organizational structure of the 
Camaçari-based petrochemical firms and the relations these firms maintain with 
governmental and private institutions. Since the proposals presented during 
meetings of external agencies are the outcome of long discussions within the firm, 
in meetings of the board of directors or of the executive management, the internal 
corporate culture of the Camaçari-based firms is also of importance. Three factors 
relating to the corporate culture will be analyzed: differences in negotiation prac-
tices; the firm management in the daily operation of the companies; and the 
adaptation of various firms to Brazilian culture.41 
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7.6.1. A variety In negotiating practices 
One way to estimate the impact of foreign-firm origin on overall management is to 
ask Brazilian directors of participating joint ventures their opinion of foreign 
participant(s). The majority of the directors pointed to the striking difference in 
negotiation practice between American and Japanese firms in particular. American 
companies were considered to be aggressive, rapid and efficient negotiators: 
"When American firms see an investment opportunity they do not hesitate to 
take it. Few meetings are necessary before a common agreement is reached and 
the contracts to be signed are never voluminous. American managers are direct 
and individualistic decision makers. But when the initial contract is signed and 
the construction of the company begins, the first problems emerge. Every little 
hinderance can be the cause of conflict and endless discussions are needed before 
a common agreement is once again reached."" 
By contrast, Japanese negotiators were said to be very cautious, they think twice 
before entering into a new investment project. Many negotiation rituals have to be 
followed and many persons are involved. However, when agreement is reached and 
a very lengthy contract signed, everything is arranged in the smallest detail. During 
construction and production, only small problems emerge because possible complica-
tions have been anticipated. According to the Brazilian managers, European firms 
could be found somewhere in between these two extremes. They are considered 
very bureaucratic and tough negotiators. A distinction was made between northern 
countries and southern European countries. The latter are said to be much more 
flexible in their negotiation practices. 
There are various reasons for the differences between Japanese firms, on the one 
hand, and American and European firms, on the other. First, cultural values are 
important. Japanese society is largely based on rituals and friendship, which is 
reflected in the behaviour of Japanese managers.*3 Brazilian directors mentioned 
several times that Japanese executives consider good relations to be of the utmost 
importance and want to know their partner well before taking any decision. They 
were said to be very patient and believe there is an appropriate time for every 
decision. Secondly, Japanese managers were unanimously described as long-term 
planners, contrasting strongly with American managers, who were considered to be 
short-term planners. Again European managers were found in between. This 
description explains the long and thorough negotiations of Japanese firms; it is 
obviously more time consuming to plan for ten/twenty years than for five years 
only. Third, having arrived recently, Japanese firms do not feel very comfortable 
and secure in Latin American countries. They want to analyze all possible risks 
before actually making investments. American and European firms are much more 
familiar with Latin America and know exactly the risks they will be confronted 
with. 
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7.6.2. Firm management and adaptation to Brazilian culture 
Similar differences distinguish the daily management practices of American, 
European and Japanese firms. The first difference that was mentioned is the extent 
to which the foreign partner exhibits dominant behaviour towards the national 
partner. The presence of the Japanese partners in the Camaçari joint ventures was 
not experienced as very dominant: 
"They do participate in the joint venture and have representatives in the direc-
tory, but their behaviour is very modest. Japanese companies are hardly visible 
in the daily practice of the firm management". 
Japanese firms were also seen as much more patient; they were not eager to reach a 
high annual turnover within a few years only. Furthermore, Japanese managers were 
said to be reliable: they keep their promises and their decisions were stable. 
Despite the general physical absence of American partners in the Camaçari joint 
ventures, the Brazilian managers were of the opinion that the Americans pressure 
the company to make as much profit as rapidly as possible. American managers 
insist on making their presence known in directory meetings. They were not con-
sidered to be very patient but their management style is very informal. "You can go 
to meetings dressed in your Τ shirt."44 
Finally, European partners were blamed by the Brazilian managers for behaving in 
an imperialistic manner. 
"Not imperialistic in relation to profits, like the American companies, but 
imperialistic in the sense of being imperialistic." 
They were said to dominate the firm management to a larger extent than American 
or Japanese companies and were called rigid, authoritarian, formal, detailed and ar­
rogant. Their firm administration is not very flexible, especially German, British, and 
to a lesser extent, Dutch executives were considered to be very rigid managers. 
To a certain extent, differences can be explained by the length of time that firms 
of different origin have operated in the country. European firms have invested in 
Brazil for so many years that they pretend to know everything and do not seem to 
be very respectful of their less-experienced partners. Japanese firms only recently 
arrived in Brazil and, consequently, behave more modestly. Their activities were not 
supported by substantial background of the Brazilian customs. American companies 
were satisfied if the company is lucrative and were not interested in exerting too 
much control. 
Differences in negotiation practices and firm management influence the degree to 
which a foreign firm adapts to Brazilian society. Although one would expect that 
the longer a foreign firm is present in Brazil the more it will have adapted, this 
does not seem to be quite the case. According to the Brazilian managers, the 
Japanese firms -although they arrived in Brazil only recently- have more successfully 
adapted than their American and European colleagues.45 Brazilian managers and 
entrepreneurs characterized the Japanese representatives as respectful, open minded 
and adjusted. American managers were said to be uninterested in Brazilian culture, 
disrespectful and not eager to learn the Brazilian language properly. According to 
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the Brazilian managers, the European managers did not have any problems with the 
language, but, like the Americans, did not know much about Brazilian culture and 
were not very interested in learning. Of the European countries the Latin countries -
France, Italy and Spain- were said to be more adjusted; their culture bears more 
resemblance to Brazilian culture. 
7.63. Opinion of foreign managers 
Thus far the thoughts and opinions of Brazilian entrepreneurs, managers and 
technocrats have been presented. Foreign managers, asked about their opinion of 
differences between Brazilian and foreign firms, painted a remarkably different 
picture. While Brazilian managers, entrepreneurs and above all technocrats were all 
very positive about the attitude of Japanese firms, Japanese managers did not cease 
mentioning the difficulties they encountered in cooperating with Brazilian firms. 
Without exception, all six interviewed Japanese executives pointed to severe 
problems. 
The largest problem they confronted with Brazilian firms was the totally different 
style of decisionmaking and firm management. The managers of Sumitomo were 
astonished that Brazilian entrepreneurs could take decisions individually. In Japan 
all decisions are the responsibility of several persons. A second problem encountered 
was the unlimited optimism of the Brazilians, the lack of risk management and the 
short-term planning. The mentality of "today we go, tomorrow we'll see!" was not 
appreciated by Japanese managers. Thirdly, in regard to corporate culture, respon-
dents noticed significant differences. The Japanese corporate culture is much more 
based in group responsibility, while the Brazilian companies have a more in-
dividualistic orientation. In Japanese firms groups of employees are responsible for 
the overall result of a particular part of the production process. In Brazil everyone 
shifts responsibility to other employees. Employees only possess knowledge of a 
particular piece of work and will not do anything else. "Do not ask your secretary 
to make a photo copy; she will refer you to the copy employee!" Fourthly, the 
language barrier was a significant problem for Japanese managers. It was considered 
almost impossible for Japanese persons to be sufficiently fluent in the Portuguese 
language to understand and express subtle differences. The president director of the 
Tokyo Bank illustrated this by saying: 
"Portugués e como о ouro Brasileira, adore mais nâo domine". (Portuguese is like 
the Brazilian gold: I adore it but I am not able to get grip on it)." 
Company meetings with many Brazilian participants were said to be particularly 
difficult: 
"When all Brazilian managers keep talking at the same time, it is impossible to 
understand one single word of the meeting, let alone exert influence on impor-
tant decisions.'"7 
Finally, Japanese managers considered it a problem that Brazilian managers, in 
contrast to Japanese managers, are not very impressed by authorities. According to 
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some Japanese managers, if Brazilian managers can find a way to avoid regulations 
that they perceive to be restrictive, they will not hesitate to do so. An example of 
this difference relates to the use of 'Side Letters'. As previously illustrated in 
chapter 6.6.2. with the example of Politeno, Japanese managers do not easily agree 
with the use of 'Side Letters'. 
The response of American and European directors to questions about differences 
between foreign firms and Brazilian companies was remarkably different. Most 
American and European managers did not begin with a laundry list of all difficul­
ties they encountered in cooperating with Brazilian managers. They did, however, 
say that they would prefer to fully own a company instead of participating in joint 
venture firms. Less emphasis was placed on problems with Brazilians and more on 
the concern that they are more or less obliged to participate in joint ventures. Not 
much difference could be discerned between European and American companies in 
this regard. It was commonly agreed that it was difficult to participate in a joint 
venture firm with a small family firm, which had little or no experience in the 
chemical sector. Differences in decisionmaking processes in particular were said to 
cause some problems. Small family owned firms could more easily make important 
decisions than large multinational согрюrations which depend on their parent 
companies. The different mentality of the Brazilians, which some managers described 
as backward, was also seen as a problem. Often the national firms did not want or 
were not in a position to contribute to innovation, new investment projects or new 
technology. The difference in flexibility on the part of national firms sometimes 
frustrated the foreign managers and hindered smooth cooperation. 
7.7. Limitations of the tripartite model explained 
In previous paragraphs, the role of macro-economic and micro-level factors in the 
limited functioning of the tripartite models was analyzed. First, the difference 
between European, American and Japanese investments in Brazil with respect to 
investment patterns was demonstrated. Secondly, differences in attitude towards 
joint ventures, firm management and corporate culture were analyzed. One question 
remains unanswered. To what extent do differences of origin explain the limitations 
of the tripartite model as analyzed in chapter 6: the unstable ownership structures 
of American and European partners in particular and the limited technology 
transfer. 
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7.7.1. Unstable ownership structures in relation to country of origin 
To what extent can the relative instability of American and European joint ventures 
be explained by the different expansion patterns and management structures of 
foreign firms in Brazil? Firstly, the recent arrival of Japanese companies in Brazil 
influenced their attitude about participation in petrochemical joint ventures. Par-
ticipation in the tripartite model was the only way for those companies to enter an 
European- and American- dominated sector. Consequently, they had a much more 
positive attitude about joint ventures which contributed to greater stability. 
Secondly, substantial state involvement in tripartite joint ventures is not considered 
to be negative by Japanese companies; in part because Japanese companies are used 
to a high level of government intervention in private production activities, and in 
part because, given their more recent arrival, participation by the state could only 
improve their position vis à vis foreign competitors and national companies. 
A third explanation for the greater stability of Japanese joint ventures can be 
found in the limited investment possibilities these companies had in other chemical 
firms in Brazil. Given their more lengthy history in Brazil, American and European 
foreign investors are represented in several chemical, pharmaceutical and petroche-
mical companies whereas Japanese representation in these branches is much more 
limited. If an American or European multinational wishes to sell its assets in a 
tripartite company, there are several alternative options for further Brazilian 
investment. Japanese petrochemical companies have few choices if they withdraw 
from a tripartite joint venture. Given limited possibilities to repatriate capital, 
Japanese companies will rather try to solve conflicts or problems than sell their 
assets. 
Fourthly, the world-wide tendency of transnational companies to shift their 
emphasis to the fine chemical sector is an explanation for the greater instability of 
American and European companies. Japanese companies are less experienced in fine 
chemicals. In Brazil this sector is dominated by American and European firms 
limiting the opportunities to swap assets in the petrochemical branch for assets in 
the fine chemical branch for Japanese firms. 
The influence of micro-level characteristics on the greater stability of Japanese joint 
ventures also needs to be analyzed. Firstly, to what extent does composition of the 
management and board of directors influence stability? The frequent replacement of 
Japanese executives, due to shortage of Japanese executives in other subsidiaries 
abroad, does not contribute to larger control by the foreign partner, but can have a 
positive effect on joint venture stability. Decisionmaking in tripartite joint ventures is 
difficult because of the three different management styles imposed on these 
companies and the presence of three different leaders.48 This likelihood of conflict 
diminishes, however, if the presence of one of these leaders is less dominant 
because, having recently arrived, he is not fluent in Portuguese. Another possible 
explanation for the greater stability of Japanese joint ventures is that Japanese 
executives are primarily senior, more experienced employees. These managers are 
not sent to overseas subsidiaries to gain experience, as one of the first steps in their 
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career, like European and American managers, but because they have already 
proven themselves and are in a more advanced stage of their career. This experien-
tial difference has consequences for their behaviour towards Brazilian counterparts. 
Differences in negotiation practices can serve as an explanatory factor for the more 
stable ownership structures of Japanese joint ventures as well. The longer and more 
thorough negotiations between the partners in a Japanese company diminishes the 
chance that unexpected problems will arise and, consequently, the possibility of 
conflicts. The low visibility of Japanese partners in joint venture management also 
explains the more enduring relationships of Japanese joint ventures. The lack of 
pretentious behaviour is apparently valued positively by Brazilian managers and 
entrepreneurs. The more dominant behaviour of European executives in particular is 
not conducive to a long-standing relationship between the various partners of a joint 
venture. It is remarkable, however, that despite the greater resemblance between 
European, and even American, culture and that of Brazil, Brazilian managers 
nonetheless stated that Japanese executives had more successfully adapted to 
Brazilian culture. 
7.7.2. Limited R&D related to country of origin 
In chapter 6.4., the limited technological development of the Camaçari firms was 
described. With respect to differences between European, American and Japanese 
participants, two aspects were important: the greater willingness of Japanese 
companies to participate with their up-to-date technology, and the fact that joint 
ventures with Japanese participation more often relied on external technology for 
firm expansions. To what extent can these features be explained by different 
expansion patterns and management structures? The first phenomenon has already 
been explained in chapter 6.6.2. The only way for Japanese transnalionals to enter 
the petrochemical branch in Brazil was through participation in a tripartite joint 
venture. Their bargaining position relative to American and European companies 
was, therefore, less favourable. 
Japanese companies more often rely on external technology suppliers because they 
lack the experience of their American and European competitors in petrochemical 
production processes. When the parent company of a Japanese participant in a 
petrochemical joint venture cannot provide the technology needed for the expansion 
or diversification of production, the joint venture has to rely on technology pur-
chased from another foreign company. The Japanese multinational, of course, sees 
this as an excellent opportunity to obtain more up-to-date and diversified technology 
on petrochemical processes. A correlation of the relationship between limited 
technological development and the different management structures of the foreign 
participants does not give remarkable findings. The lower degree of conflict in joint 
ventures with Japanese participation and the more stable ownership structure had a 
positive impact on national technological development. The greater joint venture 
stability contributes to an increase in confidence on the part of the participating 
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foreign firm. If a foreign participant believes that a joint venture will endure, it will 
be less reluctant to participate with up-to-date technology. In addition, greater 
stability makes it possible to avoid a situation in which a disintegrated joint venture 
becomes a 100% national petrochemical firm, constructed with the technology of a 
former foreign participant and is confronted with stagnating technological develop-
ment because no foreign firms are willing to sell it technology. 
7.8. Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the role of the cultural characteristics of American, Japanese and 
European transnationals in the functioning of the tripartite model has been ex-
plained. The macro-economic aspects of foreign investments in Brazil from different 
countries were first analyzed. Different investment patterns of the various countries 
represented in the Brazilian manufacturing industry can be discerned. Firstly, each 
foreign partner had been present in Brazil for a different length of time. Japanese 
firms arrived much later than American and European companies. Secondly, the 
development of the foreign direct investments followed a different pattern. The 
American investments show a downward trend during past decades, Japanese 
investments demonstrate more expansionist behaviour. The European firms can be 
found somewhere in between. Thirdly, the various companies had different reasons 
for investing in Brazil. Japanese investments in Brazil were determined by macro-
economic factors relating to their own economy whereas the global expansion of 
American firms can be explained by a micro-oriented, historical interpretation of 
firm growth. Finally, the foreign firms invested in different industrial sectors. 
American and European firms were more involved in the dynamic industrial sectors, 
like the pharmaceutical and the automobile sector, Japanese investments concentrated 
on the more traditional textile and heavy machinery sectors. 
In addition, differences between foreign investors in Camaçari were examined on 
the firm level. Three aspects were identified as important: the attitude of foreign 
firms with respect to participation in joint ventures, firm organization, and corporate 
culture. American and European companies on the one hand and Japanese com-
panies, on the other, had different views about participating in joint ventures. The 
Japanese partners in Camaçari were much more positive about joint ventures than 
their American and European colleagues. They saw the petrochemical joint ventures 
as an optimal structure for entering a Western-dominated industrial sector. Further-
more, state participation, from the Japanese perspective made it easier to survive 
harsh competition with other foreign participants and was a stabilizing factor 
between the participants inside the joint venture. By contrast, American and 
European foreign firms participated in petrochemical joint ventures for political 
reasons. They saw little advantage to this firm structure and preferred 100% 
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ownership. According to most Western managers, differences between petrochemical 
transnationals and national Brazilian companies frequently result in conflicts. 
Differences in firm organization between American, European and Japanese 
participants in the Camaçari joint ventures can also be discerned. In the first place, 
Japanese partners tend to appoint more executives to their joint ventures. This is in 
part the result of explicit Japanese company policy. In addition, most Japanese 
participants at Camaçari combine a manufacturing company and a trading company. 
Secondly, Japanese executives tend to be somewhat older and more experienced 
than American and European colleagues, again as a result of the Japanese policy of 
delegating executives abroad at a final stage in their career. Western executives, on 
the other hand, are sent to overseas subsidiaries earlier in their career. Given the 
shortage of experienced Japanese executives, due to this policy, Japanese managers 
are more frequently replaced. Although there are quantitatively more Japanese 
managers present in the Camaçari companies, they participate less frequently in 
negotiations with external agencies such as government institutions, trade unions 
and coordinating bodies. 
Corporate culture is a final micro-level aspect that sheds light on the differences 
between foreign firms. Every foreign participant at the Camaçari petrochemical 
companies has its own specific corporate culture which influences its behaviour in 
the joint venture structure to a large extend. First, there are different approaches to 
negotiations. In Japanese companies negotiations tend to be extended and detailed, 
few difficulties are encountered after a final agreement has been reached. Negotia-
tions with American companies are more quickly completed, but more problems can 
be expected in the aftermath of the final agreement. According to the Brazilian 
managers, the Japanese exert less direct influence on firm management than the 
European partners in particular. The latter arc said to dominate overall firm 
management and to be less successful at adapting to Brazilian culture. 
It is remarkable that the opinion of foreign managers docs not necessarily cor-
respond with the opinion of Brazilian managers. Whereas the Brazilians were only 
positive about their cooperation with Japanese companies, the Japanese managers 
encountered many problems. Decisions-making processes were said to be hampered 
by large differences between Japanese and Brazilian companies: the lack of risk 
management on the part of nationals, the individualistic behaviour of Brazilian 
employees and the language barrier were all problems identified by Japanese 
partners. European and American managers did not spend much time discussing the 
quality of cooperation with Brazilian companies; they all preferred 100% ownership 
structures. 
It is clear that differences between American, European and Japanese participants in 
Camaçari have a decisive influence on the functioning of the tripartite model in this 
petrochemical complex. The greater stability of joint venture structures with Japanese 
participation can be explained by the more recent arrival of these petrochemical 
companies in Brazil, the more positive attitude towards participation in joint 
ventures, especially with state partners, and internal firm characteristics, such as 
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extended negotiations, long-term-planning, and the less dominating approach to firm 
management by Japanese companies. The lesser stability of joint ventures with 
American and European participants can be explained by their longer history in the 
Brazilian manufacturing industry, which is one of the reasons that they prefer 100% 
ownership structures. The sense of being compelled to participate in petrochemical 
joint ventures contributed to the lower level of stability of these joint ventures. The 
European participants play a more dominant role in direct firm management which 
is often a source of conflict. 
The impact on technological development of the Camaçari firms can also be partly 
explained by different origin of the various participating foreign firms. Japanese 
transnationals were willing to participate with up-to-date technology on more 
favourable conditions than American and European companies because it was their 
only chance to enter the petrochemical sector in Brazil. Because they have more 
recently become involved in petrochemical production, they more often have to rely 
on external technology for expansion. The greater stability of Japanese joint ventures, 
however, contribute to a higher degree of confidence on the part of the parent 
company or external technology suppliers and, consequently, to easier access to 
technology. 
The research findings, based on the opinions of managers, entrepreneurs and 
technocrats involved in the petrochemical industry in Brazil have thus far been 
analyzed. In the final chapter of this book the findings of this empirical research 
into the Brazilian petrochemical industry will be examined in relation to assump-
tions found in internationalization theories. 
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8 
riNAL CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF FIRM ORIGIN ON 
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TRIPARTITE MODEL 
8.1. Review of Brazil's petrochemical industry 
8.1.1. Introduction 
The role of multinational enterprises in the process of industrial development in 
Third World countries has been thoroughly researched by, amongst others, resear-
chers adhering to different streams of the dependency school. Evans' research in 
Brazil, in particular, provides a valuable contribution to a better understanding of 
the role of foreign firms in industrial growth in the Third World. Starting from the 
theory of dependent development, Evans states that economic development in Third 
World countries can be generated by a constellation in which state capital, national 
private capital and foreign capital play a complementary role. This so-called concept 
of the triple alliance is an important factor in the industrial development of Brazil 
since, as result of the association between local and foreign capital, national capital 
accumulation is stimulated. Although peripheral industrialization is of a disarticu-
lated nature and dependency on the center still continues, stagnation in the 
industrial sector is replaced by dependent development. 
Evans uses the petrochemical industry in Brazil to evaluate the concept of the 
triple alliance. In the seventies the Brazilian government drew on the three types of 
capital -national private capital, multinational capital and state capital- in the 
chemical sector, to stimulate the development of national petrochemical industry. As 
a result, a large number of enterprises in Brazil's three petrochemical complexes 
consists of joint ventures with three partners: the so-called tripartite joint ventures. 
8.1.2. Development of the petrochemical industry 
In 1979 Evans evaluated the concept of the triple alliance as it is implemented in 
the most important petrochemical complex, the Camaçari complex, which at that 
moment was in its initial phase. In the research presented here, the same petroche-
mical complex is chosen in order to evaluate Evans' theoretical assumptions about 
triple alliance and dependent development as well as to evaluate the role of the 
foreign partner in the tripartite model. 
The petrochemical industry, used as example in this book, is first described on a 
world scale, after which attention shifts to the development of Brazil's petrochemical 
industry. In a relatively short time Brazil has realized a tremendous growth in its 
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petrochemical sector. Possessing neither considerable oil reserves nor large capital 
stocks for importing huge amounts of oil, the country in 1985 reached the llth 
place in the world ranking of petrochemical producers. One of the factors respon-
sible for this success was the establishment of two integrated petrochemical com-
plexes in which the government stimulated joint ventures between state enterprises, 
national private enterprises and foreign corporations. 
In the era before the tripartite model was introduced, petrochemical production 
was dominated by several large foreign firms such as National Destillers, Phillips 
Petroleum and Scientific Design, which were located in the first petrochemical 
complex in the Sâo Paulo region. During the period of military government 
following the military coup of 1964, a state bureaucracy emerged that was largely 
attached to foreign and local industrial capital. By creating state enterprises, the state 
became increasingly involved in the productive sphere of the economy. From that 
time onwards, government investment in the petrochemical industry continued and 
both the petrochemical state company, Pelroquisa, and the National Development 
Bank, BNDES, played a significant role. Furthermore, several new national private 
entrepreneurs began investing in petrochemical projects in the sixties after which the 
triple alliance became reality. 
The first petrochemical firms established in the form of tripartite joint ventures 
were located in the industrial conglomerate of Sao Paulo. The Brazilian government 
saw these spontaneously formed joint ventures as an optimal way to stimulate the 
petrochemical industry: foreign companies provide the necessary technology, state 
enterprises participate with their financial capital and provide access to material 
inputs, and the inclusion of the national private bourgeoisie gives legitimacy to the 
state. Since the tripartite model seemed advantageous for all three types of capital, 
the Brazilian government decided to use the tripartite model to establish a second 
petrochemical complex, located in the state of Bahia in northeast Brazil -the 
Camaçari complex- and a third complex, located in the south of Brazil -the Polosul. 
Companies wanting to invest in these complexes were obliged to create tripartite 
joint ventures. 
The importance of the three participants in the tripartite model has been subject to 
change. With the creation of the Camaçari complex, the importance of state tech-
nocracy and national entrepreneurs increased in comparison to foreign firms. 
Although the influence of the state seemed to diminish when the third complex was 
established, it tried to increase its influence in the petrochemical industry by means 
of the National Petrochemical Programme (1987-1991). The national private entrepre-
neurs have been able to increase their importance in the petrochemical industry and 
maintain a relatively„high level of investment in this sector. Regarding foreign 
participation in the tripartite model, some companies, such as Dow Chemical, tried 
hard to increase investments in the petrochemical industry outside the tripartite 
model. Others, like Rhone Poulenc and Mitsubishi, became very involved in 
tripartite joint ventures. Nevertheless their participation is also subject to change. 
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To obtain a clear picture of the functioning of the tripartite model, one petrochemi-
cal complex, the Camaçari complex, was selected for research on the firm level. By 
1989, ten years after the Camaçari complex came on stream, fifty firms had been 
established around the central cracking unit, Copene, which provides the feedstock 
naphtha. Half of the total number of firms can be classified as downstream petro-
chemical companies. The other half consists of fine chemical firms, plastic transfor-
mation firms, and non-chemical-related firms, such as construction and metallurgical 
firms. Of the fourty-two chemical enterprises, twenty-four companies are joint 
ventures, of which eleven are tripartite joint ventures. Furthermore there are eight 
100% foreign owned firms, seventeen 100% private nationally owned firms, and one 
state company. As a result of the government policy of using the tripartite model, 
several American, European as well as Japanese transnationals presently participate 
in the Brazilian petrochemical industry. The number of foreign companies present in 
the Camaçari complex is considerable; twenty-five in 1989 of which nine were 
American, nine European, and seven Japanese. Since the focus of this research is in 
particular on the role of foreign firms in the tripartite model, a central question is 
whether these foreign companies, coming from several different countries, possess 
similar characteristics and exhibit similar behaviour patterns in the tripartite joint 
ventures of Camaçari. 
8.2. Differences between foreign investors: internationalization theories tested 
When considering possible differences between foreign firms investing in Third 
World countries, it is necessary to pay attention to aspects on the level of firm 
organization, such as attitudes towards joint ventures, attitudes towards state 
participation, firm management, negotiation practices and corporate culture. Second, 
differences between foreign firms on a macro-level are dealt with, focussing on 
investment patterns and sectoral concentration. 
8.2.1. Firm organizational aspects 
The Camaçari complex contains various types of joint ventures, tripartite -including 
three different partners- as well as bipartite -with two partners. It is, therefore, 
interesting to examine the attitude of foreign firms towards participation in joint 
ventures, and minority joint ventures in particular. Remarkable similarities are 
revealed in comparing the findings of authors adhering to internationalization 
theories with those of this present research. Kogut, Hladik, Kojima, Sekichugi and 
Krause relate the motives of firms for participating in joint ventures with country 
origin. Consistent with their findings, this research concludes that American and 
European companies participate in petrochemical joint ventures in the Camaçari 
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complex primarily because of government pressure, whereas Japanese companies 
began participating in the Camaçari firms in order to gain access to resources and 
markets and because it created political goodwill in Brazil, a country in which they 
had only recently begun to invest. As a result, Japanese companies showed a more 
positive attitude towards participation as a minority partner in joint ventures; it was 
one of the few opportunities for them to gain access to an industrial sector that is 
largely dominated by Western transnationals. 
State companies play an important role in the tripartite joint ventures of Camaçari, 
which raised a question about the attitude of foreign firms towards state involve-
ment. The conclusion of Beamish that joint ventures involving a state firm1 are 
particularly subject to instability and failure is in accordance with the findings of 
this present research: of all the joint ventures in Camaçari, those with a state firm 
do experience slightly more changes in ownership structure than joint ventures 
without state participation. To what extent do the attitudes of foreign firms towards 
state participation determine the stability of joint ventures? Authors, such as Dicken, 
Hladik and Nakase, agree that in general Japanese transnationals are more positive 
towards state participation than American, and to somewhat lesser extent European 
companies. For the Camaçari firms the same remarks can be made: in contrast to 
the Japanese executive managers who consider the participation of Petroquisa as 
indispensible for the stability of the joint venture, American and European managers 
say they strive for fully privately owned subsidiaries without direct state invol-
vement. As a result, if American and European transnationals are in the position to 
buy out their state partner, they will not hesitate to do so. 
Furthermore, foreign firms differ in their management structure. Two indicators 
are examined in somewhat more detail: i.e. joint venture control and corporate 
culture. First, Beamish states that control in the joint venture structure is a decisive 
factor for its overall performance: autonomously managed joint ventures perform 
better than joint ventures which arc tightly controlled by the parent company of the 
foreign participant. With respect to this joint venture control differences exist 
between Japanese companies, on the one hand, and American and European firms, 
on the other. According to Taddesse, Barlett, Goshal and Negandhi, Japanese 
multinationals are characterized by their largely centralized organizational structure 
in which the subsidiary is closely tied to the parent company. Nevertheless, the 
participation of Japanese firms on a minority basis in joint ventures does not mean 
they do not possess mechanisms to influence the decision making process. The most 
important mechanism for Japanese firms to execute control over their joint ventures 
is installing Japanese executives in vital positions. In contrast, American and 
European companies, besides participating less often in minority joint ventures, more 
often appoint local managers. This is exactly the situation in Camaçari: joint 
ventures with Japanese participation appoint at least two Japanese executives. In 
addition to explicit company policy, this is because most of the Japanese manufac-
turing companies do not carry out investment in Brazil on their own, but cooperate 
closely with 'sogo shosha', Japanese trading companies. Both the 'sogo shosha' and 
the manufacturing company appoint their representative to the subsidiary. Related to 
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the question of control is the tendency of Japanese companies to appoint somewhat 
older and more experienced executives in the foreign subsidiary. By contrast, 
American and European transnationals tend to delegate executives who are in an 
early stage of their career. 
Differences in corporate culture found in the literature of the internationalization 
theories correspond with the findings of this present research. Dunning, Negandhi 
and Rowland observe one aspect of the Japanese corporate culture that is very 
dominantly present and differs largely from the corporate cultures of Western and 
Third World companies. More precisely, in their negotiation strategy and planning 
practice, Japanese subsidiaries differ significantly from American and European 
subsidiaries. Whereas Japanese transnationals -especially in countries where previous 
experience is lacking- seem to have a long-term investment strategy and reach 
agreement only after thorough negotiations, American transnationals seem to operate 
much more on short term notice, and make their decision after a short period of 
negotiation. European subsidiaries are somewhere in between. As a result, American, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent, European transnationals are not only more flexible, 
but also more inclined to withdraw when things are not going as expected. The 
differences between foreign firms described in this section are on the firm level and 
result from intrinsic firm characteristics. It is worthwhile to examine whether the 
international investment pattern of companies is a distinguishing factor as well. 
8.2.2. Macro-economic aspects: Kojima 
An important contribution to the explanation of differences in investment patterns of 
foreign firms is given by Kojima. He is of the opinion that the different behaviour 
of American and Japanese foreign investments is related to differences in the 
direction of investments as well as their sectoral concentration. Kojima states that 
Japanese companies invest a larger part of their total foreign capital in developing 
countries than American firms, which invest predominantly in Western countries. 
Another difference he found lies in the size of foreign subsidiaries; Japanese foreign 
investments involve small subsidiaries whereas American firms establish large 
companies abroad. A sectoral difference noticed by Kojima is that Japanese firms 
concentrate on more traditional industrial sectors when investing abroad. American 
foreign investments, on the other hand, concentrate in technologically advanced 
industrial sectors. 
Regarding foreign investments in Brazil, in the industrial sector in general, and in 
the petrochemical industry in particular, the ideas of Kojima can serve as an 
explanation of the differences observed between foreign firms. The history of 
Japanese foreign investments in Brazil differs largely from American and European 
foreign investments. Whereas in the fifties American firms started to invest on a 
large scale in Brazil, followed by European companies, Japanese transnationals did 
not arrive in this Latin American country until the sixties and seventies. In accor-
dance with Kojima, the sectoral preference of Japanese companies is quite different 
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from that of American firms: the former tend to invest in more traditional sectors 
such as machinery and textile while the latter dominate in the technologically 
advanced industrial sectors, such as electronics, pharmaceuticals and engineering 
plastics. Although investments in the petrochemical branch show that Japanese 
transnationals are increasingly involved in more technologically advanced industrial 
sectors, they are still almost absent in the rather sophisticated fine chemical branch. 
No doubt, this sectoral investment pattern influences the attitude of Japanese firms 
in Brazil. Firstly, because of their relatively recent arrival in Brazil, Japanese 
companies do not have the same knowledge of the country as their American and 
European competitors. Secondly, since their interests in the chemical sector are 
limited to the petrochemical branch, Japanese companies do not have much 
flexibility of transfering investments to other sectors. 
8.3. Impact of firm origin on the functioning of the tripartite model 
To what extent do the observed differences between the participating foreign firms 
in the Camaçari complex influence the functioning of the tripartite model? For the 
evaluation of the functioning of this model in the Brazilian petrochemical industry 
two aspects are of importance: the transfer of technology and the stability of the 
tripartite joint ventures. 
8.3.1. Stability of the joint venture structure 
The degree of stability of tripartite and bipartite joint ventures in the complex of 
Camaçari is influenced by the different investment patterns of the foreign firms and 
their different firm characteristics. Since Japanese participants on the Camaçari 
complex began to invest in Brazil relatively recently, their lack of experience not 
only increased their willingness to participate in minority tripartite joint ventures, 
but also made them more positive about state participation. The state partner is 
needed to balance the dominance of the foreign firm and to compensate for the 
inexperience of the national firm. American and European firms possess another 
attitude towards state participation. Due to their longer experience in the petroche-
mical sector and with investment in Brazil, they prefer investment in the form of 
100% ownership. Stability of joint ventures with Japanese participation is also 
enlarged because of the their long-term planning. Due to their relatively limited 
knowledge of the political and economic situation in Brazil, Japanese chemical 
transnationals will only invest after extensive planning and negotiation, whereas 
European and American foreign investors, partly because of their greater experience 
in the country, more rapidly decide to participate. 
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The impact of these differences on the stability of the Camaçari joint ventures is 
remarkable. To start with, tripartite joint ventures prove to be very unstable 
ownership structures; of the tripes represented in the Camaçari complex in 1989, 
40% experienced a change in ownership structure, becoming either a bipartite joint 
venture or a 100% privately owned company. One hundred percent had a change in 
shareholder composition. But this change does not apply equally to all foreign 
participants. Above all joint ventures with European and American participation 
have experienced a change in ownership structure or shareholder composition. 
Petrochemical joint ventures in which Japanese companies participate, however, 
proved to be more stable and hardly experienced any change. Illustrative is the fact 
that the three Japanese chemical companies -Mitsubishi, Idemitsu and Sumitomo-
which invested in the Camaçari complex from its start, are still participating in 
seven firms in 1989. In contrast to the stable nature of Japanese participation, the 
number and nature of American and European companies has changed greatly. 
Three American subsidiaries left the complex whereas three new American firms 
started to participate. The European firms show an even greater fluctuation: four 
firms left the complex and only one started to invest recently. 
The result of these changes is that the number of tripartite joint ventures declined 
relatively sharply during the ten years of the complex' existence. In 1980, 42% of the 
firms were tripartite joint ventures, but by 1988 this figure had declined to only 
19%. This decline can be attributed to both an increase in the number of new firms, 
mainly 100% privately owned companies -foreign as well as national- and to the 
disruption of several tripartite joint ventures. The tripartite model threatened to 
collapse because of disagreements between the partners. According to the managers 
of the Camaçari firms, there are two reasons for most of the failures: insufficient 
financial reserves of the national partner and disappointment on the part of the 
foreign partner. Other reasons mentioned, for example changing foreign firm policy 
or conflicts about technology and juridical reasons, seem to be of minor importance. 
8.3.2. Technology transfer 
Three phases arc important in the process of technology transfer: origin of initially-
used technology, investment in R&D, and the ability of a company to expand or 
diversify production with its own technology. To what extent does firm origin 
influence the transfer of technology in the Camaçari firms during these three 
phases? 
First, regarding the purchase of the initially used technology, all joint ventures in 
the Camaçari complex obtained their technology either from the foreign participant 
or from another foreign technology supplier. The various foreign participants did 
not always provide the most up-to-date technology, because in some cases foreign 
companies possessing this technology did not want to participate in a minority joint 
venture. In this respect Japanese companies behaved different than American and 
European companies. In three cases on the Camaçari complex, negotiations with 
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potential American or European participants which possessed up-to-date technology, 
failed because they refused to participate as a minority shareholder in a tripartite 
joint venture. In all three cases Japanese companies, less reluctant to participate in 
joint ventures, were asked to join. 
The second phase in technology transfer enhances investment in Research and 
Development. Generally, investments by the Camaçari-based companies are very 
limited. Most companies rely on the R&D efforts of the parent company of their 
participating foreign firm and do not cany out sophisticated innovative research 
themselves. Of all firms, only eleven carried out some R&D, focussing primarily on 
trouble shooting or debottlenecking, and only three companies had laboratories in 
which sophisticated research was carried out. In this regard, there was not much 
difference between joint ventures with Japanese, American or European participation. 
Third, as a result of the limited investments in R&D and the limited technology 
transfer most Camaçari firms on the complex were unable to expand or diversify 
production with their own technology. A large number of firms had to buy new 
technology from the parent firm of their foreign partner or from external technology 
suppliers. Apparently, the tripartite model did not succeed in stimulating a smooth 
process of technology transfer, wich would have reduced the dependency of the 
Brazilian petrochemical companies on external, foreign technology supplies. Al-
though there is no difference between the various foreign participants with respect 
to the purchase of technology needed for the expansion, there is a difference in the 
origin of this technology. While joint ventures with European and American 
participation rely slightly more on new technology from the parent company of the 
participating foreign firm, joint ventures with Japanese participation depend more on 
external technology suppliers. This is due to the more limited technological expertise 
of Japanese companies in the petrochemical industry. Because of their recent 
involvement in this sector, compared to American and European companies, the 
technological know how of Japanese companies is still limited to certain production 
processes. The external purchase of up-to-date technology for expansion of Camaça-
ri-based joint ventures provides Japanese transnationals with a good opportunity to 
obtain access to new technology. 
8.4. Ten Years Camaçari: results and analysis 
Ten years after the petrochemical complex of Camaçari came on stream, it is 
possible to evaluate the success of the tripartite model in this complex. To what 
extent was national petrochemical development is stimulated and what is the 
contribution of the three partners to the tripartite model? The objectives of the 
Brazilian government in encouraging the national petrochemical industry were: 
import substitution of petrochemical products, creation of a larger group of national 
214 
entrepreneurs in the petrochemical sector, regional development and technology 
transfer in the Northeast. 
First, import substitution of petrochemical products seems to have been successful-
ly accomplished. In only one decade (1979-1989) the country changed from a net 
importer of petrochemical products into a net exporter. The construction of three 
petrochemical complexes enormously stimulated national production of basic 
chemicals such as ethylene, butadene and propane, and thermoplastics produced by 
downstream enterprises such as low-density polyethylene, high-density polyethylene, 
Polyvinylchloride (PVC) and polystyrene. Since at the beginning of the eighties 
national demand for these products lagged behind the increased production, export 
was highly stimulated, amongst others, by export subsidies provided by the 
government. Whereas the export co-efficient was a negligible 2.7% in 1980, this 
figure had increased to 40% by 1986, changing the petrochemical sector into an 
important export sector. 
Creation of a group of national petrochemical entrepreneurs seems to have been 
less successful. Before the construction of the second and third petrochemical 
complex only a few national entrepreneurs invested in the petrochemical industry; 
among them sector-related companies such as the Ultra and the Unipar groups, 
Cevekol and Ipiranga. These four companies had their roots in the chemical sector 
and it was a logical step to invest in petrochemical production. For the non sector-
related companies things were different. When the complex of Camaçari in the state 
of Bahia was planned, the Brazilian government considered this an excellent 
opportunity to increase the number of national petrochemical producers thereby 
forming a countervailing power to foreign domination. Several entrepreneurial 
groups, originating from the state Bahia, which did not possess any experience in 
petrochemical production, began to invest in Camaçari. The most important com-
panies are the Mariani group and Banco Economico, both originating from financial 
conglomerates, and the Odebrecht group, a construction company. Smaller non 
sector-related groups are: Roche Miranda, Euvaldo Cruz and Camargo Correia. In 
the initial phase of the tripartite model the government seems to have reached its 
objective. But after some time most of the smaller family companies were bought 
out by either state companies or foreign firms, because they were unable to cope 
with the financial and technological requirements of the petrochemical sector, and 
only larger conglomerates functioned well. By the end of the eighties, the private 
national petrochemical companies were highly capitalized and still expanding inside 
and outside the petrochemical industry. But are they petrochemical entrepreneurs? 
Although the new petrochemical entrepreneurs viewed their activities in the 
petrochemical branch as highly beneficial, they do not reinvest their revenues in 
chemical R&D nor in expansion of their chemical firms. Instead, they chose to invest 
in their core activities like banking, real estate management and construction. In 
part, this behaviour can be attributed to the limited expansion possibilities in the 
chemical sector: since the central cracking units, which provide almost all inputs, are 
producing at their maximum production capacity, expansion of production in the 
downstream plants is restricted. In addition, extensive government control further 
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limits the construction of new plants. But the attitude of the national entrepreneurs 
themselves plays a significant role as well. The non sector-related entrepreneurs 
consider themselves to be investment holdings. They will invest in an industrial 
sector because it is lucrative business but as soon as business becomes less lucrative 
than their other activities, they will withdraw from this sector. The sector-related 
petrochemical entrepreneurs, such as the Unipar and Ultra group, exhibit a different 
behaviour, however, they invest in technological innovation and design strategies for 
investment in petrochemical production. 
Third, construction of petrochemical complexes was meant to stimulate regional 
development, in particular in the backward northeast of the country, where the 
Camaçari complex was created. Although performance of the Camaçari firms was 
very satisfactory with profitability rates well above the national average, a question 
remains over the impact of these favourable economic figures on regional develop-
ment. As a result of the integrated character of the complex -implying that the 
central cracking unit and downstream enterprises arc located on one complex-inputs 
either originate from the complex itself or from outside the northeastern region. Due 
to the low degree of industrialization in the northeast, demand for petrochemical 
products is low, necessitating the marketing of most of products either in the 
industrial south or in other countries. Multiplier effects stimulating further industrial 
growth in the region are, therefore, limited. Furthermore, the capital intensive 
character of the Camaçari firms and the fact that only highly skilled technicians and 
engineers are employed, does not give rise to employment opportunities for the tens 
of thousands of unskilled workers in the northeast. The majority of the 25.000 
skilled employees working in the Camaçari firms originate from the industrial south 
of the country whereas the thousands of unskilled migrants, who assisted in 
constructing the complex, lost their job after construction was finished. Impulses to 
technological development in the region prove to be rather limited as well, since 
most Camaçari companies delegate their R&D to the research center of the parent 
company providing the technology. Finally, regional state authorities have little 
opportunity to influence important decisions taken by the Camaçari firms, since all 
important decisionmaking centers are located outside the region. Although it cannot 
be denied that establishment of the Camaçari complex created certain advantages for 
regional development in the state of Bahia, the complex is an enclave of industrial 
development in a still largely underdeveloped region. 
As already noted, the transfer of technology, the fourth objective, was not very 
successful in the Camaçari complex. Ten years after the Camaçari complex came on 
stream the insufficiency of the transfer of technology is obvious. In addition to the 
attitude and behaviour of foreign firms, several other reasons are responsible as 
well. First, the attitude of the national entrepreneurs, mainly those originating from 
non-chemical sectors, limited national technological development. Second, the 
government policy to create several small, mono-producing petrochemical firms 
hampered R&D: the mass of the Camaçari-based firms is too low to carry out 
efficient research. 
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Unfavourable technology contracts, limiting expansion of production with the 
acquired technology as well as adaptation of this technology, hampered further 
technological development. In summary after functioning for ten years in the 
Camaçari complex, it is dear that although the triparite model has accomplished 
import substitution of petrochemical products, the creation of a larger group of 
national petrochemical entrepreneurs, regional development and technology transfer 
were only partially realized. 
Despite Camaçari's economic success, one can ask to what extent a dynamic 
industrial sector, capable of stimulating national industrial development has been 
generated. First, the joint ventures on the Camaçari complex are very unstable; in 
most joint ventures established in the first years of the complex' existence, either the 
ownership structure, or the shareholder composition changed. After ten years of 
petrochemical production, the popularity of the tripartite joint ventures in Camaçari 
has faded away. Second, if Camaçari-based firms want to expand or diversify 
production, they still have to rely on external technology, purchased from the parent 
company of the participating foreign firm, or from other foreign suppliers. Diver-
sification of the Camaçari-based joint ventures to other chemical sectors, such as the 
fine chemical sector, is almost impossible. Technology used in this type of industry 
cannot be obtained on the free market and foreign dominance in this sector is too 
overwhelming. The failure of a large number of national investments in the fine 
chemical branch illustrates this. The result is that the p>etrochcmical sector of Brazil 
is a rather static industrial sector in which further national capital accumulation is 
hampered. 
After reviewing the empirical results of the triple alliance, more general questions 
come to the fore. A first question is to what extent the implications of the strategy 
of triple alliance influenced development in the pœtrochemical industry in Brazil in a 
positive sense and, secondly, what conclusions can be derived from this empirical 
study about the theories of dependent development. 
8.5. The concepts of triple alliance and dependent development reviewed 
According to Evans, a fundamental factor in the national development of Third 
World countries is national capital accumulation which can be achieved by integrat-
ing state, national private and foreign capital. Peripheral countries which have been 
dependent on industrialized center countries -resulting in stagnating industrializa-
tion- can realize depsendent development by means of a triple alliance strategy. A 
certain degree of industrialization, characterized by national capital accumulation, 
can be achieved in this way. Nevertheless, Evans states that this strategy is far from 
perfect and some of its shortcomings can even result in failure of the strategy. 
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8.5.1. Constraints of the triple alliance: the findings of Evans 
Exclusion of the majority of Brazil's population from the benefits of the triple 
alliance strategy forms a threat to the political stability in the country which could 
result in a declining capital accumulation. A direct threat to the stability of the 
triple alliance, however, is the internal division of the national bourgeoisie. Part of 
the local bourgeoisie creates alliances with foreign and state capital, alienating itself 
from the remainder of the bourgeoisie. A third constraint relates to the paradoxic 
nature of the dependent capitalist state. Although the state's primarily interest is 
national capital accumulation, it also possesses strong ties with international capital 
and tends to exclude part of the bourgeoisie as well as the mass of the population 
from political participation. Since state enterprises form an indispensible part of the 
tripartite model, privatization tendencies threaten collapse of the model. 
A comparison of the findings of this present research, carried out on the firm 
level in one petrochemical complex in Brazil, with the conclusions of Evans, 
demonstrates that the constraints mentioned by Evans do not threaten the strategy 
of the triple alliance. Instead, it is the instability of the joint venture structures that 
forms a serious threat to the continuation of the triple alliance strategy and the 
possibility of achieving dependent development. In his research on the joint venture 
structures in the Camaçari complex, Evans docsd not mention this instability: 
"Overall, there have been surprisingly few significant shifts in the ownership of 
the pole's companies since the creation of the original companies (-)."2 
Furthermore he does not point to the differing degrees of stability for different 
foreign participants. This present research, on the other hand, shows that Japanese 
partners in joint ventures prove to be more stable participants than American and 
European companies. The concept of triple alliance and the theory of dependent 
development do not explain these differences. Although Evans suggests that 
Japanese, European and American firms have different investment patterns, he does 
not mention the possible impact this can have on the triple alliance strategy. 
It is, therefore, necessary to analyse the functioning of joint ventures on a firm 
level and to consult authors that pay attention to the differences between firms from 
various countries, such as Kojima, Dunning, Dicken, Nakase and Kogut. The first 
important author is Kojima since he relates differences between foreign enterprises 
to development in Third World countries. Based on research carried out in the 
seventies, Kojima concludes that Japanese foreign investment is more beneficial to 
industrial development in the Third World than American foreign investment. The 
larger part of total Japanese foreign investments directed to developing countries, 
the relatively small size of Japanese subsidiaries, and the concentration in more 
traditional industrial sectors, are indications of the more beneficial incorporation of 
Japanese investments to existing industries in a host country. Besides being less 
directed towards developing countries, American investments concentrate in 
technologically advanced industrial sectors. As a result, American subsidiaries 
remain isolated enclaves with only limited multiplier effects. 
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A few shortcomings of Kojima's research need to be mentioned, however. Kojima 
developed his ideas in a period during which Japanese foreign investments were 
largely directed towards developing countries. He fails to take notice of the more 
dynamic aspects and changing patterns of foreign investments. In the eighties 
Japanese companies increasingly invested in Western countries, the US in particular. 
The sectoral preferences of Japanese foreign investments also changed and more 
technologically advanced industrial sectors increased in importance. Another 
shortcoming is that Kojima's hypothesis is based on a macro-economic analysis, 
making it difficult to evaluate his findings on a firm level. Nevertheless, Kojima's 
ideas are of great interest for analyzing the influence of Japanese, American and 
European joint venture partners in the Camaçari complex on industrial development 
in Brazil. 
8.5.2. Contribution of the internationalization theories 
Because Kojima does not pay much attention to joint venture structures and the 
influence of firm origin on joint venture performance, internationalization theories 
focussing on micro-level can provide a valuable amplification. One of the authors 
analysing joint ventures structures from this perspective is Beamish. Examining the 
attitude of foreign firms in joint ventures. Beamish concludes that the stability of 
joint ventures is decisive for industrial development in Third World countries: stable 
joint ventures stimulate industrial development, while unstable joint ventures may 
largely hinder future industrialization. Furthermore, he concludes that foreign firms' 
motives for participating in joint ventures and their willingness to accept minority 
shares determine joint venture stability. In addition, attitudes towards state participa-
tion can influence joint venture stability. If his findings are combined with the ideas 
of other authors, such as Kogut, Negandhi, Dunning and Nakase, the conclusion is 
that firm origin decisively influences the attitude of foreign companies in joint 
ventures and is indirectly responsible for the development potential of these joint 
ventures in Third World countries. 
From the authors cited above it is clear that Japanese investments are more likely 
to stimulate industrial development in the Third World than American investments. 
Kojima argued that Japanese investments are more easily incorporated into the 
peripheral country and that differences between national firms and Japanese 
investors are small, which facilitates technology transfer and incorporation of the 
foreign firm. Although several authors, such as Kogut, Dunning and Nakase, 
conclude that a relatively large number of Japanese companies invest in the form of 
joint ventures and that these joint ventures are among the most stable joint ventures 
-even when these joint ventures involve government participation- they do not make 
a correlation between the attitude of Japanese foreign investment and development 
perspectives. American and European foreign investments, in particular in Third 
World countries, often take the form of 100% subsidiaries. If minority shareholdings 
exist, they are often the result of strict government regulations on ownership. These 
220 
joint ventures, based on negative incentives, are not the most stable structures. As a 
result, changes in shareholder composition or ownership structure are frequent. 
Correlating these conclusions with the findings of Beamish, one can say that joint 
ventures with Japanese partners are more beneficial for industrial development in 
Third World countries than joint ventures with American or European participation. 
8.5.3. Supplementing the theory of dependent development 
What are the implications of these findings for Evans' concepts and the theory of 
dependent development? One of the key arguments in Evans' work is that the 
strategy of the triple alliance, enabled certain Third World countries to achieve 
dependent development by means of national capital accumulation. This suggests 
that national industrialization is possible for certain Third World countries, even 
though this industrialization still depends on center countries. They remain depen-
dent because, amongst others, industrialization is not possible without the participa-
tion of foreign companies willing to invest in the Third World country. 
Because Evans considers national capital accumulation to be the most important 
factor of development and did not further operationalize 'dependent development' it 
is difficult to measure the impact of the triple alliance strategy on industrial sectors. 
For the purpose of this research it is necessary to operationalize the concept 
dependent development in more detail in order to facilitate an empirical evaluation. 
National capital accumulation alone is not enough to secure industrial development 
in Third World countries. Industrialization is generated by means of dynamic 
industrial sectors, characterized by their ability to generate industrial expansion by 
means of more or less autonomous technological development and the possibility of 
vertical diversification. When this dynamism is absent, the industrial sector will 
experience stagnation and the production process will become obsolete, which can 
threaten national capital accumulation. 
As previously stated, the use of the tripartite model in the Camaçari complex 
resulted in short-term economic success, but also paved the way for the stagnation 
of the petrochemical sector in Brazil, creating a situation in which expansion can 
only take place with external technology and diversification of production is 
difficult. One of the factors limiting the success of the strategy of triple alliance is 
the fact that no attention has been paid to the origin of foreign participants. The 
number of foreign firms willing to invest in Third World countries is increasing, 
and not only in absolute sense. Due to increasing internationalization, the number of 
countries involved in foreign investment is also mounting. Not only American and 
European investments in Third World countries are important; Japanese foreign 
investments are also increasing in importance. Given the larger number of foreign 
investments coming from different countries, the role of foreign investments in the 
development of Third World countries needs to be re-evaluated.3 It is necessary to 
add the question of country origin to the consideration of development aspects. In 
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what way does the strategy of the triple alliance and the origin of the participating 
foreign firms influence the dynamism of peripheral industrialization? 
First, investment patterns of the country of origin can influence the bargaining 
position of the host country. If foreign companies, Japanese for instance, do not 
have an investment tradition in certain Third World countries, they feel less 
comfortable investing for the first time. Second, the sectoral experience of the 
foreign investor is of great influence. An investing company with relatively little 
experience in a sector offers better perspectives for national development in the host 
country than an experienced foreign firm. 
These two factors suggest that foreign firms are more willing to accept minority 
shares in joint ventures with national private entrepreneurs when based on a feeling 
of mutual necessity. As a consequence, a better relationship can be built with the 
already existing national private enterprises. The more stable joint ventures resulting 
from this stimulate national capital accumulation and, consequently, have a more 
beneficial impact on industrial development. In contrast, foreign companies long 
established in certain Third World countries, possessing extensive know-how in 
certain industrial sectors, more often possess a monopoly position in this sector and 
are reluctant to share this position with national private capital. Their participation 
can hinder further industrial development in the Third World country. 
Third, intrinsic firm characteristics, such as attitude towards participation in joint 
ventures, management structure of the firm and corporate culture, including the 
negotiation practices, are important. Regarding these characteristics, it is once again 
evident that firm origin influences industrial development. For instance, Japanese 
companies are more willing to participate in minority joint ventures, even with state 
participation, results in more stable joint ventures. Their more extensive negotiation 
process may also result in larger stability; unexpected problems are less likely to 
occur. With respect to their management structure and corporate culture, Japanese 
foreign investors are more dominant. This research found, however, that Japanese 
participants were not considered dominantly present in the petrochemical joint 
ventures in Brazil. Japanese foreign investments which are more appreciated by 
Brazilian national private and state partners, can result in greater stability of joint 
ventures. 
In conclusion, the origin of foreign companies strongly influences not only the 
functioning and the succes of the tipartite model, but also the strategy of the triple 
alliance. It makes a difference whether industrial sectors are characterized by 
domination of a few monopoly foreign companies from one country, or several 
smaller foreign companies from various different countries. The theories of depen-
dent development do not further distinguish differences between foreign investments 
in Third World countries. By referring to 'the foreign investments' and considering 
foreign firms as a homogeneous group, dependent development authors underes-
timate the importance of differences between foreign investors and neglect the role 
of foreign-firm origin in the development of Third World countries. It is, therefore, 
necessary to reformulate dependent development theories and to make a distinction 
according to country of origin. Doing this, one must bear in mind that differences 
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between foreign firms are not static phenomena but will change over time. When 
Japanese companies gain more knowledge in particular industrial sectors or become 
more experienced in certain Third World countries, their willingness to participate in 
minority joint ventures will probably decline. This change in attitude can be 
illustrated by the different attitude of Japanese foreign investors in Southeast Asia 
and in Latin America. Japanese investments in Southeast Asia are more likely to 
dominate and can be found less frequently in minority joint ventures.4 
8.6. Future prospects of Brazil's petrochemical industry 
After the theoretical review of the importance of firm origin in the dependent 
development theories and the concept of the triple alliance, is it interesting to 
consider firm origin in relation to the future prospects of Brazil's petrochemical 
industry. In regard to the dynamics of the Brazilian petrochemical sector, both the 
stability of joint venture structures and the transfer of technology are of importance. 
In brief the tripartite model, as implemented by the Brazilian government in the 
Camaçari complex, seriously restricts further development of the Brazilian petroche-
mical industry. The petrochemical sector at present is very fragmented. It consists of 
small, mono-producing unstable joint venture companies, some including national 
private entrepreneurs lacking any previous experience in the chemical branch. In 
addition, a large number of foreign partners from different countries participate in 
the joint ventures. As a result, technological development in these tripartite joint 
ventures is severely hampered, reducing the possibilities for industrial expansion 
inside the petrochemical branch or towards the final chemical branch. Two options 
for future development of the Brazilian petrochemical industry will be given in 
which the importance of the origin of the foreign participant is taken into considera-
tion. 
The first option is the consolidation of the tripartite model in the form of stable 
tripartite joint ventures in which much attention is paid to adequate technology 
transfer. Future expansion and diversification of production are possible, because the 
foreign partner is obliged to transfer the necessary technology. Although the 
tripartite company will remain dependent on its foreign partner, a certain degree of 
national capital accumulation can be achieved. The present research made dear that 
this option will have more chance if the foreign partner in the tripartite joint 
venture is a Japanese subsidiary. European and American participants tend to 
disturb the stability of the joint venture since they do not choose to consolidate their 
shares in a minority shareholding with an inexperienced national entrepreneur and a 
state partner. Eventually they strive for 100% foreign ownership or leave the joint 
venture to its national owner. This option will be more viable with Japanese 
companies because they appear willing to participate in a minority joint venture. It 
is the question, however, whether Japanese subsidiaries, when they become more 
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acquaintanced with the Brazilian situation, will continue to follow the same joint 
venture policy. 
The second option is the dissolution of the tripartite model. The joint ventures in 
the Camaçari complex that collapsed, for whatever reason, became 100% foreign-
owned firms or 100% nationally owned firms. This process of industrial differentia-
tion, already referred to by Evans, can lead to a situation in which 100% nationally 
owned firms dominate the petrochemical branch, while 100% foreign owned firms 
dominate the fine chemical branch. Differentiation alone is not a solution to limited 
development prospects of the petrochemical industry. If the tripartite model is 
completely abandoned, and 100% nationally owned companies control the down-
stream petrochemical enterprises, further technological innovation will become 
extremely difficult. Without foreign participants and lacking sufficient critical mass 
to invest in R&D, Brazilian petrochemical production could quickly become obsolete. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reform the petrochemical branch and stimulate mergers 
between the small mono-producing companies in order to create larger production 
entities that arc able to generate their own R&D. The Brazilian government con-
siders this second option to be a possible solution for the petrochemical sector. But, 
although the state technocracy largely stimulated the forming of petrochemical 
mergers, until 1989 only one merger succeeded. Not one single partner in the 
petrochemical firms has wanted to sell or diminish its share in the profitable 
chemical sector. 
With respect to the second option, joint ventures with American and European 
participation are more advantageous than with Japanese transnationals. As is shown 
in this book, joint ventures with European and American participation are more 
subject to change because they have more options for investing in the fine chemical 
branch or changing their shares for investments in other industrial sectors. Japanese 
foreign firms are more reluctant to leave their minority joint ventures in the 
petrochemical companies because they can neither move to the fine chemical branch 
nor to other industrial branches. This is not only an obstacle for industrial differen-
tiation, it can also hamper the merger possibilities of these tripartite joint ventures. 
For two tripes with different Japanese participants mergers are almost impossible. 
Whatever course is chosen, the analysis of the influence of the tripartite model on 
industrial development in Brazil makes clear that firm origin is an important issue 
to consider. 
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chapter eight 
Beamish primarily refers to bipartite joint ventures between foreign firms and 
state firms. 
Evans, P., 1983, ρ 110. 
For further research relating to this question, it is of interest to consider the role 
of multinational investments originating from Third World countries. What is 
their contribution to dependent development and do they connect better with 
national companies in Third World countries. 
Oguro, E., Japan's direct investments towards Asia facing turning point. Digest of 
Japanese Industry and technology, no 217, pp 11-17. 
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ANNEX 1. The ownership structure of firms located on the Camçari complex 
in 1989 
name firm 
EMCA 
Ciba Geigy 
BASF 
White Martins 
Cobafi 
Unirhodia 
Rhodia da Bahia 
SmithKlme 
Etoxilados 
CCB 
Ridnor 
CQR 
СРВ 
Cala Nordeste 
Química da Bahia 
Nitroflex 
EDN 
СВР 
Pronor 
Nitroferhl 
Celbras 
(ex Fisiba) 
Silinor 
Pohcarbonatos 
partners 
Atlantic Richfield 
Ciba Geigy 
BASF 
Union Carbide 
Electric Furnace 
others 
Akzo 
Rhodia do Brasil 
Rhodia do Brasil 
SmithKlme 
Ultra 
ЮаЫп 
Imbasa 
others 
Salgema 
others 
Proquigel 
Banco Economico 
Cata Amazonian 
others 
Oxiteno 
Norquisa 
Cevekol 
Norquisa 
Chemicon 
Momha Sanhsta 
Suzano 
Dow Chemical 
Cevekol 
Pctroquisa 
Petroquímica da Bahia 
Pctroquisa 
Petroquímica da Bahia 
Petroquisa 
Petroferhl 
Petroquisa 
Sinase 
City bank 
Dow Corning 
Ipiranga 
Pronor 
Idemitsu 
СВР 
percentages of shares 
100 
100 
100 
348 
15 3 
49 9 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
95 
5 
99 72 
028 
100 
17 
70 
13 
50 0 
50 0 
20 
35 
35 
5 
5 
33 3 
33 3 
33 3 
50 
50 
50 
50 
99 86 
114 
70 
30 
60 
40 
33.3 
33.3 
3 3 3 
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Poli teño 
Norcom PuPont 
Polibrasil 
(ex Polipropileno) 
Poliaden 
Sansuy 
Nitroclor 
Nitrocarbono 
Sulfab 
Melanor 
Copenor 
Metanor 
Carbonor 
Ciquine Química 
Ciquine Petroquímica 
Acrmor 
Liquid Carbomcs 
Deten 
Sumitomo 
С Itoh 
Conepar / Banco Economico 
Suzano 
Petroquisa 
Norcom 
DuPont do Brasil 
Shell 
Petroquisa 
Cevekol 
Ipiranga 
Suzano 
Mitsubishi 
Nissoh Iwah 
Conepar / Banco Economico 
Petroquisa 
Sansuy 
CPC 
Others 
Liquipar 
Norquisa 
Petroquisa 
Petroquímica Bahia 
Pronor 
Copene 
Petroquisa 
Nitrocarbono 
Metacnl 
Proman 
Cavalcano 
Metanor 
Grupo Peixote do Castro 
Petroquisa 
Others 
Solvay 
Carbo Branco 
Norquisa 
Mitsubishi 
Nissoh Iwah 
Conepar / Banco Economico 
Petroquisa 
Mitsubishi 
Nissoh Iwah 
Conepar / Banco Economico 
Petroquisa 
Rhodia 
Umgel 
Petroquisa 
Copene 
Liquid Carbomcs 
Brahma 
Others 
Unipar 
Una SA 
Petroquisa 
Others 
15 
15 
20 
20 
30 
51 
49 
25 
35 
15 
10 
15 
16 8 
16 8 
333 
33 3 
77 06 
20 00 
2 94 
20 
50 
30 
17 5 
175 
40 3 
24 6 
58 
42 
97 5 
2 5 
100 
475 
47 5 
5 0 
25 
35 
40 
26 
7 
33 5 
33 5 
26 
7 
33 5 
33 5 
35 
4 
35 
35 
725 
9 
185 
35 6 
28 6 
35 6 
0 2 
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CPC 
Oxiteno 
Mitsubishi / Nissoh Iwah 
Odebrecht 
Petroquisa 
Ultra 
Cevekol 
Monteiro Aranha 
Petroquisa 
333 
333 
33.3 
28 
28 
6 
28 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
De rol die buitenlandse bedrijven in het proces van industriële ontwikkeling in 
Derde Wereld landen spelen is diepgaand onderzocht door wetenschappers be-
horende tot verschillende stromingen waaronder de dependencia traditie. In 
hoofdstuk twee komt een onderzoek dat hiertoe een waardevolle bijdrage heeft 
geleverd ter sprake; het onderzoek dat Evans eind jaren '70, begin jaren '80 heeft 
uitgevoerd in Brazilië. 
Evans' uitgangspunt is de theorie van dependent development waarin hij het 
concept triple alliantie centraal stelt. Volgens de dependent development theorie is 
industrialisatie in bepaalde Derde Wereld landen mogelijk als buitenlands kapitaal, 
staatskapitaal en nationaal privé-kapitaal een onderlinge alliantie aangaan. Hierdoor 
kan een bepaalde mate van nationale kapitaalsaccumulatie bereikt worden die het 
betreffende land in staat stelt autonome industrialisatie te bevorderen. Ondanks dat 
deze perifere industrialisatie van een gedisarticuleerd karakter is en de af-
hankelijkheid van centrumlanden blijft voortduren, maakt stagnatie in de industriële 
sector plaats voor een afhankelijke ontwikkeling. 
Het concept van de triple alliantie is door Evans toegepast op de petrochemische 
industrie in Brazilië. In de zestiger en zeventiger jaren heeft de Braziliaanse overheid 
een beleid gevoerd waarin door middel van de triple alliantie de nationale ontwik-
keling van de petrochemie is bevorderd. Alleen de vestiging van petrochemische 
bedrijven in de vorm van tripartite joint ventures van een staatsparlner, een 
buitenlandse partner en een nationale privépartner, werden toegestaan. Deze 
tripartite joint ventures zijn vooral belangrijk in het petrochemisch complex van 
Camaçari, dat gelegen is in het noordoosten van het land. Voorwaarde voor succes 
van de triple alliantie strategie is volgens Evans dat een grote internationale 
kapitaalmarkt ervoor zorg moet dragen dat de staatsoverheid in ruime mate kan 
investeren zonder daarvoor inteme reserves te moeten aanspreken. 
Hoewel Evans de constellatie van de triple alliantie als een enorme stimulans voor 
perifere industrialisatie beschouwde, zag hij ook enkele beperkingen in deze 
strategie die op den duur het succes van de strategie in het realiseren van een 
afhankelijke ontwikkeling zouden kunnen bedreigen. Een eerste beperking vormen 
de inteme contradicties binnen de staatstechnocratie. Enerzijds vervult de staat, 
gelieerd aan het internationale kapitaal, een productieve rol binnen de industriële 
sector, terwijl zij anderzijds ook een regulerende en repressieve rol binnen de 
samenleving heeft, ten einde hoge nationale kapitaalsaccumulatie cijfers te waarbor-
gen. Een tweede beperking is de interne verdeeldheid van de nationale bourgeoisie 
waarvan een deel allianties heeft aangegaan met het internationale kapitaal terwijl 
een ander deel buiten deze allianties om opereert. 
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Doelstelling van het onderzoek 
Evans baseert zijn analyse van de triple alliantie grotendeels op het petrochemisch 
complex van Camaçari dat begin jaren zeventig is opgezet. Daar hij zijn onderzoek 
omstreeks 1979 afsloot is het interessant te analyseren hoe de triple alliantie zich 
sindsdien heeft ontwikkeld. De doelstelling van mijn onderzoek is daarom een 
analyse te geven van de rol die de triple alliantie speelt in de ontwikkeling van de 
petrochemische industrie in Brazilië in het algemeen en op het Camaçari complex in 
het bijzonder, en de rol van de buitenlandse partner daarin aan een nadere be-
schouwing te onderwerpen. 
Het is vooral de bijdrage van de buitenlandse partner die mijns inziens in het 
onderzoek van Evans enigszins onderbelicht blijft. Howel Evans de interne con-
tradictie van de staatstechnocratie en de interne verdeeldheid van de nationale 
bourgeoisie als belemmerende factoren voor het succes van de triple alliantie 
beschouwt, behandelt hij de buitenlandse partners als een homogene groep inves-
teerders, die, ondanks dat ze afkomstig zijn uit een toenemend aantal herkomstland-
en, een overeenkomstig gedrag vertonen. Dat een dergelijke generalisatie geen 
correct beeld van de werkelijkheid geeft, blijkt uit de bevindingen van diverse 
auteurs behorende tot de stroming van intcrnationaliseringstheorieën. Zo concludeert 
Kojima dat, als gevolg van hun specifieke investeringspatronen, Amerikaanse 
bedrijven vergeleken met Japanse bedrijven een minder gunstige invloed uitoefenen 
op industriële ontwikkeling in Derde-Wereldlanden. Ook auteurs die specifiek 
onderzoek hebben verricht naar de invloed van herkomst op het gedrag van 
multinationals in joint venture structuren, zoals Kogut en Beamish, concluderen dat 
het gedrag van Japanse, Amerikaanse en Europese investeerders niet overeenkomstig 
hoeft te zijn. De belangrijkste vraag in mijn onderzoek betreft de invloed van 
herkomst van buitenlandse investeerders op het succes van de strategie van triple 
alliantie in dependent development. 
Ontwikkeling van de petrochemie in Brazilië 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt dieper ingegaan op de specifieke industriële branche 
waarop dit onderzoek zich richt; de petrochemie en de plaats die deze inneemt 
binnen de chemische sector. Voor een beter begrip van deze branche is het belang-
rijk een beeld te hebben van de drie verschillende generabes bedrijven die tesamen 
de productieketen van de chemische sector vormen: de centrale kraakinstallatie die 
de nafta omvormt tot ethyleen, de downstream bedrijven die de ethyleen verwerken 
tot onder andere pvc, polyethyleen en estyreen, en de bedrijven die verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor de eindproducten van de chemische industrie zoals de plastic-, kunstmest-
en rubberbedrijven. 
Wanneer vraag- en aanbodcijfers van de Braziliaanse petrochemie voor de jaren 
zeventig en tachtig worden bekeken valt onmiddellijk de enorme toename van de 
productie op. Ook de export van petrochemische producten vertoont een spec-
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tacú lai re stijging. Terwijl in 1970 nog 22.000 ton pvc geïmporteerd wordt, bedraagt 
vijftien jaar later de export van hetzelfde product 34.000 ton per jaar. 
In hoofdstuk vier is aandacht besteed aan de drie petrochemische complexen die 
in de zestiger en zeventiger jaren in Brazilië zijn opgezet. Eind zestiger jaren 
ontstonden in Sâo Paulo de eerste petrochemische bedrijven, in eerste instantie 
bestaande uit joint ventures tussen Amerikaanse bedrijven zoals National Destillers, 
Phillips Petroleum en Scientific Design en de nationale privé bedrijven Ultra en 
Unipar. Toen, als gevolg van financiële problemen, de nationale partners hun 
aandeel wensten te verkopen en een failliet van de petrochemische bedrijven 
onafwendbaar leek, besloot de staatstechnocratie in te grijpen. Petroquisa, een 
speciaal daartoe gecreëerde dochteronderneming van de staatsoliemaatschappij 
Petrobras, kocht een deel van de aandelen van de bedreigde bedrijven en werd de 
derde partner in de aldus ontstane tripartite joint ventures. 
Gestimuleerd door het succes van deze eigendomsstructuur, die voordelen leek te 
bieden aan alle partijen, besloot de overheid dit concept toe te passen in twee nieuw 
te stichten petrochemische complexen. De met dit beleid beoogde doelstellingen 
waren: importsubstitutie van petrochemische producten, vergroting van de groep 
nationale petrochemische ondernemers, ontwikkeling van technologische kennis en 
de regionale ontwikkeling van relatief weinig geïndustrialiseerde regio's. In 1979 
startte het Camaçari complex in het noordoosten van Brazilië in de staat Bahia en 
enkele jaren later kreeg ook het zuiden van het land een eigen petrochemisch 
complex, de Polosul, in de staat Rio Grande do Sul. 
In beide complexen speelde het concept van de triple alliantie een grote rol. In 
Camaçari bestonden alle 10 downstream bedrijven die in 1979 waren gesticht uit 
joint ventures tussen nationaal privé-, staats- en buitenlands kapitaal en in de 
Polosul startten in 1982 vijf tripartite joint ventures. Het aantal verschillende 
buitenlandse petrochemie bedrijven dat participeert in de Camaçari bedrijven is 
aanzienlijk. In 1979 waren veertien verschillende multinationale bedrijven aanwezig, 
afkomstig uit zowel de VS, Europa als Japan. In 1989 waren dit er vijfentwintig. 
Ook het aantal nationale privé-bedrijven dat in het Camaçari complex is te vinden is 
aanzienlijk. Naast bedrijven die afkomstig zijn uit de olie- of plastic sector, inves-
teerde ook een aantal branche-vreemde bedrijven in de petrochemie. Het over-
heidsbeleid om een groter aantal nationale ondernemers te betrekken bij de petro-
chemie resulteerde in investeringen van financiële conglomeraten als Banco Economi-
co en Grupo Mariani en constructiebedrijven als Grupo Odebrecht. De staat 
participeert in het Camaçari complex met haar staatsbedrijf Petroquisa en door 
middel van de nationale ontwikkelingsbank BNDES. 
Het Camaçari complex 
Binnen de Braziliaanse economie noemt het Camaçari complex een belangrijke plaats 
in; meer dan de helft van de Braziliaanse petrochemie productie vindt hier plaats. 
Daarom is voor dit complex gekozen voor het uitvoeren van het onderzoek naar de 
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bijdrage van de buitenlandse bedrijven aan de triple alliantie. In totaal zijn er in de 
tien jaar dat dit complex bestaat ongeveer 50 bedrijven gesticht waarvan de helft tot 
de petrochemische sector behoort. De andere helft bestaat uit fijne chemie-, plastic 
transformatie- en kunstmestbedrijven. 
Naast een bedrijfsenquête in alle 43 chemische bedrijven zijn diepte-interviews 
afgenomen met vertegenwoordigers van de drie partners die deelnemen in het 
tripartite model: de staatstechnocratie, de verschillende buitenlandse bedrijven en de 
nationale privépartners. In hoofdstuk vijf worden de gegevens, verkregen uit de 
bedrijfsenquête, weergegeven. Uit de cijfers blijkt dat de winstgevendheid van de 
kapitaalsintensieve petrochemiebedrijven op het Camaçari complex hoger is dan het 
landelijk gemiddelde. De plastic- en fijne-chemiebedrijven laten een heel ander beeld 
zien. De eerste categorie behoort tot de arbeidsintensievere bedrijven en hun 
winstgevendheid is laag te noemen. De fijne chemiebedrijven daarentegen zijn erg 
arbeidsextensief maar hebben een hoge winstgevendheidsindex. 
Een belangrijk kenmerk van de bedrijven in Camaçari is natuurlijk de eigen-
domsstructuur en, daaraan gerelateerd, de herkomst van de investeringen. De niet-
preferente aandelen in de tripartite bedrijven zijn over het algemeen gelijkelijk 
verdeeld tussen de drie aandeelhouders: de Staatspartner bezit 33.3%, de buiten-
landse partner(s) 33.3% en de nationale partner(s) 33,3%. Het grootste deel van het 
geïnvesteerd vermogen van de bedrijven is echter afkomstig uit de staatskas, hetzij 
via directe participatie van de staatsondernemingen Petroquisa of BNDES, hetzij 
indirect via subsidieregelingen, investeringen in infrastructuur, of het over-
heidsprogramma FINOR. De buitenlandse ondernemingen hebben slechts in geringe 
mate bijgedragen aan de financiële investeringen; zij participeerden voornamelijk met 
technologie. Ook de nationale privé-bedrijven droegen weinig bij aan het financiële 
kapitaal. De eigendomsstructuur die op deze manier is ontstaan is daardoor niet 
zozeer een directe afspiegeling van de investeringsbijdrage maar veeleer het gevolg 
van een overeenkomst tussen de verschillende partners om de niet-preferente 
aandelen gelijkelijk te verdelen. Het gevolg was dat sommige multinationale 
ondernemingen met een bijdrage van slechts 2% in het financiële kapitaal, 33% van 
het aandelenkapitaal verkregen. 
In 1989 telde het complex van Camaçari 11 tripartite joint ventures. Het aantal 
bipartite joint ventures -met twee verschillende typen kapitaal- bedroeg in dat jaar 
13. Tevens waren er in het Camaçari complex acht bedrijven 100% dochter van een 
transnationale onderneming en 17 in 100% nationaal eigendom. Eén bedrijf was 
geheel in handen van de overheid via het staatsbedrijf Petroquisa. 
De beslissing om het complex van Camaçari te vestigen in een regio met een 
geringe industrialisatiegraad die bovendien veraf ligt van de belangrijkste markten 
in het land, had voornamelijk tot doel regionale ontwikkeling te stimuleren. De 
overheid -en dan vooral de deelstaatsoverheid van Bahia- ging er vanuit dat een 
petrochemische industrie, met zijn sterke forward en backward linkages, een stimu-
lans zou betekenen voor de regionale ontwikkeling van Bahia. Maar tien jaar na 
haar start kan het complex slechts worden beschouwd als een rijke, moderne 
enclave in een nog immer perifere regio. De invloed van het complex op de 
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regionale ontwikkeling van Bahia is gering: de kapitaalsintensieve en arbeidsexten-
sieve petrochemische bedrijven blijken vooral linkages te hebben met het industriële 
zuiden van Brazilië en genereren weinig directe werkgelegenheid terwijl verdere 
industrialisatie ook niet wordt bevorderd. De impuls voor technologische ontwikkel-
ing is gering te noemen omdat het merendeel van de bedrijven zijn onderzoek 
uitbesteed aan R&D centra die zich bevinden in westerse landen of in het in-
dustriële zuiden van Brazilië. Een positieve factor voor regionale ontwikkeling zou 
de hogere belastingopbrengst in de staat Bahia kunnen zijn, ware het niet dat deze 
grotendeels moet worden aangewend om enerzijds de infrastructuur binnen het 
complex op peil te houden en anderzijds de problemen die zijn ontstaan als gevolg 
van de komst van het complex -zoals milieuvervuiling- op te lossen. 
Joint venture stabiliteit en technologie overdracht 
Wat betreft haar invloed op de Braziliaanse economie, lijkt het Camaçari complex 
een groot succes te zijn: Brazilië is in enkele decennia veranderd van een land dat 
het grootste deel van zijn petrochemische producten moest importeren in een 
petrochemisch exporterend land. Een interessante vraag is echter welke bijdrage het 
tripartite model leverde aan het succes van het Camaçari complex. In hoofstuk zes 
wordt het functioneren van het model uiteengezet waarbij de stabiliteit van de joint 
ventures en de invloed van het tripartite model op de technologietransfer voorop 
staan. 
Wanneer de verandering in eigendomsstructuur van de Camaçari bedrijven 
bekeken wordt, valt de grote instabiliteit van de joint ventures op. Van alle 50 
bedrijven op het complex veranderde 64% in de loop van de tijd van aandeel-
houdersstructuur. Nog opvallender is dat 38% van eigendomsstructuur veranderde, 
wat inhoudt dat één of meerdere aandeelhouders alle aandelen aan een ander type 
bedrijf verkochten. Vooral de tripartite joint ventures bleken zeer instabiel te zijn en 
maakten allen een verandering in aandeelhoudersstructuur door. Voor een groot 
aantal bedrijven betekende deze verandering echter tevens een wijziging in de 
eigendomsstructuur; ze veranderden bijvoorbeeld van een tripartite joint venture in 
een bipartite joint venture of in een bedrijf met slechts één aandeelhouder. Behalve 
uit het feit dat de tripartite joint ventures het meest instabiel bleken, is ook de 
populariteit van joint ventures afgenomen, want nieuwe bedrijven, die in de tien 
jaar dat het Camaçari complex functioneerde opgericht werden, bleken meestal niet 
te bestaan uit tripartite of bipartite joint ventures. Sinds de start van het complex 
nam daardoor het aantal joint ventures relatief gezien af van 63% naar 48% en nam 
het aantal bedrijven in 100% eigendom toe van 33% naar 50%. 
Er zijn verschillende redenen voor de dalende populariteit van joint ventures. Ten 
eerste is dat de aanwezigheid van branche-vreemde nationale bedrijven in de 
Camaçari joint ventures. Verscheidene van deze nationale ondernemers waren niet 
voorbereid op de enorme kapitaalsinvesteringen die de petrochemische industrie 
vergt en moesten noodgedwongen na enkele jaren hun aandeel verkopen. 
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Een tweede oorzaak is het gedrag van de buitenlandse partner. In enkele bedrij-
ven onstonden conflicten over onvolledige technologie transfer die het buitenlands 
bedrijf deden besluiten te vertrekken. In andere joint venutures gaf het buitenlandse 
bedrijf er de voorkeur aan om elders een nieuwe buitenlandse dochteronderneming 
in 100% eigendom te beginnen. 
Wanneer deze veranderingen in aandeelhoudersstructuur of eigendomsstuctuur 
gerelateerd worden aan de herkomst van de buitenlandse partner, blijkt dat joint 
ventures met Japanse bedrijven stabieler zijn dan joint ventures met Amerikaanse of 
Europese partners. De joint ventures, waarvan de eigendoms- of aandeel-
houdersstructuur veranderde, hadden in de meeste gevallen een Europese of een 
Amerikaanse partner. Japanse bedrijven daarentegen bleken zeer stabiele tripartite 
joint venture partners te zijn. De drie Japanse multinationals die, vanaf de start van 
het complex, in zeven tripartite joint ventures deelnamen (Mitsubishi, Sumitomo en 
Idemitsu) participeerden in 1989 nog steeds in nagenoeg dezelfde bedrijven. Van de 
Amerikaanse bedrijven besloten drie bedrijven het complex te verlaten en drie 
nieuwe VS bedrijven kochten aandelen in (andere) bedrijven op het complex. De 
Europese multinationals laten een nog fluctuerender beeld zien, vier van hen 
desinvesteerden terwijl een ander juist startte in een tripartite joint venture. 
De bijdrage van het tripartite model aan de ontwikkeling van de Braziliaanse 
petrochemie kan ook beoordeeld worden aan de hand van de technologie transfer in 
deze sector. Verscheidene Braziliaanse onderzoekers zoals Teixeira, Amilcar en 
Neves da Rocha zijn van mening dat tripartite joint ventures uitstekende condities 
scheppen voor een transfer van petrochemische technologie van de buitenlandse 
partner naar de nationale partner. Immers, alle partijen zijn er bij gebaat dat de joint 
venture waarin zij participeren over geavanceerde technologie beschikt die goed 
geabsorbeerd is in het bedrijf. Nadere beschouwing van de technologie transfer in 
de Camaçari bedrijven leert dat dit positieve beeld enigszins genuanceerd dient te 
worden. Globaal kunnen drie fasen in technologie transfer onderscheiden worden: 
de aankoop van nieuwe technologie, de absorptie van technologie in het produc-
tieproces in het betreffende bedrijf en het verder ontwikkelen van de betreffende 
technologie door middel van innovaties. Wanneer deze drie fasen alle drie door-
lopen zijn, is er sprake van een succesvolle technologie transfer. Voor de eerste fase 
geldt dat de Camaçari bedrijven niet altijd de meest recente technologie hebben 
weten te verkrijgen. Een aantal bedrijven heeft daarom second-best technologie 
aangeschaft. Deels was deze keus ingegeven door de prijs van de technologie, deels 
bleek het ook niet mogelijk om bedrijven die de beste technologie bezaten ertoe te 
bewegen te participereren op basis van een minderheidsaandeel in een joint venture. 
De tweede fase van technolgie transfer is redelijk succesvol verlopen voor de 
Camaçari bedrijven. Ondanks dat veel managers claimen problemen te hebben met 
bijvoorbeeld restrictieve technologie-contracten, blijkt dat absorptie en debottleneck-
ing in de meeste gevallen heeft plaatsgevonden. 
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Voor de laatste fase geldt echter dat de technologische ontwikkeling in de 
Camaçari bedrijven beperkt is gebleven. Om innovaties te kunnen doorvoeren is het 
noodzakelijk dat in bepaalde mate onderzoek wordt verricht in het bedrijf zelf. In 
Camaçari zijn slechts weinig bedrijven te vinden die over een eigen onder-
zoekscentrum beschikken. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat de meerderheid van de bedrijven 
op het Camaçari complex, wanneer zij het productievolume willen uitbreiden, 
afhankelijk is van extem verworven technologie. De technologische ontwikkeling in 
het petrochemie productieproces gaan relatief snel en een verouderd technologisch 
proces tast de competitiviteit van de productie aan. Het feit dat veel Camaçari 
bedrijven hun productie willen diversifiëren vergroot eveneens de afhankelijkheid 
van externe technologieleveranciers. 
Voor deze onvolledige technologische ontwikkeling zijn verschillende redenen aan 
te wijzen die voor een deel samenhangen met het tripartite model en de manier 
waarop dit model is geïmplementeerd. Allereerst is dat het beleid van de Braziliaan-
se overheid. De doelstelling om het aantal nationale ondernemers in de petrochemi-
sche branche te vergroten heeft ertoe geleid dat in deze branche vele, kleine, mono-
producerende bedrijven gevonden worden. Daarbij komt dat in een relatief groot 
aantal joint ventures een nationaal bedrijf participeert dat afkomstig is uit een 
branche-vreemde sector en daardoor weinig tot geen kennis bezit van het petroche-
mische productieproces. Het eerste bezwaar dat kan worden aangevoerd tegen dit 
beleid is dat voor een efficiënt R&D een bepaalde kritische massa vereist is die niet 
gerealiseerd kan worden door de te kleine Camaçari bedrijven. Het feit dat elk 
bedrijf slechts één of enkele producten produceert maakt dat er slechts één soort 
technologie in het bedrijf is, hetgeen R&D gericht op productdiversificatie moeilijk 
maakt. Een ander bezwaar is dat nationale ondernemers, die afkomstig zijn uit de 
financiële en constructiesector, hun prioriteiten bij voorkeur leggen bij hun kernac-
tiviteiten en minder geneigd zijn in petrochemische R&D te investeren. 
Tenslotte kunnen buitenlandse ondernemingen de technologische ontwikkeling van 
de Camaçari bedrijven negatief beveïnvloeden. Allereerst hebben zij in de eerste fase 
van technologie transfer niet altijd de meest up-to-date technologie ingebracht. 
Vooral de grote Amerikaanse en Europese bedrijven waren niet geneigd te par-
ticiperen met hun technologie. Japanse bedrijven echter bleken hiermee minder 
moeite te hebben. Dit kan een reden zijn dat er relatief veel joint ventures met 
Japanse deelneming in het Camaçari complex zijn te vinden. Ten tweede werd 
technologie transfer bemoeilijkt doordat technologiecontracten beperkt van opzet 
waren. In contracten waren bijvoorbeeld clausules opgenomen die verdere R&D met 
deze technologie onmogelijk maakten. Hierin is niet veel verschil tussen Amerikaan-
se, Japanse en Europese multinationals te onderkennen. 
Het feit dat weinig R&D door de Camaçari bedrijven werd verricht terwijl de 
petrochemische proces-technologie allerlei technologische ontwikkelingen doormaakte, 
noodzaakte de meeste Camaçari bedrijven nieuwe technologie aan te kopen. Maar 
juist de participatie van een buitenlandse multinational in de tripartite of bipartite 
joint ventures kan hiervoor een barrière vormen. Moederbedrijven van participerende 
buitenlandse partners zullen proberen de joint venture hun technologie te verkopen, 
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zelfs als deze technologie niet de meest geschikte, de meest up-to-date of de 
goedkoopste is. Beschikt het moederbedrijf echter niet over de benodigde tech-
nologie, dan moet extern technologie aangekocht worden. Er zullen echter weinig 
multinationals geneigd zijn hun up-to-date technologie te verkopen aan een joint 
venture waarin een ander buitenlands bedrijf participeert of zelfs in geparticipeerd 
heeft. Joint ventures waarin Japanse bedrijven participeren blijken sneller extern 
technologie aan te kopen dan Amerikaanse en Europese joint ventures die vaker 
opnieuw bij het moederbedrijf aankloppen. Dit is vooral het gevolg van de relatief 
geringere technologische kennis van de Japanese petrochemie multinationals. Door 
hun langere ervaring met petrochemieproductie, bezitten Amerikaanse en Europese 
bedrijven relatief meer technologische kennis en zijn zij in staat de joint venture te 
dwingen hun technologie aan te kopen. 
Invloed van herkomst van het buitenlands bedrijf 
Het blijkt dat tripartite joint ventures niet in alle opzichten even succesvol zijn. Het 
onderscheid dat gemaakt dient te worden tussen joint ventures met Japanse 
participatie en joint ventures met Europese of Amerikaanse participatie wat het 
succes van de tripartite joint venture betreft, wordt in hoofstuk zeven nader 
uitgewerkt. 
Allereerst verschilt het investeringsproces in bedrijven van verschillende nationali-
teit. Terwijl Amerikaanse en Europese bedrijven reeds een lange investeringstraditie 
bezitten in Latijns Amerika in het algemeen en in Brazilië in het bijzonder, zijn 
Japanse multinationals pas in de zestiger en zeventiger jaren gestart met investering-
en in dit land. 
Voorts bestonden er lange tijd grote verschillen in sectorale concentratie van de 
buitenlandse investeringen. Japanse bedrijven concentreerden hun investeringen in 
Brazilië in meer traditionele industriële sectoren zoals de textiel- en de zware 
machine-industrie terwijl Amerikaanse en Europese investeringen meer gericht waren 
op de geavanceerdere industriële sectoren zoals de chemie, electrónica en autopro-
ductie. 
Tenslotte is er een verschil wat betreft de kennis van petrochemische procestech-
nologie, die, doordat Japan pas recent is gaan investeren in deze sector, relatief 
gering is. Als gevolg hiervan hebben Japanse multinationals minder kennis van het 
investeringsklimaat in Brazilië waardoor ze voorzichtig opereren in de Westers 
gedomineerde petrochemische sector in dit land. Hun bereidheid om op minder-
heidsbasis te participeren in bi- of tripartite joint ventures met nationale en staastbc-
drijven wordt hierdoor vergroot. Dit in tegenstelling tot Amerikaanse en Europese 
bedrijven, die slechts zullen overgaan tot deelname met minderheidsaandelen in een 
bi- of tripartite joint venture wanneer er reglementair gezien geen andere mogelijk-
heid is om te investeren in een lucratieve industriële sector als de petrochemie. 
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Zoals het voorbeeld van de Braziliaanse petrochemische industrie aantoont, zijn deze 
laatste joint ventures niet de meest stabiele eigendomsstructuren. 
Ook op bedrijfs-niveau blijkt het verschil in stabiliteit tussen joint ventures met 
Japanse bedrijven en joint ventures met Europese en Amerikaanse multinationals. 
Ten eerste staan Japanse bedrijven positiever ten opzichte van participatie in joint 
ventures vergeleken met Amerikaanse en Europese bedrijven. Bovendien wordt 
participatie van staatsbedrijven in joint ventures door Japanners als positief ervaren. 
Ook deze factoren blijken een gunstig effect te hebben op de stabiliteit van joint 
ventures in Camaçari. 
Een tweede onderscheid doet zich voor in de bedrijfs-organisatorische structuur. In 
joint ventures met Japanse participatie zijn in de meeste gevallen meerdere Japanse 
managers aanwezig die dan bovendien in een wat later stadium van hun bedrijfscar-
rière naar het buitenland gezonden worden. Ondanks het grotere aantal Japanse 
managers in de Camaçari bedrijven wordt hun invloed op de directe bedrijfsvoering 
door de nationale managers als minder dominant ervaren dan de invloed van 
Amerikaanse of Europese mangers die meestal in een eerder stadium van hun 
carrière uitgezonden worden. 
Een derde verschil tussen de participerende multinationals in Camaçari is de 
bedrijfscultuur. Japanse multinationals kenmerken zich door een andere beslissings-
en onderhandelingsstructuur dan Amerikaanse en in wat mindere mate, Europese 
bedrijven. Terwijl vooral Amerikaanse bedrijven een korte termijn planning hebben 
en snel beslissingen nemen waarbij een klein aantal managers betrokken is, streven 
Japanse bedrijven naar een langere termijn planning waardoor onderhandelingen 
langduriger van aard zijn. Daarbij lopen Japanse onderhandelingen veelal over een 
groot aantal schijven en is er een groot aantal managers bij betrokken. Het resultaat 
van deze onderhandelingsstructuur is dat het Japanse bedrijf anticipeert op even-
tuele problemen hetgeen stabielere joint ventures kan opleveren. 
Conclusie 
In het slothoofdstuk wordt het empirisch onderzoek dat uitgevoerd is in het 
petrochemisch complex van Camaçari gerelateerd aan de theorie van dependent 
development zoals deze door Evans is toegepast in Brazilië. Uit het onderzoek blijkt 
dat de verschillen die te onderkennen zijn tussen de multinationals in Camaçari, op 
zowel macro-economisch gebied als op bedrijfs-organisatorisch terrein, invloed 
uitoefenen op de rol die deze buitenlandse bedrijven spelen in het tripartite model. 
De stabiliteit van het tripartite model is groter in het geval van Japanse participatie 
in joint ventures dan in het geval van Amerikaanse of Europese participatie. 
Doordat instabiliteit van joint ventures een negatieve uitwerking heeft op de 
ontwikkeling van een industriële sector, wordt nationale kapitaalsaccumulatie 
hierdoor negatief beïnvloed. 
Op basis van zijn onderzoek signaleert Evans een aantal factoren die bedreigend 
zouden kunnen zijn voor het succes van de strategie van de triple alliantie voor 
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dependent development. Het gedrag van de buitenlandse partner in de alliantie ziet 
hij echter niet direct als destabiliserende factor. Door buitenlandse investeerders in 
Brazilië, die afkomstig zijn uit verschillende herkomst gebieden, als een homogene 
groep te beschouwen en te veronderstellen dat zij een overeenkomstig gedrag 
vertonen, gaat Evans naar mijn mening voorbij aan het specifieke karakter van 
multinationale bedrijven zoals dat wordt bepaald door hun herkomst. De toenemen-
de internationalisatie van productie heeft ertoe geleid dat het patroon van buiten-
landse investeringen in Derde-Wereldlanden een zeer divers karakter is gaan 
vertonen. Een analyse van de effecten van buitenlandse investeringen op industriële 
ontwikkeling in Derde-Wereldlanden is daarom onvolledig wanneer geen aandacht 
wordt besteed aan de invloed die de herkomst van de buitenlandse investeerder 
hierop kan uitoefenen. Het is noodzakelijk dat de dependent development theorie 
aangevuld wordt met bevindingen afkomstig uit de intemationaliseringstheorieën. De 
resultaten van het onderzoek van Kojima kunnen hiertoe gebruikt worden, evenals 
de bevindingen van onder meer Beamish, Kogut en Dunning. De theorie van 
dependent development, waarin industriële groei in de periferie verklaard wordt 
met de strategie van de triple alliantie, kan een bijdrage leveren aan de analyse van 
internationaliserings-processen in de Derde Wereld, mits aandacht wordt besteed aan 
het belang van herkomst van buitenlandse bedrijven. 
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STELLINGEN 
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Shaping Brazil's petrochemical industry, the importance of 
foreign firm origin in tripartite joint ventures 
t. 
Onderzoek naar de invloed van buitenlandse investeringen op het induslriali-
salieproces in Derde-Wereldlanden кал niet voorbij gaan aan hel belang van 
de herkomst van deze buitenlandse bedrijven. 
2. 
Het feil dat Japanse bedrijven in de Bra/ilinanse petrochemische industrie 
positiever denken over participatie in joint ventures en sneller geneigd /ijn 
genoegen te nemen met een minderheidsaandeel zal een tijdelijk fenomeen 
zijn; op hel moment dat hun onderhandelingspositie verbetert zullen zij een 
grotere invloed opeisen. 
3. 
Industriële differentiatie waarbij de meer traditionele petrochemische 
branche wordt gcrcscrvccid voor de nationale indiistriclc bourgeoisie en de 
gcavancccrdc fijne chemie branche wordt beheerst door buitenlandse 
ondernemingen, vergroot de afhankelijkheid van Derde-Wereldlanden van 
het Westen. 
4. 
De ontwikkeling van het petrochemisch complex van Camaçari in Brazilië 
is een voorbeeld bij uitstek van een Industrialisatie strategie die niet de 
beoogde regionale ontwikkeling op gang heeft gebracht. Hierdoor blijft dat 
deel van de bevolking dat van de positieve spill-over effecten zou moeten 
profiteren -de groep landloze, werkloze inwoners van het Noord-oosten van 
Brazilië- buiten spel staan. 
5. 
Het voorbeeld van een Braziliaans chemisch bedrijf dal de productie van de 
pharmacculische grondstof 'acrylic acid" slechts 1er hand kon nemen door 
middel van een geoorloofde bcdrijfsspionage in Mexico, toont aan dat 
productdiversificatie in de richting van de fijne chemie slechts bereikt kan 
worden met behulp van verouderde technologie. Het is daarom de vraag of 
het niet doeltreffender is de productie van aspirines en andere fijne chemie 
producten over te laten aan buitenlandse bedrijven en de daardoor onslane 
afhankelijkheid van deze bedrijven voor lief te nemen. 
6. 
Met felt dit ее llhAnlteltjIcshcldttheone voor de metste onderroelten die 
rieh be*l| houden met onMtcltellngsMiidieS nU Ъті Ьт concept heeft 
»fgedAftn Impllctett niel ooit MUomillich dat het geen bniiltbm« componen­
ten яні bevlHcn. 
7. 
baar reall.iÉlle van het (ripartile model In de petrochemische Induilrle In 
BrvitlS In hoge triste alhinltelijV was van de beschlltbaarhcld van 
oliedollars en de aftnwerigheld van een militaire dictatuur. Is herhaling vta 
dit tmxkl In endere ontwikkelingslanden niet mogelijk en niet wenselijk. 
8. 
liet succia van de Internationale ori&italle vtn hel moderne Japan kan niet 
beter wotdert getllustreerd dan mei een Ьетоек aan het Mttsie tfOriay In 
t'ari)* Wear de locllchllngeit Ы) de lentoongeslelde weilten niet alteen In het 
frtns en Ëftgelj, miW levens In het Japans zijn opgesteld. 
9. 
bc huidige hongennood In Afrika dreigt opnlctrw de stelling van loglstlrl 
Ie ondcrslnfcn dat Voedsclhttlp altijd Ie laat komt en daarna altijd Ie lang 
blijft voortduren. ' 
10. 
deHcrt hel leboe dat nog steeds rust op het gebruik van het herenlollet door 
vrotiwcn. verdient het aanbeveling om In bioscopen, theatert en congresem-
tra de helft van het lantal hcnptoileHen om te bouwen lot damestoiletten 
ten einde de patire en wandelgangen Hftdínter it ktmnen benutten. 
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During the Brazilian miracle (1967-1973), Brazil experienced 
impressive growth in GNP which exceeded 10% annually. One of the 
factors responsible for this was the existence of a triple alliance 
among the strong state bureaucracy, the influential national private 
bourgeoisie and the large number of foreign investors. The central 
question of this book is to what extent has industrial development in 
Brazil been influenced by the triple alliance in general, and tripartite 
joint ventures in particular during the '70s and '80s. Special attention 
will be given to the role of foreign transnationale. 
Using the petrochemical industry in Brazil as an example, Japanese, 
American and European participation in tripartite joint ventures is 
compared, focussing on two aspects: the stability of joint ventures 
structures in the tripartite model and the transfer of technology. This 
case study of the petrochemical complex of Camaçari, located in the 
state of Bahia, shows that foreign firm origin plays a decisive role in 
the functioning of the tripartite model. Joint ventures with Japanese 
companies, which had arrived more recently in Brazil, lacked 
technological knowledge of petrochemical production, had a different 
corporate culture, and were more stable than those with American 
and European companies. 
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